137 Ind. 449 | Ind. | 1894
This was a suit brought by appellants, Anna Snyder, George Snyder, and Lillie S. Keefer, against the appellees, William L. Jetton, Thomas J. Jet-ton, and Lydia A. Jetton, in the St. Joseph Circuit Court on the 27th day of December, 1887, to set aside the conveyance of real estate described in the complaint, made by the appellees, Thomas J. and Lydia A. Jetton, to their co-appellee, William L. Jetton, who is the father of said Thomas.
The complaint, which is in one paragraph, shows that the appellants are the owners of an unpaid judgment against the appellee, Thomas J. Jetton, and alleges that the conveyance was made with the intention, participated in by all the appellees, of cheating, hindering and delaying the creditors of said Thomas.
On the 14th day of October, 1885, Thomas J. Jetton unlawfully killed William Snyder, the husband of Anna Snyder, and the father of the other two appellants. At the time of the homicide, appellee Thomas J. Jetton held the legal title to the land described in the complaint. On the 17th day of November following, Thomas J. Jetton and his wife joined in the conveyance of the real estate to his father, William L. Jetton. On the 19th day of October, 1886, appellant, Anna Snyder, as administratrix of the estate of William Snyder, deceased, recovered a judgment against Thomas J. Jetton, in the St. Joseph Circuit Court, in the sum of five thousand dollars damages for the unlawful killing of said William Snyder. Execution was issued upon said judgment; and no property found. Subsequent to the recovery of said judgment, and prior to the filing of the complaint herein, said administratrix made her final report to the St. Joseph Circuit Court and was discharged; and said judgment is in full force and unappealed from.
The case was put at issue by an answer in general denial. On the 23d day of March, 1888, the cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury, and the evidence was heard. On the 14th day of January, 1889, the court rendered special findings of fact and stated its conclusion of law thereon as follows: “That on the 22d day of October, 1879, William L. Jet-ton, being owner of the following described land, to wit: The north half ( X ) of the southeast quarter (X ), and the southwest quarter of the northeast quarter, and the
To this conclusion of law, the appellants, at the time, excepted.
On the same day, appellants filed their motion for a new trial, which was overruled, to which ruling of the court appellants, at the time, excepted.
On the 15th day of January, 1889, the court rendered final judgment upon the conclusion of law stated.
The errors assigned in this court are two in number:
First. The court erred in stating its conclusion of law.
Second. The court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial.
The appellants, in the court below, after introducing formal proof of the ownership of the land by Thomas J. Jetton, the killing of William Snyder by him, the relationship of the plaintiffs, the value of the land, and the insolvency of Thomas J. Jetton at the time of the conveyance, and at the time of filing the complaint in this cause — about all of which facts there was no controversy —rely wholly upon the testimony of William L. Jetton, one of the appellees, and grantee in the deed, taken on examination of the parties under sections 518 and 519, Burns’ Rev. 1894.
The learned counsel for the appellants, in his very
He contends that the facts established are substantially as follows: In 1879, William L. Jetton advanced to his son the land in dispute, retaining a lease which provided for the payment to the father, by the son, of $300 a year during the life of himself and wife, or the survivor, with a provision in the contract that in case he defaulted any payment, the father might take possession of the land and have the actual use of it until the death of himself and wife, or the survivor, but there was no such agreement or arrangement between the parties as would constitute the relation of vendor and vendee. There was a verbal agreement and understanding that if, at the death of the father, he did not leave property enough to equal the land at $8,000 valuation, the son was to pay enough to the sister to make an equal distribution of the father’s estate, taking into consideration the advancement to the son at $8,000; that in 1885 the appellants became creditors of the son, at which time he made a voluntary conveyance of all the land, and turned over to his father personal property to the value of $800, which constituted the entire property of all kinds of which Thomas J. Jet-ton was the owner; that the father at various times paid out for the son sums aggregating in amount $923.49, less the proceeds of the personal property which he received from him; that the entire transaction took place by reason of the anxiety of both the father and son that the farm should not be subjected to sale for the payment of the demand which the appellants held against the latter; that the conveyance of this property was at the special instance and request of the debtor for the purpose
It is also contended to have been the idea on which the parties acted, that inasmuch as the son had never paid the father any consideration for the land, he might deed it back to him, in the emergency in which he found himself, because of the prior gift, and we are reminded of the rule that such circumstances will not constitute a consideration to sustain the conveyance as against creditors.
“A gratuity can not be subsequently converted into a debt so as to become the consideration of a conveyance made by the grantor to the injury of his creditors.” Wait’s Fraud. Conv., 209, citing “Clay v. McCally,” 4 Woods, 605; Susong v. Williams, 1 Heiskell (Tenn.), 631.
Counsel sets out in his brief an abstract of much of the testimony of the father, from which he draws his conclusions.
It is not essential to this opinion that we should embody in it an epitome of the evidence on which appellants rely for a reversal of the case. It is enough to say that there is testimony in the record from which an inference of fraud could have been drawn by the trial court, that would not be disturbed by us, but it does not follow from an examination of the whole evidence that the judgment rendered should be reversed.
It appears from an examination of all his evidence,
The following testimony tends to sustain the judgment: In answer to interrogatory 20 William L. Jetton states that he had $8,000 which his son owed him, and then he let him have $2,000 to build a house.
In answer to interrogatory 21, replying to the question as to how the claim of $8,000 originated, and what kind of a claim it was, he said: “The same as any other kind of a claim.”
