Solomon Monk, A/K/A David L. Martin v. Secretary of the Navy

Next, argues that the amount of Lewis prej- demonstrates that the MONK, jury award Solomon a/k/a outweighed evidence

udicial effect of the David L. Martin jury found Officer probative its value: $7,500 Brown liable but awarded NAVY, Appellant. SECRETARY OF ex- damages, although Lewis’ medical No. 84-5874. $24,000. jurors, penses alone exceeded Lewis, reluc- according to must have been Appeals, Court and fair be- tant to award full District of Columbia Circuit. against drug users who cause of a bias Argued Jan. 1986. Another repeatedly arrested. have been Decided June 1986. explanation, would also account jury may limited award: for the shooting for the

found Brown liable not but rough treatment of Lewis after for his explanation, shooting.1 Under this

jurors used the contested evidence rather,

prejudicial way; they awarded com-

plete, approximated, for the albeit

particular they for which found conduct

Brown liable. Lewis has not made a showing judge that the trial

clear abused proba- ruled that the

his discretion when he of the evidence was not substan-

tive value outweighed by danger preju-

tially

dicing, confusing, misleading jury. stated,

For the reasons we hold that the lawfully

district court acted and within the ruling prior

bounds of its discretion in

drug use and arrest evidence admissible.

Accordingly, decision of the district limine, judg- on the motion in and the verdict, jury’s

ment on the entered are Mikva, Judge, concurring filed Affirmed. opinion. him, determining injuries.

1. Lewis testified that after Brown shot without the nature of his him, him, interrogated Brown searched hand- See Tr. I him, lying ground cuffed and left him on the

Opinion for the Court filed Circuit Judge BORK.

Concurring opinion filed Circuit Judge MIKVA.

BORK, Judge: Circuit Defendant Secretary of Navy appeals an order of the district court denying his motion to dismiss and his motion for sum- mary judgment granting plaintiff and Monk’s motion for summary judgment. Because the district jurisdic- court lacked action, tion over Monk’s we reverse and remand this case to the district court with grant instructions to the Secretary’s mo- tion to dismiss.

I. Monk, Appellee, was a corporal in the Corps United States Marine serving on ac- duty Pendleton, at Camp California. In February, charged Monk was with wife, murdering his a violation of article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Jus- tice, (1982). Monk was general tried before a court-martial and found guilty May on 1978. He was dishonorably sentenced to be discharged service, from the to forfeit all and allowances, and to be confined at hard la- thirty years. bor for Monk’s conviction and sentence were af- firmed the Navy both Court of Military Review, Martin, see United States v. (N.C.M.R.1979), M.J. 731 and the United Stuart H. Newberger, Asst. Atty., Military Appeals, States Court of see Unit- with Joseph diGenova, whom E. U.S. Atty., Martin, (C.M.A. ed States v. 13 M.J. 66 Royce C. Lamberth and Craig Lawrence, R. 1982). petitioned Monk the Naval Clemen- Attys., Asst. U.S. Washington, D.C., were cy and Parole Board clemency for and res- brief, appellant. for John H.E. Bagly, duty. toration to requests These were de- Jr., Atty., Asst. U.S. Washington, D.C., nied. Monk has exhausted his available also entered appearance, appellant. military and administrative remedies and Stephen Armstrong, Fairfax, A. Va., remains incarcerated at the United appellee. Barracks, Disciplinary Leavenworth, Fort

Kansas. Before BORK, MIKVA and June Monk filed suit the Unit- Judges, ed GREENE,* States District Court for and the District of Judge, District his conviction on var- States District Court for the Dis grounds. ious constitutional prayed Monk trict of Columbia. * 292(a). Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. “simply sought (1) he to have his conviction declare his convic-

