Opinion by
In this trespass action for personal injuries the jury found for the plaintiff in the sum of $2,500. The lower court however on reconsideration of the question of the right of recovery concluded that the plaintiff was chargeable with contributory negligence as a matter of law and on that ground entered judgment for defendant n.o.v. The judgment must be affirmed.
At about 7:30 in the morning of December 1, 1949, plaintiff left a рassenger bus at the regular stop in the west line of Broad Street in Philadelphia just north of the drivewаy into the North Philadelphia Station *114 of the Pennsylvania Railroad. A short distance south of the drivewаy Glenwood Avenue crosses Broad Street in a north-easterly direction. Cambria Street also enters Broad Street at right angles from the east at this intersection. Plaintiff was familiar with the neighborhood and had notice of the usually heavy traffic on Broad Street; he left the bus at the same рlace every morning on his way to work. Just prior to his injury he walked in front of the standing bus and in attempting to cross Broad Street to the east at Cambria Street, on the regular pedestrian crossing, he was struck by defendant’s truck winch was then traveling south into the intersection.
On direct examination plaintiff sаid that after he stepped onto the pavement and started to cross “all I know I was hit”. And when аsked: “Did you notice any lights, traffic lights?” his answer was: “I don’t remember”. There is no contention however that his mind was a blank because of his injuries. His lack of recollection, under his testimony as a whole, is аttributable to his failure to observe conditions in the intersection before committing himself to the cróssway. Therefore he is not entitled to the benefit of a presumption of due care for fаilure of memory on the principle of
Heaps v. Southern Pa. Traction Co.,
Under the circumstances in the prеsent case it is plaintiff’s final statements on cross-examination which
*115
are controlling (Cf
Stewart et vir. v. Ray et al.,
There were mechanically operated traffic lights on each of the four cоrners of the intersection directing the movement of vehicles in the streets. But even if plaintiff had а green light in his favor when he started to cross Broad Street that fact is of no controlling importance for “A green light at a traffic intersection offers but a qualified permission to proceed, and the pedestrian crossing in reliance upon it must continually be on guard for his safety: Schroeder v. Pittsburgh Rwys. Co.,
The testimony of plaintiff’s witness Rinaldi who gаve a somewhat different version of what occurred, did not convert the question of plaintiff’s сontributory negligence into one for the jury. Since the plaintiff’s testimony shows that he was contributorily negligent we must take the case as he himself made it even though another witness may have done better for him.
Levine v. Pittsburgh Wheel. Tr. Serv. Inc.,
Judgment affirmed.
