Snyder v. Charlotte Public School District

123 Mich PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT v CHARLOTTE SNYDER 16, 1982, Lansing. at 60659. Submitted June Docket No. Decided 8, February appeal granted, 1983. Leave to 417 Mich 1041. Academy. at Christian is a student Charlotte Brenda program not Brenda’s did offer a band Because Snyder, attempted parents, in enroll her David and Patricia High She course offered Charlotte Junior School. the band Public School District’s refused because of Charlotte was allowing policy its schools full-time attendance brought against Snyders an action the school students. The seeking require injunction which would the district district an Court, Brenda the band class. The Eaton Circuit to admit Robinson, J., plaintiffs had no of action held cause Richard appeal. appeal, complaint. On dismissed Plaintiffs appellant. Attorney General has intervened as an Plaintiffs policy district’s violates the First and contend that to the Amendments United States Constitution Fourteenth contrary to Held: is statute. required to offer shared-time 1. A school district However, do must once it elected to so it instruction. has provide regard to the the instruction without personal dis- of the individual student. The school convictions permissibly this case not to make its courses trict in elected any available to but full-time students. guarantee policy 2. The district’s does not either the violate equal guarantee of the free exercise of or the protection by the of the The reasons district law. advanced adoption reasonably operation of to the are related Furthermore, adoption plaintiffs’ school district. [1, [3, [8, ^[6] [7,11] 16A Am [4, 68 Am Jur 8, 9] 2, 5] 46 Am Jur gion 9] 68 Am Jur 10] Am68 68 Am Jur clauses of Federal Constitution. 37 L Ed 2d Court cases 2d, Judges Jur Jur References 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, 2d, Schools § Schools Schools 215. Constitutional Law §§ Schools involving § 220. for Points § 290. 283. § § 304.5. establishment and freedom Headnotes 473. 1147. of reli- Snyder v Charlotte position provide potential "entangle- for excessive ment” between the school district and the exercise of religion. empowered 3. The school district offer courses of those desirable, study necessary including which it deems or certain auxiliary services as health such services and remedial educa- auxiliary tion. not Band instruction is such an service. support part 4. failed claim Plaintiffs to their of bias the on judge. of the trial Affirmed. Burns, J., that, despite T. M. dissented. He hold the policy appears face,

fact the school that district’s neutral its on impermissibly' against its is effect discriminates the plaintiffs acting according who are to the of dictates sending religious nonpublic beliefs in a Brenda to school. The policy plaintiffs’ rights freely to violates the exercise their religious by conditioning right beliefs the to enroll Brenda in right foregoing the band on the of choice the to her in a enroll by school. The reasons advanced the district are not justify plaintiffs’ sufficient to the burden on exercise the Judge rights. entry Burns would reverse and order of an appropriate injunction. op

Opinion the Court — 1. Schools Shared Time. may permissibly any

A local school district decline to offer shared instruction, public time in which the school district makes general available courses in its curriculum to both and students; however, once a district chooses instruction, participation may depend upon offer such not particular personal convictions of the individual student, — — Equal 2. Schools Shared Time Protection. proper The standard of review to determine a school whether district’s decision not to offer time shared instruction violates equal protection standard, relationship” is the "rational not the "compelling state interest” standard. Religion. — 3. Schools enrolling

A local school district’s of students full-time deny in its courses does not a school student the free where, of policy, exercise because of the district permitted student is school. attend a class 123 Policy — — 4. Schools of Discretion. School District Abuse providing decisions in courses of a school board’s Review study necessary or desirable utilizes the standard of it deems appropriate "arbitrary capricious” and or "abuse of discretion” review, bodies; presumption in such administrative propriety and board’s in favor of the reasonableness actions. Auxiliary — —

5. Band Services Instruction. "auxiliary which not an service” Band instruction is provided to all of the district school district residents (MCL statutory authority pursuant rule administrative 340.292). AC, 380.1296; 15.41296;1979 R MSA Presumption Impartiality. Judges — 6. litigant judge presumed impartial fair and a to be A trial proof. challenging heavy presumption ahas burden of T. M. Religion — Compelling — 7. Constitutional Law Freedom Interest. State freely one’s beliefs is fundamen- exercise interest; infringes upon categorization which tal upheld upon showing compelling only of a state be interest. Religion — — Neutral Rules. 8. Schools religious Application of a rule which results in discrimi- neutral permissible; allowing nation is not a school district’s participate of instruc- full-time students to in its courses face, tion, against while a student neutral on its discriminates private beliefs who attends school because of her who a class in school which is wishes to attend not offered school. Religion. — 9. Schools responsibility the district is

A school to the district’s residents neutral in the face differences. Auxiliary — — 10. Schools Shared Time Services. resources, using time’’ which "Shared is a method of equated auxiliary nonmandatory services such cannot be with as health care and remedial education. Religion. — 11. Constitutional Freedom of Law religion Constitu- The free exercise of clause of the United States v Charlotte Opinion of the Court prevail tion must over the establishment of clause (US I). Const, where the two conflict Am Swarthout, Kenneth L. plaintiffs. for Frank J. Kelley, Louis J. General, Attorney Caruso, General, Solicitor and Gerald F. Young Zimmer, and Paul J. Assistants General, Attorney intervening appellant. Thrun, Maatsch & Nordberg, P.C. (by Thomas J. Nordberg Eschelbach), Michael A. for defen- dant.

Amici Curiae:

Michigan Association of Nonpublic Schools (by Hubbell). Stuart D.

Michigan Levin, Education Association (by Levin, Dill, Ellmann). Garvett & by Erwin B.

Michigan Association of School Boards (by Linda Bruin). L. Holbrook,

Before: D. E. Jr., P.J., and T. M. Burns and J. McDonald,* E. JJ.

