*1 further adjustments of the sales data and corresponding adjustment of the common-level ratio are necessary, light Co., of Keebler must be determined initially the trial by court. we Accordingly, remand the record to the court of pleas common for such a determination.
Orders of the Commonwealth Court and the court of pleas common vacated and record remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
O’BRIEN, J., WILKINSON, J., C. and did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
LARSEN, J., filed a concurring dissenting opinion. LARSEN, Justice, concurring dissenting.
I concur that the sales data and analysis submitted by the
were
taxpayer
properly admitted
trial court.
I
dissent, however, from that portion of the majority opinion
court,
which directs the trial
remand,
on
to determine the
common level ratio in light of Keebler Co. v. Board of
Revision of Taxes of
Philadelphia County,
A.2d 583. Real estate
not be
may
divided
validly
into classes
for the purpose of calculating the common level ratio. See
Co.,
v. Keebler
Kenney
53 Pa.Cmwlth.
Barker, Appellants, THORNBURGH, Richard Governor of the Commonwealth Pennsylvania, et al.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued May 1980. Sept.
Decided *2 Levin,
Michael I. Harrisburg, appellants. Koontz, Bedford, John B. for appellee Bedford Co. Bd. of Elec. Bedford,
Gordon Stoup, se. pro Meehan, Robert Smith, Leonora M. Counsel, Chief Timo- thy Holland, J. Harrisburg, for appellee Auditor General. Elseeser, Jr.,
Harry C. Lewis P. York, Sterling, for appel- lee York Co. Bd. Elections. Grine,
David se. pro *3 John Blasko, onte, W. Belief for appellee Centre Co. Bd. Elections. Uhler, York,
John C. se. pro Hoffman, Robert for Harrisburg, appellee Com. Officials except Atty. Gen. Rosenfield,
Bruce A. Philadelphia, amicus curiae. Graebner, Carol F. Edwin L. Klett, Pittsburgh, for Alle- gheny Bar—amicus County curiae. EAGEN, J,
Before O’BRIEN, C. ROBERTS, NIX, LAR- KAUFFMAN, SEN and JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT PER CURIAM:
I. Mr. Chief Justice O’Brien files an opinion modifying the determination of the Commonwealth Court to the extent that the Commonwealth Court held that 65 P.S. 402 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause in excluding ap- from the definition of officials non-compensated
pointed, Larsen, Flaherty Mr. Justice Mr. Justice “Public Official.” join portion opinion. Kauffman this and Mr. Justice files an which dissents from opinion Justice Roberts Mr. of Mr. Chief Justice of the opinion the above portion opinion announcing of that O’Brien, portion as well as the the remedy. an which dissents from the opinion
Mr. Justice Nix files Justice of Mr. Chief O’Brien. opinion above portion II. divided on whether reach being The Court equally financial disclosure concerning due issue process or a candidate for public of a Public Official family members of the order of the Common- office, the remaining portions are affirmed. wealth Court opinion files an supporting Chief Justice O’Brien
Mr. by family of financial disclosure on issue affirmance Mr. Mr. Nix and Justice Kauffman Justice members join. supporting files an reversal on opinion Justice Roberts
Mr. by family disclosure members which of financial issue join. and Mr. Justice Flaherty Mr. Justice Larsen files an reversal opinion supporting Justice Flaherty Mr. members. by family issue of financial disclosure on the III. Commonwealth determination Accordingly, it held the statute is not to the extent Court modified *4 Clause, and the exclusion Equal Protection violative officials from the definition non-compensated of appointed, respects, In all other officials” is removed. of “public is affirmed and of the Commonwealth Court determination sustaining Court appellees’ the Order of the Commonwealth dismissing appellants’ and Amended objection preliminary affirmed. for Review is Petition EAGEN, J., in the decision participate former C. did case. of this
OPINION O’BRIEN, Justice. Chief in the order entered Common- from an appeal
This is an preliminary objections sustaining appellees’ Court wealth Petition for Review. Amended dismissing appellants’ and before us now are as to the matters The facts germane follows: known as the “Public Legislature popularly
The Act of the the Governor on signed by Law”1 was Ethics Officials 1, 1980. The effective January to become October conduct conflicts Act, involving certain proscribes generally, officials, and, accordingly, part public of interest on the office, elected officials that candidates requires file financial disclosure state- certain officials appointed and The Commissionis a Ethics Commission. ments with State in the Act to and Legislature implement created its provisions. administer not rele- preliminary proceedings to certain
Subsequent 21,1979, filed an Amend- here, February vant on appellants, invoking original jurisdiction ed Petition for Review are elected school di- Appellants Commonwealth Court. Commonwealth, in three school districts rectors their Petition relief for themselves sought individually belong: and for all members of a class to which elected they Governor, directors. as were the respondents school Named Treasurer, the Auditor and the Attorney General Gener- Commonwealth, the Ethics al of the State Commission and its members and the boards of elections individually, county and district as a class. their attorneys By petition appel- alleged lants the Act is violative of Constitutions relief sought Commonwealth and of the United States relief; relief, and, declaratory injunctive in three counts: warranto, count in the ouster from office of certain quo of the Ethics members Commission. amended, 4, 1978, seq. as et
1. Act of October P.L. P.S. § 1980-1981). (Supp. *5 below, herein, Respondents appellees filed ob- preliminary to the Amended Petition for Review in jections the form of a a a petition raising question jurisdiction, demurrer and a motion to strike for lack of to a conformity rule of court. hearing appellees’ a on an Following preliminary objections entered, 31, 1979, August order was on sustaining pre- liminary objections dismissing appellants’ petition. Hence this appeal.
