Solaroll Shade and Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., Broward Solar Center, Inc.Solaroll Shade and Shutter Corp., Inc. v. Bio-Energy Systems, Inc., Broward Solar Center, Inc.
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Johnson
This case involves an appeal from the district court’s denial of a motion to vacate a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement. We affirm, and because the issues presented in this appeal are frivolous, we award double costs to the appellee.
I
BACKGROUND
In September 1980, appellee, Solaroll Shade and Shutter Corporation, Inc. (“Solaroll”), instituted a trademark infringement action against appellant, Bio-Energy Systems, Inc. (“Bio-Energy”), in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The parties eventually agreed to a settlement, and on August 16, 1982, the district court dismissed the suit with prejudice in accordance with the settlement agreement. The court, however, retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.
On January 25, 1985, Solaroll, alleging that Bio-Energy was in violation of the settlement agreement, filed a motion to reinstate the action and to enforce the stipulation. Bio-Energy’s Tampa counsel received service copy of the motion three days later and promptly forwarded copies to Bio-Energy and to Bio-Energy’s New York counsel. Shortly thereafter, Bio-Energy’s Tampa counsel spoke with Solaroll’s counsel and promised to forward a proposed stipulation and joint motion for extension of time. Bio-Energy’s counsel, however, never communicated again with Solaroll’s counsel, never sent either document, and never responded to Solaroll’s motion.
Consequently, on February 28, 1985, the district court granted Solaroll’s unopposed reinstatement motion and, without further notice, entered the order submitted with the motion. The clerk entered the order on March 4, 1985.
Seven days later Bio-Energy served a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to
This appeal followed.
II
DISCUSSION
However, this Court will set aside the district court’s refusal to vacate that order only if such refusal constitutes an abuse of
A. Attorney Mistake
Appellant first argues that. the “oversight” of its counsel in failing to respond to the motion constitutes excusable neglect within the meaning of 60(b)(1). However, an attorney’s negligent failure to respond to a motion does not constitute excusable neglect, even if that attorney is preoccupied with other litigation. United States v. One 1978 Piper Navajo PA-31, Aircraft, 748 F.2d 316, 318-19 (5th Cir.1984); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1020 (11th Cir.1982); Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir.1976) (per curiam).
Admittedly, this result appears to penalize innocent clients for the forgetfulness of their attorneys. However, a court possesses the inherent authority to enter a default judgment in response to an attorney’s dilatory tactics. Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). Accordingly, a court’s refusal to vacate a default judgment entered to penalize the repeated failure to produce documents does not amount to an abuse of discretion. Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir.1984). Thus the district court’s refusal to vacate the order is not an abuse of discretion merely because appellant was not directly responsible for the failure to respond.
Nonetheless, courts are chary of dismissing actions on account of attorney inadvertence in non-abusive situations. Thus, in Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 586 F.2d 382, 385-86 (5th Cir.1978), the former Fifth Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion in denying appellant’s 60(b) motion where the district court had dismissed his action in order to sanction his attorney’s failure to appear at a pretrial conference and to respond to interrogatories within a month. In so doing, the court emphasized that the district court should have undertaken less drastic measures to obtain compliance. See also Jackson v. Beech, 636 F.2d 831, 837 (D.C.Cir.1980) (improper to impute attorney’s negligence to client on motion to reconsider default judgment); Pond v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 453 F.2d 347 (5th Cir.1972) (abuse of discretion to dismiss action sua sponte absent “clear record of repeated willful delay”).
Furthermore, courts are supposed to construe liberally the requirements of
In this case Bio-Energy’s counsel did not exhibit a hostile antagonism to the adjudicatory process or engage in abusive, dilatory maneuvers. Nor is there any allegation that Bio-Energy conspired with counsel to delay the proceedings. Bio-Energy’s counsel simply forgot to respond. In addition, only 34 days had lapsed from the time Solaroll filed its motion until the court entered its order. Furthermore, the court
Furthermore, Bio-Energy has failed to establish a meritorious defense. To obtain relief under 60(b), a party must demonstrate a defense that probably would have been successful, in addition to showing excusable neglect. Seaboard Coast Line, 678 F.2d at 1020; Gulf Coast Fans, 740 F.2d at 1510-11. Even the court in Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 403, required the showing of a meritorious defense. Bio-Energy cannot satisfy this burden by asserting a general denial to Solaroll‘s claim. Nor can Bio-Energy satisfy this burden by showing that Solaroll would not suffer unfair prejudice if the judgment were vacated. Fackelman, 564 F.2d at 736. Instead it must make an affirmative showing of a defense that is likely to be successful. One 1978 Piper Navajo, 748 F.2d at 319. Bio-Energy has failed to make any such showing. Therefore, relief is unavailable under 60(b)(1).
Some courts have held that attorney error comes within the scope of 60(b)(6) even though it does not constitute excusable neglect under 60(b)(1). See, e.g., Boughner v. Secretary of H.E.W., 572 F.2d 976 (3d Cir.1978); L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 824, 85 S.Ct. 50, 13 L.Ed.2d 35 (1964); Transport Pool Division of Container Leasing, Inc. v. Joe Jones Trucking Co., 319 F.Supp. 1308 (N.D.Ga.1970). However, these cases specifically require gross neglect or other exceptional circumstances and indicate that the client was generally diligent despite its attorney’s lapses. Boughner, 572 F.2d at 977-78; L.P. Steuart, 329 F.2d at 236-37; Transport Pool, 319 F.Supp. at 1311-12. Bio-Energy has demonstrated neither gross misconduct by its counsel nor its own diligence, especially considering that it received a copy of the notice. Thus these cases are inapplicable.
There is also a more fundamental reason why these cases are inapplicable. Although 60(b)(6) provides a residual equitable authority for vacating judgments, this Court consistently has held that 60(b)(1) and (b)(6) are mutually exclusive. Therefore, a court cannot grant relief under (b)(6) for any reason which the court could consider under (b)(1). Hall v. Alabama, 700 F.2d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 859, 104 S.Ct. 183, 78 L.Ed.2d 163 (1983); Gulf Coast Building & Supply Co. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 460 F.2d 105, 108 (5th Cir.1972). The holdings in L.P. Steuart and its progeny are at odds with this established policy. Therefore, relief is unavailable under 60(b)(6) as well.
B. Judicial Mistake
Bio-Energy next argues that relief from the February 28 order is warranted under 60(b)(1) because the district court committed a mistake of law in entering the order. To the extent the order constitutes a default judgment, it is allegedly invalid because the court failed to comply with the notice and hearing provisions of
We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion because the district court did not commit any mistake of law in entering the judgment. First of all, the reinstatement order was not a default judgment within the meaning of
In this case, the responsive pleading stage had long passed, and issue already had been joined. There is no indication that Solaroll moved to strike Bio-Energy’s previous pleadings when Bio-Energy failed to respond or that the court did the same to penalize Bio-Energy. When appellant failed to respond, the district court simply proceeded with the motion, receiving appellee’s evidence and basing its decision on the record. Such a judgment is not a default judgment; therefore, the court was not required to follow
Even if the conditional dismissal with prejudice closed the original action so that Solaroll’s motion to reinstate constitutes a new action, the court was not required to provide Bio-Energy with additional notice. The notice and hearing provisions of
Nor is the February 28 order a final summary judgment. A preliminary pleading can be treated as a motion for summary judgment if accompanied by affidavits. See, e.g., Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 671, 92 S.Ct. 1232, 31 L.Ed.2d 569 (1972) (per curiam) (motion to dismiss treated as motion for summary judgment). However, an order is not a summary judgment merely because the court relied only on the movant’s supporting evidence. If the opposing party fails to respond despite adequate notice, it, and not the court, is responsible for the “summary” nature of the order. Appellant would require forgetful or dilatory parties to receive notice twice: first when the motion is served originally and once again before the court enters the order. Rule 56 requires no such double notice. Appellant here received adequate notice of the motion to reinstate. Its failure to respond does not entitle it to additional notice.
Notes
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Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(2) By the Court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor____ If the patty against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he ... shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least 3 days prior to the hearing on such application.
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The motion [for summary judgment] shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing.