Soloco, Inc. v. DupreeSoloco, Inc. v. Dupree
This case arises out of an accident between an automobile and a thoroughbred race horse. At issue is the constitutionality of
FACTS
In the early morning hours of February 3, 1994, “June‘s Bid,” a thoroughbred race horse, escaped from the farm of Shelton J. LeBlanc near Breaux Bridge, Louisiana. June‘s Bid was owned by Julius W. Dupree, who had stabled the horse at the LeBlanc farm while he attended business in Texas. Prior to his departure, Mr. Dupree had arranged for Cornelius Johnson, a licensed groom who lived near the LeBlanc farm, to feed and exercise June‘s Bid in his absence. On February 3, 1994, Johnson was exercising the horse in a swimming tank on the LeBlanc farm when the horse broke its lead and bolted towards Highway 94, which was adjacent to the farm. Before June‘s Bid could be recovered, it was involved in an accident with a pickup truck owned by Soloco, Inc., and driven by P.J. LeBlanc, a Soloco employee. June‘s Bid was killed in the collision, and significant damage was caused to the Soloco vehicle. P.J. LeBlanc was also injured in the accident. Soloco and P.J. LeBlanc filed suit for damages they sustained as a result of the accident, and their cases were consolidated for trial purposes. Julius Dupree, Shelton LeBlanc, and Cornelius Johnson were named defendants in both suits.
Prior to trial, Julius Dupree and Shelton LeBlanc each filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and no right of action, citing
A. No person, partnership, corporation, or other entity engaged in the breeding, training, or racing of thoroughbred or quarter horses in Louisiana shall be held liable for damages to a third party caused by a horse they own while such horse is in the care, custody, or control of a person other than the owner, unless such damages were caused by the gross negligence of the owner of the horse.
B. The sole right of action for an employee of a person, other than the owner of the horse, who had care, custody, or control of such horse at the time damages were incurred shall be pursuant to the Louisiana Worker‘s Compensation Law.
C. The right of action for all other third parties is restricted to the person, other than the owner of the horse, who had care, custody, or control of the horse at the time damages were incurred.
In response to defendants’ exceptions, Soloco filed a “Motion for Summary and/or Declaratory Judgment,” asserting that
So it seems to me that what this statute is doing is protecting people that are in the business of racing horses who can more afford the burden than the individual who privately owns a horse and is not using it for breeding and is not in the racehorsing business. It‘s putting the burden on them. Whereas the people that are in the business, they could more afford the burden to assume the risk....
And to allow the owner a protection by this statute just isn‘t fair. Soloco has every right to be in business and conduct its business without any injury to operation, as the people in the horse business do. So it‘s setting aside a certain business and giving them a special exemption. And the court finds that it is unconstitutional. I will grant the declaratory judgment as prayed for.
LAW
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the burden of proving that an act of the legislature is unconstitutional is upon the party attacking the act. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 78 (La.1990). The power of the legislature is plenary, and a party challenging a statute‘s constitutionality must articulate a particular constitutional provision that limits the legislature‘s powers. Chamberlain v. State, Through DOTD, 624 So.2d 874 (La.1993). In the instant case, plaintiffs
EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
As noted by this Court in Manuel v. State, 95-CA-2189 (La.7/2/96), 692 So.2d 320,
The basis for plaintiff‘s equal protection challenge is its assertion that the statute unfairly discriminates against people injured by thoroughbreds as opposed to people injured by other types of animals. Plainly, this is not a classification based on one of the characteristics enumerated in
The clearly stated policy of the legislature is the promotion and encouragement of licensed horse racing in Louisiana.
A. It is the policy of the state of Louisiana in furtherance of its responsibility to provide revenues for the operation of state government for its people, to acknowledge and declare that the providing of funds and financial assistance to licensed horse racing tracks in the state of Louisiana constitutes an authorized public function and purpose of the state of Louisiana ...
(1) To institute and maintain a program to encourage and permit development of the business of horse racing with parimutuel wagering thereon on a high plane.
(2) To institute and maintain a program to encourage and permit development of the breeding and ownership of race horses in the state.
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B. This Chapter is an exercise of the police powers of the state to promote the public health, safety and welfare.
The horse racing industry is an important source of state revenue in addition to being a substantial employer of Louisiana residents. The owners of the thoroughbred horses used in racing are the lifeblood of the industry, in that they are the major source of the industry‘s capital.
DUE PROCESS
Prior to the enactment of
Initially, we note that the accident in the case sub judice occurred in 1994, long after
Where an injury has occurred for which the injured party has a cause of action, such cause of action is a vested property right which is protected by the guarantee of due process. See Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332, 54 S.Ct. 140, [142], 78 L.Ed. 342 (1933); Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124, 132, 1 S.Ct. 102, [107], 27 L.Ed. 104 (1882). However, where the injury has not yet occurred and the cause of action has not yet vested, the guarantee of due process does not forbid the creation of new causes of action or the abolition of old ones to attain permissible legislative objectives. See Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122, 50 S.Ct. 57, [58], 74 L.Ed. 221 (1929). Our jurisprudence has recognized the validity of legislative regulation of causes of action, including replacement and even abolition, that one person may have against another for personal injuries. See Ancor v. Belden Concrete Products, Inc., 260 La. 372, 256 So.2d 122 (1971); Colorado v. Johnson Iron Works, 146 La. 68, 83 So. 381 (1919); see also Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Services, 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1975).
The district court held that the policy advanced by
The district court erred in allowing its own policy determination to override the policy determination made by the legislature. It is not the prerogative of the judiciary to disregard public policy decisions underlying legislation or to reweigh balances of interests and policy considerations already struck by the legislature. Daigle v. Clemco Industries, 613 So.2d 619 (La.1993). It is not our role to consider the wisdom of the legislature in adopting the statute. It is our province to determine only the applicability, legality, and constitutionality of the statute. Chamberlain v. State, Through DOTD, 624 So.2d 874 (La. 1993), citing City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507 So.2d 215, 219 (La.1987).
CONCLUSION
REVERSED AND REMANDED.