*1 al., Petitioners, Robert SNYDER et
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent. B-2980.
No.
Supreme Texas.
June July 26, 1972. Denied
Sanders, Scott, Saunders, Brian
Fin-&
Smith, Gibson, Ochsner,
ney, Robert H.
Adkins,
Hankins, Wayne
Harlan
P.
&
Sturdivant, Underwood, Wilson, Sutton,
*2
ries,
Bybee,
occupants
as
the
Berry,
Walter
did the
of
other
Heare &
Gerald G.
Wolfram, Amarillo,
petitioners.
pending against
who have suits
Robert
P.
for
Snyder
damages
person
proper-
for
and
to
Boulter,
Garner,
Beau
Jesko,
Boulter &
ty as a
the
result of
collision.
Lubbock,
respondent.
for
father,
Snyder
Sny-
Robert
and his
John
der,
father,
her
and Darla Rhodes and
J.
DANIEL, Justice.
Rhodes,
requested
B.
Allstate to de-
have
Snyder
up
fend Robert
of
controversy
is between Allstate
to
limits
The
here
against any
arising out
policy
auto- Allstate
suits
Company,
issued an
which
Insurance
Rhodes,
policy
of
collision.
to
B.
mobile insurance
J.
Company,
Casualty
Fidelity
and
and
is
declaratory
action
judgment
Allstate’s
Snyder,
policy
a
to which
to
as
issued
John
Rhodes,
Snyders,
all
against
claimants
obligated
defend Robert
insurer
was
against
Snyder,
litigation
in other
Robert
and
Snyder
Snyder)
son
(minor
of John
Casualty Company of
Fidelity and
and
arising
pay damages
out of the collision
York,
liability insurance
New
automobile
possession
of and
an automobile
a
It
for Robert’s father.
seeks
carrier
(minor
daughter of
used
Darla Rhodes
decreeing
has no
judgment
that Allstate
Rob-
driven
Rhodes) while
B.
J.
Snyder
pay
obligation
or
to defend Robert
Snyder
passen-
ert
Darla Rhodes as a
with
arising
of the
any
against
claim
him
out
ger.
alternative,
question,
in the
collision in
or
Fidelity
obligat-
that both Allstate and
are
brought
Company
this
Insurance
Allstate
Snyder
ed
Darla Rhodes and Robert
seeking an af-
action
declaratory judgment
“pro
keeping
policy
rata —in
with their
it
no obli-
firmative
that
determination
has
answer, Rob-
limits.” In addition to their
Fidelity
contends
gation under its
Snyder
parents
ert
filed a cross-ac-
and his
primary coverage and
that Allstate has
up
expenses
for
and
tion
medical
services
liability
excess
Fidelity’s
that
is limited to
policy
incurred
limits of
coverage
Snyder’s policy.
under John
by them as a result of the collision.
jury
trial court withdrew the case from the
granted judgment against
and
Allstate.
policies
insur
Both
have “other
Appeals
The Court of
and
Civil
reversed
policy
that
ance”
which state
clauses
remanded.
Withdrawing insured, the case from the at provided his actual evidence, en- operation the close the trial court operat- or he is not (if judgment obliga- tered has an ing) his other actual use thereof tion to Snyder, defend Robert scope within permis- of such sion, and Darla Rhodes all actions pay all claims limits “(3) organization collision, arising out of and further de- *3 only respect but with to his or its parents creed that Robert and his liability because of acts or omis- expenses recover medical services in- and (1) sions of an insured (a) under by colli- curred them as a result of the or (2) above.” policy, sion of limits the Allstate plus fees, attorneys’ penalty, and interest “Owned automobile” is defined in the from judgment. the date of policy as: “(a) private a util- passenger, a farm or reversing remanding In and to the trial ity policy for automobile described in this court, Appeals interprets the Court of Civil specific charge which a indicates premium policy requiring as the le- that afforded, that coverage . .” . gal equitable of the auto- title “owned policy mobile” described in the be undisputed specific premium It is that a insured, Rhodes, in the named B. and J. specific charge paid on automobile was presented disputed held that the evidence a therefore, question; in the automobile question ownership. of fact such As as to argues an “owned automobile.” Allstate by stated Appeals, Court of Civil there that in definition of “owned addition to the dispute was a delivery as to whether of actual requires automobile” the that policy the car by daughter, B. Rhodes to his ownership in the of the' automobile be Darla, gift for her use constituted a so named not policy insured. The does passage legal of or equitable title. This provide, and which we find no rule of law immaterial, fact issue is hold that since we compel requirement. would us to add such provisions of policy the Allstate do not require that (J. named insured if not Even the automobile were Rhodes) be the owner of the vehicle. by owned not B. Rhodes that does neces By policy insurance, of All- sarily precluded mean that he would be state contracted with purchasing by from an being covered insured, named pay all should sums he liability policy automobile become legally obligated pay damages 1193; as 1 7 insured. See ALR 3rd bodily because of injury 307; or property dam- Appleman, Insurance 7 Am.Jur.2d age “arising Blashfield, out ownership, mainte- Law and Practice 264 7 (1962); nance or use of the owned (3rd automobile.” Automobile Law & Practice 164 ed. “insureds,” respect defines 1966). with It is true that inter- several cases automobile, the owned preting recognized as: Texas law have owner- ship coverage, they requirement a of but as “(1) the named insured and resident policies expressly provided involved of the same household that the named the owner of the insured be 1
“(2) any
automobile.” All of these cases
using such auto-
policies
prior
dealt with
issued
permission
mobile with the
e.).