that the district seek, void, (2) He did not nor did the direct invalidated. illegal and and sentence tion grant, district court immediate release annul his con- Secretary and to vacate custody.” Brief for at 10. sentence, (3) direct Secre- viction general an honorable tary to agree with the discharge, direct peti must construed as a Monk’s action allowances to pay and pay him all back corpus. It is tion for a writ of habeas entitled but for have been which he would requested not immaterial that Monk has (“J.A.”) Appendix Joint his conviction. See If Monk receives the immediate release. at 8-9. declaratory judgment requested relief —a dismiss on the Secretary moved to invalid and an order that the conviction is jurisdic- directing Secretary court was without to vacate and annul ground that the Secretary argued that Monk’s his conviction and sentence—the additional tion. was, effect, of petition a for a writ or a new action relief of immediate release trial jurisdictional since, subject to the corpus automatically follow a sec would requirements corpus, of the federal for a writ of habeas ond action judicata court denied the mo- prior judgment The district would have res ef statute. tion, holding could “seek civilian adopting that Monk fect. the federal habeas cor cor- scope Congress of a habeas ha pus review outside determined that v. rem pus action.” Monk beas is the federal of 83-1853, mem.op. at Action No. that he is “in Navy, edy Civ. who claims 5, 1984), (D.D.C. at 14. In the 4 J.A. Oct. violation of the Constitution ... alternative, States,” held that even if the the court petition 2241(c)(3)(1982). a for habeas specific is viewed as This determi since general must override the terms of nation custodian,” ques declaratory judgment Monk’s “ultimate and federal the District of Navy, Rodriguez, was within v. tion statutes. Preiser Cf. 1827, 1836, J.A. at 14-16. 36 Columbia. See 411 U.S. 93 S.Ct. (1973) (habeas questions: whether over We consider two 439 L.Ed.2d petition treated as a general Monk’s action must be of section 1983 and rides the terms so, and, remedy whether the for for habeas the exclusive federal seeking speed asserted prisoners district immediate state custody).

ier release from II. also Monk stresses that dam- pay, equivalent back brought challenge, alleging this 1331, is not available in ages, and that this relief jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ corpus proceeding. Brief for (1982), general question and a habeas Preiser, 411 at (citing at 10 U.S. provisions. The Sec- declaratory judgment true, 493, 1838). Though below, at argues, he that Monk’s 93 S.Ct. retary as did conclusion way in no alters our petition must treated as a observation collaterally attack his con- corpus. “Appellee has that Monk must a writ of habeas viction, all, if at in an action for habeas attempted a collateral actually to mount requirement may not avoid the He on his court-martial conviction” attack corpus by add- proceed by habeas specific request to that he “[ajlthough there is confinement, may not be request for relief it is clear be released Any directly made in a this ultimate relief must flow may have is pay that Monk declaratory sought in this claim for back from the relief upon validity of his entirely dependent Appellant Brief for at 5. Monk case.” underlying If Monk successful- corpus is the ex- conviction. that habeas contends by petitioning collaterally ly challenges his conviction may he clusive means which corpus, his recourse argument is that attack his conviction. His separate damages, Rights to initiate a under the Civil Act in federal the determination any requirement one which of the inval- court without prior idity underlying conviction will be exhaustion of state remedies. judicata. res 494, at 93 S.Ct. at 1838 original). analysis entirely Our consistent with Rodriguez, Preiser 411 U.S. v. S.Ct. dispositive This distinction was in Wolff (1973), 36 L.Ed.2d 439 v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 94 S.Ct. Wolff McDonnell, (1974), a similar case decid- (1974). Preiser, L.Ed.2d 935 state prisoners ed the next term. In Wolff, state oners, deprived good-conduct-time cred- brought seeking a section 1983 action pursuant disciplinary proceedings, its good-time restoration of credits cancelled an action under U.S.C. 1983 allegedly pro- unconstitutional (1982) against Depart- the New York State (2) damages cedures and resulting from the prison- ment of The Correctional Services. procedures. use of such Supreme challenge validity ers did not of their Court held that Preiser makes restoration Rather, underlying convictions. their claim good-time credits available in an disciplinary proceedings was that the failed corpus and thus una- process afford due them of law. The here, vailable preclude but that it does not they sought compelling relief was an order in this case either declaratory judgment “a credits, which, grant- if restoration of the predicate as a damages to a award” or “an ed, in would have resulted their immediate proper injunction otherwise enjoining the prison. release from Under these circum- prospective enforcement prison of invalid stances, challenge the Court reviewed the regulations.” See S.Ct. at falling squarely as “within the core of ha- disposition 2974. This entirely is consistent corpus,” 411 beas U.S. at 93 S.Ct. at with Preiser. Relief other than restoration prisoner held “when a state prisoner’s of credits would not result challenging very is fact or duration of speedier prison immediate or release from physical imprisonment, his and the any way validity or undermine the relief he seeks is a determination that he is Thus, underlying conviction. under Preis- speedi- entitled to immediate release or a er, provisions implicat- the habeas were not imprisonment, er release his ed. remedy sole federal is a writ of habeas request That included a for back corpus.” (em- Id. at S.Ct. at 1841 any way in his not in does added). phasis alter our conclusion that his expressly Preiser Court limited its his conviction must be treated as a holding request- to cases in which the relief Preiser did prisoner’s ed would result in the immedi- premise not alter the that habeas is ate, speedy, prison. or more release from prisoner’s exclusive method for collateral- distinguish the Court was careful to ly attacking of his conviction damages resulting claims for from similar to which he is incarcerated. post-conviction action: Rather, Preiser considered a one prisoner seeking damages, step If a state is removed: whether habeas is attacking something prison- he is other than the also the exclusive method which confinement, length may challenge post-conviction fact or and he ers seeking something other than immedi- correctional officers where the relief re- speedy quested prisoner’s ate or release—the more tradi- would result in the im- purpose tional speedy the mediate or more release from claim, damages together, case of a on. Taken Preiser and es- Wolff prisoner challenges is not an or available federal tablish that when a ac- conviction, remedy. damages Accordingly, underlying ... a ac- tion other than his prisoner requested tion a state could be the nature of the relief deter- that, exclu- District of corpus is the mines whether habeas arguing contrary, prisoner If seeks to the remedy. sive federal “[t]he attempts to confuse with ven- equitable relief that will result retroactive release, original). ue. Id. speedy then in immediate or more remedy. habeas is the exclusive accept argument. cannot re States Parole Commis- See In provides “[wjrits The statute of habe- (D.C.Cir.1986) (pris- sion, F.2d corpus may granted by as the dis- ... parole eligibility determi- oner jur- their respective trict courts ... within is not restricted to habeas nation 2241(a) (1982). isdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § “a outcome would successful when Originally, language interpreted peri- or automatically terminate shorten proper only in to mean that confinement”). prisoner ifBut od of his the district which the was lo- prospective injunc- seeks cated, usually the district of incarceration. exclusive, relief, then habeas is not the Clark, Ahrens v. damages, an avail- in the case of even (1948). Subsequently, 92 L.Ed. 1898 able, remedy. Supreme Court has held that 2241(a) language requires

