692 F. App'x 838
9th Cir.
2017

Sohrab HAROONIAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMITTEE OF BAR EXAMINERS; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-56035

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed June 26, 2017

688 F. App‘x 838

Submitted May 24, 2017*

satisfy the requirements for constitutional standing or third party standing. See id. at 1184-85 (setting forth constitutional standing requirements); Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth third-party standing requirements).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Al Azzawi’s motions for sanctions (Docket Entry Nos. 22 and 24) are denied.

AFFIRMED.

Sohrab Haroonian, Pro Se

Destie Overpeck, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, State Bar of California, Office of the General Counsel, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM **

Sohrab Haroonian appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims arising out of his failure to pass the California Bar Exam. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010) (application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Haroonian’s claims for damages against the State Bar of California and the Committee of Bar Examiners because those defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995) (the State Bar of California is an arm of the state and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1985) (suit against the Board of Governors of the California Bar and the Committee of Bar Examiners is barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

The district court properly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine over Haroonian’s declaratory relief claim because his claim amounted to a “forbidden de facto appeal” of the California Supreme Court’s denial of Haroonian’s application for admission to the state bar. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) (district court lacks jurisdiction over challenge to denial of bar admission, which is a challenge to a state court decision).

AFFIRMED.

GI SPORTZ INC. and GI Sportz Direct LLC, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. APX GEAR LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16-56882

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Filed June 26, 2017

688 F. App‘x 839

Argued and Submitted June 6, 2017 Pasadena, California

Karin G. Pagnanelli, Esquire, Counsel, Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Michael G. Kelber, Michael Turner, Neal Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants

Stephanie P. Alexander, Attorney, Smith LC, A. Louis Dorny, Esquire, Attorney, Gordon & Rees LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Patrick Mulkern, Attorney, Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: GRABER, SACK,* and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM **

This interlocutory appeal arises from the denial of GI Sportz Inc. and GI Sportz Direct LLC’s (collectively, “GI Sportz“) motion for preliminary injunctive relief for its pending trade-dress-infringement claim against APX Gear LLC. In denying the motion, the district court correctly recited the four factors set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest.“). But the court’s analysis began and ended with the first factor; it concluded that GI Sportz had not established a likelihood of success with respect to an essential element of a trade-dress-infringement claim: that “its claimed dress serves a source-identifying role either because it

Notes

*
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). The Honorable Robert D. Sack, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.