J. McDonald, E. J. Plaintiffs David and Patricia Snyder, and their daughter, minor plaintiff Brenda Snyder, reside Eaton County, Michigan, where Brenda is enrolled in grade the sixth at the Char- lotte Christian Academy. Patricia Snyder attempted to enroll Brenda in the band course offered by the Charlotte High Junior School. The principal of the school refused to admit Brenda for * judge, sitting Circuit Appeals by assignment. on the Court of The majority opinion J., as McDonald, approved by written J. E. was Jr., P.J., Holbrook, prior D. E. Judge to the death of McDonald. The opinion released, however, 8,1983. was not filed and February until Mich op Opinion the Court the school district’s of because instruction

band allowing of policy in its schools attendance students. full-time plaintiffs September 1981, 8, filed

Thereafter, on seeking County an Court Charlotte Circuit the Eaton suit injunction requiring Public defendant class. Brenda to band to admit District School September 25, Following on trial held a bench judgment of action and of no cause final complaint plaintiffs’ rendered was dismissal right. appeal judge. as of Plaintiffs the trial Attorney Michigan has State of General parties appellant, and various an intervened as amici curiae. have filed as plaintiffs appeal, that defendant contend On denying to its admission school district’s Amend- First and Fourteenth violates the courses ments to and, fur- Constitution the United States acting without statu- ther, tory authority. board is that the school analysis plaintiffs’ of judgment careful After disagree arguments, and affirm the we the trial court.

I. Considerations Constitutional rely heavily Court’s on the Plaintiffs Attorney City Dist v decision in Traverse School General, for the NW2d .185 proposition to offer has refused defendant thereby Brenda, instruction to "shared time” band equal protection denying and coerc- her of the law constitutionally ing choosing her her into between freely guaranteed right her exercise training. Defendant and her desire for musical provide any counters that kind of shared time instruction whatsoever it has elected not

and is authority statutory within its constitutional and doing so. Snyder v Charlotte Opinion op the Court

The Court discussed the concept of shared time instruction at length in Traverse City, supra, a case which involved certified questions regarding the C, constitutionality Proposal an 1963, 8, amendment to Const art 2. Proposal C § prohibited the state or any municipality from directly aiding or indirectly private or other non- public schools. Consideration of Proposal C re- quired the Court to consider the ramification for shared time instruction as it has existed Michi- gan since 1921. The Court defined shared time as: operation whereby public "an school district makes general available courses in its curriculum to both public nonpublic school students normally on the premises public school.” 384 fn 3.

The Court invalidated part Proposal C which prohibited categorically any support for nonpublic school part-time students instruction public institutions, received at holding that such a prohibition violates the free exercise of religion equal protection guaranteed of the laws federal constitution. 384 Mich 414-415. In discuss- ing the implications constitutional of the amend- ment, the Court stated: "The Attorney interpretation Proposal General’s C

severely curtails the right constitutional of school selec- tion while the state by Proposal interests advanced C do require upon intrusion the exercise of a funda- mental right. constitutional Consequently, excluding private school receiving children from shared time in- struction denial of auxiliary or public services at the school is a equal protection. This does not mean that a public school district must offer shared time instruction auxiliary services; it means that if it does offer them public school, children at the 123 Mich Opinion of the Court right them at the also have a to receive

school students public school. participa- is denied school student

"When auxiliary funded shared time courses or publicly tion in because, at of his services offered nonpublic school student and he attends a status as a conviction, he also has a private school out imposed upon freely exercise his his burden protected right religion. constitutionally of the free legal religion is violated when a classifica- exercise of upon practice tion has a coercive effect being justified by compelling a state interest. without * * * above, pointed compelling are no As out there by Proposal justify state interests advanced C which attending placed burden on the choice of (Citations omitted; religious conviction.” school out of emphasis added.) 384 Mich 432-433. language together When this is considered with time”, it the Court’s definition of "shared is clear partici- that, that the Court while meant pation in shared time instruction could not turn seeking participate, on the status of the student the initial decision to offer shared time instruction discretionary Only with the local school district. after the initial decision to offer shared time in- struction has been made are the constitutional equal nondiscriminatory strictures of ment treat- imposed. permissibly may A school district any decline to offer shared time instruction what- soever; however, once it to offer such chooses participation depend upon instruction, particular personal convictions of the individual student. developed imple- case,

In this defendant has policy mented a of nonadmission to its courses to any but full-time resident students. Defendant has developed and administered on a consis- its tent and evenhanded It basis. has not denied Snyder v Charlotte Opinion op the Court class Brenda admission its band because beliefs. her The district has simply elected not make its available courses non- City, supra, school students. Traverse indi- within rights cates that it was its do so. Conse- is not with the quently, plaintiffs’ remedy courts but, rather, to elect school board which will change policy. the district’s Supreme Court,

Decisions of the United States City, supra, which Traverse with consis- fully tent, support the conclusion that pol- defendant’s in no icy way contravenes the First and Four- teenth Amendments to the States United Constitu- fact, tion. In these cases demonstrate presents case fide no bona constitutional issue. Harrison, Norwood v US S Ct 37 L Ed 2d rejected the Court contention that a state’s refusal to lend free text- books to racially discriminatory nonpublic schools constituted an invidious classification and denied equal protection simply parents because the had chosen to protected exercise constitutionally right to nonpublic send their children to schools. Although dispute that involved racial discrimina- tion, the Court discussed at length implications of the First Amendment in resolving permissi- ble boundaries state nonpublic of aid to schools. that, The Court noted appellees while the had intimated that the state must provide assistance to private equivalent schools it provides to that to schools, public "Clearly, the need church-spon- State not. Even to as * * *, any

sored schools negated, right equal absolute to aid was implication, Kurtzman, at by least in Lemon v (1971).” US 91 S Ct 29 L Ed 2d US 462. App 56 123 Mich Opinion of the Court that, noted since the Court further confine strictly First Amendment of the

clauses education, could a state aid to sectarian state legislative pol- of a matter conclude as rationally to as sectarian neutrality that constitutional icy withholding all achieved might be best schools Id. assistance. Sisters, Pierce v Society cited

