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Soignier v. Fletcher
256 P.3d 730
Idaho
2011
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*1 EISMANN, and Justices Chief Justice

BURDICK, W. JONES HORTON

concur.

256 P.3d 730 SOIGNIER,

Mary Killins

Plaintiff-Appellant, FLETCHER,

W. Defendant- Kent

Respondent.

No. 37123. Idaho,

Supreme Court of

Boise, April 2011 Term.

June 2011.

Rehearing July Denied claims, judgment 5. The district court's contained a Rule IPPEA and IHRA both of which were 54(b) stating judgment upon summary certificate judgment. dismissed It 54(b) regard final with superfluous, issues dealt with therein. the Rule certificate was as all 54(b) why It is unclear a Rule certification issues were resolved and the required complaint only fully disposed appeal. because the raised the case has been of on *2 Ellis, Shields, Chtd., Boise, & Brown and Office, Boise, Appellant. Strother Law for Jeffrey argued. Strother Troxell, LLP, Hawley, Hawley, & Ennis Boise, Respondent. for Michelle Points ar- gued. OPINION. COURT’S

SUBSTITUTE THE OPINION PRIOR DATED JUNE HEREBY 2011 IS WITHDRAWN JONES, Justice. W.

I. Nature of the Case Soignier appeals K. the district grant summary judgment court’s decision Fletcher, attorney, Kent on her W. legal malpractice. She asserts Fletcher that a ensure prepared conveyed pro- will he to her the of a trust of which ceeds the decedent was beneficiary shortly until the dece- before adequately death. Since ef- dent’s Fletcher expressed fectuated the testator’s intent as itself, the will was cor- district court grant summary judgment rect to on the However, va- claim. this Court grant cates the district court’s 12-120(3), malprac- claim in this ease not stem from a tice does commercial transaction. Background

II. Factual and Procedural represented Kent W. decedent, Cowan, Zachary A. for several years until Cowan’s death in October of 2006. lifetime, During his was the beneficia- Cowan provided that his ry of a trust mother him, known as the Leonarda A. Cowan Trust Trust”). (the “Cowan The terms of the Co- provided wan Trust the trust would age fifty, at persist until Cowan reached most of which time was terminate and to be assets were distributed to Cowan. its birthday fiftieth was in and Cowan’s signed March a Final Release agreement terminated Discharge in which he did not have interest the trust. Cowan his trusts. any beneficial interests in other Shortly terminating party after his interest 3.Whether either is entitled to attor- Trust, ney the Cowan instructed fees on under 12- 120(3). prepare his Last andWill Testament. *3 provided The will that all of remain- Cowan’s ing beneficial interests in trusts be de- IV.Standard of Review Soignier, Appellant. vised to Killins It applies This Court the same stan also referred to written list of items and ruling dard as the court when district on a recipients intended that was never located. summary judgment. motion for WescoAuto Society The American Cancer was named as Ernest, body 881, Supply, Inc. v. 149 Idaho the residual all of devisee for Cowan’s other 890, (2010). 243 P.3d Summary property. judgment proper if pleadings, deposi “the filed a claim Cowan’s es- tions, file, together and admissions on with Trust, proceeds tate for the from the Cowan affidavits, any, the if that show there is no rejected.

which magistrate magis- the The genuine issue as to material fact and that that, trate found because the trust had termi- moving party the judgment is entitled to a nated, unambiguously conveyed any the will 56(c). a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. The mov assets that remained in Cowan’s estate to the showing ant has the genu burden that no Society. American Cancer ine issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 149 Idaho Believing that Cowan intended to leave the (2010). Disputed facts her, Soignier trust assets to asserted this and reasonable inferences are construed in claim legal malpractice against for Fletcher favor of nonmoving party. the Castorena v. granted 2009. The district summary Elec., 609, 613, 149 Idaho Gen. Fletcher, ruling that there was freely Court This reviews issues genuine no issue fact as to whether the of law. Cnty., Lattin Adams will frustrated Cowan’s intent. The court 497, 500, granted request Fletcher’s for fees under I.C. V.Analysis

Soignier appealed Court, to this contend- ing that Fletcher carry Correctly A. The District Court Granted out inaccurately Cowan’s wishes describ- Summary Judgment to Fletcher Be- ing his trust assets. She further contends Duty cause He Did Not Breach a that it improper to award fees under I.C. because engaged she was never There legal- are four elements to a in a commercial transaction with Fletcher. (1) malpractice claim: attorney- there is an responds that the will was not defi- client relationship plaintiff between the and giving cient in effect to Cowan’s intent (2) defendant; lawyer the defendant owed a leave remaining Soigni- trust interests to (3) plaintiff; care to the lawyer the and, additionally, er that the fee award was duty; breached the lawyer’s neg the correct because claim arises di- ligence proximate awas cause of the client’s rectly from a transaction for services Jones, damage. Johnson v. between Fletcher and Cowan. (1982). Here, the dispute do not the first two Appeal III.Issues case, present elements are in this as Idaho 1. Whether correctly district court recognizes exception to the traditional granted summary judgment to requirement plaintiff that the have been in on Soignier’s for privity with lawyer the defendant in order to by finding that no breach had occurred. expect lawyer profes owe or her a 2. Whether Fletcher was entitled to attor- sional of care. v. Han

