104 Mo. 158 | Mo. | 1891
— On the twenty-second day of May, 1885, plaintiff brought ejectment for the east half of the southwest quarter and the west half of the southeast quarter of section 13, township 45, range 24, Johnson county, Missouri. This cause in another form, and with an additional plaintiff and with additional defendants, was before this court on a former occasion. 83 Mo. 651. The decree entered therein setting aside the title of the defendants to the land above described on account of fraud upon the creditors of G. W. Harrison and vesting the same in the then plaintiffs, Snell and Glass, bears date February 24,1880, and the proceedings which resulted in that decree, afterwards affirmed in this court, were instituted the twenty-third day of May, 1878.
On the, twenty-first day of October, 1885, defendant, G. W. Harrison, filed amended answer, in which he admits that on the first of June, 1880, plaintiff was entitled to the possession of tbe undivided seven-tenths of twenty-six and two-thirds acres of the premises sued for, being the south thirds of the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter and the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter of the said section 13. Defendant, states that he has not been in possessibn of the above described portions of said premises since April 1, 1885.
Defendant also alleges that on the fourth day of March, 1881, plaintiff obtained a judgment against defendant for the possession of said portion of said premises, and damages, and rent, and profits, which judgment remains in full force.
Defendant admits that he is in possession of the remainder of the premises in controversy. Defendant says that as to the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter, and the northwest quarter of the southeast
That the estate of said George W. Glass was administered in Johnson county, Missouri, and that said widow filed in probate court of Johnson county her election in writing to take as a child in lieu of dower, whereby she became entitled to one-third interest in said premises; that Rebecca Glass, Lucinda Glass and David A. Glass afterwards, for the purpose of making partition of said premises, mutually agreed, in consideration of the release by the said Rebecca of all claims in and to the north two-thirds of said premises, she should take the south one-third of said tract and Lucinda and David should take the north two-thirds of said premises.
That afterwards Rebecca Glass sold to defendant, George W. Harrison, the said south one-third of the said tract, and that he immediately entered into the exclusive possession of said south third of said tract and continued to occupy the same with the knowledge and consent of the said Lucinda and David A. Glass; that afterwards the said Lucinda married one Joseph R. Ray ; that afterwards in course of the administration of the estate of George W. Glass the said northeast quarter of the southwest quarter and the northwest of the southeast was ordered to be sold for the payment of debts.
That at said sale defendant, George W. Harrison, became the purchaser ; the sale was approved and a deed made by the administrator conveying said land to defendant, George W. Harrison; that afterwards, in January, 1875, the said David A. Glass commenced a suit in the circuit court of Johnson county to set aside said administrator’s deed, and to divest said Harrison of all title to said property which he acquired by virtue of said administrator’s deed; that at the June term,
That said Brunetta Harrison purchased and paid said Glass for said north two-thirds of said tracts, relying upon the actions and conduct of said George W. Harrison, and his disclaimer of any interest in said tracts under and by virtue of said administrator ’ s deed.
This defendant further says that on the fifteenth of February, 1878, the said David A. Glass and plaintiff J. R. Snell became the owners of all the title and estate of the said George W. Harrison in the said south third of said tracts by purchase at execution sale, upon judgments against said George W. Harrison; that at said sale said Glass became the owner of the undivided three-tenths interest in said tracts.
- This defendant, as the husband of said Brunetta Harrison, holds and claims under her right and title. On the same day defendant, George W. Harrison, filed a motion asking that his wife, Brunetta Harrison, be made a party defendant. This motion was granted, and Brunetta Harrison filed her separate answer.
She admits that on the first day of June, 1880, plaintiff was and still is entitled to the possession of an undivided seven-tenths of twenty-six and two-thirds acres, being the south thirds of the northeast quarter of the
Upon the application of defendants a change of venue was awarded to Henry county. Plaintiff filed a reply denying the matters alleged in the answers of defendants. The cause was tried September term, 1886, in the Henry county circuit court.
The decree referred to, caption included, is the following :
“John R. Snell and David A. Glass,
v.
“Brunetta Harrison and Geo. W. Harrison, her husband, Chas. A. Harririson, Mary A. Harrison, Harvey E. Harrison, Nellie M. Harrison and Virgie Harrison, minor heirs of A. B. Harrison, deceased, defendants.