Plaintiffs have (1925), for 571; 69 L Ed 1070 510; 45 S Ct US right to their constitutional that proposition requires defen- nonpublic school Brenda to a send However, to her. classes open its band dant Norwood, supra, 413 US Court, contention: that explicitly rejected private right of "In Pierce the Court affirmed the nothing any operate; said to exist and schools supposed with or schools are cated for education classification is one maintenance of to share schools private equal largesse, on an basis public in state schools if It never been held has otherwise. allo- funds given not some share into a are isolated that such schools It Equal Protection Clause. violative the say prohibit not thing say that a State quite another to private schools and must, equal protection, matter of schools as a such receive state aid.” Norwood, have, conformity courts with

Other plain- claims similar to those advocated rejected Kaufmann, F Luetkemeyer tiffs herein. (WD 1973), 888; 95 S Ct ail’d Mo, 419 US Supp 376 held that 167; 42 L 2d 134 the Court Ed transporta- provided statute which bus Missouri stu- nonpublic not tion to students but equal protec- unconstitutionally deny dents did not children process tion and due rights. forego them to their free exercise by forcing that Pierce did There, the Court reiterated Snyder v Charlotte op Opinion the Court imply that the constitution all required services may which a state decide provide provided nonpublic schools must also be schools. Griffin, Cook v in Similarly, the court 47 App Div 23; (1975), 2d NYS2d that held there was no equal protection refusing violation in to provide transportation bus school students for a field In trip. holding, so the Court noted: dealing not question are with the of what a "[W]e district do but school 2d what it must do.” 47 Div 28; 637. NYS2d Norwood and its sequels compel conclusion that the proper standard of for review defendant’s not, plaintiffs aver, policy as the "compelling standard, state interest” but rather the "rational Luetkemeyer Court, relationship” standard. The McGowan Maryland, citing 366 US 81 S Ct 6 L Ed 2d for its choice of the relationship standard, rational held that the plain- required tiffs were establish that state deci- to deny transportation sion to nonpublic bus school students wholly arbitrary was and capri- supra, cious. Luetkemeyer, 382. case, defendants state that the reasons

for their residency full-time include the fact part-time admission of students cause a dilution program regularly en- rolled students disproportionate taking of resources, scarce the administrative and educa- tional in advantages full-time attendance single school, and that permitting part-time admis- sion would an cause overall decline full-time student enrollment resulting in a decline of state aid. We agree with defendants these reasons are rationally related to the operation of a event, district. In any indicate that they App 123 Opinion of the Court capri- arbitrary certainly is

district’s cious. indicat- at trial addition, testimony there was

In program time of a shared ing implementation that the between extensive coordination require schools, a nonpublic and schools public Charlotte of unconsti- spectre the evokes which itself notion 349; 95 S Pittenger, 421 US In Meek v tutionality. (1975), Supreme the Court 1753; 44 L Ed 2d Ct need for surveillance continuing that the stated nonpublic cur- public and integration of over the great poten- too presented and functions ricula in a violation of resulting "entanglement”, tial for for In Americans United First Amendment. Porter, & State v Supp 485 F of Church Separation (WD that Mich, 1980), the court stated 432, 440 excessive en- indicator of "monitoring is itself an tanglement”. re- entanglement for excessive potential nonpublic of the coordination

quired by disposes plaintiffs’ activities students’ unrestricted statu- Brenda has an argument that schools. at defendant’s right to attend courses tory 380.1147; provides 15.41147 MSA Although MCL to attend right has a that a school district resident to the district, right subject in Indeed, Amendment. limitations First right if has the argued plaintiff may defendant’s notwithstanding attend band classes her extends policy, full-time residency art, without restric- and other classes chemistry, tion, that struck in a similar resulting situation Porter, school was down where supporting while able to offer a full curriculum Court’s decision part of it. While this State Su- Education v Citizens to Advance Public Instruction, 65 Mich perintendent Public Snyder v Charlotte Opinion of the Court (1975), 168; 237 lv NW2d den 397 Mich 854 parties appeal, upheld all to this cited arrangement an of shared time secular educa- premises programs operated on tional nonpublic leased from schools, well the decision be of constitutionality analysis dubious if the Porter fact, followed gan federal courts. the Michi- anticipated holding Court supra, Meek, that extensive coordination of activi- posed ties between schools great potential entanglement too when it supra, City, remarked in Traverse 384 Mich 417: special "It should needless to observe circum- stances not considered above create unconstitu- religious entanglements, tional but shared time in and of itself not.” does policy enrolling only sum, of defendant’s full- deny

time in students its courses does not to religion guar- Brenda the free exercise of anteed policy the First Amendment. does Nor its Michigan subject violate the 1963, Constitution of interpretation 1, § 4, art is which similar to that of the First Amendment to the United Advisory Opinion States Constitution. re Constitu- tionality 1970, 100, of PA 82; No (1970), app NW2d 265 28 L Ed dis US S 91 Ct (1971). policy Likewise, 2d does deny protection equal Brenda the of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 1963, States 1, Constitution and Const art §2. Statutory

II. Considerations Defendant, as a district, third class school is grades, authorized to establish and maintain the App 56 123 Mich Opinion the Court of schools, study or courses of departments and maintenance or desirable necessary deems MCL of education. improvement and 15.4244(a). man- statutory This 380.244(a); MSA 380.1282; 15.41282. in MCL MSA is reiterated date pursuant district’s actions of a school Review authority arbitrary utilizes grant of appropri- standard capricious or abuse-of-discretion in presumption administrative is bodies. ate propriety reasonableness favor Superintendent Hiers Detroit actions. board’s Schools, 234-235; 136 NW2d 376 Mich (1965). defendant’s refusal We do not believe was such an abuse enroll Brenda band class pursuant to the action was taken discretion. This and reasonable long-standing district’s in its enrollment schools. requiring full-time Nevertheless, argue defendant plaintiffs required pursu- to enroll Brenda band class was respecting "auxiliary statutory ant to its duties however, untenable, argument services”. This not an ser- auxiliary because band instruction vice. statute empowered by