“the noth- issuing more than that the court prisoners both Monk and custodian,” over the writ sought damages, the nature of the Wolff “even himself is confined gave action that rise to their state jurisdiction.” outside the court’s territorial Wolff, the crucial distinction. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court prisoners sought damages the which result- of Kentucky, 410 U.S. allegedly ed from the state's use of uncon- (1973). Braden, In an procedures revoking good- in stitutional prisoner applied to a district court Alabama wholly indepen- time credits—state action Kentucky in for a writ of habeas prisoners’ of the Deter- dent convictions. prisoner validity The did not the (as mining validity procedures of the the a Rather, his Alabama conviction. he at- course, of predicate awarding damages), of to validity three-year-old a Ken- tacked the of implicate does not the of the contrast, tucky indictment which was the basis By oners’ convictions. Monk lodged against by Kentucky him detainer directly seeks that result first held that the officials. Court the fact of his conviction. order to custody” Kentucky “in in prisoner was requests, the Monk there- meaning the of fore, within the court must first determine the 2241(c)(3)by virtue of the interstate de- validity of Monk’s But this de- § conviction. 488-89, tainer. See 410 U.S. at 93 S.Ct. at termination, unlike the one involved in next held that since his Court might in Wolff, result Monk’s release from dispute Kentucky was with his “custodi- and, therefore, prison made in an must be ans,” jurisdiction proper in federal dis- was action for habeas Kentucky.

