188 A.D. 12 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1919
Lead Opinion
This action was brought to recover upon a benefit certificate for $1,000, issued by the defendant to John' Sobischek, Jr., in which the plaintiff was designated as the beneficiary. The complaint alleged the admission of said John Sobischek, Jr., to membership in the defendant society, issuance to him of the benefit certificate designating the plaintiff as beneficiary, performance upon the part of the said member of all the conditions required by him to be performed and the death of said member on the 2d day of November, 1916. All of these allegations were admitted by the answer, which set forth an affirmative defense to the effect that the contract of membership contained a stipulation that in case the member should within five years from and including the date of his initiation take his own life, whether sane or insane, his benefit certificate should become null and void; that five years have not elapsed since said John Sobischek, Jr., became a member of said order and that said member did take his own life by chloroform poisoning or the inhalation of chloroform vapor on the date above mentioned.
The facts are undisputed. At the opening of the case the defendant was given the affirmative of the issue and introduced practically all of the testimony. One witness was examined upon the part of the plaintiff, but his testimony is in accord with that given by the defendant.
At the time of his death, Sobischek lived at Bohemia, a small hamlet north of the village of Sayville, in the county of Suffolk. He was employed by a florist named Shevalley, at Blue Point, a village about six miles distant from Bohemia. At the time of his death he had worked for Shevalley only three days. Immediately before that he had worked for another florist about two months, and before that a few days for a man named Bom. Prior to his employment by Bom he had worked for Shevalley, the man for whom he was working at the time of his death. • His work with Shevalley required him to arise very early in the morning — about three-thirty a. m.— upon days when flowers were shipped. The night previous to his death he occupied the same bed with his wife. On the morning of Sobisehek’s death, hi° wife says she was aroused by hearing dogs barking; her dog
The decedent was of a cheerful, jovial disposition until a few days before his death. Then he became quiet and morose and told one of his fellow-workmen that it was “ the miser-ablest day ” of his life. He also said that he had stopped smoking and his friend advised him to resume smoking.
The label upon the bottle found in the cellar bore the name of Sewell Thornhill, a druggist at Sayville. Sobischek purchased chloroform from Thornhill some five months prior to his death. At the time of the purchase of this chloroform Sobischek told the druggist that he desired it for the purpose of killing a dog. His wife, the plaintiff in this action, testified that she saw the empty chloroform bottle and that her husband threw the empty bottle into the woods, and that she saw no chloroform around the house after that. An autopsy was performed and the doctor who performed the autopsy testified that death was the result of chloroform poisoning.
; The death, therefore, must have been the result either of
The judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide the event.
Jenks, P. J., and Rich, J., concurred; Putnam, J., read for affirmance, with whom Blackmar, J., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
As defendant had the burden to prove that deceased’s death was by suicide, I think the court properly directed a verdict for plaintiff, where both sides united in asking for the direction of the court. The evidence was circumstantial and left the cause of death to conjecture. Suicide is not presumed. (Mallory v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52, 54; Travellers’ Ins. Co. v. McConkey, 127 U. S. 661, 667; Connecticut Life Insurance Co. v. Akens, 150 id. 468.) Even where the alternative to suicide may be murder, as where the deceased was found dying in his back yard with a bullet wound near the heart, the presumption is still against suicide. (Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. M’Whirter, 73 Fed. Rep. 444, 449.) The circumstances here are much stronger against defendant than in many cases where the court sustained a verdict against the insurer’s claim of death by suicide. (Pythias Knights’ Supreme Lodge v. Beck, 181 U. S. 49; Kornig v.
Blackmar, J., concurred.
Judgment and order reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event.