Local school districts are their stu- provide certain services for auxiliary 380.1296; provides: dents. MSA 15.41296 MCL provides auxiliary "The of a school that board district specified pupils in services in this section to its resident elementary grades provide the shall the secondary and pupils in auxiliary equal same the services on an basis to elementary secondary grades and at pay for schools. The board the use state school aid to auxiliary in- auxiliary services. The services shall examinations; nursing clude health and and services crossing guards services; educa- street tion act national defense services; testing speech language teacher of and services; services; psychologi- school social work services; cal teacher for handi- consultant services Charlotte Opinion of the Court capped pupils ancillary and other services for the hand- reading; icapped; remedial and other deter- services legislature. Auxiliary mined the services shall be provided promulgated under rules the state board.” indicates,

As the statute the state board of edu- cation is authorized to promulgate rules governing the provision of auxiliary services. Rule 340.292 of Michigan Administrative Code describes which services are included within the statutory authori- zation. These include health nursing and examina- tions, speech correction services and remedial reading services. Band instruction conspicuously absent.

Auxiliary were services discussed by the Michi- City, Traverse supra, gan Supreme Court 418-419, where stated: statutory "By practical definition and application, special auxiliary services are educational de- services signed remedy physical and mental deficiencies provide school children and physical for their health safety. Functionally, general and they are health and safety measures. auxiliary general "Since services are health wel- and measures, fare they have only incidental an relation to instruction of They school children. are related to educational by design instruction that purpose and they provide seek to physical children, health safety of school or they treat physical and mental deficiencies of school children so that such children can learn peers.” like their normal City Traverse

Plaintiffs argue that Court did distinguish between time auxiliary shared services, implying concepts two are inter- changeable. This assertion lan- incorrect. The quoted guage above clearly indicates App 123 56 Mich Opinion of the Court health and the characteristic recognized Court time, on Shared services. auxiliary nature of safety any hand, provision the other includes the chooses the local school district which course offer. to be an cannot be construed

Band instruction imple- the under the statute or auxiliary service Further, the Court menting rule. supra, Mich noted that City, Traverse auxil- provision restrictions attend certain services: iary auxiliary- course, regarding this Court holds "Of what in the is limited to those services enumerated

services auxiliary states services not service clause the act which act. The services other auxiliary services shall include 'such that legislature’ does as be determined any give legislature check to make a blank the reach safety and measure outside health calling it Proposal simply by auxiliary an service.” C argument that has defendant Consequently, instruction statutory duty provide band in fact as has auxiliary Brenda an service no basis logic rejected. and is claim plaintiffs’ note that Finally, briefly we is meritless. judge that trial demonstrated bias Co, In S C Inc v Ford Motor Gray, that this Court stated NW2d impar- presumed that a trial is fair and judge tial, has a litigant challenge who burden. heavy burden. Plaintiffs have met this judge the trial transcript clearly reveals appro- dispute applicable decided this on the of law. priate principles

III. Conclusion of auxil- provision Plaintiffs’ contention that Charlotte T. M. iary and shared services time instruction man- datory City simply under the Traverse decision is City without foundation. The Traverse decision did authority not alter the board’s to establish atten- policies curricula, dance scope or nor did it alter the providing in

of the board’s discretion auxil- iary services. Defendant’s contention it was required not iary band offer instruction as an auxil- required

service, and not that was to offer any whatsoever, shared time instruction is correct. plaintiffs’

We find no violation of constitutional rights in the denial band instruction to Brenda Snyder public Likewise, at school. find we no statutory by violation defendant its full-time residency policy. certainly While defendant had the discretion to offer time shared band instruc- authority require tion, Court this finds no defen- dant to so. do

The decision of trial court is affirmed. Jr., P.J., D. E. Holbrook, concurred. (dissenting). agree T. M. J. I cannot with majority’s policy conclusion that defendant’s deny "does not to Brenda the free exercise religion guaranteed by the First Amendment”. argument The thrust of this is defendant is discriminating against plaintiffs not because of policy Instead, beliefs. defendant’s merely "evenhandedly” pre-empts Brenda from taking majority silently band instruction. The as- plaintiffs that, sumes because not do have send parochial they school, Brenda to the have made plain- by However, their choice and it. must abide really They tiffs parochial have no choice. sent Brenda

school in obedience to their Unfortunately, dictates. this school does not offer policy precludes enrolling band and defendant’s 123 Burns, M.T. Therefore, defen- class. school band applica- policy in its discriminates neutral dant’s against to send exercise their those who tion majority school. to a their children ignores clear mandate to "ac- the constitution’s religion”. commodate policy undoubtedly discriminates

Defendant’s limiting school stu- to full-time admission issue district. The real is within the school dents per- discriminatory or whether categorization uphold any Courts will missible. categorization sufficiently justified. If the which suspect class a fundamental either a involves discriminating agency interest, must demon- compelling However, interest. where state strate involved, classifications is neither agency these a rational basis between need show categorization. purpose and argue categorization that defendant’s Plaintiffs impinges freely to their on their exercise religious so, interest beliefs. If a fundamental has Society for violated. Heffron v International been Inc, 650; Consciousness, 452 101 S Ct US Krishna (1981); Maynard, Wooley 2559; 69 L Ed 2d (1977). 705; 1428; 51 L 430 US 97 S Ct Ed 2d 752 However, its face defendant’s rule does not on against religious be- discriminate the exercise of Instead, liefs. discriminates between nonpublic Thus, face, the students. on its suspect neither class a fundamental involves a nor interest. analysis

But not the discussion does end facially may impermissibly rule because neutral application. is obli- discriminate its Defendant gated provide minimum level of education to every geographical jurisdiction. student within its v Charlotte T.M. 8, 2. Const art duty This would include § those students now attending and paro- if chial schools those schools did not exist.

