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Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree
862 P.2d 259
Colo.
1993
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*1 259 requirements minimum compliance safety the National Electric with Safe- elec- industry.” (“NESC”) in tric ty Code constitutes conduct safety minimum conformity with the Therefore, I specially concur. industry. quirements of the electrical A simple

Instruction 20 is defective pre-

reason it creates a rebuttable

sumption compliance with NESC is

equivalent good “accepted engineering practice industry.” my in the electric SNYDER OIL COMPANY Colorado opinion, only phrase the use of it is Authority, Insurance 20 flawed renders Instruction Petitioners, party’s compliance of a characterization congruent industry standards as with v. “accepted practice” good engineering finds EMBREE; Frank The Industrial Claim support statutory nor in neither common Colorado; Appeals Office State law. Labor, Director, Division of Re- clear, however, It is that the common law spondents. compliance rule recognizes that with ac No. 92SC437. cepted industry con standards amounts to corresponding safety duct to the minimum Colorado, Supreme Court requirements See, given industry. En Banc. Co., Inc., e.g., v. Patton Elec. 781 Meisner (D.Neb.1990); F.Supp. 15, 1432 Kirkendall v. Nov. Co., F.Supp.

Harbor 698 768 Ins.

(W.D.Ark.1988), (8th 887 F.2d aff'd, 857

Cir.1989). al., Page See also W. Keeton et

Prosser on the Law and Keeton Torts 36, 1984), (5th at 233 ed. Restate § (Second)

ment Torts 288C cmt. a § (1965). Furthermore, provisions specifically recognized

NESC have been industry

the accepted standards for the See, industry. e.g.,

electrical Cerretti v. Coop. Ass’n,

Flint Elec. 251 Hills Rural (1992);

Kan. 837 P.2d 330 Martel v. Co., 231 Mont. Power 752

Montana (1988); Sulpher Springs Valley

P.2d 140 14 Coop., Verdugo, Ariz.App.

Elec. Inc. v. (1971); Kemp 481 P.2d 511 Wiscon Co., 44 Wis.2d 172

sin Elec. Power (1969);

N.W.2d Gladden v. Mis Co., 277

souri Public Serv. S.W.2d

(Mo.1955).

Thus, retrial, opinion that on I am of the

Yampa to an Valley is entitled instruction

which is to Instruction with the identical “accepted good

offending phrase engineer-

ing practice industry” in the electric elimi- phrase replaced

nated and “the *2 Steiner, Denver, petition-

Michael J. Compensation Authority ers Colorado Ins. Oil Co. Koppes, Greeley, respondent Rebecca Frank Embree.

Justice KIRSHBAUM delivered the Opinion of the Court. Embree,

In Snyder 839 P.2d 494 Oil (Colo.App.1992), Ap- the Colorado Court of 8-42-110(3), peals held that section 3B (1990 Supp.), of the C.R.S. Colorado Work- Compensation ers’ Act1 did not limit the petitioners Snyder Company insurer, Compensation and its the Colorado Authority, permanent partial Insurance employee, suffered a disabled appeal's opinion substantially 1. The court of refers Laws 389. The two sections are identical, §to 8-42- 110(3), (1990 purposes clarity Supp.), applicable and for we will 3B C.R.S. as the 8-42-110(3). adopted refer to statute at issue as § statute. Section was 13, 1990, general part 1991, March recodifica- repealed Section ef 62, 1, 19, tion of the Workers’ Act. Ch. July approved April fective 1991. See Act 468, 8-42-110(3), 1991, 219, 18, 8-42-110(3), § Colo.Sess.Laws 494. It ch. sec. § 1991 Colo. (1987 replaced Supp.), repeal § 3B C.R.S. Sess.Laws 1312-13. The statute’s applicable which statute was claim. not affect Embree’s does Embree’s claim. See Fulton v. (Colo.1992). King Soopers, See ch. sec. 1987 Colo.Sess. 710 n. 1 § Embree, director for redetermination of E. at Embree’s respondent Frank appeals permanent partial disability original The court of pay. and, inapplicable award, upon showing statute was proper concluded because Embree’s employee’s limitations the labor he in a remuneration sulted decrease market, *3 appro- the director shall order an em- from concurrent previously received partial permanent award of dis- priate Snyder peti- ployers. Having granted Oil’s ability. certiorari, reverse remand