In answer, to interrogatory 22 he says he did not know as there was much of anything in the way of evidence to show for it, that it was agreed it should fall back to him whenever the son failed to pay for it. There was a life lease.
We also quote the following questions and answers:
Int. 36. Is it not a fact that you deeded this land to him as an advancement, which, after your death, was to be applied to his interest in your estate? Ans. No, sir; not at all.
Int. 39. This land, the value of it $8,000, was to be considered in the accounting, when they equalized your estate. What do you mean by saying you have a claim of $8,000 against this land? Ans. That was what the land was valued at.
Int. 40. What do you mean by saying you hold a
In answer to interrogatory 44 he says that in a conversation had about the conveyance of the land his son Thomas said: “We owe you for the place. You let us have some money to build a house, etc.” This conversation was had after Thomas was in jail, but before the suit for damages was instituted.
Int. 50. At the time you took the deed from Thomas Jetton you had been advised, had you not, that Mrs. Snyder had a good cause of action against Thomas Jet-ton as damage for the killing? Ans. No, sir; I never thought of such a thing. It never came into my mind, and he didn’t think it, either.
In answer to interrogatory 68 he states that Thomas said: “We had better deed the place back to father.” “We don’t pay anything on it, and we haven’t paid what we agreed to pay yearly, and you gave us the money to put up a house, and we propose to deed the place back to you and make you safe.”
Int. 69. Did you mean the expenses you were about to incur in aiding him in his defense? Ans. I included that in what he owed me.
Int. 70. You say he owed you how much? Ans. He owed me over $11,000.
Int. 72. I asked what he owed you at the time the deed was made? Ans. He owed me, outside of the farm, well nigh $4,000, including these debts.
Int. 92. Don’t you know that you simply took the deed from Thomas Jetton for the purpose of aiding him in preventing Mrs. Snyder from collecting any damages? Ans. No, sir; it was the last of my thoughts. I never thought of a suit for damages going to be commenced at all when he gave me the deed.
Int. 94. At the time you took this deed, if I under
Int. 132. Didn’t you know, as a matter of fact, that at the time Thomas Jetton took the deed of the land from you, he never promised to pay you a dollar for it, excepting $300 a year? Ans. I don’t know any such a thing. If he did not pay me he had to pay the rent.
Int. 139. Do you remember what consideration was mentioned in the deed? What you paid to Thomas? Ans. Eight thousand dollars.
Int. 140. Do you remember, whether, in that deed, you acknowledged the receipt of that? Ans. I signed the deed, if that is what you call it. I recollect signing the deed.
Int. 141. Do you recollect that in signing it you signed an acknowledgment that you received the $8,000? Ans. No, sir; I don’t know I acknowledged I received that.
Int. 142. You say, as a fact, that you did not receive anything? Ans. No, sir; not a dollar of it.
Int. 144. State whether, at the time you took the deed from Thomas J. Jetton, you believed him guilty of any crime whatever, or whether you thought he killed William Snyder in self-defense and was innocent of having done a criminal act? What was your belief at the time you took the deed? Ans. I did not think he was guilty of any criminal act. I think he done it in self-defense; that was my opinion. I was not there. From the circumstances that happened before, I think Thomas had no idea of anything else. He would not have bothered or touched him if he had stayed away.
Int. 145. Was that your belief? Ans. It was. From threats he has made to Thomas, and at other times,
The testimony of John Dixon contains the following:
Int. 1. You drew the deed which has been introduced here in evidence, by which William Jetton conveyed the land to Thomas Jetton? Ans. Yes, sir; I did.
Int. 2. And also this lease? Ans. Yes, sir.
Int. 5. Please state as to what was the consideration. Ans. Thomas Jetton agreed to pay him $8,000.
Int. 6. How was it to be paid? What was said? State what occurred? State the facts? Ans. They called on me to make the deed, and I asked what was the consideration, and they said $8,000.
■Int. 7. How was it to be paid? Ans. That was to be paid when the father wanted it. If he wanted to draw it out, he could take it.
Int. 8. Was there any note taken? Ans. No, sir; no note taken.
The testimony of Thomas J. Jetton was substantially as follows:
Int. 1. When you bought this land, what agreement was made between you and your father? What was the actual price? Ans. $8,000.
Int. 3. What agreement was made as to whether it should be paid? Ans. There was no certain time as to when it should be paid.
Int. 4. Under what consideration, if any, was it to be paid? Ans. If he needed it or wanted it, he was to call on me and I was to pay him what I owed him.
He also testifies that at the time he deeded the land to his father he was not aware that Mrs. Snyder had a claim of any kind against him for damages.
From the foregoing quotations of evidence, it appears that the land was sold by William L. Jetton to his son for the sum of $8,000; and that the son was to pay the
It further appears that William L. Jetton took the deed in good faith, without any knowledge or suspicion that the administrator of William Snyder had, or could have, any claim against the son, and without any knowledge of any debts due from the son, except those he agreed to pay.
The court below heard all of this testimony, and was of the opinion that the deed was made in good faith and was not in any respect fraudulent.
We can not, under the well settled rules of this court, overthrow the conclusion reached. It is true Thomas J. Jetton should pay the judgment rendered against him, but if we were sitting as a trial court, with the evidence in this cause before us, we would hesitate to enter a decree depriving William L. Jetton of this property. He and his wife are about seventy years of age, and the farm in litigation, from the evidence, represents the most of the accumulations of an industrious life. To deprive him of it on this testimony would be inequitable and a severe punishment for the tort of the son.
We find no error in the record.
The judgment is affirmed.