However, since those schools do in fact exist does defendant have the to offer duty band instruc- tion to parochial those students whose schools do provide not it? Defendant need not offer band However, to anyone. instruction having offered band, defendant against discriminate exercising religious those students their beliefs. In Vincent, Widmar v 263; 454 US 102 S L Ct 2d Ed a university denied access for services to a group facilities to other generally open student groups. Su- preme Court held this to impermissible be reli- However, gious discrimination. had the facilities clubs, not been open other university required not have been open facilities for v Bd Ed worship services. See Trietley Buffalo, City App Div 2d NYS2d 912 (1978).

Plaintiffs do correctly not contend that defen- dant must show a compelling state interest excluding all students. addition students like Brenda who parochial attend compliance with the dictates religious beliefs, nonpublic students include those who attend secular private schools and those who attend schools for nonreligious reasons. against Discrimination these groups may justi- by fied a rational basis. do, however,

Plaintiffs contend that defendant must demonstrate compelling state interest to against discriminate them. one dispute No can plaintiffs’ right to parochial send Brenda to school in compliance with their religious beliefs. Pierce Sisters, Society 268 US L S Ct 123 Burns, by T.M. (1925). chal- Furthermore, no one has Ed lenged religious plaintiffs’ sincerity beliefs. the differing reasons, very society For diverse. is Our schools. their children send families are not suit- state schools believe Some everyone. cultic that such believe Some able for important prayer in a are symbols rituals as and public and education life and child’s hostility system these rituals toward shows ignoring believe them. Others teaching funda- state’s in fact is —the viewpoint their is antithetical mental religious —which They, therefore, their exercise beliefs. religious expression be- of their the free sending to schools which children their liefs incorporate every principles religious

their that, course. Still while a neutral others believe possible in fact be and in fact education taught schools, their children should in the religious according the families’ instructed any reasons, cases, of these for In certain views. parents really but to send have no choice training. religious giving such to a school children plaintiffs this fun- to exercise chosen have Once right, may force defendant damental giving in- band Brenda choose between them to paro- continuing to the to send her struction intentionally essence, whether chial school? denying instruction not, band defendant family Snyder simply her because she Brenda right. re- Defendant’s have exercised this religious principles quires plaintiffs to violate their offering price instruction. Brenda band as stemming discrimination, from Such soundly application rule, con- neutral was of a 404, Verner, 374 US in Sherbert v demned (1963): 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 406; 83 S Ct Charlotte 75 T.M. Dissent day "It late in that is too the doubt the liberties of religion expression may infringed by and the denial placing upon or a of benefit privilege. conditions * * * availability upon the of condition benefits [T]o appellant’s willingness princi- this ple violate cardinal effectively penalizes of the her faith free her constitutional exercise of liberties.” Seventh-Day There, a Adventist had been fired from Saturday. work her because she had refused to work on employment

Because she refused from reason, other the businesses for same she was Although unemployment denied requiring benefits. the rule compensation employment applicants to accept Saturday proper, work on was in this case right appli- it violated her First Amendment in its cation: apparent appellant’s "Here not that de- ineligibility solely clared for benefits derives from the

practice forego religion, her pressure upon but the her to practice ruling that The is unmistakable. forces her to following precepts choose between the of her religion abandoning benefits, hand, forfeiting and on one precepts one of the of her in order work, accept on other hand.” US 404. analysis

The same was used Wisconsin v Yoder, US S 32 L Ct Ed 2d (1972). facially compulsory There, a neutral attendance law was found to violate the religious expression guaranteed to Amish who believed that education for their children should grade. cease after the sixth Court in recognized regulation that a neutral could its application requirement offend the constitutional governmental burdening neutrality by unduly required the free exercise of beliefs neutrality state, as a condition of its toward religious beliefs, to accommodate Amish: 123 Mich Burns, J. T. M. danger an ignore Court must "The citizenship on general obligation

exception from a of the Establishment may run afoul religious grounds Clause, prevent danger cannot be allowed but to the vital it be exception no matter how any right free by the promoted protection of values 406 220-221. US exercise.” Em- the Indiana Board of In Thomas v Review Security ployment 707; Division, 450 US 101 S Ct Supreme Court 624 1425; 67 L Ed 2d dissent) (with upheld only There, a Sherbert. one job reli- of his left his because Witness Jehovah’s gious being to a mu- transferred after convictions factory. there, to work he refused Because nitions he was denied compensation

unemployment bene- government that the held Court fits. had freely right exercise his reli- violated his imposed gious condition on it such a when beliefs him: compelled to choose between person may not be "[A] participa- Amendment

the exercise of a First tion in an otherwise available * * * public program. important receipt of an the state conditions "Where faith, religious upon proscribed by benefit conduct conduct man- a benefit because of where denies such belief, putting substantial thereby dated and to modify pressure on an adherent his behavior beliefs, religion exists. While upon violate his the free exercise is nonetheless burden upon indirect, infringement compulsion may 716- 450 US substantial.” 718. up follows:

These cases are summed as valid, the claim- "For a First Amendment claim to be * * *. In theological must be sincere ant’s conviction addition, upon religious, the conviction must be founded Charlotte v T. M. * * * not secular If beliefs. these two conditions are met, guarantees the First Amendment freedom of belief grant and can freedom act in with accordance those * * * beliefs. required "What not an absence of discrimi- nation, protected guarantees, other under constitutional obligation imposed upon but constitutional secular government by the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, religion. 'accommodate’ Zorach v Clau- (1952).” son, 306; US S Ct 96 L Ed 954 City Sumner, Baptist of Sumner v First Washing- Church of ton, (1982) (Utter, J., Wash 2d P2d concurring).

The majority and defendant however contend does constitute dis- crimination. The arguments up have been summed accepted Thomas Allegheny County Bd Ed, 312; 51 App Md 443 A2d 625 where the all-county music was program made available to public school children:

"The participation decision to confine in the All- County Band to not infringe students does upon the private school of religion. students’ freedom prohibits The rule parent neither enrolling from the school, in a child following nor deters the students from practices

the of their faith.” argument What fails recognize to is that First Amendment encompasses religious practices in addition Cannecticut, to beliefs. Contwell v 310 296; US 60 900; S Ct 84 L 1213; Ed 128 ALR 1352 (1940). Furthermore, even if policy defendant’s not does directly prevent plaintiffs practicing from their religion by sending their daughter paro- school, chial though religious even their be- liefs do not require them to enroll Brenda in the 56 123 T. M. policy their violates nevertheless

band, defendant’s rights freely beliefs: exercise regulation in- here argued that because "It impact directly a fundamental tenet not volved does church, member’s First Amend- it does not violate a however, has never been a rights. impact, ment requirement. Direct against tenet of It a fundamental was school; high it was their children the Amish to send requirement the Amish the incidental effects of faith to their and hence to be detrimental believed rights. Amendment Wisconsin of their First violative Yoder, It a fundamental tenet of the supra. was not be disal- of teachers that unionization Catholic faith lowed; yet indicated that for the Court involved Relations Board to become National Labor regarding pose signifi- teachers could parochial school reli- on the free exercise of infringement cant risk of Chicago, 490; Bishop of US gion. v Catholic NLRB (1979). 1313; 59 L Ed 99 S Ct 2d again’ tenet of 'born "It not a fundamental was teaching to not of basic education Christians allow pernicious though incidental day; yet hours each mandatory allowing regulation regarding effect of state subjects time has been held and allocation of classroom to that exercise clause as violate free 181; St 2d 351 NE2d group. State v Whisner Ohio [47 employ (1976)]. tenet to Neither is it a fundamental school; yet it in a has substandard teachers require nonpublic teach- held that a state cannot been equivalent’ qualifications 'essentially ers to have LaBarge, 134 State v Vt those schools. (1976).” Baptist City v First A2d 121 of Sumner Sumner, Washington, 97 639 P2d Church of Wash 2d (1982). 1358, 1362 plaintiffs’ First violates Defendant’s right conditioning rights by their Amendment choosing in the on their enroll Brenda school band forego to educate their First Amendment parochial with her in a school. Defendant counters Snyder v Charlotte T. M. Conference, v Hen Valencia Blue F Supp 809 (D Del, 1979), an unincorporated where association public high schools had excluded membership. comparing schools from the bur- den with the plaintiffs imposed on burdens Sherbert, Yoder and in the Court noted: complained "The burden of in pales by this case * * * In comparison. light degree minimal imposed plaintiffs burden on the and the remoteness religion, seriously exercise their Court infringe upon any doubts that the defendants’ actions rights protected by the F Free Exercise Clause.” 476 Supp 822.

However, issue not how much simply burdened, plaintiffs’ rights have been but rather whether this burden can sufficiently be justified by the reasons advanced defendant. Defendant’s is to neutral responsibility in the of religious Abing- differences. School Dist of face Twp, ton Schempp, Pa v 203, 225; 374 US 83 S Ct 1560; (1963); 10 L Everson Bd of Ed of Ed 2d Ewing Twp, 330 US S 67 Ct L Ed 711 (1947). Student Members of the Playcrafters v Bd of Ed of Twp, Teaneck NJ Super 66; 424 A2d states: First Amendment does "[T]he not mandate hostility or callous indifference religious practices. To do so be to prefer those who do not believe in a religion over those addition, who do”. In what may appear to one person to be a minor infringement on another’s rights fact be a infringement. critical No one knows what Prices, Leontyne Leonard Bern- steins, or Ira if Gershwins would have been lost parents had been forced make a choice like the one plaintiffs face.

Similar conditioned choices have been con- App 56 123

80 T.M. J. Burns, Dissent County v Kanawha Hughes ex rel State demned (1970), app Ed, Bd of 107; 174 SE2d W Va Ed S 29 L 2d dis 403 US 944; 91 Ct trans- had provided the school board where students. The West only public for portation im- held that action Virginia Supreme Court against parochial permissibly discriminated religious their beliefs: because of students guarantees recognition pertinent constitutional "In of freedom, has legislature the this state of provided of that, public and in which both counties secondary are parochial primary and schools Catholic maintained, parents of Catholic children elect stat- attend schools. The have their children ute, believe, right guaranteed by merely expresses we provisions. constitutional clearly child be quite "It is true that Catholic would expedi- transportation by the mere aiforded school bus the electing school. We are of ent of to attend attending however, opinion, that denial children the equal rights of trans- parochial schools of bus Catholic attending public portation deprives schools accorded children parents of their Catholic children and provisions freedom in violation of the of the First Amendment of Constitution States.” 154 W Va 120. United Committee Members of Jamestown School In Schmidt, (RI, 1979), v Rhode 405 A2d Supreme Island Court stated: "Indeed, merely responding Assembly General * * * by mandatory law the dictates of the education enabling safely with comply easily all citizens to Ed, Va Hughes rel v 154 W law. See State ex Bd sense, busing at 174 SE2d at 718. In a a tool minor enforcing duty compulsory education of * * * The place upon parents. children that states parents, States Court has held United acting law, may compulsory-education under a state Snyder v Charlotte T. M. state-approved religious send their children to schools. * * * fostering an anomaly We thus if we obligated held that the state is under [the law] parents assist those who choose over ** schools *.” Bartlett, Alexander 177, 182; Mich App (1968), 165 NW2d 445 this Court held that provid- ing transportation bus to parochial school children does not violate the Establishment Clause. In do- so, ing specifically this Court noted: "[G]iving full meaning whole, and effect to law], as a re- [this in maintaining sults the neutrality govern- religion, safeguards ment toward the free exercise religion, prohibits of the establishment of religion.” Traverse City School Dist v Attor-

While citing General, ney 390; 384 Mich (1971), 185 NW2d 9 State ex rel Supreme Nebraska Court in stated School Dist Hartington v Nebraska State Bd of Ed, 1, 5; 188 Neb 195 cert (1972), NW2d 164 den 409 921; 220; US 93 S Ct 34 L Ed 2d 182 (1972): "It deny right seem that to a student

participate program in a by offered a solely district because that in student is enrolled a parochial school would violate that student’s a free exercise equal protection law.”