tion for and (1990 Supp.). 3B Em- C.R.S. § appeals with directions. to the court of Snyder bree contested Oil’s admission requested liability subsequently and a hear- I ing judge before an administrative law con- a February employed while In disability cerning permanent benefits and Snyder Oil, on a slipped Embree pumper disfigurement. tank slick stairway production made injuries and sustained to his with oil ice and September hearing, At the Embree thereafter, Shortly left hip and shoulder. employed at that while he was testified Snyder again performing work for while self-employed a Snyder Oil he was also Oil, re-injured Embree his left shoulder dairy farmer. stated that because Embree loading a flat tire onto the bed of while a performing injuries prevented him from his pickup truck. requiring and irrigation other activities lifting necessary to maintain the heavy filed subsequently Embree a workers’ farm, loss in he had suffered some reve- De- compensation claim with Colorado hearing, Employment. At the partment of Labor and See nue. conclusion 8-53-101, (1986) (repealed Em- judge SB C.R.S. found that administrative law § 1990). Snyder liability for Sny- Oil admitted employment to his bree returned temporary disability in total the amount July of rate of 1988 at same der Oil $3,937.14 partial disabil- for Snyder from Oil pay he had received $3,120. Snyder Oil ity in the amount of a functional injury; his that he suffered liability perma- its for based admission of percent of nine the whole impairment disability on 8-42- partial nent section unit; working and that he was body as a 110(3), provides as follows: which statute dairy farmer. The to work as not able (3) any case where administrative found that Em- judge law em- reemploys or continues disabled only to return to one of bree was able ployee employment in the work at the time occupations he held two employee’s preinjury employer at extends judge law determined The administrative adjustments, wage the usual qualify for Snyder Oil order permanent partial disability award ee’s established sec- limitations permanent medical be limited to shall have had to reem- it would payment under section impairment or a equivalent ploy Embree a rate 8-42-107, is less. This sub- whichever previously received he from both the sums (3) apply if director shall not judge law occupations. The administrative finds that due to the Snyder had Oil concluded because permanently perform unable to pay equal at a rate of reemployed Embree If, employer. dur- offered duties receiving he salary level was only to years following the date of the two company injured, when he was from the reemployment, the in- to work or return applicable was em- employee, as a result of said jured permanent partial Snyder Oil was liable for permanent disability due to the

ployee’s $16,- in the amount of benefits employment injury, is dismissed review, Upon Industrial 286.40. Claim resigns the em- petition Appeals Office affirmed. ployer, said wage pay” adjustments” and “usual are appealed the decision to the affirmed, appeals. arrangements The court con- payment court of limited to the be- ap- cluding that section is not injured employee and the em- tween the upon reemployment plicable unless ployer payment of disabili- who is liable equal claimant receives remuneration ty injury-producing pay from the total of his or her employer. performed work might Noting that its decision all sources. meaning recently We considered employers, the court result added cost 8-42-110(3) in purpose of section Fulton reasoned that its construction of the stat- (Colo.1992). Soopers, King legislative policy pro- ute furthered the claimant, In that case the a member of viding an incentive for to contin- *4 union, injured during was employees employ ue to their disabled King Soopers. Two months after the pay. preinjury rates of

