Snider v. Jefferson State Community College

or of the trial court to lawyers to ask for competency hearing prej- cannot be

hold enough justify habeas relief.10

udicial

CONCLUSION reasons, foregoing

For the the district petition denying

court’s order Moore’s corpus

habeas is AFFIRMED. SNIDER, Ponder,

Thomas et John

al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

JEFFERSON STATE COMMUNITY

COLLEGE, Drennen, R.L. William Defendants,

Shelnutt,

Judy Merritt, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-12472. Appeals,

United States Court of

Eleventh Circuit. 15, 2003.

Sept. served, the evidence established trial court —would not necessar- drink, ily judge Moore refused to eat or to no lead a evidence reasonable trial competency. shows that the trial court was aware of this Moore’s After suicide Moore’s hospital attempt, judge competency fact until Moore was to the taken the trial ordered a evening September, Nagi that is after the evaluation and was assured Dr. days competent trial are focus Moore's Moore was to stand trial. A trial incompetency judge reasonably claim. Neither does the evi- could have concluded that appearance dence reflect that Moore’s Moore’s weakness the after-effects of his attempt. acts at trial raised a “bona fide doubt’’ about suicide We with the district competency. Although reporters, his two court that Moore failed to establish that the deputy, sheriff's and Moore's mother testified evidence before the state trial court estab- lethargy regarding that Moore exhibited a “bona weakness lished fide doubt” Moore's trial, during competency ob- this situation' —even if trial. stand Wooten, AL, Birmingham, M. for

James Plaintiffs-Appellants. Fleming, Ingram L.

