These cases were consolidated to consider the common issue of whether the rate of interest on workmen’s compensation awards is 5% or 6% per annum. The question has created a split in the Court of Appeals panels. 1 We find that the Legislature has provided for 5% interest.
Additionally, plaintiff White confronts the Court with the question of whether he is entitled to workmen’s compensation based upon his $1.25 per hour wage received from Extra Labor Power of America (ELP) (a labor broker) or upon the $1.95 per hour received by ELP from Están Manufacturing Company for plaintiffs wage plus ELP’s services.
Solakis
The Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) found 6% interest applicable to plaintiffs award. The Court of Appeals remanded and ordered modification of the award of benefits to provide for interest of 5% per annum from the due *17 date. It further ordered payment of the additional 1% interest held in abeyance pending further decision.
White
WCAB provided for 5% interest per annum upon plaintiffs award. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
The White matter raises an additional meritorious question growing out of plaintiffs employment by a "temporary help” or "manpower” labor agency. Through the efforts of ELP, defendant worked for Están Manufacturing Company. He would report each morning to ELP. From there he would be transported by the agency to work and then back to the agency after work. The hours worked would be noted by Están each day on a time sheet and the sheet would be presented to ELP. Plaintiff was paid by the agency each day at the hourly rate of $1.25 for his day’s work (time and a half for overtime). Están paid ELP at the rate of $1.95 per hour, the difference being used by ELP for its operational costs, including workmen’s compensation premiums to its carrier and for its profits. Están could terminate plaintiffs services by notifying ELP and controlled the work performed during the day. ELP held the right to hire and fire plaintiff at any time.
While he was engaged in work at Están, three fingers of plaintiffs left hand were amputated (December 21, 1965). Plaintiff sought workmen’s compensation benefits and on June 7, 1971, the hearing referee found plaintiff disabled and awarded compensation on the basis of $1.25 per hour. Liability was assigned to ELP and its carrier, defendant Employers Mutual Casualty Company. WCAB affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, claiming *18 that recovery should be based upon $1.95 per hour instead of $1.25. ELP also sought leave, claiming that Están should be co-liable for payment of the benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the WCAB, but remanded for determination of plaintiffs wages, paid by ELP.
I —Interest
Until
Wilson v Doehler
— Jarvis
Division of National Lead Co,
In
Wilson,
the Court found that although interest is purely statutory, interest could be allowed in cases where no express statute could be invoked. The Court looked to other jurisdictions and found that the right to an award arose out of the contractual relationship between employers and employees. The Court stated in
"In discussing the principle involved in the leading case of Bourdeaux v Gilbert Motor Co, 220 Minn 538, 541 (20 NW2d 393 , 394) [1945], the court said:
" 'The sole question raised in that case (Brown v City of Pipestone) [186 Minn 540;245 NW 145 (1932)] was * * * "whether or not unpaid installments of compensation bear interest at the legal rate from the date when under the provisions of the compensation act they should have been paid.” We there held: " * * * Compensation in this State is a liability arising out of the contract of employment, and the compensation act becomes a part of every contract of employment.” We *19 there further stated: "Here was a contract debt due at the times when the compensation installments should have been paid under the provisions of the act, and we see no reason why it should not, like any other debt, bear interest at the legal rate when it is subsequently decided that the debt existed.” ’ ”
In Wilson, the Court also relied on Parker v Brinson Construction Co, 78 So 2d 873 (Fla, 1955), wherein the Florida Court also applied a contract theory to determine the rate of interest on workmen’s compensation awards.
As was properly stated in Wilson, it has long been established that the question of interest in Michigan is purely statutory. 2
Having determined that the right to an award in workmen’s compensation was contractual, the Wilson Court found 1948 CL 438.7; MSA 19.4 applicable. Since interest was allowable, the rate was fixed at 5% by virtue of the provisions of 1948 CL 438.51; MSA 19.11, now MCLA 438.31; MSA 19.15(1), which provides in pertinent part:
"The interest of money shall be at the rate of $5.00 upon $100.00 for a year, and the same rate for a greater or less sum, and for a longer or shorter time, except that in all cases it shall be lawful for parties to stipulate in writing for the payment of any rate of interest, not exceeding 7% per annum.”
The 5% interest rate was uniformly applied until the WCAB decision in
Maxwell v General Motors Corp, Fleetwood Division,
1973 WCABO 1075. In
Maxwell,
decided April 30, 1973, the WCAB began to order that 6% interest be paid on such awards. In so ordering, the WCAB relied on MCLA 600.6013; MSA 27A.6013 as amended by
*20
"Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment recovered in a civil action, such interest to be calculated from the date of filing the complaint at the rate of 6% per year unless the judgment is rendered on a written instrument having a higher rate of interest * * * 99
After Maxwell, the Court of Appeals split, with some panels following Wilson, supra, and applying a 5% rate of interest and some following Morris, supra, and allowing 6% interest.