injury, the claimant returned to work at his II However, pay. rate of as a re- sult of his the claimant was not argues that section 8- position journeyman to elevated 42-110(3) applicable employ to limit an is by approximately the union until mechanic when, here, liability injured er’s an em three months later than would have been ployee reemployed at the rate of is injured. the case had he not been paid employee by employer pri- to that agree. or to the We King Soopers asserted that the limita- principles Well established of employer liability tions on for workers’ statutory guide the resolution construction compensation benefits established sec- presented. of the issue Statutes are to be it. The were available to construed in such manner as to further the argued that his elevation claimant because legislative they intent for which were en wage journeyman to status was a usual Pinder, acted. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. 812 adjustment King Soopers did and because (Colo.1991). P.2d 648 To discern the wage actually him higher not until he Assembly, intent of the General we first classification, higher job King obtained language examine the of the statute. Soopers did not extend to him the usual Williams, Group, 805 Farmers Inc. v. wage adjustments required by the statute (Colo.1991). 422 P.2d Words and eligible and was therefore not to benefit phrases given according should be effect to provisions. from its plain ordinary meaning their unless the rejected claimant’s construction We Dep result is absurd. 't Social Colorado of 8-42-110(3). Comm’rs, of section We noted that City 697 P.2d Servs. v. Board of statute, (Colo.1985). statutory enacting that the General Assem 18 Where the lan guage unambiguous, attempted provide we need bly is clear and an incentive for interpretative not rules of statuto employers employees resort to rehire disabled ry Rogers, construction. employers Van Waters & which turn would benefit both (Colo. Keelan, Inc. v. 840 P.2d Fulton, employees. P.2d 715. 1992). Appeals See Boice Industrial Claim 1339, 1341 Office, (Colo.App.1990). 800 P.2d 8-42-110(3) provides benefits for Section employers We stated that would benefit partial an liable for they save on their would employee injured an disability benefits to permanent partial disability and would ap- working employer. for that It while expense training employ save the of new plies only reemploys who an Fulton, ees. 823 P.2d at 715. We also employee’s prein- injured employee “at the employees that would benefit be observed jury pay” and extends “the usual they job might retain a cause would wage adjustments” employee. to the Read whole, open difficult giving meaning full otherwise be to obtain on the as a to the thereof, plain language the words “rate market. Id. however, employers employee. er of found, the incentive rehires

We designed penalize the statute would be rendered created The statute is not to so required trigger meaningless “if the acts employers reemploy workers are who who were outside the statutory limitation Furthermore, self-employed. also if the employer.” Id. at 714. We control applicability statutory is limitations employers if their suggested that others, determined the conduct of no applica- unable to control the conduct were required could acts control “the limitation, statutory they bility trigger statutory limitation.” Ful- advantage taking be deterred ton, provisions, contrary reemployment detri- intent and to the legislative to the designed The statute encour employers partially dis- ment both age, discourage, reemployment not of in employees. Id. at 714-15. We thus abled potentially prohibi The jured employees. up- because the decision concluded that consequences consid tive cost mechanic journeyman the claimant to grade ering reemploy injured employ whether union, responsibility adoption ees indicates that King of the statute Soopers, construction urged by construction Embree would ren King prevented Soopers qualify- *5 der the incentive established therein mean the ing for would contravene its benefits However, ingless. section also legislative intent. protections employees. By for its contains ease, Snyder to sought In this Oil take terms, not applicable the section is if the advantage reemployment the incentive of perform to employee permanently is unable 8-42-110(3) by reemploying Em- of section by employer. the offered the The duties by Oil wage paid Snyder rate to bree provides injured that an em statute also prior court injury. Embree to The of request may of ployee redetermination 8-42-110(3) did appeals held that section permanent partial disability award apply Snyder ground on the that not Oil any during two-year period time follow employee’s purposes of the statute an if, reemployment her as a result his or pay sums the preinjury rate of includes disability of the caused prior employee employ- received from all injury, resigns is dismissed opinion The its ers. court reconciled encouraging em employment. from While by noting in that un- our decision Fulton ployers reemploy injured employees, the case, in like the situation wherein the protected Assembly injured also General required acts to fulfill exploitation by unprinci employees indepen- quirements were decisions made pled employers. in dently party, a third this case “the controlling employer capable is still of its pur have determined that for We statutory require- compliance