Margaret Sandra AL, Montgomery, Virginia Mi- Speakman, Obradovic, Bir- Waldrep, chelle & Gorham AL, mingham, Defendants-Appellees. EDMONDSON, Judge, Before Chief COX, Judges. BARKETT and Circuit EDMONDSON, Judge: Chief Snider, Ponder, Tommy John Thomas (“Plaintiffs”), Diltz, Benny Gilcrest se- granted State to dismiss and will be if the curity employed officers Jefferson (“JSCC”), brought Community College “complaint allege fails the violation of a § against Judy suit under U.S.C. right.” established constitutional JSCC, Merritt, and R.L. president v. Sparks, Chesser Drennen, Operations Dean of Business (11th Cir.2001) (quoting v. Ala. Williams (“Defendants”).1 at JSCC Univ., State Cir.1997)). the complaint alleges Whether alleged between 1983 and Plaintiffs right violation of a established employees and other male July they is a of law which we review de of same-sex sexual were victims novo, accepting alleged facts as true supervisor, harassment committed their all drawing reasonable inferences time, At that Shelnutt William Shelnutt.2 in plaintiffs therefrom favor. Id. Security at Plain- the Chief of JSCC. was alleged tiffs that Defendants knew or rea- Qualified immunity protects gov sonably should have known about Shel- performing discretionary ernment officials conduct, a duty prevent nutt’s had to this liability functions from if their conduct conduct, stop and failed to the conduct “clearly does not violate established statu right equal protec- of Plaintiffs’ violation tory or constitutional of which a tion under the Fifth and Fourteenth person reasonable would have known.” Amendments. Pelzer, Hope v. the com- Defendants moved dismiss (2002) (citation 2515, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 on, plaint among things, quali- based other omitted). The plain burden rests on the immunity grounds. fied The district court tiff qualified immunity to show that is not assumed, purposes evaluating Ferraro, Lee v. appropriate. defense, that Plaintiffs quahfied-immunity (11th Cir.2002). 1188, 1194 claim. cognizable stated constitutional that, at The district court concluded recently long We after the events — violations, alleged time of the it was not underlying present case—declared clearly established that same-sex sexual the Equal protects the Equal harassment violated Protection against same-sex discrimination. See clause and that Defendants were entitled Downing v. Bd. Trustees the Univ. qualified immunity. The district court (11th Cir.2003). Ala., granted the motion to dismiss. therefore allegations Accepting Plaintiffs’ as true— On Plaintiffs assert that suffi- appeal, that Defendants knew or should have cient case law existed to establish the con- constantly known that Shelnutt touched right tours of their to be free from same- employees Plaintiffs and other male the Equal sex sexual harassment under Security Department sexually inap in a Protection Clause and that the district constantly manner and made propriate quali- granting court erred Defendants to Plaintiffs gestures sexual remarks and immunity. fied conduct employees and other male —such immuni would violate The defense Therefore, important ques- ty may be raised and addressed on a mo- Clause.3 3.Although allege act- has since retired from JCSS. Plaintiffs that Shelnutt 1. R.L. Drennan against employees, ed male we note that specifically Plaintiffs do not state that Shel- Shelnutt was named as a defen- against nutt did not make such advances appellee dant he is not an in this case. supervision. employees female under his n. 10 already 1032-33 right this tion is whether (en banc). at the time of the al- clearly established leged violations. (1997) and the Although this Court entitled to fair warn are Officials (1998) during the time in Supreme Court — their preexisting law ing from harassment was occur occurred, acts, the acts at the time ring concluded that a same-sex sexu —had Hope, were unconstitutional. al harassment claim was actionable under right to be 2515. For a constitutional against private employer, this Title VII case, the given in a clearly established precedent fairly put could not Defendants that ev must be so clear right’s contours on notice that their conduct official must ery, objectively reasonable right. violated a federal constitutional defendant, in the that the understand what generally Oncale v. Sundowner See Off case, of the is context of the circumstances Servs., Inc., 75, shore 118 S.Ct. right. the See Vin doing clearly violates (1998) (con 1001-02, 998, (11th Wilson, 1340, 1353 yard v. 311 F.3d cluding that same-sex sexual is (or Cir.2002). very That the act some VII); under Title Fredette v. actionable it) to thing materially similar Assocs., 112 Mgmt. F.3d 1510 BVP a previously by been held unlawful has (11th Cir.1997) (same).4 always necessary. But the court is not reach originally Title VII was created to law, the unlawfulness light preexisting that did not conduct the Constitution clear, plain, obvious. apparent: must be reach; and the statute and Constitution act government the official’s is so Unless always Washing are not concurrent. See light preexisting in the obviously wrong, Davis, ton v. 96 U.S. law, only incompetent official plainly that a (in (1976) 48 L.Ed.2d knowingly violating the or one who was impact stating context “We have never act, law would have committed held that the constitutional standard for immunity. official is entitled to adjudicating claims of invidious racial dis 335, 106 Malley Briggs, (1986). crimination is identical to the standards 1092, 1096-97, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 VII, applicable under Title and we decline ‘clearly ‘When case law is needed to estab today”); to do so see also Bass v. Bd. pertinent applicable lish’ the law Comm’rs, Fla., County Orange County, circumstances, we look to decisions of the (11th Cir.2001) 1095, 1103 Court, (noting Supreme U.S. the United States Circuit, that, although analyses for Title the Eleventh VII Appeals Court of closely Protection claims are highest pertinent and the court of the Ala., related, County, Supreme state.” Court Johnson v. Marsh v. Butler Cross, present pur- (emphasis For our 1369 n. 16 at 1508. raising observation, however, poses, added). because Plaintiffs are This itself Protection claims and assert Shelnutt compel every objectively would not reason- sexually employees, we harassed male infer that, government able official to believe if his alleging Shelnutt's con- Plaintiffs are VII, Title would also nec- conduct violated it only employees. duct was directed at male Instead, essarily violate the Constitution. it that, only put employer notice would if 4. We have written that section 1983 "[w]hen same-sex harassment was actionable under parallel remedy for violation of is used as Protection Clause and Title both 2000e-2], § section VII U.S.C. [42 703 Title VII, the of the two causes of action elements the elements of the two causes of action are would be the same. Stynchcomb, the same.” Hardin v. County, Supreme under Title VII. Id. 1002. The Santa Clam Cal Agency, Transp. that, although male-on- 94 Court concluded if, 480 U.S. (1987) workplace it male sexual harassment in the recognized that L.Ed.2d 615 “assuredly principal identical the con was not evil Con- regard “do[es] it gress and the Federal Con was concerned with when enacted of Title VII straints stitution”). statutory ... Congress prohibitions In extended Title VII often go beyond the rea- principal of Title VII of the Civil evil cover coverage ” sonably Be- against comparable 1964 to allow suits evils.... Id. Rights Act of un cause involved a Title action government employers local Oncale state and against employer, private employ private the same conditions as issue der Discrimina whether same-sex harassment also violated Employment ers. See In re: Ala., con- Against the State Clause Litig. Cir.1999). Oncale, Although Supreme sidered Court.5 Amendment 5 of the Fourteenth Section sov Congress abrogate

authorizes state ereign immunity to enforce may people some well have by the Fourteenth Amend guaranteed reasonably guessed earlier that same-sex ment, Congress power does have the sexual harassment was a violation of the to alter the “substance the Fourteenth Clause, Equal Protection the answer was the Amendment’s restrictions on States.” debatable, not free from cloudiness and Flores, (quoting City Boerne v. Id. settled, truly before our 2003 decision— 2157, 2164, 138 507, 117 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d U.S. six-page explaining opinion with its —in (1997)). Thus, may Title be used 1017; Downing, 321 F.3d and can officials only to enforce against states predict the future “expected be of the Fourteenth found within borders course constitutional law.” Wilson Amendment. Layne, 526 U.S. 119 S.Ct. (1999) (quoting 143 L.Ed.2d 818 Procunier Supreme only The Court has considered Navarette, harassment in v. 98 S.Ct. the issue of same-sex sexual (1978)). a Neither the against the context of a Title VII action Oncale, Oncale, decision in private employer. Supreme See Court’s 140 L.Ed.2d 201. In the Fredette, decision, in nor our decision pertinent Supreme offi provided government out that the state and feder- clear notice to pointed Court sexual harassment vio “bewildering variety al courts had taken a cials that same-sex Equal of stances” on same-sex lated the Protection Clause.6 sexual Fredette, way, equal protection and In a similar because that the elements of 5. Downing, against also involved a Title VII action Title VII claims were identical.” private employer, accepting a this Court did not consid- 321 F.3d at 1022. Even now Downing's interpretation application of er whether same-sex harassment also violated Cross, Equal Protection Clause. we do not think that it was certain and Cross, clear in 1998 that in had decided every clearly act that violated Title VII necessari- It was established at the time of the that that, ly in in the violated the Constitution. The decision harassment here context harassment, supervisor harassing different-gender a male Cross involved apply provided right female subordinates and did not Protection Clause a to be free his clarity public with obvious to same-sex sexual from unlawful sexual harassment n Cross, Supreme Court’s observa- employment. See at 1503. In harassment. The Downing, that the courts had taken we wrote in 2002 that Cross “held Oncale immunity. Vinyard, 311 F.3d sexually harassing tied to supervisor A male at 1352-53. engages contemptible employees male conduct contemptible all conduct. But not AFFIRMED. say cannot We the Constitution. violates BARKETT, Judge, concurring in Circuit Protection Clause or case dissenting part: part Downing provided Defendants law before majority any I with the warning that male

with fair and clear prior occurring claims based on facts harassing male em sexually supervisor because, May due to be dismissed 1997 are feder employees’ violate the ployees would majority opinion, quali- in the explained officials, rights. al constitutional However, immunity would them. fied bar applies law with obvi preexisting when the May the relevant caselaw clarified that their clarity, put can be on notice ous harassment violated that same-sex sexual law even in violates established conduct Because, fully as more ex- Title VII. circumstances, we stress that novel factual below, the law was also plained “expected predict cannot be officials there is no difference be- established that of constitutional law.” Wil future course scope of Title VII and that of tween son, pre 119 S.Ct. at 1701. Because concerning Defendants existing case law available to in the form intentional discrimination harassment did at the time of in the work- treatment Protec apparent not make I believe that the Defendants had place, protected against same-sex tion Clause adequate notice of the constitutional viola- harassment, Thus, May any after 1997.1 claim Defendants are enti- tion sexual Supreme "bewildering variety on the Court which had decided that same- of stances” issue Equal harassment in the Title VII the of same-sex sexual context, sex sexual harassment violated Pro- nearly pretty Equal giving true the seems in tection Clause at the time of the events (or Marsh, context. We have found had Protection to case. See 268 F.3d at rise this that, attention) only two Circuits called to our 1032-33 n. 10. harassment in this case the time agree majority qualified taking place, spoken of with the that im had to the issue I munity operates governmental offi whether sexual harassment could insulate same-sex performing discretionary Equal cials functions from violate the Protection Clause. Al though personal liability Seventh Circuit had concluded "insofar as their conduct public that same-sex sexual harassment in does not violate established constitu statutory rights a employment could violate the Protec tional or of which reason Clause, Belleville, by City person v. Doe Doe v. able would have known.” Harlow of 2727, Ill., 563, 800, 818, (7th Cir.1997), Fitzgerald, U.S. 102 S.Ct. 119 F.3d 596-97 457 (1982). by Supreme 73 L.Ed.2d In order for a consti decision was vacated Court 396 later, statutory right eight City to be deemed less than Belleview tutional or months 1001, 1183, established,” Doe, by "clearly "the of that v. Doe 523 U.S. 118 S.Ct. contours (1998). right sufficiently 313 The Fourth Circuit 'must be clear that reason what that sexual harass able official would understand that he is had concluded same-sex ” right.’ Kucyn doing that v. ment claims were not actionable under the violates Holmes 1069, da, (11th Cir.2003) if the harassers and 321 F.3d 1077 Protection Clause 635, (quoting Creighton, v. 483 U.S. were the same sex. Anderson the victim heterosexuals of (1987)). County v. Bd. 97 L.Ed.2d 523 See McWilliams Su Fairfax Further, (or (4th Cir.1996). very I act pervisors, "[t]hat 72 F.3d 1195 it) case, is, way, something materially Mr. Shelnutt similar to In this important, previously been held unlawful a court to be a homosexual. Most has Majority always necessary,” Op. at not directed us a case—and is not Plaintiffs have rather, question” Supreme but the "salient is we have found a case—in the Circuit, Court, gave the whether the "state of the law” offi- the Eleventh or the Alabama