In Epeldi Engelking, 390; Idaho 488 P2d (1971), cert den US 92 S Ct L (3-2) Ed 2d 343 provid- court held that ing bus transportation parochial students vio- lated However, Idaho’s Establishment Clause. dissent noted: deny

"To school children the benefit of App 123 T. M. they choose attend of the fact transportation because The Equal Protection. denies them parochial There is is unreasonable. a classification denial such a bus. about nothing ideological, sectarian trans- the benefits should share All children provided the transportation should portation. student, school but he attends certain not because within a certain classification he is a child because (Mc- legislature.” 94 Idaho 400 by the properly created C.J., dissenting).1 Quade, Attorney Dist v School City Traverse

Finally, General, our Court ruled that supra, time” "shared prohibiting C Proposal section was unconsti- school students services to tutional: religion and the the free exercise of

"It violates both United States Consti- equal protection provisions of the tution. participa- is denied school student "When auxiliary publicly time courses or

tion in funded shared of school because his public at services offered and he attends a as school student status private a conviction, he also has a of school out right freely his imposed upon exercise burden his protected right the free constitutionally religion. The legal a classifica- religion exercise of is violated when upon practice tion has coercive effect being compelling state interest. justified without Attorney Gen- passing, may "In be noted inapplicable. argued eral in his brief that Sherbert pointed 'Proposal He out C does deal with private all schools schools such but rather with as However, Su- whether or non-sectarian.’ sectarian 1 Ed, Bd of relied on Judd v majority opinion specifically The (1938). However, Bd 200; Judd was overruled NY 15 NE2d Allen, 799; aff’d 109; Ed 228 NE2d 20 NY2d NYS2d (1968). L 2d 392 US 88 S Ct 20 Ed Snyder v Charlotte T.M. preme Court of the United States in matters of racial discrimination looks 'impact’ to the of the classification. * * * principle This same apply should to the First protection against Amendment’s tion religious discrimina- percent with 98 private here being students nearly in church-related 'impact’ schools the (Footnote omitted.) total.” 384 Mich 433-434. City clearly Thus, Traverse that, states on.ce a program is offered to the students in a school may district, public the school board not exclude non- merely they school students because have rights freely exercised their exercise their reli- gious by attending beliefs school.

I note that the Court also stated: "This does public not mean that a school district must offer shared time instruction auxiliary services; it means that if it does offer public them to school, public children at the nonpublic school students also have a to receive public them at the school.” 384 Mich 433. majority interpret and defendant this state- forbidding paro- ment as chial and secular discrimination between school students where a already school district has elected to offer shared services; however, time the school district need not place. offer such services in the first cursory reading language While a may of this suggest interpretation, opin- the essence of the strongly ion itself it. A contradicts correct inter- pretation language depends of this on the defini- tion majority’s of "shared time”. In the and defen- view, dant’s merely "shared time” is a course concept which be offered instead of a educating large through at interpretation school If resources. this were cor- rect, simply then "shared time” would be like an App 56 123 Mich M. T. to the not be offered which need service

auxiliary offered, on which, must be offered once but public, However, because nondiscriminatory basis. a method using school is really time” "shared nonman- with such resources, equated it cannot be ig- interpretation The majority’s services. datory I which have analysis Court’s nores following. been policy is discrimina- though defendant’s

Even sup- interests compelling if permissible it tory, "com- defendant’s first port majority’s it. The convenience. administrative interest” pelling Board, supra, ex- County Allegheny Thomas v argument: plained scale, appears that side of "On the other confining public in legitimate interest

Board has a Although the ad- programs students. school ministrative mandating partici- impact of a decision into this private students pation of the program appears to us to be trivial, precedent as it administration is spectrum of school affects the broader of a far more deleterious such 'Pandora’s clude, opening nature. With pre- box’, no device to there would be difficulty having example, for unilaterally from securing deciding nearby public qualified chemistry teacher body to a transport the entire student chemistry education. school for Thus, disruption is obvious. potential for administrative agree any if administrative we little while these permitting hardship inure to the Board Band, it All-County participate in the three students is not them, must admit to hold that the Board this Court We implications involved. view of the broader courts, should and not think the school administrators disruption is too decide how much administrative much.” 443 A2d 625-626. aside, the administra- "floodgates” argument

This v Charlotte by T.M. J. Burns, Dissent tive inconvenience occasioned Brenda Snyder’s request extremely minimal. Not only will plain- provide tiffs the transportation to and from the school, but Brenda has her own instrument. Furthermore, plaintiffs, and all others similarly situated, must accommodate themselves to defen- dant’s regulations. reasonable Defendant certainly has the to require anyone applying for band within a apply reasonable amount of time and obligation is under no to offer band instruction at a time to fit plaintiffs’ convenience. is, therefore,

It understandable the majority focuses on the possibility large numbers nonpublic students demanding entrance to any course desire. they Thus the focus is on sheer numbers. While I understand concern, this I be- lieve it to be overstated. I Preliminarily, note that if all students decided to join public school, defendant would have to accommodate each one of them.