own provided employers poses of the benefits trigger ments that the limitation on disabil- Co., the relevant of compensation_” Snyder by section rate ity reject paid by reemploying P.2d 496. conclusion. is We the amount injured prior employer employee multiple employers When an of regard injury, to income from without may injured, is some those previously enjoyed by other prior employment wish continue the not conclude, therefore con employee. We However, relationship.2 injured when the trary to the determination of court self-employed, employee is also such em- appeals, of this circumstances ployee may elect not to retain himself or subject provisions case Oil is to the pay solely rate herself at the 8-42-110(3) and, therefore, is of section permanent partial his or her to ensure that provided disability are not if entitled to benefits therein. reduced anoth- farming per- disputed tain he had It is that as a result of his work- strenuous activities carry could not out formed related Embree cer- to.the III pay- reduce its ments when the rehires the work- reasons, foregoing For the we reverse salary employ- er at a that is less than the judgment appeals. court of The pre-injury wages ee’s from former case is that court for remanded to remand majority deny ment. The full dis- Appeals to the Industrial Claim Office with and, ability the worker benefits to at the apply directions to time, employer liability same reduce of this case consistent circumstances disability payments “penalize so as to not opinion. with this result, employers.” Op. at 263. This granting reduced liability J., SCOTT, dissents. conferring corresponding without benefit MULLARKEY, JJ., join LOHR and return, employees contrary to both the dissent. spirit the letter and of our Workers’ Com- pensation Act.2 dissenting: Justice SCOTT The majority purposes holds that “for compensation Our workers’ laws are in- provided employers by the benefits compensate wage- for the loss tended (1990 Supp.),] C.R.S. [3B earning capacity to a inju- due paid by is the relevant rate of amount ry. arising pre-1990 provi- cases under injured to the reemploying Act, sions of the Workers’ injury, prior to the without re- expressly recognized the Act gard employment pre- to income other liberally should accomplish be construed viously enjoyed employee.” Op. its benevolent full remedial purposes interpretation 263-264. such an Because protecting employees who sustain work- compensation our state workers’ law *6 See, injuries. related e.g., Bellindir v. unfairly disability compensa- reduces the Kezer, 645, (Colo.1982); 647 648 P.2d payments paid tion otherwise to workers Claimants Death Garner v. Vanadium of unduly employers, respectful- and I favors 358, 360, 1205, Corp., 194 572 Colo. P.2d ly dissent. (1977); Serv., 1206-07 Frohlick Crane Inc. Mack, 34, 38, 182 Colo. 893

I (1973); Irrigation James v. Motor & legal Co., Inc., 195, 199, The the Pump issue before court is wheth- 180 Colo. 503 8-42-110(3)1 (1972). er under employer section an P.2d it 1028 Thus is clear Demko, 8-42-110(3) language ly 1. The relevant of section United States v. 385 U.S. 382, 383, provides (1966) (“Histori that in S.Ct. 17 L.Ed.2d 258 cally, compensation workmen’s statutes were any employer reemploys case where an or offspring give injured the of a desire to workers employee continues the disabled work in quicker recovery a and certain more than can employment employer the the at the em- negligence be obtained from tort suits based on ployee's pay pre-injury rate of and extends to subject and to common-law defenses to such employee wage adjustments, the the usual the compensation practically suits. Thus laws are employee's permanent partial disability for, always thought supple of as substitutes not permanent awards shall be limited to impairment medical to, actions.’’); ments tort common-law see also payment or under a section 8-42- Larson, Compensa A. The Law Workmen's 107, which less. ever is 1.00-5.30, through (1993) tion 1-1 §§ 2-25 character, (describing origin purposes the and purpose compensation 2. The of workers’ stat- law); Larson, compensation of workers’ A. The provide equitable recovery utes is to an to em- Origins Compensation, Nature and Workmen’s ployees they injury; when sustain a work-related (”[T]he (1952) L.Q. employee 37 Cornell benefit, employee acquires the a but also relin- dependents, exchange in for ... modest but quishes right employer to his or her sue the for benefits, give up assured their common-law damages injury. Similarly, for the when an right employer damages any to sue the employer, pursuant reemploys §to compensation] [workers' covered the employee pre-injury the at his or her rate of act."). very following injury, Thus the nature of our prin- a workers’ the same work, i.e., compensation ciple law is an is in effect accommodation be relinquishing right conflicting employers tween to sue his or interests of her compensation. general- employees. er for full See their 110(3), Act, wage adjustments” do Compensation effec- “usual not that the Workers’ job up- injury, expected of Embree’s include union classification tive at the time designed primarily grades. so that bene- Fulton 823 P.2d compensation on fits be based bear- would Fulton, majority The now reads incor- approximation employee’s fair to think, rectly say I that we must consider earning proven capacity. real I believe employer’s forces control to outside the majority is in direct contraven- holding might way if in see those forces some objective. tion this exempt employer complying express liability conditions of the limita- II contrast, In I provision. read Fulton require employer the maxi- majority Apart my view that the i.e., payable employee, mum amount purpose has the fundamental overlooked fully compensate before Act, I find also the Workers’ employer benefits to at- King reliance on Fulton v. majority’s any exception I tach. would thus limit (Colo.1992) mis- Soopers, 823 P.2d 709 Fulton, like wherein principle to case Fulton, that placed. we noted employer is the the “em- sole source of limiting 8-42-110(3) employers by ployee’s pre-injury pay.” Unlike compensation awards and their case, Fulton, in in the instant training by containing inherent the costs not Snyder Oil was Embree’s sole source inexperienced employees; new continu- compensation. previous ing, stated that that section also bene- who, they have in- employees fits Next, major- I am unable to reconcile permanent partial disability, curred a might ity’s be concern fu- be confronted restrictions their it “penalize[d],” unless it holds as does. opportunities. ture Fulton Op. at 263. Were section Thus 823 P.2d at 715. we indicated employer, available to “quid pro quo” there kind is a allure required compensate be the dis- encourages em- par- worker a full abled ployers comply with the criteria set out pre-injury on disability award based all tial em- statute so that 8-42-110(3) merely compensation. Section *7 ployees alike benefit. compensate the employer to em- allows the impair- a more limited medical ployee with op. majority, As noted the see at is payment when the worker reem- ment in that the incentive observed Fulton a conse- employer, the and as ployed reemploy employer the disabled workers his total quence, is made whole because hollow, however, if would become the compensation equal pre-injury is to his rate quirements of stat- the limitation such, provision provides pay. As triggered by ute force remote were some paying employer with an alternative the decision, upon reem- employer’s from the partial disability employee the ployment, compensate employee at award, i.e., under section pay. rate employee’s pre-injury full only obligated to limited Fulton, in Id. Thus impairment the em- medical benefits when union’s refusal was unable “control” the employee pre- rehires the ployer apprentice to employee advance pay. Thus 8-42- injury rate of employee journeyman mechanic after 110(3) changes the form of the interpre- that an injured, we concluded nature, i.e., but not its benefit 8-42-110(3) that includes tation of section compensation individual and fair full part upgrades of the classification union as a whole worker. viewed language wage adjustments” under “usual would undermine that statute Ill this ability to control costs. Based on er’s equitable intended simply, Put result reasoning, we held that accordance is that the section 8-42- legislative purpose fairly compensated. case, In proven pre-injury capacity. be this Because I can- that, injuries AU found as a result of accept that the Assembly General in- Oil, during employ Snyder sustained his enacting tended such a result in section 8- longer perform 42-110(3), Embree was no able to I respectfully dissent. engaged work he had been for over i.e., twenty was, years, dairy farming.3 He say I am authorized to that Justice however, generally able to continue work- join LOHR and Justice MULLARKEY ing Snyder prior Oil as he had to incur- this dissent.

