Hаrley Snyder was charged with homicide by vehicle in the first degree, serious injury by vehicle, driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he was a less safe driver, driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration, failing to yield the right of way, and violating Georgia’s seat belt law. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, this court granted Snyder’s application for interlocutory *351 appeal. Snyder contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test. We disagree and affirm.
On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, “where the evidence is uncontrovеrted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Citations
omitted.)Vansant v. State,
The record reveals that a trooper with the Georgia State Patrol responded to the scene where two vehicles had collided. The trooper concluded that Snyder, the driver of one of the vehicles, failed to yield at a stop sign аnd struck an oncoming vehicle. The trooper detected a strong odor of alcohol on Snyder’s person and in his vehicle. Concerned that Snydеr may have had some other unknown injuries, and because emergency personnel had placed Snyder in a neck brace, the trooper did nоt conduct any field sobriety tests. He did, however, administer an alco-sensor test which registered positive for alcohol. Snyder had no visible injuries, and his pаssenger was conscious and alert with what appeared to be only minor lacerations to his face. Nevertheless, emergency medical personnel transported both Snyder and his passenger to a hospital, where his passenger later died.
The trooper contacted a public safety officer at the hospital and requested that the officer read Snyder the implied consent warning and oversee a chemical test of Snyder’s blood. The officer complied and Snyder consented to a test of his blood. Although the officer had probable cause to arrest Snydеr prior to the blood test, Snyder was not arrested. A few days following the death of the victim, a warrant was issued for Snyder’s arrest.
Snyder argues in two enumerations that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the trooper did not have probable cause to request a blood test and was required to place him under arrest prior to such a request. He contends that the subsequent death of his passenger cannot now validate what he contends was the invalid request to give his blood to test for the presence of alcohol.
OCGA § 40-5-55 (a) provides:
The State of Georgia considers that any person who drives or is in actual physical control of any moving vehicle in violation of any provision of Code Section 40-6-391 constitutes a direct and immediаte threat to the welfare and safety of the general public. Therefore, any person who operates a motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this *352 state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to Code Section 40-6-392, to a chemical test or tests of his оr her blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substances for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or any other drug, if arrested for any offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed in violation of Code Section 40-6-391 or if such person is involved in any traffic aсcident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities. The test or tests shall be administered at the request of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grоunds to believe that the person has been driving or was in actual physical control of a moving motor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state in violation of Code Section 40-6-391. The test or tests shall be administered as soon as possible to any person who operates a mоtor vehicle upon the highways or elsewhere throughout this state who is involved in any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.
Further, the Georgia Supreme Court has held that
where an individual has been involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities and the investigating law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the individual was driving under the influence of alcohol . . . the ensuing search [via chemical testing] is both warranted and constitutional.
(Emphasis in original.)
Hough v. State,
In short, one of two circumstances (in addition to probable cause) must exist to trigger the reading of implied consent: (1) if the person is involved in any traffic accident resulting in sеrious injuries or fatalities, 1 or (2) if the person is arrested for violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (DUI). Snyder argues that at the time the implied consent was read, none of the circumstances enumerated in OCGA § 40-5-55 existed, since he was not arrested and the traffic accident, at the time he was read his implied consent rights, had not resultеd in a serious injury or fatality.
The first circumstance — if arrested for violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 — contemplates that the person be arrested prior to a reаding of implied consent.
Hough,
supra,
In this case, the trooper had probable cause to believe that Snyder was driving under the influence of alcohol based upon his observations at the scene and the result of the alco-sensor test. See
Jenkins v. State,
Although we could imagine a more explicit statute concerning not only under what circumstances a person is deemed to have given consent, but also when implied consent warnings should be read, a plain reading of the statute and the holding in Hough, supra, show that the implied consent warnings and request for a blood test were valid in this case. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Snyder’s motion to suppress.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
It is undisputed that the accident did not involve serious injury as defined in OCGA § 40-5-55 (c) (“a fractured bone, severe burns, disfigurement, dismemberment, partial or total loss of sight or hearing, or loss of consciousness”).