We wish to restate our position in Wilson and, therefore, we affirm those Court of Appeals decisions applying the 5% rate of interest.
When an employee’s injury is within the scope of the act, workmen’s compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy against the employer. MCLA 418.131; MSA 17.237(131);
Ladner v Vander Band,
In
Tews v CF Hanks Coal Co,
"The compensation act is in derogation of the common law and, therefore, its measure of relief may not be extended beyond its express terms; it is a legislative creation permitting no enlargement by principles of equity or common-law adaptations. It is arbitrary and where it speaks nothing can be added nor changed by judicial pronouncement. It imposes liability upon operatives under its provisions and measures exclusive relief in its own terms.”
Thus, it was not by happenstance that this *21 Court in Wilson grounded the interest recovery concept on a contract theory. Because interest in Michigan is statutory, plaintiffs’ arguments sounding in equity are to no avail.
In
Siebert v Northport Point Cottage Owners' Assn,
"Appellee refers to the revised judicature act of 1961, and particularly to section 2921 of Chapter 29 and section 151 of chapter 1 thereof.
"The revised judicature act does not apply to workmen’s compensation as is evidenced by the title of the act, which reads in part:
" 'An act to revise and consolidate the statutes relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the courts; * * * the forms and attributes of civil claims and actions; the time within which civil actions and proceedings may be brought in said courts.’
"The words upon which appellee relies in regard to 'judicial power,’ which he claims include 'any other agencies,’ were eliminated by the 1963 legislature by the enactment of PA 1963 (2d Ex Sess), No 18. ” 4
Additionally, this Court has often stated that WCAB is not a "court” and "is not possessed of judicial power”.
Modeen v Consumers Power Co,
*22 In summary, the unilateral action of WCAB in Maxwell attempting to apply the interest rate of 6% found in MCLA 600.6013 was beyond the scope of the powers delegated to that body. This Court’s decision in Wilson trod the fine line separating the legislative and judicial branches of government.
As this and other jurisdictions have noted, the contract theory is a sound basis upon which to ground the interest on workmen’s compensation awards. The concept of a money judgment is totally alien to the policy and philosophy of the workmen’s compensation law.
Until the legal interest rate is changed (MCLA 438.31) or the Legislature provides what they have heretofore failed to provide, the interest on workmen’s compensation award must remain at 5%.
We affirm the Court of Appeals as to this issue.
II —Compensation (White)
At the hearings before the referee, the plaintiff testified that during the first six weeks of employment he worked ten hours per day and six days per week and that during the final five weeks, he worked eight hours per day and six days per week.
The referee found plaintiff’s average weekly wage to be $60 computed at the rate of $1.25 per hour and fixed his compensation at $40 per week. 5 WCAB affirmed the findings of the hearing referee. 6
We have not previously spoken to the question of whether the plaintiff’s compensation should be determined by reference to the actual monies paid *23 to him by the employment service, or by reference to the amount paid by the company to the employment firm.
The applicable statute, MCLA 418.371; MSA 17.237(371), provides:
"(1) The weekly loss in wages referred to in this act shall cohsist of such percentage of the average weekly earnings of the injured employee computed according to the provisions of this section as shall fairly represent the proportionate extent of the impairment of his earning capacity in the employment in which he was working at the time of the injury, the same to be fixed as of the time of the injury, but to be determined in view of the nature and extent of the injury. The compensation payable, when added to his wage earning capacity after the injury in the same or another employment, shall not exceed his average weekly earnings at the time of such injury.
"(2) Average weekly wage means the weekly wage earned by the employee at the time of his injury, inclusive of overtime, premium pay, and cost of living adjustment, and exclusive of any fringe or other benefits which continue during disability, but in no case less than 40 times his hourly rate of wage or earning. When it is found that the established normal work week for the employee’s classification of employment in the establishment of the employer where the employee suffered a personal injury is less than 40 hours, then the average weekly wage shall be established by multiplying the employee’s hourly rate or earning by the number of hours customarily worked in the employee’s classification or employment in that place of employment or his actual earned wages, whichever is greater.
"(3) When a hearing referee finds that the employee was employed specifically and not temporarily on a part-time basis, the average weekly wage shall be determined by multiplying the hourly rate or earning by the average number of hours worked in the part-time employment. When it is found that the employee has worked an average of 25 hours or more per week in all *24 of his current employments, he shall not be considered a part-time employee.
"(4) If the hourly earning of the employee cannot be ascertained, or if no pay has been designated for the work required, the wage, for the purpose of calculating compensation, shall be taken to be the usual wage for similar services where such services are rendered by paid employees.