1331 occurring subsequent to In Fredette v. Management on conduct BVP based Associ ates, (11th not have been dismissed that date should Cir.1997), 112 F.3d 1503 this immunity grounds. Court held that same-sex sexual harass ment is actionable discrimination under Ti at least 1979 it has been estab Since tle VII. See-id. at 1506 (concluding lished right “a constitutional to be free provides weight “the of the case-law and the better unlawful discrimination and sexu from sex support viability” reasoned cases public employment.” al claims). Likewise, year such than one less Dep’t Cross v. Ala. Mental Health & later, Supreme unanimously Court Retardation, Mental 1507 held “that nothing necessarily Title VII Passman, (citing Davis v. bars a claim of discrimination ‘because of 228, 235, S.Ct. ... merely sex’ plaintiff because the (1979)). VII, And Title L.Ed.2d (or person the defendant charged with applied since 1972 has as well as defendant) acting on behalf of the are of private employers,2 unquestionably ap “is the same sex.” Oncale v. Sundowner Off legislation to propriate [E]qual enforce Servs., Inc., 75, 79, shore City [Protection Scott v. [C]lause.” (1998). 140 L.Ed.2d 201 Al Anniston, Cir. though not all violations of Title also 1979).3 Thus, during the time of the al Constitution, violate the City see Boerne here, leged harassment a reasonable offi Flores, cial must have known that both (1997), significantly, there Clause, Davis, e.g., 442 U.S. at is no scope difference between the of Title VII, e.g., and Title scope VII and the of the Equal Protection Stynchcomb, Hardin v. concerning Clause intentional discrimina (11th Cir.1982), prohibited 1369 & n. 16 tion in the form of treatment intentional sexual discrimination the public workplace: when utilized as then, public workplace. question, The is discrimination, parallel remedies for such official in the Defen whether reasonable the elements of a claim under are each position dants’ should have known that See, e.g., identical. Richardson v. Leeds qualified same-sex sexual harassment as (11th 801, Dep’t, Police 71 F.3d 805 Cir. and, purposes sexual discrimination for our 1995) Cross, curiam); 1508; here, (per 49 F.3d at whether it so within the meaning of Pearson v. Equal County Hosp. Protection Clause. Macon-Bibb warning” message they cials "fair that what were do- case ... sent the same to rea- lier] ing statutory Circuit.”). violated the or constitutional sonable officers in that Pelzer, provision question. Hope v. 536 2508, See, 385, e.g., Friday, 2. 478 U.S. Bazemore (2002). is, plaintiff only 666 That "the need 387 n. 106 show that there existed sufficient case law (1986) curiam) (per (noting March 1972 establishing the contours of his or her consti- applicable as "the date Title VII was made tutional such that” a reasonable official public employers”). be of the would aware unlawfulness his Dep’t actions. Nicholson v. Ga. Human Prichard, City 3. Bonner v. 661 F.2d In

Resources, (11th Cir.1990). 918 F.2d 147 (en banc), (11th 1981) 1209 Cir. reasoning Hope made clear that the of earlier adopted binding prece Circuit as Eleventh may provide warning,” cases such "fair even dent all Fifth decisions handed down Circuit specific holdings if the cases’ do not. See prior September ("The to the close of business on Hope, at 122 2508 reasoning, holding, though ear- 1981. a[n not the 1332 Cir.1992).4 disparate in the form of discrimination

