32 N.J. Eq. 329 | N.J. | 1880
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Under these conditions of this controversy the single question to be decided on this appeal is, whether the appellant has a right to proceed at law on the ground of this alleged invasion of its right to these waters in dispute, or must, under compulsion, seek redress in equity.
In entering upon this inquiry it is important to present to our minds, in a distinct and definite form, the question to be decided. That question is, whether this corporation can be compelled, against its will, to come into equity for relief against the wrong of which it complains. That wrong is, that being th.e riparian owner of certain lands through which a natural stream flows, a portion of such water has been diverted to its injury by the illegal act of the respondent. Such a cause of action being a legal one, unless from the presence of jurisdictional equities in the case, the appellant has a clear right to pursue his remedy before a common law court. In this case, this respondent, standing on such right, was urging its suits before such a tribunal. The question consequently is, whether it can be stopped in such pursuit by the hand of the chancellor. Such a prerogative manifestly depends on the existence, in the facts involved, of some equitable circumstance which, according to estab
I cannot think that, because the questions involved in this controversy are of magnitude, or are intricate, or difficult of solution, that therefore the courts of law can be divested of their jurisdiction over them. It does not appear that the importance of the matters in dispute has ever been regarded as affording any test of the cognizance of a court of equity. The 'claim, if admitted, would confer upon the court of chancery a prerogative jurisdiction over the entire field of all momentous and obscure controversies. No decision, so far as is known, has ever gone on such a principle. Nor is it perceived how such a jurisdiction can arise, because the suit relates to corporate franchises. When a corporation, under a legislative grant, claims the right to divert a natural stream away from a riparian proprietor, the matter in issue is purely a legal question, and it seems indisputable that, under ordinary circumstances, the person injured can pursue his remedy in an ordinary action at law, and such action, in the absence of qualifying conditions, is not amenable to equitable control.
Neither have I been able to discover a ground for equitable intervention in such cases, because of the principle that when several persons are entitled to the use in common of a stream of water, the distribution among them of their respective shares is an equitable function. That a court' of equity has jurisdiction in such eases is undeniable, and in the present case, if either the appellant or the respondent had applied for relief and a regulation of its right, to the court of chancery, there would appear to be no doubt of the right of such tribunal to take the controversy in charge. Such were the cases of Belknap v. Trimble, 3 Paige 577; Ballou v. Inhabitants of Hopkinton, 4 Gray 324; The Boston Water Power Company v. Boston &c. Railroad, 16 Pick. 512.
Nor have I found any authority for the doctrine that equity should intervene in this case in order to avoid that multiplicity of suits that would be incident to the continuance of the legal jurisdiction. The rule is entirely settled, that in case of private nuisances,-the person injured may vindicate his rights by repeatedly suing the wróngAoer in a court of law. The point is too clear to be discussed.
The consequence is, that on none of these grounds can the decree in question be vindicated.
There is, however, another jurisdictional claim which, remains to be examined.
This claim grows out of the alleged existence in the case of certain circumstances which, it is contended, constitute an equitable estoppel.
The facts embraced in this contention are those that relate to the acquisition by the present respondent of the
In endeavoring to measure the equitable effect of this •situation, it is of the first importance to bear.in mind that, from the beginning and all through the progress of the series of litigations which have occurred, it has ever been claimed and asserted by the Morris Canal and Banking Company that the possession by it of the waters in dispute was not only a convenience, but something very like a necessity, to the successful operation of its canal. That such right was and it is of great moment to this company, is perfectly conspicuous. The important consequence, therefore, follows, that the appellant is chargeable with the knowledge
But it is said, in the logical and learned brief of the counsel of the appellant, that the duty .of inquiry as to the title and rights of the lessor, was, upon general principles,, devolved upon the lessee. This is. undoubtedly so. The oases cited in the brief are authorities to this effect, and the rule is so well established that it is not necessary to look, into its foundation. But in the present case it is far from clear that the appellant is not chargeable with knowledge-that, under the conditions of things then existing, such inquirjq made with ordinary diligence and upon ordinary rules, would have failed to discover the claims which the appellant is now insisting on. If .the respondent, .at the; time of taking its lease, had investigated, what would it have discovered ? It would have ascertained that for over twenty years the canal company, from whom it was about
In the argument of the counsel of the appellant, it was claimed that the obligation to make an inquiry more extended in point of time than this, was imposed by law on the respondent, for it was assumed that the respondent, as a matter of course, would have ascertained, in the exercise of a due diligence, the records of the ancient litigations between these parties. But is not such a position of uncertain tenability ? The appellant, in its answer, refuses to treat those suits as lites pendentes, but says that, having served their purpose, they were mutually abandoned. The inquiry, there-' fore, arises, whether, according to any known practice, this respondent can be required to have searched for these timeworn litigations which had then been laid aside and relinquished for more than twenty years. It is manifest the point is worth a careful consideration.
But again, on the hypothesis claimed, and on the-assumption that the respondent had ransacked these records, and is, therefore, to be held responsible for tbe knowledge thus-acquired, what would be the position of the equities of this branch of the case ? It is said that the respondent would thus have known that the society was entitled to the rights a riparian owner in the waters in dispute, and that the court of chancery had so adjudged, and that the lessor of the respondent had never disputed them, but had merely-denied that its works occasioned any diminution of such water. In short, the contention is, that the respondent would-
In addition to these features of the case it should likewise be remembered that, for six years after the execution of this lease and possession of the canal had been taken under it, the respondent was suffered to proceed under such lease and make large outlays of money and incur many obligations of great magnitude, without receiving any intimation, from the appellant of its present momentous claim. •
It would not be proper, at this stage of these proceedings, to decide definitively that the foregoing circumstances constitute inevitably an equitable estoppel, for such circumstances may be deprived of some of their intrinsic force from'