I. The Protection Claim Equal claim that the Act is violative initially of the Appellants Protection Clause of United Equal States Constitution. unconstitutional argue an effect is worked Appellants by in section definitional item two Act. The statute official” “public may that a not take the oath of provides of his official until perform any office or duties he has filed a “statement of financial interests.” The disclosure require- must be fulfilled all by ment thus established candidates for well as appointed elective office as officials who receive by of their compensation performance duties. “ provides But the Act further official’ shall ‘public official not include who receives no any appointed compensa- for actual tion other than reimbursement expenses.” P.S. this by 402. claim definitional distinction Appellants § created a Legislature constitutionally impermissible has classification. The dichotomy perceived complained of Alone among is as follows: by appellants, political Commonwealth, of this the City subdivisions of Philadelphia to,2 to,3 and has chosen appoint authorized rather than vacant, elect its school directors. Additionally, unexpired positions throughout elective school board the Common- filled, pursuant Code, wealth are Public School appointment.4 13218(a)(3).
2. 53 P.S. §
3. 351 12-201. Pa.Code 3-315, seq. P.S. et serve Pennsylvania all school board members Since the classification created compensation,5 without *6 On the one hand are all apparent. terms of the Act becomes directors in to whom the Pennsylvania, the elected school of the Act And on the other are provisions apply. disclosure of and a certain Philadelphia school directors number of elsewhere, all school directors temporarily appointed are from the strictures of the Act. exempt whom is whether the The issue for our resolution classification so guarantee equal protec- drawn violates the constitutional of the laws. tion review, us distinct standards of urge upon
The
and
parties
that question. Appellees
we
address
advocate
preliminarily
of a standard we
invoked in
recently
Springfield
utilization
Education,
539,
District v.
483 Pa.
Department
School
397
Therein,
(1979).
upon
opinion
A.2d 1154
relying
Supreme Court United States v. Maryland Savings Share
4,
16,
Insurance
400
Corporation,
U.S.
91 S.Ct.
Appellants, propound test, different and direct our attention to Phillips, v. 462 Pa. Moyer A.2d 441 In Moyer, we held: Equal “The Protection Clause . . . does not deny state the to treat different power classes of persons different but does ways, deny right legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed aby statute into different classes on the basis criteria whol- 5. 24 P.S. 3-321. statute. particular of the objective to the unrelated
ly. reasonable, arbitrary, must be classification a fair having of difference ground some must rest so legislation of the object relation to substantial will treated circumstanced be similarly persons all (emphasis Id., 462 Pa. at alike.” 400— supplied). 289, 328 A.2d Butler, in Commonwealth
Again,
classification
“if a legislative
(1974), we stated
to the
relationship
purposes
no reasonable
bears
Id., 458
violated.”
clause is
protection
the equal
legislation,
A.2d 851.
standards
argue opposing
us
before
parties
That the
frequently
our
decisions
prior
surprising;
is not
review
one hand are cases
On the
inconsistent.
to be
appear
*7
see,
test,
g, Springfield
e.
School
“rational basis”
of a
speak
Home Loan
Nursing
v.
District,
Pennsylvania
Tosto
supra;
and on the other are
1,
(1975),
A.2d 198
Pa.
331
460
Agency,
be-
and substantial relation”
a “fair
which require
those
see, e.
legislative objective,
and the
classification
tween the
Cavill, 459 Pa.
In re Estate of
Phillips, supra;
v.
Moyer
g.,
(1974).
411,
Both This common a common source. from spring disparity, the most fundamen in what is perhaps is manifested source the presumption construction: statutory principle tal This constitutionally. presumption acted has legislature due to the respect judiciary part “reflects on School government.” branch of co-equal as a legislature 562, 554, Pa. 345 A.2d Kane, v. of Deer Lakes District defer to the courts Accordingly, properly 658, refuse to its function and may exercise of in the legislature plainly palpably, if it only “clearly, a statute enforce Nursing Pennsylvania Tosto v. the constitution.” violates supra. Loan Agency, Home and the concomitant constitutionality
The presumption enact- where the applies the legislature deference judicial ment question is on challenged equal protection grounds or otherwise. But in the absence of a claim that classification is “suspect,” or that the statute implicates “fundamental rights,” there is no requirement, or, indeed, justification, for utilizing different standards of review in different cases.6
That our prior decisions apparently apply different tests may perhaps be traced to language contained in Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, U.S. 40 S.Ct. 64 L.Ed. (1920), and often quoted this Court: classification must be reasonable, not
“[T]he
arbitrary,
and must rest
some
ground of difference having a
fair and substantial relation to the object of the legisla-
tion, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.” Id.
at
language constitute a single test:
in order to be nonarbi-
trary,
is to have a
basis,
reasonable
the classification
must be based upon a difference having a fair and substan-
tial relation to the legislative objective. That the “reasona-
basis”,
ble
basis”,
“rational
for a classification must be a
function of the relationship between the classification and
purpose
the legislation, has been recognized
this
See,
Court.
for example, Commonwealth
Staub,
v.
486,
We
that the mistaken assumption that
the phrase “rational basis” implies a greater assumption of
constitutionality
connotes a less strict standard of review
than the phrase “fair and
relation”,
substantial
should be
discarded.
we
Accordingly,
proceed to analyze the classifi-
See,
Independent
San Antonio
6.
School
Rodriguez,
District v.
U.S.
(1973);
S.Ct.
cation a fair and having rests a difference arbitrary, of the object legislation. to the relation substantial clear; in the instant case is the legislation The object in enacting declared its intention has Legislature plainly the Ethics Law: office is a' public declares hereby
“The Legislature finan- personal effort to realize any trust and that public compensation office other than public through cial gain In to a violation of that trust. order law is provided confidence of the of the people the faith and strengthen further de- Legislature government, in their State to be assured that the right have people clares that the of or candidates for public of holders financial interests of a appearance a conflict nor the neither present office Because confidence public trust. public with the conflict assuring be sustained by can best in government officials, honesty the impartiality people construed to promote complete shall be liberally this Act disclosure.” 65 P.S. § of review we juxtapose our standard
Applying the classification alongside intent legislative declaration official” 402 and “public the definition created latter bears a “fair and substantial determine if the seek to framed In our view the so question to the former. relation” vacant, fill unex persons appointed itself. Those answers directors functions perform elected school terms of pired those individuals elected to their respect identical in every provisions so from the appointed To exclude persons offices. same the elected members of the including while of the Act relation, substantial or bears no of school directors board not, legislation. to the object school hand, appointed true that it is On the other differently somewhat are situated Philadelphia directors in the Commonwealth. school directors from all other power levy not have direct Board does School Philadelphia Rather, Philadelphia v. Casey, supra. taxes. Danson local with- each City year account to Council directors must school *9 expendi- and receipts anticipated of sum statement “a lump to authority for request and a year next fiscal for the tures Philadelphia the year.” for budget balance its taxes to levy 12.12-303(b). Neverthe- Charter, 351 Pa.Code Rule § Home are no means Philadelphia of school directors less, the in- to incur are, authorized example, They powerless. employees; and remove debtedness; hire, demote promote, prop- contracts; equipment supplies, purchase into enter et seq. 12.12-300 351 Pa.Code erty. distinction between is some while it is true there
Thus and elected school directors school Philadelphia’s appointed The classification elsewhere, is required. more directors a fair and substan- must bear differently them which treats It should be the legislation. of object relation to tial limited that the act be not intend did Legislature clear taxes; without officials many to levy empowered to officials the statute. More- scope are included that power is, directed, statute to which the over, objective officials, is at in its confidence public the maintenance spend who to those officials pertinent least as it. generate as to those who revenue inten- declared Legislature’s that the cannot believe We people confidence of the the faith and “strengthen tion was, conceivable any under in their government” the State to school least in relation at stop, intended analysis, Accordingly, Philadelphia. directors, at the boundaries Act, 2 of the provision that the definitional we hold school coverage appointed its from operates exempt violating effect directors, works an unconstitutional to the exempted equal protection persons of those right of the laws. Privacy Challenge
II. The that each elected the Act require four and five of Sections his concerning disclose information director publicly school extent the financial affairs, to some financial or her claim that these Appellants of his or her family. affairs rights their individual violate requirements disclosure privacy. the constitutional or source identify statutory
Unable to *10 assert, appellants upon which privacy right they rely of cases decided in the Federal courts and in other variety a It should be sufficient to observe that jurisdictions. state the cases relied controls the instant matter. none of the Supreme It is of course true that Court has deter- citizens a enjoy constitutionally protected right mined Wade, 113, 705, 410 93 35 Roe v. U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d privacy. is of a line of (1972), upon by appellants, typical 147 relied the most discernible delineating readily protected pri- cases “This privacy right encompasses protects interest. vacy home, marriage, intimacies of personal family, motherhood, and child Paris procreation rearing.” Adult Slaton, 49, 2628, 413 93 37 Theatre I v. U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d interest of the discerned in privacy quality 446 No I, has or Paris Adult Theatre been asserted these Wade appellants. Valeo, 1, 612, 424 96 46 659 v. U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d
Buckley
is,
, also relied
while somewhat
(1976)
upon by appellants,
mark,
also not
In
controlling.
Buckley,
closer to
the financial disclosure
of the Fed-
upheld
provisions
Court
eral Election
Act of 1971 in the face of a claim
Campaign
Act
the first amendment
of associa-
“right
that the
violated
The First Amendment
challenge
tional
made
privacy.”
dissimilar to that made in the instant case.
is
Buckley totally
Roe,
589,
869,
v.
97
51
Neither Whalen
U.S.
S.Ct.
(1977),
L.Ed.2d 64
in the
(patient-identification requirements
York
Act of
do not
New
State Controlled Substances
violate a
“zone of
nor
constitutionally protected
privacy”),
Schultz,
California Bankers Association v.
416 U.S.
(1974)
Thus, in
possessed by
that the
interest
privacy
recognized
we
(1938),
records, and so
to his financial
citizen extends
an individual
issued
a committee
records
of such
subpoena
show that the demands
it does
is “void
Legislature
not]
[if
*11
214,
Id.,
Pa. at
. .
333
inquiry.
to the
germane
are
therein
”].
of persons In Ex interests. asserted involving privacy ties in cases 381, (1882), L.Ed. 232 371, 1 27 Curtis, 106 S.Ct. U.S. parte regulate, Congress power Court affirmed of the limits, govern- conduct political reasonable within ment’s employees. in all this class of of Congress evident purpose
“The efficiency integrity promote has been to enactments duties, to maintain proper of official the discharge in Clearly purpose service. such public in the discipline Id., 373, . . ”. at legislative power. scope the just within S.Ct., 1 at 383. Mitchell, 75, v. 330 U.S. also, Public Workers United
See Valeo, supra; v. 556, (1947); Buckley L.Ed. 754 91 67 S.Ct. Carriers, 413 93 v. Letter U.S. Commission Civil Service (1973). 2880, 37 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. congressional upheld cases Court all the above-cited
In consti- challenges invoking express in the face regulation regulation that the noting Even while guarantees. tutional DeJohn, also, See, 7. Commonwealth acts officials against by public “prohibitions constitute may was citizens,” such regulation to other permitted that are Workers, at supra, U.S. United Public upheld. at 567. S.Ct. much an case assert not so in the instant
Appellants more as the somewhat protection constitutional express instruc- The Nixon Court was privacy. right ephemeral that when one when it observed this regard in “enter[s] tive secured privacy voluntarily life he surrender^] the public themselves in place elect not to those who law for at at Nixon, 433 U.S. S.Ct. supra, spotlight.” financial disclosure with agree appellants We abdicate they in fact require of the Act do requirements in their financial interests privacy of their some measure circumstances, be different under might, histories are constrained We private persons. invoked by successfully Court, that however, appellants as did the Nixon observe, those interests. surrendered voluntarily some extent have to into affairs appellants’ private intrusion Moreover, the interest Legislature’s not great; the Act is under levels, is at all government, confidence securing public Act requirements disclosure The financial small. func- legislative to fit a legitimate tailored reasonably are are without merit. the contrary claims to Appellants’ tion. Appointment Invalidity The Claim of III. *12 of the Governor appointment by next claim the
Appellants was in violation Ethics Commission of the members this Commonwealth. IV, 8 of the Constitution Article is as follows: provision constitutional pertinent The of Educa- Secretary a appoint shall The Governor “(a) by as he shall be authorized other officers and such tion of the Secretary The appointment appoint. law to as bemay specified other officers and of such Education or a of two-thirds to the consent law, subject shall be by is the as elected to Senate the members majority law. by specified in offices to which The shall fill vacancies
“(b) Governor proper person to the a nominating he Senate appoints by within 90 of the first the days day to fill the vacancy The shall act on each and not thereafter. Senate vacancy within 25 of its legislative days executive nomination a nomina- upon If the has not voted submission. Senate submission, such following 15 legislative days tion within writing request inmay, five members of Senate any the nomination place officer of the Senate presiding the nomination Body whereby the entire Senate before five legisla- to the upon prior expiration must be voted submission following 25 legislative days tive days If nomination is Governor, whichever occurs first. die, the recess or after sine during adjournment made a after its legislative days shall act it within upon Senate If the reason fails reconvening. any return or Senate nomination submitted to it within the to act a shall take office the nominee required legislative days, had been consented appointment as if shall in a similar manner fill The Governor Senate. General, in the offices of Auditor State Treasur- vacancies of the and in other er, justice, judge, justice peace any he is authorized to fill. In the case of a elective office office, shall be elective elected to vacancy person an to the day appropriate the office on the next election within office unless the first two day vacancy months the election immediately preceding day calendar the election shall be held on the second in which case election to the office. succeeding day appropriate nominations, “(c) In on executive acting Senate sit doors. The votes shall be taken by yeas shall with open and shall be entered on the nays journal.” the Ethics were appointed by members of Commission his the consent of the having sought Governor without warranto, in quo their count raised a Appellants, by Senate. IV, Article 8 of the was thereby claim that Constitution violated the ouster from office of the commission sought members.
Commonwealth Court addressed the merits of this issue and found appellants’ claim to be unpersuasive. While we do not disagree with that court’s resolution of the question merits, on its we conclude Commonwealth Court erred in ruling had appellants standing to raise the issue in the first instance.
For a to have party sue, standing several requisites must be satisfied.
“The core ... concept is that a person who is not adversely affected in any the matter way by he seeks to is challenge not ‘aggrieved’ and has thereby no standing to obtain a judicial resolution of his challenge. In particular it is not sufficient for the person claiming to be ‘aggriev ed’ to assert the common interest of all citizens in procur ing obedience to the law.” William Penn Parking Ga rages, Inc. v. City Pittsburgh, 168, 192, 269, 280-81 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
These appellants do not argue to us interest any beyond that shared in common all citizens. by Appellants do not contend the mere existence of the Ethics Commission injures them, although do, course, they challenge other portions of the Act. Appellants do not argue that their duties or obligations have in fashion been any compounded or their or rights in privileges any way diminished by appoint- ment of the presently sitting commission members. Their complaint is merely that the appointments were not made in accordance with the law. The interest so pleaded no different quality than that quantity shared by the citizenry general.
Additionally, standing to sue requires that
the interest
asserted be not
substantial,
only
but also “direct,”
is,
“the person
claiming
be
must
aggrieved
show causation of
the harm to his interest
the matter
by
of which he com-
plains.”
Penn, id.,
William
Pa. at
ed be
‘immediate’ and ‘not a remote consequence of judgment’
[Tjhese
....
two requirements reflect a single
concern. Here that concern is with the nature of the causal
connection between the action
complained
and the injury
to the person challenging
Penn, Id.,
it.” William
On the record before have appellants failed to demon- strate, even if they possess an interest different from that held by at citizenry large, and even if such interest is direct, that to that injury interest is not a remote consequence of the action complained of.
Appellees correctly indicate that but two classes have been held to have to raise standing IV, an Article 8 violation: § themselves; Senators Sutherland, Frame v. 177, 459 Pa. A.2d 623 (1974); Stroup Kapleau, 171, 455 Pa. 313 A.2d 237 (1973); and officials their contesting successors’right to office. Crisconi v. Shapp, Pa.Cmwlth. 275 (1972).
While we do not now hold that standing to raise an Article IV, 8 violation is under § all circumstances limited to these two classes, we do hold that appellants the instant case have no standing to assert that claim.
IV. The Equal Rights Amendment Claim Appellants next claim the financial disclosure require- ments of the Act I, offend Article 28 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. I,
Article 28 of the Constitution provides: “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania because of the sex of the individual.”8 Appellants’ sole specific contention in this case is the claim that the Equal Rights by Amendment is process violated the act. No due argument by parties any has been stage proceed- raised at in the ings. supporting The decision the members reversal to create and dispose process argument then of a due is in contravention of our number, a since one of their wom- argue
Appellants an, by her husband to make permission has been denied affairs, his financial an unconstitu- disclosure required is her. effect worked sexually discriminatory tional amend- purpose equal rights have held that We tool.” Common- as a “classifying eliminate sex ment 296, Butler, 328 A.2d wealth v. 458 Pa. held, state, as appellants correctly we have also
But practical . . . which have the effect “facially policies neutral . constitute dis- discriminatory practices” . . of perpetuating Electric v. Human Corporation General crimination sex. Commission, 649, 654 Relations *15 (1976).9 facially the Act at issue is not that deny do
Appellants view, neutral; nor, appellants could Rather they. in our of households’ and the ‘heads “[wjith being men argue cases, it is submitted that in most the breadwinners primary office will be public frequently women to seek desiring the refusal to make spouses’ their opportunity by denied the 20). (Brief appellants at financial disclosures.” required is discrimination, which any, appellants complain if of The I, 28, but Article contemplated “under law” as § itself action. The Act purely private rather results from the both sexes. As Com upon its burdens places equally as hus found: “Wives well as correctly monwealth Court of family’s disclosure the public bands might object deter their might well as husbands and wives as finances disclo agree public office rather than spouses public from unit as well as family upon sure. The burdens more place but these burdens no might great, individual be principle their consideration that courts will confine often reiterated parties usurp presented and not the role to issues Weigand Weigand, management litigants of the lawsuit. Cf. Commonwealth, also, (1975). 337 See Witt v. A.2d 256 (1981) (Opinion Banking, Department Remand) (at 376-377). Support of I, Electric, however, on the basis of Article was not decided General Act, Pennsylvania 43 P.S. Human Relations but rather the § 955(a). § weight one sex than the other.” v. Shapp, Snider 337, 353, A.2d Pa.Cmwlth.
Appellants’ contention that the Act is violative Article I, 28 is without merit.
V. The Claim of Right Violation of the to Republican a
Form of Government 3(b) Section provides: Act “No person shall offer or to a give public official or public employee or candidate for office or a mem- public ber of his immediate or a business family with he is associated, and no official or public public or employee candidate for office shall or accept, solicit anything value, including gift, loan, political contribution, reward, or promise of future employment based on any understanding vote, action, official or judgment the public official or public employee candidate for public office would be influenced thereby.” Appellants argue that this section of the Act is “repug- to the principles nant of a republican form of government.” gravamen of appellants’ complaint that most cam- paign contributions are made with understanding that “will candidate-recipients be platforms.” faithful their Thus appellants 3(b) conclude of the Act criminalizes this most common type contribution and will have “a chilling *16 and effect on stifling both campaign and contributions state- ment of of positions candidates to public (Brief office.” 21). appellants at
Commonwealth claim, Court summarily disposed of this observing that “this section merely prohibits the and buying selling of and votes influence.” 405 A.2d at We 603. agree. A of determination the merit of claim, appellants’ if any, must await a more concrete case.
