61 Pa. Commw. 396 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1981
Opinion by
This is an appeal by claimant, Richard V. Snow, from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which affirmed a referee’s decision denying claimant unemployment compensation benefits by mandate of Section 402(b)(1) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Act).
Claimant, Snow, was last employed by B. W. Sidley in Painesville, Ohio, as a mechanic. When claimant accepted the job in Ohio, he and his family resided in Butler, Pennsylvania. There is a distance of approximately one hundred miles between Painesville and claimant’s home in Pennsylvania. Due to the great distance and the costs of commuting, claimant made arrangements to live with his uncle in Ohio until such time as he could have his family join him there. Shortly after claimant moved in with his uncle, irreconcilable disputes arose, necessitating claimant’s leaving his uncle’s home and renting his own living quarters.
As a consequence of claimant’s moving to his own apartment, he was forced to maintain two residences until his wife and family moved to Ohio. When claimant’s wife refused to relocate herself and their family in Ohio, claimant voluntarily terminated his employment. Claimant stated that discussions between him and his wife concerning their family’s relocation had led to heated disagreements, causing a great deal of friction in his marriage. In addition,
Claimant filed an application for unemployment benefits with the Office of Employment Security (Office). The Office issued a determination denying benefits to claimant under Section 402(b)(1) of the Act. The claimant appealed that determination and a referee’s hearing was held at which claimant appeared unrepresented. Following the hearing the referee issued a decision affirming that of the Office. The claimant filed a timely appeal from that decision to the Board. The Board, deciding that claimant had voluntarily terminated his employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, affirmed the referee’s decision. The Board held that, “Voluntarily terminating one’s employment because the claimant’s family refuses to relocate with him does not constitute cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for so doing. ’ ’
Upon obtaining legal counsel, claimant filed a Bequest for Remand and Reconsideration. Such Request was not timely filed and thus, not granted. Claimant now appeals to this Court.
Claimant advances several arguments in his attempt to persuade us to reverse the Board’s decision.
At the outset, claimant alleges that compelling and necessitous reasons existed to justify his voluntarily leaving his employment. In that regard, claimant cites several causes which he deems necessitous and compelling. First, he charges that domestic considerations led to his decision to quit his job. He alleges that marital problems due to his employment situation mandated that he return to his home in Butler, Pennsylvania. In support of his contention,
This Court has held that the eligibility for unemployment compensation of applicants who terminate their employment for marital, filial, or domestic reasons must be determined under Section 402(b)(1) of the Act. Each claimant must be afforded the opportunity to demonstrate that his termination was for cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. See Biberman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 451, 401 A.2d 9 (1979); Wallace v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 38 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 342, 393 A.2d 43 (1978). In the instant case, claimant’s domestic circumstances do not rise to the level of a necessitous and compelling reason for his decision to terminate his employment. Here, claimant chose to move back to Pennsylvania because of his wife’s refusal to relocate near her husband’s place of employment. Claimant was not needed to care for his wife or children as was the case in Pittsburgh Pipe, Biberman, and Wallace.
Secondly, claimant contends that since he cannot afford to maintain two households, he would have to commute in order to retain his job. The transportation difficulties involved in such a commute, he asserts, justify his quitting his job.
This is admittedly a close case, since the need to travel 200 miles each day to engage in work surely indicates a serious question as to the suitability of the work. However, when one considers the claimant’s hourly wage of $11.10 and the possibility of relocating, in order to retain a well-paying job and to eliminate the transportation problem, we are not persuaded that his job in Shippingport was unsuitable work. Even conceding that Shaw’s failure to relocate was reasonable under the circumstances, it does not constitute a necessitous and compelling cause for voluntarily terminating employment such as to allow him to be eligible for unemployment compensation. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 455, 406 A.2d at 609.
Thus, it is eminently clear, under the Shaw case, that claimant’s potential commuting dilemma did not amount to cause of a necessitous and compelling nature so as to entitle him to the collection of unemployment benefits.
Thirdly, claimant avers that since he was not engaged in suitable employment, he was not obligated to preserve that employment. He argues that the conditions which originally made his employment possible ceased to exist when he was forced to rent
Claimant goes on to assert that his due process rights were violated because of the referee’s failure to advise bim of Ms right to be represented by an
Finally, claimant argues that the Act violates the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution by requiring a claimant to show compelling and necessitous circumstances when terminating his employment for domestic reasons, yet requiring only a showing of good cause for refusing an offer of suitable employment for the same reason. That same issue was raised in the case of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Jenkins, 23 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 127, 350 A.2d 447 (1976), and there rejected. Accordingly, claimant’s argument must fail here.
Order
And Now, the 20th day of August, 1981, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review at Decision No. B-165716, denying claimant benefits, is affirmed.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937), 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(b)(l).