ney cock, below under I.C. 90 P.3d 884 this defending against the legal-malpractice Court attorney’s extended the duty to non- claim. clients who are named identified as benefi- at testamentary instrument. 140 wan had his death. The fact that no riaries in a actually P.3d at 888. interests existed did not render the Idaho at expressed purpose. will deficient its appeal in this pivotal issue Soignier believes that Cowan intended to breached his of care whether Fletcher her the leave Cowan Trust assets. The main drafting Soignier by a will leaves attorneys of her thrust is that have an when the decedent had her interests trusts ongoing duty to monitor the status of the Harrigfeld explained that no such interests. property that the testator includes his or testamentary attorney’s duty to a benefi notify her will and their clients whenever it ciary requires attorney to “effectuate the may that the client not understand expressed intent as in the testa testator’s *4 the nature of their Harrigfeld, ownership interests. In mentary instruments.” 140 Ida added). view, 138, negligent by her (emphasis at 888 was ho at attorney properly cheeking draft and exe the trust documents to see The must whether instruments, only already will and other but the had cute the Cowan Trust terminated be- passed away. argues to effectuate the testator’s intent as ex fore Cowan She also pressed within those documents. Estate that Fletcher explain to of 526, Callahan, 522, v. remaining Becker Cowan Cowan had no benefi- P.3d any cial interests trusts. genuine there is no issue of material As Soignier’s arguments already have whether Fletcher breached a fact as to First, rejected by Soignier been this Court. grant- Soignier, properly court district presumes that Cowan intended to do some summary judgment. portion The relevant ed thing unambiguously other than what was “Residue,” will of the is entitled and reads: expressed in Harrigfeld, his will. In howev rest, All of the residue and remainder of er, expressly attorneys this Court held that any my property which I or have own have “no to see that the testator distrib my at the of interest whatever time property or among utes his her the named death, other than beneficial interests in in any particular beneficiaries manner.” 140 trusts, give, bequeath, I and devise to the words, Idaho at 90 P.3d at In other Society. American Cancer All beneficial lawyers testamentary have no benefi any give, I interests that I have in trusts regard they ciaries with to what share re bequeath Soig- [Killins and devise estate, any. ceive from the if testator’s any power appointment I exercise of nier]. Becker, 140 Idaho at 96 P.3d at 627. It might appoint Mary that I [Kil- hold and Soignier’s legal-malpractice is immaterial to Soignier]. lins claim whether in she believes that Cowan parties agree language The that the will’s is tended to leave her assets that he did not unambiguous properly and that it exe- identify Holsapple in his will. See unambiguous cuted. The intent of the testa- (Iowa 1998) McGrath, 575 N.W.2d will, tor, as it in the was to leave all (holding attorney that an was not liable to any Soignier