trict court in circum- 93 S.Ct. at 1129-32. “Under these III. purpose it would no useful stances serve argues Monk next that even if his require that apply the Ahrens rule and the petition a action must be characterized as action in Alabama.” Id. at a of the district for writ Braden, prisoner 93 S.Ct. at 1132. After juris court nevertheless exercised may apply for a writ of habeas jurisdiction diction. Monk claims that lies in the district where he is incarcerat- either judicial in district in which his the different, ed the district in which his located, in immediate custodian is but also custodian is located. the district where the “ultimate custodian” outset, at 11. As noted at the Monk is resides. See Brief Leavenworth, incarcerated at Fort Kansas application Monk asserts that is the any and his custodian commandant of on behalf of of its inmates.” (footnote omitted). facility. concedes that Id. at under Braden, brought this he could have action Meese, (D.C.Cir. Guerra v. 786 F.2d 414 court in the federal district Kansas 1986), term, just decided this applied the his custodian are where both he and locat- Sanders rule to a habeas filed in he is also free ed. His claim is that District of Columbia federal prison- bring the action challenging ers it his “ultimate custo- because is here that Parole Commission. the petition- dian,” Navy, resides.1 serving ers were sentences various fed- Nothing supports this Braden assertion prisons country, eral they around ar- pur- We hold that reject and we it. gued jurisdiction proper since the poses of the federal habeas Commission could be considered as their proper in the district in is purposes custodian for of Com- immediate, ultimate, which the not the cus- prevented mission action which their re- todian is located. rejected lease. The argument, this holding that “the warden of federal [the today Our decision controlled Sand- penal facility prisoner in which a is current- Bennett, (D.C.Cir.1945). F.2d 19 ers v. ly serving prisoner’s sentence] Sanders, prisoner, a federal confined meaning custodian within the of 28 U.S.C. Columbia, applied outside the District (1982).” 2241-43 Id. at 416. In reach- §§ to the district conclusion, ing this the court observed: court for the District Columbia. The appellees’ theory, “Under the Attorney jurisdic- district court for lack of dismissed General of the could be con- prisoner appeal, argued tion. On every sidered the custodian because he was in supervises because he General, Attorney “custody” Federal spe- Bureau of Prisons. We have official over whom district court had cifically rejected interpretation. Sand- Judge Arnold framed the Bennett, (D.C.Cir. ers v. F.2d a court in as “whether the District 1945).” (citation omitted). Id. & footnote Columbia has to issue a writ short, corpus against Attorney argument habeas the In Monk’s Gen- that the Sec- representa- retary eral of the or his can his be considered custodian for purposes tive on of a federal con- is no different Columbia,” Attorney fined outside the District of from the claim the id. that General is 19, prisoners. at and held it does the “[Ojnly that not. custodian of all In Sanders, claim, having jurisdiction rejected courts over the we the latter warden and of a penitentiary today reject can a writ of we the former.2 course, Navy bring 1. Of the is located available as a forum in which to Pentagon, Virginia, inapposite. Hayes at the is in which not the action and is therefore District of Columbia. Demjanjuk, Nor does In re 784 F.2d 1114 J., (D.C.Cir.1986) (Bork, chambers), provide parte 2. Monk’s citation of cases such as Ex position. any support Demjan- for Monk’s In 23, 1327, Hayes, 414 S.Ct. 94 38 L.Ed.2d 200 juk, petitioner the about to be was extradited to J., (1973) chambers), (Douglas, provides Israel of habeas and a writ in the support contrary Hayes, conclusion. Demjanjuk District of Columbia. was in the petition by Douglas Justice considered a a Unit- Marshal, of a United in a confi- Army private Germany ed States stationed in attorneys. dential location unknown even his application and held that in the very "appropriate, I found it in these limited and Columbia because absence of a circumstances, special Attorney to treat the Gen- forum where the and his custodian eral the of the United States as custodian.” Id. Bator, Mishkin, were P. P. located. Accord D. added). at 1116 No such circum- Wechsler, Shapiro & H. Hart & Wechsler’sThe present in this case stances are since Monk’s System Federal Federal n. Courts and the 359 52 kept location has never been confidential. Ac- (2d 1973). Meese, ed. concedes that the cord 786 F.2d 416 Guerra v. n. 1 States district court Kansas was at all times (D.C.Cir.1986). Demjanjuk: I stated in As 370 jurisdiction

