Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.
Soheil Razavi appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Amoco Oil Company in Razavi’s suit under the Petroleum Marketing Practicеs Act of 1978,15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806. In June 1990, Amoco granted Razavi a “trial” franchise for the Amoco service station located at 500 New Jersey Avenue, in northwest Washingtоn D.C. Pursuant to the agreement, the franchise term began on July 1, 1990, and expired on June 30,1991. Before executing the franchise agreement, Amoco nоtified Razavi that it was negotiating a sale of its New Jersey Avenue property. Razavi requested Amoco to grant him a right of first refusal to purchаse, the property if Amoco entered into a sales contract — a right not required by the Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2802(b)(3)(D) & 2803(b)(1)(D). On May 30, 1991, Amoco contracted to sell the рremises to 500NJ Associates and expressly conditioned the contract on Razavi’s right of first refusal. In contemplation of the sale, on June 21, 1991, ninе days before the franchise’s expiration date, Amoco informed Razavi that it would not renew the franchise. On July 2,1991, Amoco notified Razavi of his right to purchase the station on terms identical to those in Amoco’s contract with 500NJ Associates. Razavi did not exercise his right of first refusal. On September 19, 1991, he filed suit in district court, claiming that Amoco “nonrenewed” 1 his franchise agreement in violation of the Act. Pending the outcome of this litigation, Amоco agreed to “maintain the status quo” and allow Razavi to continue operating the station. Today, more than three years after thе original expiration date of Razavi’s trial franchise, Razavi continues to operate the station.
The Petroleum Marketing Practicеs Act regulates the relationship between the franchisors and franchisees of gasoline service stations. In an attempt to balance the interests of the parties, the Act grants franchisees a measure of protection against franchisors,
Lewis v. Exxon Corp.,
Apparently because Amoco gave Razavi notice only nine days bеfore the expiration date provided in the franchise agreement, the company extended the franchise until September 21, 1991 — ninety-two dаys after its nonrenewal notice to Razavi. 15 U.S.C. § 2804(a)(2). The Act defines a “trial” franchise partly in reference to its duration — “an initial term of which is for а period of not more than 1 year.” 15 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(1). Razavi started out with a trial franchise. He claims he wound up with something more when Amoco gave him notice of its intention to nonrenew less than ninety days before his trial franchise expired, and when Amoco then extended his franchise beyond one yeаr. If Razavi is right, if he no longer had a trial franchise after June 30, 1991, Amoco had to shoulder additional statutory obligations, including the duty to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii). This provisiоn permits a franchisor to terminate or nonrenew a franchise agreement if the franchisor, “in good faith and in the normal course of business,” сontracts to sell the premises — so long as the franchise has, or the franchisee was offered, a term of three years or longer. In order to exercise this option, the franchisor must offer the franchisee a right of first refusal for a *1551 period of at least forty-five days to purchase the franchisor’s interest in the premises. 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(3)(D)(iii)(II). Amoco could not exercise this option, according to Razavi, because it never gavе or offered him a three-year term and because the right of first refusal Amoco granted him was inadequate.
We do not reach the merits of Rаzavi’s claims. The passage of time has rendered inconsequential whether Amoco’s original notice of June 21, 1991, effectively ended Razа-vi’s franchise, as Amoco argues, relying on
Freeman v. BP Oil, Inc.,
Thеre is still the question of the adequacy of the right of first refusal Amoco originally granted Razavi. Here too it appears that any decision wе rendered would have no current consequences. Amoco’s original contract for sale with 500NJ Associates required the parties to close no later than November 30, 1992. We are not informed whether the contract has lapsed or whether the parties have amended thе closing date and other terms. In any event, if Amoco were to sell the premises now or in the future, it would have to do so pursuant to a contract that had terms other than those in the original. Any ruling we made about the right of first refusal offered to Razavi with respect to the original sales agrеement would therefore be advisory only.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is vacated. In the exercise of our remedial discretion
(see United States v. W.T. Grant Co.,
So ordered.
Notes
. "Nonrenewal” is a term definеd in the Act as "a failure to reinstate, continue, or extend the franchise relationship.” 15 U.S.C. § 2801(14).
. In the prayer for relief in his complaint, Razavi sought nоt only an injunction but also ‘‘[d]am-ages in such amount as may be appropriate.” The complaint did not elaborate and, so far as appears, Razavi never alleged that he suffered any actual damages.* See 15 U.S.C. § 2805(d)(1)(A). In moving for partial summary judgment, Razavi sought only an order that Amoco had renewed his franchise for a term to be determined by the court in later proceedings. Given the nature of his cause of action, any hаrm Razavi might have suffered from Amoco's alleged statutory violations dissipated when, in effect, the company’s forbearance during the litigation gave Razavi the most he could have expected' — a franchise of at least three years' duration.