73 P. 22 | Utah | 1903
(after stating the facts).— It is insisted by plaintiff that if the property in question was not exempt to the Easband brothers respectively, so as to be subject to levy and sale by the defendants, that then title to the same passed to the plaintiff under the assignment of all the assignor’s property, except exempt property. It may be noted that this land was not scheduled, nor in any manner taken possession of by the assignee, the plaintiff. In fact, he appeared as counsel for Easband Bros, in the attachment proceedings without making claim in himself to the property. The plaintiff likewise appeared as attorney for the administrator of the Easband estate in the earlier stages of the administration proceedings, but at no time, so far as appears from the evidence, suggested, except to the administrator, that he claimed any interest in the estate by reason of the deed of assignment. The property in litigation was no doubt exempt from execution to the
The question here as to the validity, upon collateral
It was decided in Chever v. Ching Hong Poy (Cal.), 22 Pac. 1081, where the estate was distributed to the heir, and he had previously conveyed, that he was es-topped by reason of his deed of conveyance from disputing the title of his grantee. In the case at bar the question does not arise between grantor and grantee, but between alléged grantees of the same grantors. In re Vaughn’s Estate (Cal.), 28 Pac, 221, it was held that the grantee of the heirs was entitled, under section 1678, to have the estate distributed to him. If it be the duty of the court to distribute to the grantee of an heir, legatee, or devisee the share in the estate held by him by assignment, such decree should be given some effect against not only the heir, legatee, and devisee, but also as against their grantees. Such grantees are all before the court upon constructive notice, in the same manner as heirs, creditors, and other persons interested in the estate. The distinction should also be noted between an adjudication of claims among heirs and their grantees, and claims which dispute the title of the estate itself. Of the latter are such cases as In re Singleton’s Estate (Nev. 1901), 64 Pac. 513, and the authorities there cited, in which the court of probate is denied “jurisdiction to adjudicate disputed rights against the estate. ’ ’
At an early day in California, the Supreme Court of that State, in passing upon section 264 of the probate
While the case of Freeman v. Rahm, 58 Cal. 111, supporting the same doctrine, seems to be criticised in Chever v. Ching Hong Poy, supra, it is approved in the later case of Crew v. Pratt, 119 Cal. 149, 51 Pac. 42.
It is not necessary to consider the other questions discussed by counsel.
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs