The sole issue on this appeal is whether defendant Home Mutual may be directly sued on its policy *205 of insurance, which it issued to defendants Joyce, before the liability of defendants Joyce to plaintiffs has been determined.
The coverage clause of Home Mutual’s policy provides as follows:
“To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, and as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, excepting liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of additional premises, custom farming, and liability to farm employees, other than exchange labor as defined in this policy.”
Among the exclusion clauses of the policy is one which provides that the policy does not apply to “the ownership, maintenance, or use of automobiles including the loading or unloading thereof.” The word “automobile” is defined in the policy so as to expressly exclude farm tractors.
The controlling statutes are secs. 204.30 (4)
1
and 260.11 (1), Stats. 1957.
2
This court has held that these two
*206
statutes must be considered together.
Smedley v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co.
(1961), 12 Wis. (2d) 460, 465, 466,
Thus we must look to sec. 204.30 (4), Stats., to determine whether there is direct liability, and to sec. 260.11 to determine whether the insurer may be made a defendant in the action despite a no-action clause in the policy. In keeping with this premise we stated in Smedley v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., supra, at page 465: “Sec. 260.11 refers to an insurer of motor vehicles and contemplates the type of insurance policy referred to in sec. 204.30 (4).” It may be that these two statutes are mutually inclusive though we need not decide that point here.
Home Mutual contends that sec. 204.30 (4), Stats., does not make it directly liable to plaintiffs because the Joyce farm tractor was not described in the policy. This contention is grounded upon the following words of that statute, “when caused by the negligent operation, maintenance, use, or defective construction of the vehicle described therein . . . .” (Italics supplied.) In view of the legislative objective in enacting the statute, we do not believe the words “described therein” should be interpreted literally as Home Mutual contends. We cannot believe that the legislature intended the phrase “vehicle described therein” in sec. 204.30 (4) to exclude from the operation of that statute situations in which the policy provides coverage to the insured with respect to substituted vehicles or while driving the vehicle of another. Such an interpretation would unduly limit the remedial purpose of sec. 204.30 (4), which is to permit direct action against an insurer whenever there is coverage under the terms of the policy. Therefore, we con- *208 elude that if the policy extends coverage to the vehicle involved in a particular accident, then such vehicle is a “vehicle described therein” within the meaning of sec. 204.30 (4). This interpretation of sec. 204.30 (4) makes Home Mutual directly liable to plaintiffs because it is undisputed that its policy did cover the Joyce tractor at the time of the accident.
Home Mutual further contends that its policy is not of the type referred to in sec. 204.30 (4), Stats. It argues that the statute contemplates the type of policy commonly known as an automobile liability policy and not a public-liability policy of the type which it issued to the Joyces to protect them against liability to others arising from the hazards of their farming operations. In support of this contention Home Mutual relies on certain statements made in Smedley v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., supra. The court therein commented that the policy involved was not one covering liability by reason of the operation of a motor vehicle, but instead was an owners’, landlords’, and tenants’ liability policy. A careful reading of the Smedley Case shows that its result did not hinge upon the form of the policy, but rather upon the determination that the stationary operation of the crane at the time of the accident was not the operation and control of a motor vehicle within the meaning of sec. 204.30 (4). We are confident that the legislature, in enacting this statute, was not concerned with the type of policy issued. Instead, it intended to provide direct liability if coverage was extended to a self-propelled vehicle operated upon the public highways. Therefore, we hold that the form or type of policy issued is not controlling in determining whether sec. 204.30 (4) applies.
Home Mutual also relies upon a statement made in
Rudolph v. Currer
(1959), 5 Wis. (2d) 639, 642,
Home Mutual lastly contends that the Joyce tractor is not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of both secs. 204.30 (4) and 260.11 (1), Stats. Two bases are asserted in support of this position: (1) Farm tractors are expressly excluded from the definition of “motor vehicle” set forth in sub. (2) (b) of sec. 344.01; 3 and (2) sub. (3) of sec. 204.30, the “omnibus coverage statute,” uses the words “automobile” and “vehicle” interchangeably.
The definition of “motor vehicle” set forth in sub. (2) (b) of sec. 344.01, Stats., is found in ch. 344, Stats., which pertains to the Safety Responsibility and Financial Responsibility Acts. See
Laughnan v. Griffiths
(1955),
While sub. (3) of sec. 204.30, Stats., the “omnibus coverage statute,” does use the words “automobile” and “motor vehicle” interchangeably, this does not control the meaning of “motor vehicle” as employed in sub. (4) of sec. 204.30. These two subsections were enacted at different times to achieve different objectives.
One of the rules of statutory interpretation is that words of a statute should be accorded their ordinary and accepted meaning.
State v. Resler
(1952),
*211 In view of the foregoing, we conclude that a farm tractor while being operated on the public highway is a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of secs. 204.30 (4) and 260.11 (1), Stats.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.
Notes
Sec. 204.30 (4), Stats. 1957, provides: “Any bond or policy of insurance covering liability to others by reason of the operation of a motor vehicle shall be deemed and construed to contain the following conditions: That the insurer shall be liable to the persons entitled to recover for the death of any person, or for injury to person or property, irrespective of whether such liability be in praesenti or contingent and to become fixed or certain by final judgment against the insured, when caused by the negligent operation, maintenance, use, or defective construction of the vehicle described therein, such liability not to exceed the amount named in said bond or policy.”
Sec. 260.11 (1), Stats. 1957, provides in part: “In any action [brought by plaintiff on account of any claim against the insured] for damages caused by the negligent operation, management or control of a motor vehicle, any insurer of motor vehicles, which has an interest in the outcome of such controversy adverse to the plaintiff or any of the parties to such controversy, or which by its policy of insurance assumes or reserves the right to control the *206 prosecution, defense, or settlement of the claim or action of the plaintiff or any of the parties to such claim or action, or which by its policy agrees to prosecute or defend the action brought by the plaintiff or any of the parties to such action, or agrees to engage counsel to prosecute or defend said action, or agrees to pay the costs of such litigation, is by this section made a proper party defendant.”
Sub. (2) (b) of sec. 344.01, Stats. 1957, provides: “ ‘Motor vehicle’ means a self-propelled vehicle and also includes trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such vehicles, except that ‘motor vehicle’ does not include farm tractors, well drillers, or road machinery.”