567 F.2d 1133 | D.C. Cir. | 1977
Opinion for the court per curiam.
In September 1974 the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) sued certain federal officials (later succeeded by the Federal Election Commission (FEC))
In the context of this particular suit, with its special circumstances and procedures, it is clear that the order of April 19, 1977 is not a preliminary injunction, and that this court has no jurisdiction to review it. The District Court obviously was aware of the necessity in appropriate cases to provide anticipatory judicial relief against prosecutions threatening sensitive First Amendment freedoms.
Accordingly, we hold that this appeal be, and the same hereby is,
Dismissed.
. The SWP originally sued the Clerk of the U. S. House of Representatives, the Secretary of the U. S. Senate, and the Comptroller General, who were the “supervisory officers” for disclosure requirements under the Federal Election Campaign Act (hereinafter FECA) of 1971, Pub.L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the FECA of 1971 was substantially amended by the FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub.L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, and the FECA Amendments of 1976, Pub.L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475. As amended, the Act made provision for civil prosecutions by the newly-created Federal Election Commission, FECA Amendments of 1976, § 109, 2 U.S.C. § 437g (Supp. 1976), and for criminal prosecutions by the Attorney General, FECA Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 2 U.S.C. § 44 lj (Supp. 1976). Accordingly, in July 1976 plaintiffs amended their complaint to add the Federal Election Commission and the Attorney General as defendants. The Attorney General declared that he would not institute criminal actions during the pendency of this action and therefore, by order of January 17, 1977, the District Court granted the Attorney General’s motion for dismissal as to him.
. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958); Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.Supp. 248 (E.D.Ark.), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 14, 89 S.Ct. 47, 21 L.Ed.2d 14 (1968).
. See note 1 supra.
. Buckley v. Valeo, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 172, 219-220, 519 F.2d 821, 868 (1975), aff’d on these grounds, 424 U.S. 1, 71 & n.87, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (declaratory relief); Civil Service Com’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d 796 (1973); Bradley v. Saxbe, 388 F.Supp. 53, 55-56 (D.D.C.1974).
. Under the FECA as amended, the FEC has broad powers to make rules, render advisory opinions, and enter into conciliation agreements barring civil and limiting criminal prosecution. FECA Amendments of 1974, § 208(a)(8), 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(8) (Supp. 1976); FECA Amendments of 1976, §§ 108(a), 109, 2 U.S.C. §§ 437f, g (Supp.1976). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 140, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). The FEC informed the District Court that it had the power to promulgate rules creating procedures by which parties could obtain exemptions, Appellee’s Appendix at 29-30. Thus, perhaps before this litigation is over, the FEC may voluntarily or by judicial order provide exemption procedures which would eliminate the need for the court to decide some or all of the issues in this and similar cases. See Doe v. Martin, 404 F.Supp. 753 (D.D.C.1975).