“Now at this day come the parties aforesaid by their attorneys and the motion of plaintiffs heretofore filed to set aside and disregard the finding of the jury
“And the court further finds that on and prior to October 9, 1875, the said Gr. W. Harrison was largely indebted, and at said date was owing one John Snell a note of §600, dated March 30, 1874, upon which a suit was then ( October, 1875) pending in this court by the said John Snell ». said Gr.. W. Harrison, upon which judgment was finally rendered October 16, 1877, for $700.35, against said Gr. W. Harrison ; that in January, 1875, said D. A. Grlass commenced his suit in this court against said defendant, Gr. W. Harrison, to set aside a
“It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the said deeds to said A. B. Harrison, Joel H. Warren and Brunetta Harrison each and all of them be set aside and held for naught, and that the title to said real estate, to-wit: East one-half of southwest quarter and west one-half of southeast quarter, and northeast quarter of southeast quarter, all in section 13, township 45, range 24, and lots 7 and 8 in block M,’ railroad extension to the town of Knobnoster, all in Johnson county, Missouri, be divested'out of and from the said defendants and each of them and that the same be fully vested in said plaintiffs, and that said defendants pay all costs accrued in this suit, and that execution issue therefor.”
This decree was read in evidence by the plaintiff on the hearing of this cause, and, also, the sheriff ’ s deed executed February 15, 1878, and recorded four
Plaintiff then offered in evidence the following agreement:
“This contract or agreement, made by and between J. R. Snell and D. A. Glass, witnesseth, that the said parties have this day bought at execution sale, as the property of Geo., W. Harrison, the east half of the southwest quarter and the west half of the southeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the southeast quarter, all of section 13, township 45, range 24, and lots 7 and 8, in block ‘M,’ in the railroad extension to the town of Knobnoster, and all in Johnson county, state of
“Dated at Warrensburg, Missouri, this fifteenth day of February, 1878.
“ [Seal.] John R. Snell.
“[Seal.] David A. Glass.”
Plaintiff next offered in evidence the petition on which the decree aforesaid was obtained, but, as its statements are all contained in substance in said decree, it is unnecessary to repeat them.
In that case, Geo. W. Harrison filed a separate answer to said petition, a general denial. Defendant, Brunetta Harrison, filed separate answer as follows : “She denies each and every allegation and statement set forth in said petition and says that each and every one of them are untrue. And for further answer states that she is the legal owner in her own right of that portion of the real estate described in the plaintiff ’ s petition, to-wit: ■ East half of southwest quarter and the west half of the southeast quarter and the northeast of the southeast quarter, all in section 13, township 45,
The heirs of A. B. Harrison, by guardian ad litem, filed answer denying the allegations in the petition. But the court found to the contrary of said answers as alreády seen in the decree heretofore set forth.
David A. Glass then testified on behalf of'plaintiff: “I am the same D. A. Glass who was mentioned in the suit with Brunetta Harrison et al. to set aside certain deeds. I entered into the agreement with Dr. Snell offered in evidence; at the time this suit was brought, Geo. W. Harrison was in possession of this land. The land is worth $2.50 per acre, rent per annum. After Dr. Snell and I bought the land at sheriff’s sale, we joined in a suit against Brunetta Harrison and others to set aside some deeds from Geo. W. Harrison on the ground of fraud. The case went to the supreme court. I claimed three-tenths of the land, and Dr. Snell claimed seven-tenths; that is the way we bought it at the sheriff’s sale. I did not claim any other interest in the land.”
Cross-examined : “I sold to Mrs. Harrison on the twentieth of April, 1881. Was in possession of about forty or fifty acres of the north eighty described in the petition. I claimed an interest of three-tenths in the
Plaintiff, in his own behalf, testified as follows: “lam the plaintiff. I know the land in controversy. It could be rented for $2.50 per acre per annum ; it is worth that. Before the land was sold by the sheriff, D. A. Glass and I entered into the agreement to buy the lands and hold them in proportion to the amount of our judgments, and we did so buy the lands.” This is all the evidence offered by the plaintiff in chief.
To maintain the issues on their part, the defendants offered in evidence the transcript of record and proceedings in the case of David A. Glass v. Geo. W. Harrison in the Johnson county circuit court commenced on the twenty-first day of January, 1875.
The petition in that cause was entitled : “Lucinda Ray and-Ray, her husband, and David A. Glass, an infant, who sues by James R. Glass, his guardian, and curator, plaintiff, against Geo. W. Harrison, defendant.” The petition states in substance that plaintiff’s father, Geo. W. Glass, died intestate, seized of the real estate therein described, to-wit: The northwest quarter of the southeast quarter and the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter all in section 13, township 45, range 24; that he left as his only heirs at law Lucinda and David A. Glass, and his widow, Rebecca.
That defendant was a brother-in-law of said Geo. W. Glass ; that defendant connived with the administrator of their father ’ s estate and procured the allowance in the probate court of fictitious claims, and fraudulently procured the land to be sold by order of the probate court and obtained a deed to said land. The petition sets out in full the fraudulent acts of the defendant, and prays that the administrator’s deed to
Afterward, at the June term, 1875, David A. Glass, by guardian and curator, filed an amended petition making Lucinda Ray and husband parties defendant with Geo. W. Harrison; he prays that the administrator’s deed be set aside as to his interests and for possession thereof. (The administrator’s deed sought to be set aside by this proceeding was dated April 4, 1870.) Defendant, Geo. W. Harrison, filed an answer denying specifically all the allegations in the petition. Lucinda Ray and husband did not file any answer.
