Snyder v. PantaleoSnyder v. Pantaleo
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Baldwin
The plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Shirley C. Snyder, brought this action for alleged malpractice against the defendant and had a verdict for damages. The defendant moved to set the verdict aside and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it was contrary to the law and the evidence. The trial court denied these motions, and the defendant has appealed. The question is whether there was evidence which reasonably and logically supported the verdict.
Shirley, who lived in West Haven, was sent by her family physician, Dr. Raymond J. Zagraniski, to the defendant, a specialist in radiology practicing in New Haven, for an intravenous pyelogram, a procedure used in diagnosing kidney ailments. An iodine compound called diodrast, which is opaque to roentgen rays, is administered intravenously and outlines the affected parts so that pathological conditions otherwise not observable are disclosed. The procedure is used quite generally, although it is attended with some danger because a small percentage of patients are allergic to the iodine contained in diodrast. Iodine is deleterious to bodily tissues, and there is no known antidote for a systemic reaction to an injection of it. Because of this fact, extreme
A physician is under a duty to his patient to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Horton v. Vickers, 142 Conn. 105, 113, 111 A.2d 675; Marchlewski v. Casella, 141 Conn. 377, 380, 106 A.2d 466; Ardoline v. Keegan, 140 Conn. 552, 556, 102 A.2d 352. Usually, proof of the breach of this duty must rest upon the testimony of an expert witness qualified to state what the particular standard of care requires and to express an opinion that the treatment accorded the patient failed to meet this standard. Ardoline v. Keegan, supra; Frogge v. Shugrue, 126 Conn. 608, 612, 13 A.2d 503; Person v. Lilliendahl, 118 Conn. 693, 695, 172 A. 94; Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465, 473, 234 P.2d 34; Stryker, Courts & Doctors, p. 84; Herzog, Medical Jurisprudence, § 192. Cases in which the want of care and skill is so obvious as to compel a conclusion of negligence furnish the only exception to this rule. Slimak v. Foster, 106 Conn. 366, 370, 138 A. 153; Chubb v. Holmes, 111 Conn. 482, 486, 150 A. 516. The case at bar does not come within the exception.
The evidence submitted to the jury admits of two possible versions of what happened after Shirley was prepared for the examination. The jury could have found from the testimony of the defendant that lie made a so-called skin test which produced nothing
The jury, however, could have found that the defendant, when he talked with Dr. Zagraniski later in the morning in question, gave him a substantially different version of what had taken place. Dr. Zagraniski made a note in the hospital records of what the defendant had said. It reads as follows: “This A.M. [Shirley] was seen by [Dr. Pantaleo] who skin-tested her and got a one-plus reaction. He gave her a few ce. [of diodrast] intravenously and then gave her three minims adrenalin for her flush and feeling of weakness. He gave the rest of the-
In
Slimak
v.
Foster,
106 Conn. 366, 370, 138 A. 153, we said: “[W]e are unable to agree with the trial court that the plaintiff’s evidence was necessarily so lacking in the expert testimony required by the rule as to thereby defeat his recovery. To be sure, there was no specific expression of opinion that the conduct of the defendant was negligent or unskillful, the expert witnesses being manifestly and naturally cautious in characterization, in the absence of more exact information as to the precise
In reviewing the court’s ruling on the motions, we must accord to the plaintiff the most favorable inferences and conclusions which the evidence will admit. A trier of fact, whether court or jury, may accept part of the testimony of any witness although it rejects the rest. It cannot, however, cull statements from the testimony of an expert which in and of themselves are not complete but are dependent upon other testimony. With these generally accepted principles in mind, we can state the facts the jury could reasonably and logically have found as follows: The use of diodrast demanded extreme caution because of its dangerous potentialities and
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.