VI. Remedy held,
We have in Part I the supra, that Act is violative of This appellants’ rights equal the protection of the laws. unconstitutional effect is result of that portion wherein one class cognizable section of the Act
definitional “public is excluded from definition of servants of the Act as a hence from the strictures servant,” the matter of remedy. We turn now to whole. Butler, 458 Pa.
In Commonwealth
rights
that the
Act violated the
Muncy
we concluded
(1974),
protection
offenders to the
equal
convicted female
we
that “in view
a
determined
fashioning
remedy
laws. In
sever one sentence
intent ...” we could
Legislature’s
of the
defect.
Act and
cure the constitutional
thereby
from the
Act], standing
noted that “the valid
part
We further
[the
in
with the legislative
is
executed
accordance
alone,
easily
intent;
with-
independent
complete
this valid portion
n.22,
Butler, Id.,
Instantly
its
furtherance thereof
statement of
intent.
In
unequivocal
that
of the
provided
any provision
has also
Legislature
be severed from the remainder.
may
Act held to be invalid
the existence of a
Although
recognize
we
65 P.S. §
is not the
factor
determin-
severability
controlling
clause
of a statute
be ex-
portion
may
an offensive
ing whether
v. Bethle-
cised,
great weight. Saulsbury
it must be given
Accordingly, determination of the Commonwealth Court is modified to the extent it held the statute is not violative of the Equal Clause, Protection and the exclusion of appointed, non-compensated officials from the definition of “public officials” is removed. In all other respects, the determination of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed and the Order of the Commonwealth Court sustaining appellees’ preliminary objections and dismissing appellants’ Amended Petition for Review is affirmed.
KAUFFMAN, J., joins in this opinion. NIX, J., joins in this opinion, to the except extent that this opinion removes the exclusion of appointed, non-compensat- ed officials from the definition of “public official.” FLAHERTY,
LARSEN and JJ., join in this opinion, ex- cept to the extent that this opinion refuses to reach the due process claim involving financial disclosure by family mem- bers.
OPINION NIX, Justice.
In my judgment the Commonwealth Court was correct in rejecting the constitutional challenges to the “Public Offi- cials Ethics Law” from excluding the Act’s definition of a “public official” “any appointed official who receives no compensation other than reimbursement for actual ex- penses.” 65 P.S. 402. I believe that the exception served a salutary purpose and was well within constitutional con- fines.
The error of the can majority be attributed to its myopic definition of the classification as one between the school 4, 1978, Act of October amended, P.L. as seq. 65 P.S. et (Supp. 1980-81). *18 (and in Philadelphia school directors appointed
directors unexpired state an and all of filling term) other areas of the in school directors the Commonwealth. the other elected framework, the this focused Proceeding majority within the responsibilities of school director the duties and the was concluded that classification unreasonable. and the involved. an distorts issues analysis Such was not to distin- designed The instant exclusion solely elected directors. appointed between the and school guish it was to make available a category To the contrary, a performing myriad official” of functions “public appointed would be from the exempted require- in who government those individuals were not com- of the Act provided ments services. The fact that at the moment for those pensated fall might excep- school directors within this only appointed the consequence. exception provided tion is of no political posi- subdivisions to create permit opportunity could of those who expertise whereby they tap tions private talents in their business unique developed have Most careers, public to offer volunteer service. professional individuals, who able to offer significant would be of these not be induced salaries and contributions, would the Act. requirements deterred would be probably Act’s to make exclusion in the coverage that the judgment A service is clear- governmental rich resource available this legislature’s for the actions basis a fair and substantial ly regard. this disclosure spousal that agree majority
I with the Pennsylvania Equal Rights not offend the does requirement Constitution, art. 28. I also Amendment, Pennsylvania have not raised majority appellants with the agree I this requirement reference to with due claim process subject. no on that views express
OPINION FLAHERTY, Justice. provision that the definition join majority’s holding
I offi- “public Law (defining Ethics Public Officials cial”), 1980-1981), 65 P.S. 402 (Supp. Equal violates the Protection Clause of I the United Constitution. States dissent, however, from sections four and upholding Act, five 1980-1981), (Supp. P.S. §§ requires the disclosure financial affairs of the employ- ee’s, official’s or candidate’s Joining with Mr. Jus- family. Roberts, tice I would hold that the Act’s requirement those who persons must disclose their own financial interests and the financial interests of their them spouses, subjecting penalties criminal event of nondisclosure, violates *19 the due process clause. It cannot be presumed that a person has control over his so as spouse compel to of disclosure the financial spouse’s In control, affairs. the absence of this there process is a due violation when criminal penalties may be imposed non-disclosure.
ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting.
I. The Scope the Act Is Coverage Ethics Constitutional
as to Applied School Directors. By rewriting the Act Ethics to within bring its those scope public officials the Legislature excluded, has specifically the usurped has majority Legislature’s function. The Com- monwealth Court was in its clearly correct determination that the classification public officials which the Ethics Act is employs constitutional as to applied school directors Commonwealth, throughout and does not equal violate protection. See v. Snider Shapp, Pa.Cmwlth. (Wilkinson, A.2d 602 (1979) J.). I Thus, dissent.
