Soliz v. ChaterSoliz v. Chater
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Kelly, Barrett, Wesley E. Brown
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA (D.C. No. 90-C-841-E)
Submitted on the briefs:
Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney, Phil Pinnell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Joseph B. Liken, Acting Chief Counsel, Tina M. Waddell, Acting Deputy Chief Counsel, Randall Halford, Assistant Regional Counsel, Social Security Administration, Dallas, Texas, for Defendant-Appellee.*
Plaintiff appeals the district court‘s order affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services denying plaintiff‘s applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. We exercise jurisdiction under
Plaintiff claims to have been disabled since December 1987 as a result of chronic back pain, hepatitis, and depression. After conducting
Vol. II at 334. Because plaintiff‘s past relevant work had required “prolonged standing and walking, and was stressful requiring an ability to deal with the general public,” the ALJ determined that plaintiff could not return to that work. Id. at 332.
Based on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), however, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff could perform a number of light and sedentary jobs that exist in the national economy in significant numbers and, therefore, that plaintiff was not disabled. When the Appeals Council denied plaintiff‘s request for review, the ALJ‘s decision became the final decision of the Secretary.
“We review the Secretary‘s decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standards.” Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is “‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‘” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. First, she argues that the Secretary failed to apply Social Security Ruling 83-12 as it relates to her need to alternate periods of sitting and standing. Second, she contends that the Secretary failed to consider her combined physical and mental impairments in determining her residual functional capacity. Finally, plaintiff argues that the Secretary failed to assess her allegations of chronic pain properly.2
Plaintiff‘s first argument is based on an incomplete reading of Social Security Ruling 83-12 and is legally frivolous. Plaintiff contends that, given her need to alternate periods of sitting and standing, none of the jobs identified by the VE constitute substantial evidence supporting a conclusion of no disability, because none of those jobs were managerial or professional, and most of them were unskilled. In support of this contention, plaintiff cites to the statement in Social Security Ruling 82-13 that, while professional and managerial jobs often permit a person to alternate between sitting and standing, most jobs require a person to be in a certain place or posture for a certain length of time, and “[u]nskilled types of jobs are particularly structured so that a person cannot ordinarily sit or stand at will.” S.S.R. 83-12, 1983-1991 Rulings, Soc. Sec. Rep. Serv. 36, 40 (West 1992).
Plaintiff neglects, however, to mention the very next sentence in the ruling, which states: “In cases of unusual limitation of ability to sit or stand, a VS [vocational specialist] should be consulted to clarify the implications for the occupational base.” Id. As this is precisely the procedure the ALJ followed here, there was no legal error. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).
Our review of the record reveals that plaintiff did not raise either of the remaining issues in her objections to the magistrate‘s report and recommendation in the district court. Our opinion in United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir.1996), holds that “a party‘s objections to the magistrate judge‘s report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for . . . appellate review.” Plaintiff‘s general objection that “[t]he Findings of the Secretary of
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.