(Tex.Civ.App.1955,
Davis
n. r.
188
Viator v. American General
Insurance
Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company,
Company,
(Tex.Civ.App.
v. St.
change policy provisions in (Tex.Civ.App.1967, S.W.2d Insurance Commission Texas Paul-Mercury Indemnity Davis v. previous requirements of St. which omitted all 1961); St. Paul ownership from definition actual Dean, Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. there- “owned automobile” and substituted F.Supp. They (W.D.Ark.1970). con- quoted new definition the above recognize questions fact are two present tained presented: authority permittee for the (1) Marine In York Fire & Underwrit- New person (Robert) (Darla) allow a third ers, (E. Fleming, F.Supp. Inc. v. origi to drive or (2) use the recognized 1967), D.Texas Court permittee’s nal consent to such use a ownership requirement the auto- above, person. third indicated these As been named insured had not mobile present facts were in the case. Supreme of Texas by considered ownership requirement delet- since the *4 in payment coverage the medical ed under from the standard held Allstate policy contains the same definition in- the “Erie” doctrine that if the named automobile”, coverage “owned the might liability sured incur some due to extends or the named insured “to operation automobile, pol- or use . or any person who sustains icy though may ac- effective even he not is accident, bodily injury, by caused while oc- All- tually own the automobile.” automobile, cupying being while owned argues state that “owned automobile” nec- by by used . . named insured . or by essarily implies must it be owned permission other person with the in- ” This would be a reasonable insured. Clearly, the named . . . insured . ference if it not for the definition were coverage this was as broad as the provides contrary. coverage. Snyder person Robert was a oc- cupying the “owned automobile” while it Mr. testified that he Darla gave Rhodes by used Darla Rhodes with the the car for general her use and “left it father, permission of her in- named to judgment” her for her own how as to sured. car, she warning “every used the not let to Tom, Harry” Dick and use it. Darla testi- ownership Since fact of is not a ma- fied that asked she Robert to drive her question case, terial in this we reverse the from Stratford to Fritch did because she judgment Appeals of Civil not have a in her car jack and did not and affirm judgment of the trial court. in want to drive alone Allstate dark. did dispute not facts these but relied on them Ap- here and in the Court of Civil REHEARING ON FOR MOTION
peals argument making that Mr. authority give per- Rhodes had no to this for re urges in its motion mission as named he insured because nor Rob hearing Darla Rhodes that neither did own not the automobile. per Snyder driving with the ert be could insured, B. mission of named interpreting Several cases Texas law grant power no to because Rhodes had Mr. scope permission by have dealt with permission car drive the since refuse permittees authority insured to and their it was not that he was the own established operate allow a third owned support er. cited Authorities automobile. Indiana Mutual Lumbermen’s Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident and this ing argument involved situations Indemnity insured no (Tex.Civ. S.W.2d 781 which the had non-owner App. In insured Phoenix control over use of the autom —Waco case, undisputed that In this it is obile.1 cer parent
the named insured retained he his and that of title in name
tificate daugh
gave to his minor permission of use here parent-child relationship
ter. The it
governed how Darla used the since both Darla recognized that Darla’s use
Rhodes
subject given her her instructions existed, this father.2 Since control give permission could
Rhodes Darla
impliedly to Robert within
terms of the Allstate
Motion for is overruled.
The CITY OF UNIVERSITY PARK, al., et Petitioners, Texas, Hagaman
Ruth Executrix, BENNERS, Respondent.
No. B-3321.
Supreme Court of Texas. 4,
Oct.
1972.
Denied Nov.
1972.
3[a],
Blashfield,
1. United States
Co.
Cas.
v. Ohio
Auto
§
Ins.
A.L.R.3d 10
Cas.
Co.,
(5th
1953) ;
(3rd