A. The school directors whom to the statute does not apply (1) consist school only directors within Penn- Philadelphia, sylvania’s only school and, thus, district the first class only district law authorized to have appointed school directors; (2) school directors in other school districts in the Commonwealth who are interim appointees prior than after occurring sixty days more election municipal
next et the classifica- 3-301 When seq. 24 P.S. appointment. §§ the statute’s stated against purpose is tion measured trust, with it is conflicts interest prevent differences fair substantial there exist manifest the statute’s within and outside school directors between the objective. legislative are relevant scope which re- uncompensated clearly officials of appointed exclusion that the financial disclo- judgment Legislature's flects the should not elected officials imposed upon sure requirements directors, who have Philadelphia school upon also be imposed directors, than school less fiscal elected power considerably who are needed to immediately appointees, interim fill vacancies. this (1979), Casey,
In Danson are school directors in Philadelphia recognized Court of their duties when the performance situated uniquely in other districts in this with school directors compared We stated: Commonwealth. school district of Pennsylvania’s only
“Philadelphia
Code, 24
2-201. Pursuant to
School
P.S.
first class. See
voters of
have
authority,
Philadelphia
adopt-
statutory
*20
August 9,1963,
See Act of
ed a
rule school district.
home
et
seq.;
P.L.
1 et
53 P.S.
13201
Education-
seq.,
§§
§§
Rule
to
Home
Charter
Philadelphia
al
Supplement
While
of education of other
(hereinafter Charter).
boards
24
elected,
must be
School Code
of school districts
classes
et
of
Charter
3-301
section 12.12-201
seq.,
P.S. §§
school
board
appointment
Philadelphia’s
authorizes
Code, 24
See also School
P.S.
Mayor
Philadelphia.
its
Assembly may delegate
Because the General
3-301.
officials,
elected
to
taxes
to
legislative power
levy
only
to
does not have direct power
School Board
Philadelphia
District,
v.
taxes. Wilson
School
levy
Philadelphia
local
(1937).
328
Id., 484 Pa. at A.2d at 364. school Philadelphia directors must account to each City Council with “a year lump receipts sum statement of anticipated expendi- tures for the next year request fiscal and a for authority taxes balance levy budget year.” its for the Philadelphia Charter, Home Rule 351 Pa.Code 12.12-303(b). Because school directors have less Philadelphia control over the than public purse districts, school directors other and must obtain approval taxes and from proposed expenditures elected subject officials who are themselves to the Ethics Act, it is entirely Legislature rational to exclude school Philadelphia directors from financial disclosure re- quirements designed to conflicts of prevent inter- financial ests public with the trust. Whether this is a wise choice is a legislative determination, and not one for this To Court. be a valid exercise of legislative it is power sufficient exclusion have a fair and rational relationship in substance to the statute’s purpose.
Similarly,
temporary nature of interim appointments
in school districts
elect
their directors
an
provides
inherent check on potential abuses of these offices for pri
This,
vate gain.
too, constitutes a fair and substantial basis
for excluding these school directors from the statute. As
Court
Supreme
of the United
stated,
States has
“[t]he
problems
government
are practical ones and may justify,
”
if
do
they
require, rough accommodations . . . . Me
tropolis Theatre Co. City
v.
61, 69-70,
Chicago, U.S.
441, 443,
S.Ct.
730 (1913).
L.Ed.
See
Dandridge Wil
liams, 397
U.S.
The exclusion of appointed uncompensated officials also indicates legislative purpose encourage individuals to accept uncompensated appointments not only to the School Board in Philadelphia but also to myriad posts throughout this Commonwealth. Legislature, in seeking to promote in government trust and to prevent conflicts of inter- est, established a permissible scheme to further legisla- this *21 tive It judgment. is not this Court’s function to substitute its judgment that the of Legislature. Legislature
184 unwilling to qualified have that thought persons well may would best be encouraged the of electoral fray politics enter no which offer com- and accept appointments to volunteer not with the they required comply if were pensation Thus, of the Ethics Act. disclosure requirements detailed from its re- officials excluding appointed uncompensated the vital the act accommodates and promotes quirements, in government. of public participation goal does that Protection Clause not Equal is clear ‘the “It attacking every a must choose between State require ” at all.’ attacking problem a or not the problem aspect Education, 483 Pa. Dep’t District v. School Springfield Williams, 569, 1154, 1170, A.2d v. 539, quoting Dandridge same 486-87, at 1162. “Evils in the field at 90 S.Ct. U.S. requiring of different dimensions proportions, bemay . legislature may remedies. so the think.. . different Or time, addressing one at a itself may step the reform take Or the which seems most acute to the the phase problem v. Lee mind.” Williamson U.S. Optical, legislative (1955)(citations omitted). 99 L.Ed. S.Ct. Thus, appointed uncompensated because exclusion directors, officials, school has rea including Philadelphia relation to the sonable, purposes fair and substantial as enacted Legislature the Ethics Act legislation, as applied. constitutional
B. the exclusion the Ethics Act strike down rewriting In uncompensated officials the act of all appointed from usurps majority only in this Commonwealth express language role but also contravenes Legislature’s be Indeed, Legislature well may the act. it at all without the the Ethics Act not have enacted would strikes down. majority which the exclusion if, only severed of a statute be portion may An invalid severance, can be executed accordance the statute after ¡§ 1925. The See Pa.C.S. intent. legislative with Butler, relies Commonwealth majority erroneously
185
289,
which,
458 Pa.
“It
is certain that
the legislative intent
to have women
convicted of crime be
at
imprisoned Muncy (where facili
ties
exist)
for women
is not ‘essentially and inseparably
with,’
connected
but rather is distinct and
from
separate
the question whether those women should serve minimum
Moreover,
566,
sentences.
part
valid
standing
§
alone, is easily executed in accordance with
legislative
intent;
this valid portion is independent
complete
within itself.