IV. in part based on 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) that, therefore, and the federal § brief, reply In his jurisdiction circuit had exclusive over the light states that in Drasek v. Van Leh appeal 1295(a)(2). under 28 U.S.C. § man, (D.C.Cir.1985), “this 762 F.2d may jurisdiction present lack over complaint sought declaratory and Appellant appeal.” Reply Brief for at n. injunctive relief as well as “all back conclusion that the Given our district and allowances which he would have re- jurisdiction court was without to consider ceived, but did not receive because of [his] conviction, of Monk’s we dis prosecution and conviction.” J.A. at 9. agree. jurisdiction juris to decide specify, Monk did not we assume diction. $10,000 this claim exceeds since it Act, Improvement The Federal Courts 28 represents approximately eight years’ pay. 1295(a)(2)(1982),provides U.S.C. that the Doe Department v. United States Cf. Appeals for United States Court of Justice, (D.C.Cir.1985). 753 F.2d juris- Federal Circuit shall have exclusive argument, At oral attempt- Monk’s counsel appeals diction over from final decisions of any might ed to waive claim Monk have for a district court that court’s $10,000 in excess of thereby “in in part” was based whole or on the satisfy retroactively requirements Act, 1346(a)(2)(1982). Tucker 28 U.S.C. § jurisdiction in the district court based on Drasek, explained As we in Van the Tucker Act. Though we doubt that effective, for a claim in the district court attempt to be such an could be we need Act, (1) point because, case, based on Tucker it must seek not decide the in either (2) $10,000 (3) money exceeding from the district court lacked pay. United States and be founded award Monk back upon upon provi- either a contract or district court based its Constitution, any sion of “the or Act of (1982), gen- on 28 U.S.C. §§ Congress, any regulation of an execu- eral federal declaratory judg- 1346(a)(2), department,” 28 U.S.C. § provisions, alternative, ment fairly interpreted “can as man- (1982), seq. et the federal dating compensation by the Federal But, corpus provisions. since Government for the sustained.” Monk’s claim involves a collateral attack on (quoting 762 F.2d at 1068 United States v. conviction, latter statute Mitchell, jurisdiction.3 basis exclusive Under (1983)). the district court was without Drasek, and, Corps captain jurisdiction circumstances, Van a Marine in these suit in the United States District neither 28 U.S.C. 2201 nor 28 §§ Columbia, 1346(a)(2) Court for chal- supply indepen- can § lenging jurisdiction. the Marine Board’s Selection deci- dent basis for Jurisdiction promote sion not to him to the rank of the district court was not based in whole or major seeking part because, reconsideration and on the Tucker Act for the pay $9,999. given, jurisdiction back amount of reasons in that court entirely lacking. Therefore, district court denied all relief and Dra- Van 28 U.S.C. 1295(a)(2) appeal sek jur- decision to this does not affect this court’s § court. appeal. We found that the district court’s isdiction over the pursu- "Should it become known that is held tion for back either in a district court one, judge 1346(a)(2) in a other than (if ant to 28 U.S.C. the claim § jurisdiction." this circuit would be divested of $10,000), for less than or in the United States 784 F.2d at 1116. Claims Court (1982). case, appeal In either would lie then having 3. If Monk were to succeed in his convic- exclusively in the federal circuit. See 28 U.S.C. tion invalidated in an 1295(a)(2) (3) (1982). & he then could maintain an ac- We reverse and remand this case to the

district court with instructions to dismiss NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES complaint jurisdiction. for lack of UNION, Petitioner,

It sois ordered.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY, MIKVA, Respondent. Judge, concurring: demonstrates, No. 84-1292. opinion ably As the court’s plainly requires the law in this circuit Appeals, States Court of actions be filed where the District of Columbia Circuit. petitioner’s immediate custodian resides. I Argued April 1985. opinion therefore concur and complaint decision to dismiss Monk’s be- Decided June cause the court lacks separately, I write to articulate

my grave justice yet concern that has not

been done this case. A careful review me firmly record leaves convinced that questions

there are critical about Monk’s

guilt adequately that have never been ad- giving complete

dressed. Even deference credibility questions to the factfinders in court, military significant there remain

inconsistencies in the evidence and in the

evidentiary procedures adopted at trial that easily

cannot Findings be brushed aside.

concerning appellee’s whereabouts at the death,

time of his wife’s and the unavaila-

bility to Monk potentially exculpatory think, require,

information and evidence I authority to re-examine the find- guilt. necessary jurisdiction,

Absent the these

questions us; are before I arguments

hence do not rehearse the

presented. I concur separately only to em-

phasize my feeling that Monk’s important issues,

raises ones that deserve

careful examination should this case be re-

viewed elsewhere.

Case Details

Case Name: Solomon Monk, A/K/A David L. Martin v. Secretary of the Navy

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

Date Published: Jun 20, 1986

Citation: 793 F.2d 364

Docket Number: 84-5874

Court Abbreviation: D.C. Cir.