114 Mich. 83 | Mich. | 1897
John Soderstrom, a man 29 years of age, in good health, who had at the time of his death been em
There are 61 assignments of error presented for the consideration of the court, in elaborate briefs, of upwards of 170 pages. While there was considerable testimony taken in the case, it is not conflicting in essential particulars, and from it the following facts are established beyond any reasonable controversy: The defendant was owner and operator of two mills. Temple Emery was its president and superintendent. James Emery was foreman of mill No. 2, and of the dock where the accident occurred. He had control of the mill and the dock, and it was under his instruction and supervision that the work was done at the mill and dock. He was authorized to employ and discharge the men employed about the business under him, and did employ Mr. Soderstrom. Mr. Wickham was employed to see that the lumber was piled properly on the dock. He worked under instructions from Mr. Emery. He had no authority to employ or discharge men without consulting Mr. Emery. The size of the piles of lumber, and their height and location, were determined by Mr. Emery. In the early summer of 1894, when the lumber was removed from the portion of the dock where the accident occurred, it was discovered that a number of the spiles had been taken out by the ice or by some other cause, and others of the spiles had been displaced, so that the stringers which should rest upon them did not rest upon them. There was one space, variously estimated by the witnesses of 6 to 14 feet in length, where the spiles were gone. The dock was an open dock, so that it was apparent to any one who looked that the spiles were gone. It could also be observed that the flat pieces which should rest upon the top of the spiles were unsupported, because the spiles were gone. The
In the case of Brown v. Gilchrist, 80 Mich. 56, which was a negligence case, it was held to be error to refuse to charge, “If plaintiff’s own negligence caused or contributed to the injury, he cannot recover;” and the court said the rule is well understood that, in all actions for injuries caused by the alleged negligence of another, the plaintiff himself must be free from fault to sustain his action. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Coleman, 28 Mich. 440; Melzer v. Car Co., 76 Mich. 94. In Deer. Neg. § 210, it is said:
“A servant must observe ordinary care for his personal safety in any employment. He must make reasonable*87 use of his senses, to avoid danger and injury in the course of his employment. An employer is not liable for an injury sustained by an employe where his own negligence or want of ordinary care contributes materially to the injury.”
See, also, Beach, Contrib. Neg. § 35.
In Bailey, Mast. Liab. 159, it is said :
“It is the duty of the servant to exercise care to avoid injuries to himself. He is under as great obligation to provide for his own safety from such dangers as are known to him, or are discernible by ordinary care on his part, as the master is to provide for him. He must take ordinary care to learn the dangers which are likely to beset him in the service. He must not go blindly to his work, where there is danger. He must inform himself. This is the law everywhere. ”
Where the danger is open and visible and known to the deceased, and the risk apparent to him, there would be no liability. Fisher v. Railway Co., 77 Mich. 546; Wheeler v. Berry, 95 Mich. 250. It has also been held in a negligence case that where the whole testimony in a case, and all legitimate inferences that can be drawn therefrom, show that the plaintiff’s intestate was injured by reason of his own want of ordinary care, the question of whether there was or was not negligence on the part of the injured party is a question of law to be decided by the court, and that, under such circumstances, the plaintiff cannot recover. Mynning v. Railroad Co., 67 Mich. 677.
It is claimed that Mr. Wickham was foreman over Mr. Soderstrom, and that, because he gave the order for Soderstrom to work upon the dangerous place, the defendant was liable. We think the proofs show that Wickham was a fellow-servant, and not a vice principal; but, if it be conceded he was a vice principal, there would be no liability, for Soderstrom had the same knowledge of the danger which Wickham possessed, and was under no obligation to work under such circumstances, and, in going to work, he assumed the perils surrounding the situation. Kean v. Rolling Mills, 66 Mich. 277; Toomey v. Steel Works, 89 Mich. 249. The vice principal of the
The case was one in which the trial judge might very properly have directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, lie did not do so, but left the various questions raised by counsel to the jury. This action of the court does not entitle the plaintiff to complain.
Judgment is affirmed.