Armao,
See Commonwealth v.
325,
446 Pa.
338,
626,
(1972);
632
Bethlehem
Saulsbury v.
Co.,
Steel
320-21, 196
A.2d
(1964);
666-67
Rieck-McJunkin
Co. v. Milk
Dairy
Comm’n,
Control
153, 162-63,
Pa.
(1941);
A.2d
871-72
Rutenberg
Philadelphia,
26, 39,
196 A.
79 (1938). See
2 J.
generally
Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Con
struction
(4th
44.01-44.20
ed. C.
1973);
Sands
§§
C.
Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law
(1969).”
15.35
Id., 458
303 n.22,
Pa. at
A clear similarly legislative statement of intent cannot be found in the statute now before this Butler, Court. Unlike two involved separate independent statutory pro- visions to relating minimum sentences facilities, and prison each of which could stand other, without here the statutory provisions are “essentially and con- inseparably nected.” In articulating who is come within the require- ments of Act, the Ethics the Legislature stated expressly that appointed uncompensated officials are to be treated either differently than elected officials or appointed compen- sated Appointed officials. uncompensated officials, unlike other officials, public are to be excluded from the act. 65 P.S. Manifestly, majority that, errs in holding contrary to the express intent, legislative all public officials must be treated same. IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL
II. OPINION Financial Disclosure Requirements Mandatory Violate Due Process. Relating Spouses Act, its the Ethics those within persons the terms of By financial of their who fail to disclose the interests coverage be may subject office and will be denied spouses $1,000 fine of more than including a criminal penalties not more than one both. year, or imprisonment *23 Court, record before this the 404,405, 409(b). On the P.S. §§ to his seeker’s disclose spouse personal of an office refusal to her the run opportunity interests denied financial were her fact that those interests office, beyond the despite holder, a In case of an office or control. knowledge in not the loss only could spouse similar refusal result of criminal the imposition penalties. of office but also liability from office and criminal disqualification Where inability comply but from unwillingness, not from result imposition these sanc with the act’s requirements, violates the due clearly unfair fundamentally tions is of the Constitutions the United process requirements Short, See Tate v. 401 U.S. Pennsylvania.* and of States be 395, 668, (1971) (imprisonment L.Ed.2d 130 91 28 S.Ct. unconstitutional); fine Common pay cause of inability 575,155 Pa. 825 Koczwara, (1959)(impris 397 A.2d wealth v. due criminal offense violates process); vicarious onment for 2.9, (1973) at 104 (inability comply Remedies Dobbs, contempt both criminal and civil against defense good Commonwealth, Pa. DPW, 476 Perillo v. See also charges). Reversal, 494, (1978) Support A.2d (Opinion 383 208 because of refusal Manderino, J.) (denial of AFDC benefits husband to encum non-recipient non-applicant, mother’s process). ber violates due realty * constitutionality spousal Appellants challenge the disclosure theory Pennsylvania Equal requirement on it violates the Pa.Const, 1, Amendment, theory Rights Although this does art. merit, challenge may have the constitutional is meritorious Yeaple, Yeaple properly See A.2d be addressed. 402 (1980). only Ethics Act not those penalizes within its scope who fail to with comply spousal disclosure requirements; Thus, effect, it no permits defense. the act creates an presumption irrebuttable that a person has knowledge or his or control of her spouse’s financial interests. However, as the Court of the Supreme stated, United States has presumption process violates due “where the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circum- ” Tot v. life States, United stances of . . . . 319 U.S. 1241, 1245, S.Ct. L.Ed. 1519 (1943).
This has Court made clear that the fiction that husband and wife are one has no in this entity place Commonwealth. In 1979 we held that an individual’s under testimony Dead Man’s Pennsylvania Statute may not be excluded on solely the basis of his marital status. Estate of Gross- man, There we stated:
“Any presumption of of interest is identity based same outmoded social conditions and as was policy common law legal of person of unity fiction husband and wife.
Modern conditions demand that courts no longer engage in the automatic and unsupported assumption that one’s or pecuniary proprietary interest is identical to that of one’s spouse.”
Id.,
472-73,
control of his reasonable, fair and substantial relation to the bears no Thus, it cannot dis- justify mandatory statute’s purpose. office and criminal penalties from qualification spousal who are unable to with the against persons comply reason, For this those statutory disclosure requirements. financial an individual to disclose the provisions require interests of his or her over which he has no control spouse (sever- must be declared unconstitutional. See 65 P.S. § ability provision). FLAHERTY, JJ., in Part II of this join
LARSEN Opinion. Pennsylvania,
COMMONWEALTH SCOTT, Appellant. Harold L.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued Sept. 1981. Decided Nov.