97 Cal. 140 | Cal. | 1893
This action was brought to set aside a transfer of certain real estate, valued at one hundred thousand dollars, alleged to have been procured by defendant from his mother through the exercise of undue influence and artful schemes.
The court found, as conclusion of law, that plaintiff was not entitled to the relief claimed, and rendered judgment in favor of the defendant. From this judgment the plaintiff, by her guardian, has appealed.
The facts found, as stated above, do not warrant the court in ascribing the deed in question to undue influence. It is apparent, if the facts stated be true, and they must be so regarded, that the plaintiff was not the dupe of the defendant’s artifices, the victim of his contrivances, or in any way subjected to his sway. The defendant’s position was one of high trust and confidence, and binding him, both by honor and in law, not only to abstain from anything like craft or guile, but to be generous and fair, and his conduct should be examined with the greatest scrutiny; but there is no rule which creates a disability to take a bounty under the circumstances narrated. Transactions of the kind in question should be thoroughly sifted, but a voluntary deed, free from any imputation of undue influence, exe
There is no doubt as to the principle applicable to cases of this kind. Transactions like the one under consideration are watched by courts of equity with the most scrutinizing jealousy, and are generally held to be presumptively void. They will be set aside upon the discovery of the least fraud, and every presumption ought to be indulged against them. The person who makes the donation and bestows the confidence is not bound to show that any imposition has been practiced upon him. It is sufficient for him to establish intimate and confidential relations with the donee. Some of the cases hold that undue influence is not to be inferred from the relation of parent and child, where the gift is from the parent to the child (Millican v. Millican, 24 Tex. 446); but where the parent is of great age, or is enfeebled by disease, and conveys his entire estate to one child, to the exclusion of other children dependent upon his bounty, the burden is unquestionably upon the donee to show that the gift was made freely and voluntarily, and with full knowledge of all the facts, and with perfect understanding of the effect of the trans
At the argument, some suggestions were made which,' if true, lend a moral aspect to the case that strongly appeals to the sentiment of equity and justice, but they are not verified by the record, and if they were, it would be sufficient to say that neither courts of equity nor of law have a right to enforce mere moral obligations. The findings of the court are conclusive. They show that the plaintiff’s gift was made in the execution of a purpose long entertained by her, originating in a desire to show her appreciation of defendant’s devotion and services, and they negative expressly and entirely all the material allegations of the complaint.
It is claimed by the appellant that the transfer should be set aside because the plaintiff did not have independent advice. No case has been cited which holds that it must be shown that the donor acted upon independent advice in transactions between parent and child, when it appears that the gift was .made freely, voluntarily, and with full understanding of all the facts and the effect of the transfer. The rule in this regard is not the same ;as in the case of a gift from a client to his attorney.
In Allore v. Jewell, 94 U. S. 506, and Richards v. Donner, 72 Cal. 207, cases upon which the appellant relies, it appeared that the grantor did not fully understand the nature and effect of the conveyance. All of the cases cited contain some ingredient showing undue influence sufficient to induce the conclusion that the act was not perfectly free and voluntary on the part of the donor.
We do not regard the age of the plaintiff as a controlling fact in ,the case. Some of the greatest men of modern times have displayed the highest abilities after passing the age of threescore and ten. Notable instances of .this are found in the lives of Disraeli, Gladstone, Bismarck, and of Lord Mansfield, who left the bench at the age of eighty-four. Chancellor Kent wrote his great commentaries after he had retired from the
Garoutte, J., and Harrison, J., concurred.
Hearing in Bank denied.