64 So. 594 | Ala. | 1914
This is the second appeal in this cause. — Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 276, 58 South. 201. A somewhat similar cause, of like title, was considered in 176 Ala. 282, 58 South. 199. Different conclusions prevailed in the two appeals. Both bills sought an accounting of one who had served as trustee of estates for a long term of years. The ruling on the last-mentioned appeal was predicated upon the doctrine of Whetstone v. Whetstone, 75 Ala. 495. The opinion in the former appeal of this cause recognized Whetstone v. Whetstone as authoritative, but distinguished that authority, and Snodgrass v. Snodgrass following it, by reference to the facts averred in the original bill in this cause. Upon the remandment of this cause, the bill was amended. It is to be inferred that the object of the amendment ivas to state a cause within the doctrine of Whetstone v. Whetstone and of Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 281, 58 South. 199. It is insisted for appellant that the principles announced
The original bill was filed July 22, 1911. Ann C. Snodgrass died July 25, 1904. Nathaniel H. Snodgrass was a brother of Ann C. Snodgrass. They were children of John Snodgrass, who died in 1880, from whom Ann 0. inherited, in her proportion, an estate of both personal and real property. Another brother of Anri C., viz., William E., exercised, by general consent in the family, the trusteeship of the estate of Ann C., as well as that of another brother, John T., until December 15,
It is clear from the averments of the original bill that the relation, to the estate of Ann C., assumed and acted upon by Nathaniel Snodgrass, was one of a trust nature; and that the inception of a period wherefrom, if sufficiently long maintained, the right or the remedy to exact an accounting by the trustee would become bar
Pretermitting the recital of any more of the facts averred in the amendment than are at this time essential, the pith of the presently important averments therein are these: “Ann C. Snodgrass was always, after she reached and passed the age of twelve years down to her death, -which occurred on July 25, 1904, of unsound mind and subject to fainting fits, with which she was often and repeatedly visited during her life, and she died * * * while a fit or convulsion was upon her. The unsoundness of her mind was in a degree such as to render her wholly incapable of understanding business affairs, or transacting her business affairs with judgment and intelligence.” That “it was ascertained by her teachers and by her parents that her mind was incapable of receiving and retaining more than the rudiments of a literary education.” That her mental incapacity was well known to her parents and to her brothers, one of whom Nathaniel was. That the father, shortly before his death, verbally requested his
It is further averred that Nathaniel never denied or repudiated the trust or his obligation to account for and settle the same; “but, on the contrary, he at all times and contimiously, by his acts and declarations both before and after the ■ death of said Ann C., held himself out to the world as her agent and trustee, and recognized and admitted the existence of such continuing trust on his part, and his duty and obligations to account for and settle said trust.” It is further averred : “That about three months before the death of said N. H. Snodgrass, he, in conversation about his business affairs, which conversation was with divers of his acquaintance and friends, several of whom are living and reside in Jackson county, Ala., and who have no interest in the result of this suit, stated in said conversations that he had been continuously for many years receiving, managing, and controlling the moneys and all other properties belonging to said Ann C. Snodgrass, as her agent and trustee for many years next before her death, and that he had not, but that he desired to have an accounting and settlement of his trust with his brother Wm. E. Snodgrass. That his said brother desired such settlement, and that his said brother objected to his cutting and selling timber trees grown on lands owned in common by said N. H. Snodgrass, Wm. E., and John T. Snodgrass. That he did not think his brother, Wm. E. Snodgrass, should have objected to his having cut and sold timber trees from said lands and for the reason that the branches and tops of said trees were, or some of them were, dead and others were
It is manifest that the trust relation, and the trust described in the original and amended bills, terminated upon the date of the death of Ann C. Snodgrass, July 25, 1904. — 2 Beach on Trusts, § 760. She was, in the nature of things, the beneficiary of the relation of confidence, and her demise, on that date, necessarily left that formerly existing trust without a beneficiary, thereby determining the trust. It was ruled in Whetstone v. Whetstone, and recently reaffirmed in Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, supra, 58 South. 199, that lapse of time is without effect on right or remedy, in respect of an accounting or liability arising out of a trust, where-there is a recognition of the existence of the trust; that each act, or other recognition of the trust, affords a new beginning for periods that may, if of sufficient duration, bar the right or the remedy.
While the great duration of the trust — from 1886 to 1904 — cannot, under established principles herein-before restated, avail to affect the right to the remedy the original and the amended bills would assert, yet in exercising the sound discretion reposed the court will consider the period the trust covered and the extent and nature of the transactions or affairs of which an accounting is sought in order to determine whether the means to the ascertainment and effectuation of justice are fairly sufficient to enable the court to safely exercise its ordinary functions in such cases.
The amended bill presents no excuse whatever for the stated postponement and delay in the assertion of the remedy sought. The averred mental incapacity of Ann C. Snodgrass, of course, presents no- excuse for the delay since her death. The averred concession, by word and act, of Nathaniel Snodgrass that a trust had existed, affords no excuse. Upwards of six years intervened between the deaths of Ann 0. and Nathaniel Snodgrass; the latter dying November 24, 1910. ' Letters of administration on the estate of Ann C. were never issued or applied for until February, 1911. The bill was filed July 22, 1911. It thus appears that the accounting-sought would cover eighteen years, beginning in the year 1886; and that it, if directed, would be with the
From a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstances set forth in the amended bill, coupled with the more than six years of unexcused delay after the trust terminated and the death of the trustee, convince this court that “there can be no longer a safe determination of the controversy,” that to enter upon the accounting sought would expose the estate of the trustee, and in consequence those who are entitled to his estate, to the “danger of injustice from the loss of information and evidence and means of recourse occasioned” by his death and the extended period that has elapsed since 1886.
Reversed and remanded.