ring Thus, under majority’s holding, Snyder Oil is able experience benefit from Embree’s

training, and at the same time to limit its compensation is,

workers' liability. That

by permitting Snyder advantage Oil to take limitation, statutory liability

of the the ma-

jority in fully effect allows enjoy statutory pro- intended Colorado, The PEOPLE of the State vision, expense but at the of Frank Em- Plaintiff-Appellant,

bree, workers, one of its whose work-relat- v. injuries prevent ed him working now farm, dairy earning wages and from Billy LONGORIA, Joe Defendants at the same level as he had to sustain- Appellee. disability.4 Colorado, The PEOPLE of the State of

IV Plaintiff-Appellant, I interpretation believe the correct of sec- consistent with objec- tives which underlie Gary EKIN, compen- the workers’ Defendant-Appellee. Dean comports sation laws and one that with the 92SA502, Nos. 93SA38. spirit scheme, would be to application limit its to those workers who Supreme Colorado, Court employed by only are one or who En Banc. compensation receive total after Nov. equivalent pre-injury to their pay. way, the disabled fully compensated be either

receipt comprehensive disability compen- *8 benefits,

sation the identical

income received to his or her thought,

As a final I wish to add that majority

under the opinion, the efforts of

men and women who must take on addi-

tional work in the course of providing for disregarded

their own are now whenever injured reemployed salary worker is at a does fairly represent

which his or her dairy pumper, Annual income from Embree’s farm was able to return to work at |2,000 approximately amounted to limitations; however, which com- Oil with no because his prised twenty percent pre-injury almost of his self-employment shoveling as a farmer involved compensation. heavy lifting, he was unable to return to his prior, self-employed farming. Embree, 4. The record is uncontroverted that week, employed days eight day five hours a

Case Details

Case Name: Snyder Oil Co. v. Embree
Court Name: Supreme Court of Colorado
Date Published: Nov 15, 1993
Citation: 862 P.2d 259
Docket Number: 92SC437
Court Abbreviation: Colo.
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