"(5) Where there are special circumstances under which the weekly wage cannot justly be determined by applying the above provisions, an average weekly wage may be computed by dividing the aggregate earnings during the year prior to the injury by the number of days when work was performed and multiplying such daily wage by the number of working days customary in the employment, but not less than 5.” (Emphasis added.)
The question becomes one of plaintiffs "earning capacity in the employment in which he was working”.
The plaintiff argues that his "earning capacity” should be measured by what Están was willing to pay to obtain his services ($1.95 per hour). The plaintiff maintains that this is what he would have received had he been hired directly by the company for that job as a regular employee. Plaintiff additionally argues that if the earnings cannot be clearly ascertained, the "usual wage for similar services”, must be used. 7
Defendant Están replies that plaintiff’s "earning capacity” and "wages” are that which he was paid for the work he was doing ($1.25 per hour). The plaintiff’s earning capacity must be ascertained from that which he was able to obtain for his services, and not that which someone else was willing to pay to obtain them. Defendant Están submits that the difference between the $1.25 *25 amount paid by ELP to plaintiff and the $1.95 paid by Están to ELP was the result of a contract between the defendants. The difference reflected the costs 8 and profit of ELP and was in no way a fringe benefit inuring to the plaintiff. The defendant maintains that the plaintiff’s reliance on the "usual wage for similar services” standard is misplaced herein because this is not a situation where "the hourly earning of the employee cannot be ascertained”. 9
The plaintiff also maintains that ELP was engaged as his agent to find him employment. Thus, plaintiff asserts that the dollars received by ELP for acting as his agent should not be deducted from his average weekly wage.
The Court of Appeals was correct in applying the "economic reality” test 10 to the instant case. Under the criteria espoused in the "economic reality” test, the plaintiff was an employee of both Están and ELP and thus the principal-agent argument is inapplicable to the instant case.
Although there is a dual employment situation herein, we long have held that joint liability does not necessarily follow from a dual employer situation.
Wing v Clark Equipment Co,
There it was held that because both employers paid wages to the injured employee, separate awards should issue. In the instant case, only ELP paid wages and therefore the ELP carrier is primarily liable.
As the Court of Appeals noted, the referee and *26 the WCAB found that ELP should be exclusively liable for the payment of benefits.
In
Allen v Kendall Hardware Mill Supply Co,
In plaintiff White, Están obtained an employee whom it could and did supervise on its premises. Están was relieved of almost all paperwork and costs incident to employment, including the payment of the employer’s share of employment taxes. White was relieved of the obligations of a full-time employee. He also was relieved of expenditures (e.g., transportation) which may represent an economic gain to him.
ELP received $1.95 per hour on behalf of plaintiff White. From this sum, ELP paid White $1.25 per hour and its out-of-pocket expenses (for example, workmen’s compensation insurance and employer’s share of employment taxes) were deducted and the balance if any was its profit.
We find that ELP’s profits should not be deducted from White’s wage computation.
We remand to WCAB to determine that wage between $1.25 and $1.95 per hour which WCAB determines best to serve the objectives of the act, recognizing the wage paid part-time workers per *27 forming the same task, the economic gain to White of transportation provided by ELP, the economic gain accruing to White because of ELP’s finding work for him and any other economic gains to him, the temporary nature of the employment, and ELP’s out-of-pocket expenses.
Affirmed and remanded to WCAB for factual determination of plaintiffs average weekly earnings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Notes
See, also, Gilbert v Reynolds Metals Co,
In the two most recent decisions, Johnson v Muskegon,
Kermott v Ayer,
Also, see Wagner v LaSalle Foundry Co,
Footnotes 4 and 5 at
" 'The judicial power is vested in a single court system consisting of the supreme court, circuit courts, probate courts, justices of the peace, superior court, municipal courts, common pleas courts, recorder’s courts, circuit court commissioners, and any other agencies created by the legislature which exercise judicial power.’ CLS 1961, § 600.151 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.151).”
*' 'The judicial power of the state is vested exclusively irs 1 court of justice which shall be divided into 1 supreme court, 1 court of appeals, 1 trial court of general jurisdiction known as the circuit court, 1 probate court and courts of limited jurisdiction created by the legislature.’ CLS 1961, § 600.151, as amended by PA 1963 (2d Ex Sess), No 18 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 27A.151).”
MCLA 418.361; MSA 17.237(361).
The Court of Appeals maintained that the plaintiffs testimony was not borne out by the records of ELP. It must be noted that the records of ELP were never admitted into evidence. There was nothing to. refute the plaintiffs testimony in the record.
MCLA 418.371(4).
ELP paid plaintiffs social security and workmen’s compensation.
MCLA 418.371(4).
See Goodchild v Erickson,