Auth., e.g., public employment, may be treatment claims parallel such Accordingly, Cross, Richardson, 805; at 71 F.3d be with no distinctions analyzed together, 1508; Pearson, at 1281- See, e.g., F.3d at the two. between ing drawn clearly established “state (reversing provides sum Pearson, at 1281 of Fredette application § the law”6 for the protection 1988 equal on mary judgment integral part comprises an Oncale racial intentional claim of quali in our must be reversing as of what considered same reasons” the[] ddiscrimination“[flor Accordingly, it is immunity inquiry.7 VII fied judgment on Title summary a reasonable to conclude that appropriate “the substantive claim because treatment knowledge with of this connection under both official proof are the same elements of statutes”).5 fair notice that a violation given was Title intentional same-sex sexual reason, once Title VII was clari- For this workplace would public same-sex proscribing intentional fied Protection likewise violate harassment, a reasonable official sexual Clause.8 conduct in given fair notice such Therefore, the Plain- to the extent workplace also violated predicated sexually are ha- body of law tiffs’ claims Protection Clause. The prior May occurred rassing Title conduct that evidencing the connections between (the Fredette), I spe- date we issued Protection Clause VII and law majority with the at body concerning intentional cifically, that “by it Shelnutt's sexual harassment of principle, this itself .. involves I concur that 4. females, males, public employment. objectively compel every reason- but would not government to conclude that a able official” necessarily VII "would also violation of Title Hope, S.Ct. 2508. 6. 536 U.S. at Majority Op. at the Constitution.” violate However, point n. 4. remains that Recognizing VII case- the relevance of Title itself,” "by but principle does not stand this allegations violations law to of constitutional larger con- rather must be considered in qualified immunity not with- in the context is Hope, text of the "state of law.” Hawaii, precedent. Bator v. State out properly 2508. When con- & 7 n. manner, VII-Equal the Title sidered in this (relying on Title VII caselaw to find it nexus, along with the hold- pub- that sex discrimination in the established ing that intentional same-sex sexual harass- workplace violated the lic VII, Title constituted "fair ment violated equal protec- Clause because "Title VII and warning” to a reasonable official that inten- wrong: tion cases address the same discrimi- pub- sexual harassment in the nation,” tional same-sex noting and that the differences be- workplace also violated Constitution. lic equal protection claims tween Title VII and prohibited; they "do not affect what is affect wrong who can be sued and can be how persuaded by the Su- 5. I am not otherwise remedied”). preme Court’s statement in Johnson v. Trans- County, portation Agency, Clara Santa expressed Downing was 8. The connection Alabama, (1987), partially quoted University is in Bass v. v. Board Trustees of of of Commissioners, (11th Cir.2003), County which relied Board of (2001), regard explicitly do in find- that "we not on the earlier case of Cross ing holding principled "no basis for that the identical the constraints of Title and voluntarily adopted implicated in a Clause is Federal Constitution on opposite-sex but plans,” primarily case of discrimination affirmative action because "voluntarily discrimination.” Id. at involve a a case of same-sex this case does Rather, plan[].” adopted affirmative action 1024. tion, Secretary State, Secretary concerning same-sex sexual time Treasury, employment was suf- and Commissioner of Service, that the Defendants are United States Customs ficiently unsettled Defendants-Appellees. immu- by the doctrine of shielded However, I would remand to the nity. No. 02-1224. further as to proceedings court for district Appeals, United States Court of have arisen after our any claims Fredette, Federal Circuit. when reasonable decision position giv- Defendants’ was official Sept. DECIDED: the conduct here en fair notice that Protection Clause. violated III, Snape,

William J. Defenders of Wildlife, DC, Washington, peti- filed rehearing tion for en banc for plaintiffs- appellants. petition With him on the WILDLIFE, Earth DEFENDERS OF Kumar Vaswani. Institute, Society The Humane Island Tosini, Stephen Attorney, C. Trial Com- States, Environmental of the United Branch, Division, Litigation mercial Civil International, Animal Wel Solutions Justice, DC, Department Washington, Institute, fare International Wildlife filed a to the for response petition Coalition, American Humane Associa him defendants-appellees. With on the re- tion, Greenpeace Earthtrust, Founda Keisler, sponse were Peter D. Assistant tion, Fund, Society Animal American General; Sansonetti, Attorney Thomas L. Cruelty for the Prevention of to Ani General; Attorney Assistant David M. Co- Labudde, mals, Club, Sierra Samuel hen, Director; Davidson, and Jeanne E. Craig Note, Plaintiffs-Appel and Van re- Deputy Director. Of counsel lants, Anthony Hoang; Wayne P. sponse were Thurston, Hettenbach; D. and M. Alice

Attorneys, Environment Re- & Natural Division, Fund for Animals and David Washington, sources DC. Brower, Plaintiffs, ORDER petition rehearing A for en banc was HOGARTH, by response Ad- filed and a Appellants,

William T. Assistant Fisheries, ministrator National thereto was invited the court and filed Atmospheric Appellees. Administra- This matter was re- Oceanic tion, Secretary Evans, rehearing to petition Donald L. ferred first as a for Commerce, Secretary panel appeal. that heard the Under of Com- merits Thereafter, merce, rehearing en petition Administrator of the National banc, Atmospheric to the response Administra- and were referred Oceanic tion, Secretary, to re- judges Assistant National circuit who are authorized Atmospheric appeal to rehear the quest poll Administra- whether Oceanic

Case Details

Case Name: Snider v. Jefferson State Community College

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date Published: Sep 15, 2003

Citation: 344 F.3d 1325

Docket Number: 02-12472

Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.