However, not every nonpublic student would be involved in First, this situation. the administrative inconvenience projected by defendant may well satisfy the rational basis test as to students who attend schools for reasons other than religious A dictates. may inquire state into the sincerity of a person’s religious beliefs. Ballard States, v United 329 US 67 S Ct 91 L Ed (1946). Second, one can strongly question just how sin- cere parochial school’s and the parents’ convictions are if the parochial school unilaterally decides to drop chemistry and have its student body take it at a public school. parents These would not have been given the same coercive choice that plaintiffs have given. been Such a appears decision more to have been made out of 123 T.M. out of conviction than convenience particular necessary. form of education practical matter, Third, those students in as Snyder’s position must them- accommodate Brenda regulations administrative to reasonable selves the number This alone will limit and class times. seeking admission. addi- students tion, reasonable control over defendant maintains budgetary matters; size, curriculum, al- class though on defendant discriminate religion, limit is entitled to class defendant basis nonmandatory to or even not offer a size decide necessary. as Given this class such band where parents unlikely parochial situation, that solely public depend on will school students provide perceive they system to the courses as necessary to a education. well-rounded addition, main

In defendant overlooks the rea- parochial many their to families send children son every families, course is to be To these schools. taught They to God’s will. have sent obedience parochial precisely children to their to schools taught according to allow children to be encompasses literature, and life world view which reasoning philoso- scientific and music as well as people phy theology. necessarily Such not are drop very likely unilaterally like chem- course istry. majority argues

The will be also defendant compelled to use forced scarce resources if it is accept although Snyder However, into Brenda the band. contributing

everyone in the state public public schools, education, and the public receiving children, the tax are money. allowing Snyder Brenda into band Would again really disproportionate? I that defen- be note obviously obligated completely dant would Snyder v Charlotte T.M. nondiscriminatory offer all courses to her aon if basis Brenda decided to attend the

full time. argues majority hand,

On the other also permitting students like Brenda to attend enrolling individual classes instead of as full-time encourage parochial will students them to attend reducing schools, thus number full-time reducing funding. students and thus also state However, require while First Amendment does not encourage

defendant a student’s attend- ing require school, it does defendant to plaintiffs’ accommodate free exercise of their be- supra. Yoder, liefs. encourage The incidental effect tobe parochial schools, the attendance of but the First Amendment will not tolerate discrimina- addition, tion as the earlier, alternative. as I stated I do believe that defendant’s fears actually materialize. majority argues contrary last that a deci entanglement. First, sion could lead to excessive plaintiffs however, above, as must noted accommo date themselves to the schools’ reasonable regulations. majority Second, administrative ignores Michigan the fact that so state courts have far held that shared time does not violate the supra; City, Establishment Clause. Traverse Citi Superin zens to Advance Public Education v State Instruction, tendent of 168; Public 65 Mich (1976). (1975), 237 232 NW2d lv 854 den majority Luetkemeyer counters with v Kauf (WD 1973), Supp mann, Mo, 364 F aff'd 888; US 95 S Ct L Ed 2d 134 which requiring ruled that Missouri’s constitution even greater separation of the church and state than provided compel United States Constitution the ling state interest the state to discrimi- allow App 56 123 Mich by T. M. students in public and

nate between However, Missouri’s transportation. bus providing by held insufficient was specifically constitution Widmar, in Supreme Court the United States L 451: 277; 70 Ed 2d supra, US 102 S Ct hand, rights First Amendment respondents’ "On one special Our constitutional solicitude. are entitled cases have exacting in required scrutiny most cases the speech the regulate on in which a State undertakes * * * hand, the State content. On the other basis its achieving greater separation interest asserted here —in of church Establishment limited already ensured under and State than is Clause of Federal Constitution —is Free and this case Exercise Clause Speech as well. In constitutional the Free context, as crimination Clause recognize the State’s interest we are unable to justify dis- sufficiently 'compelling’ to content-based against respondents’ religious speech.” Furthermore, not re- Michigan’s constitution does state; church and quire greater separation therefore, interest has been compelling no state fact, White, Chief joined by shown. Justice dissenting following Burger, Justice wrote Luetkemeyer: opinion legislation’ 'benefits of welfare "[T]he —here 'general program help parents get children * * * safely expeditiously and and from accredited * * * schools,’ stu- seem to because certain be denied seeking training. valid dents are Without a supporting interest public the different treatment accorded students, that classi- protection princi- equal fication would violate federal Moreover, ples. denial the arbitrariness general question service raises the whether State 'adversary’ has become the placed rights.” appellants’ has burdens free exercise on 419 US 891. Luetkemeyer’s precedential I believe value questionable. somewhat v Charlotte T.M.

I also realize that federal cases some have de- time provisions clared certain shared unconstitu- for E.g., Separation Americans United tional. City Church & State v School Dist of the of Grand (WD Mich, Ameri- F Supp Rapids, 1982); United for & Separation cans of Church State v (WD 1980). Porter, Mich, However, F Supp our presently we are bound own Court’s that shared time does not decision violate supra. Clause. Traverse City, the Establishment Furthermore, present presents case far less problems plans establishment than reviewed addition, these federal cases. where Establishment with Clause conflicts the Free Exer- Clause, cise the Free Exercise Clause prevail. must Ed, Resnick v East Bd Twp Brunswick 77 NJ (1978). 389 A2d 944

If Brenda Snyder handicapped were and at- tended, special to obtain necessary education life, live a full handicapped within defendant’s did jurisdiction that not offer band instruction, we would find that defendant readily discriminating against would be her invidiously if it refused to allow her to take band a different school merely because she "full- would not be a school, time student” in that her forcing thus choose between her special needs musical training. See generally MCL 37.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.550(401) et seq. type How of discrimina- any tion more invidious than the discrimination the majority today sanctions? The concludes majority "plaintiffs’ but, with remedy the courts rather, to elect a school will change board which the district’s policy”. Why plaintiffs should (if ever) forced to wait possibly years before being able to willing elect school board to vindi- cate their rights? constitutional

I would reverse and with remand instructions enter the appropriate injunction.

Case Details

Case Name: Snyder v. Charlotte Public School District

Court Name: Michigan Court of Appeals

Date Published: Feb 8, 1983

Citation: 333 N.W.2d 542

Docket Number: Docket 60659

Court Abbreviation: Mich. Ct. App.