493 U.S. 900 | SCOTUS | 1989
Lead Opinion
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Sup. Ct. Ind.;
Sup. Ct. Ala.;
Ct. Crim. App. Tex.;
Sup. Ct. Mo.;
Ct. Crim. App. Ala.;
C. A. 11th Cir.;
Sup. Ct. Mo.;
C. A. 5th Cir.; and
Ct. Crim. App. Ala. Certiorari denied. Reported below: No. 87-7191, 742 S. W. 2d 371; No. 88-7465, 535 N. E. 2d 507; No. 89-219, 545 So. 2d 122; No. 89-5083, 773 S. W. 2d 525; No. 89-5110, 766 S. W. 2d 640; No. 89-5193, 545 So. 2d 214; No. 89-5245, 875 F. 2d 1520; No. 89-5256, 769 S. W. 2d 427; No. 89-5442, 873 F. 2d 757; No. 89-5496, 548 So. 2d 1062.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 227, 231 (1976), we would grant certiorari and vacate the death sentences in these cases.