beneficial interests trusts plaintiffs including for not in the decedent’s any if will so exist. The does not mention plaintiffs will certain real-estate assets the Trust, likely a the Cowan because it is resid- receive). thought they Attorneys would do uary any bequeath clause not intended to postulate not have to whether a in testator Rather, specific simply assets. devises something tended to do than what other already trust assets to that have not expressed in the will. disposed testamentary been of in other Kirk, Second, Soignier Matter that Cowan instrument. See Estate assumes of of of the Idaho did not understand the nature assets residuary (interpreting light leaving Soignier. Again, Harrig a clause in of he was strong presumption against intestacy). that “a testator who has sufficient stated feld capacity mental to make a valid will can This clause effectuated the testator’s ex- pressed property will intent to make the residual understand how his her be testamentary under the devisee of beneficial trust interests Co- distributed docu- attorney 140 Idaho at 90 P.3d at 888. that no merits.” fees are available for mal- claims). presumed to have understood that practice The Court reasoned that residuary 12-120(3) leaving Soigni- a interest to § only applied sounding to claims specific er and not the he received as a Rice, assets in contract. 132 Idaho at Thus, distribution from the Cowan Trust. at 565. attorneys ongoing duty have no to monitor categorical rule award property status mentioned in 12-120(3) ing attorney § fees under in tort testamentary instrument. The district longer applies actions no in Idaho. Blimka correctly granted summary judgment Wholesaler, LLC, My v. Web to Fletcher on mal- 728-29, 599-600 practice. Buxton, City McCall v. P.3d 629 specifically this Court over B. Entitled Is Not prior legal-malpractice ruled eases that Fees de Below Under case, nied fee awards. In that we ruled Soignier challenges the district instead that not require “does grant court’s fees to Fletcher that there be a contract between the provision This re *5 applied; before the statute is only the statute quires attorney-fee prevailing awards for the requires that there be a commercial transac party “any in a civil action in commercial McCall, City tion.” 146 Idaho at 201 of 12-120(3).1 § transaction.” I.C. “The term P.3d at (quoting 638 Equip., Great Plains ‘commercial transaction’ is defined to mean Pipeline Inc. v. Nw. Corp., 136 Idaho except per all transactions transactions for (2001)). 36 P.3d 224 Accordingly, in purposes.” sonal or household Id. The com instances, some prevailing party may be integral mercial transaction must be to and 12-120(3) attorney entitled § under fees upon party the basis which a is attempting to an malpractice long action for so aas Nickerson, 5, 12, recover. Lee v. commercial transaction occurred between the 189 P.3d 474 prevailing party party and the from whom recently, prevail- Until this Court held that party that seeks fees. ing parties attorney could not win fees tort The district court was incorrect 12-120(3), to hold § including actions under legal- that Fletcher attorney could collect Litster, fees actions. See Rice v. 132 because there was no com- Idaho 980 P.2d 565 fees). mercial transaction between (denying attorney them. The fact Despite the fact that Fletcher owed a that narrow of attorney this Coui’t refused to care to award fees, a testamentary beneficiary it as repeatedly nonetheless has did observed that a create a commercial contract for transaction between services can be a Harrigfeld, “commercial them. In transaction” as this defined in the Court noted that Ranches, attorney’s Gigray Inc., “[a]n statute. v. Brooks arises out of the con- 72, 79, (1996); attorney Idaho tract between the Fuller and his or her Wolters, 415, 425, and, further, v. client” did not rest the (1991); Hayward see Valley v. of care to third-party-benefi- Vista non-clients on a 342, 350, Corp., Care ciary Hancock, theory. Harrigfeld v. (2001) (stating 134, 137-38, contracts for medical Idaho 887-88 services are “commercial transactions” but The district court’s decision to award § provides 1. Idaho Code in full: The term "commercial transaction” is defined except to mean open civil action all to recover on an transactions transactions account, stated, note, bill, negotiable account personal purposes. or household The term instrument, guaranty, relating or contract "party” any person, part- is defined to mean wares, purchase goods, the dise, or sale of merchan- association, nership, corporation, private or- and in services commercial trans- ganization, political the state of Idaho or sub- law, provided by action unless otherwise division thereof. prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable court, attorney's fee to be set to be taxed and collected as costs. Soignier to specific § Fletcher under 12- receive some sum of attorney fees to I.C. mon- 120(3) ey contrary provisions certainly is to the vacated. bequeath his will he did not because her Entitled Is Not C. Fletcher specific speculate sum. The need to as to Appeal § I.C. on Under Fees supposedly what would have done had his attorney given why shows different advice requested attorney fees on Both expanded be should not Ms. 12-120(3). appeal As ex- pursuant to Soignier requests. above, this plained in the section was not in which action in a “commercial transaction” attorney entitled prevailing party pursuant provision. there-

fees We attorney award

fore decline to fees 12-120(3). Conclusion YI. P.3d 735 correctly granted sum- The district Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, STATE mary judgment to Fletcher on attorney malpractice, but errone- ously attorney fees under I.C. awarded FOLK, Jonathan Defendant- Earl is affirmed in Appellant. part part. We vacate the and reversed below. award No fees or No. 36244. appeal. costs are awarded on *6 Idaho. Supreme Court of Boise, 2011 Term. June BURDICK, J. Justices JONES and concur. HORTON June EISMANN, specially Chief Justice

concurring. majority opinion,

I concur in the but write additional comment. add an expand

If v. Han- we were

cock,

requested by Soignier, Ms. what amount of entitled

money would she be to receive? question

That she could was a not answer argument.

during oral already received a had distribution prior making will.

from the trust his final obviously longer money received no trust,

subject attempt and he to the made no money Ms. bequest Soignier. Had to, certainly could done so

he wanted have bequest by making specific to her or

either portion of the of the

granting her a residue beneficial interests “[a]ll

estate other than trusts.” He neither. I have did give

Assuming that he wanted her a be- certainly money

quest, he had it was So, what it? How

already received. money

much he want her to receive? did

Any intended for Ms. contention that Cowan

Case Details

Case Name: Soignier v. Fletcher
Court Name: Idaho Supreme Court
Date Published: Jun 30, 2011
Citation: 256 P.3d 730
Docket Number: 37123
Court Abbreviation: Idaho
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