At the February term, 1876, plaintiff filed a second amended petition, in two counts, the first to set aside the administrator’s deed to Harrison, the second for possession and for rents and profits. With the second amended petition were filed as exhibits the administrator’s deed, the application to the administrator to sell the real estate, the order of the probate court ordering the land sold, copy of the appraisement and report of sale with the order of the probate court approving the same. Defendant, G. W. Harrison, filed an answer to the amended petition denying specifically all the allegations therein contained. At the June term, 1876, the cause was tried.
The court found that defendant was guilty of all the fraudulent conduct charged against him in the petition and decreed as follows: “It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court, that said allowance as well as said sale of said land as made by said public administrator together with said deed executed by said administrator to said defendant Harrison, be and they are hereby annulled and held for naught, so far as they affect the rights of David A. Glass, and that said defendant, G. W. Harrison, be divested of all rights and title which he may have acquired by virtue of said sale of said land and the deed therefor, and it having been
To the introduction of the record and proceedings in the cause of I). A. Glass v. G. W. Harrison, above referred to. plaintiff objected, because the same was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial; because plaintiff was no party to said action, and because Glass and those claiming under him with knowledge were estopped from claiming any other interest than that acquired at the sheriff’s sale ; which objections were overruled by the court, and plaintiff at the time excepted.
The defendants also offered in evidence the judgment obtained by David A. Glass in the ejectment count in his petition aforesaid, showing a recovery of $300 for damages as well as rents and profits, it being one of the same judgments recited in the sheriff’s deed heretofore mentioned. The return in this transcript also shows the acknowledgment of satisfaction of said judgment made on the margin of the record thereof, signed by David A. Glass, and dated April 20, 1881.
The plaintiff vainly urged objections to this- transcript. The defendants next introduced in evidence over plaintiff’s objections transcript of the record in an ejectment suit brought by plaintiff and David A. Glass against G- W. Harrison on the twenty-seventh of July, 1880, in which they recovered judgment for certain portions of the land in suit.
Over objections of plaintiff the defendants then introduced in evidence a copy of the administrator’s deed to G. W. Harrison, executed April 4, 1870, and which the decree in favor of Glass set aside on account-of Harrison’s fraud, as already stated.
Defendants next introduced the following instrument : “This indenture made the sixth day of July, in the year one thousand, eight hundred and seventy-four (1874), between G. W. Harrison and Brunetta Harrison, of the county of Johnson, state of Missouri, parties of the first part, and Harvey Harrison, guardian and curator of the minor heirs of Charles Culver of the county of Johnson, state of Missouri, parties of the second part, witnesseth : That the said parties of the first partin con-consideration of the sum of four, hundred dollars ($400), to them duly paid, has bargained and sold, by these presents does grant and convey to the said party of the second part and his heirs and assigns forever all the right, title and interest to the following described real estate, viz. : The southwest quarter of the southeast qualter, and the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter, in section number thirteen (13), township number forty-five (45), range number twenty-four (24), 'situated in the county of Johnson, state of Missouri. This grant is indorsed as security for the payment of a certain note herein described: ‘ Knobnoster, Missouri, July 6, 1874. Twelve months after date I promise to pay to Harvey Harrison, guardian and curator, of the minor heirs of Charles Culver, deceased, four hundred dollars ($400), for value received, with interest at the rate of ten per cent, per annum; which payment, if duly made, will render this conveyance void; and if default shall be made in the payment of the
“In witness whereof, said parties of first part have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year above written.
“( Signed) G. W. Harrison [ Seal].
“ Brunetta Harrison [ Seal ].”
Which instrument was acknowledged on the sixth day of July, 1874, and filed for record on the ninth day of July, 1874. Objections made by the plaintiff to this instrument were also overruled.
Defendants next introduced in evidence the following deed:
“ Whereas Geo. W. Harrison and Brunetta Harrison, his wife, of the county of Johnson and state of Missouri, did by their mortgage deed, recorded in book J, page 208, on the sixth day of July, 1874, grant, bargain and convey to the undersigned Harvey Harrison as guardian and curator of the minor heirs of Charles Culver, deceased, the following described real estate situated in the aforesaid county of Johnson, to-witThe southwest quarter of the southeast quarter and the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 13, of township 45, and of range 24, for the purpose of securing the payment of a certain promissory note therein described; and whereas default has been made in the payment of the principal and interest of said note, now, therefore, I, the said Harvey Harrison, by virtue of the power and authority in me vested by said deed and in consideration of the sum of $745 to me in hand paid by the said Brunetta Harrison, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do by these presents grant, bargain and sell unto the said Brunetta Harrison the said real estate described as follows, to-wit: The
“In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal this, the fourteenth day of January, A. D. 1882.
“ [ Seal.] Hakvey Habéis on.”
This instrument was duly acknowledged and filed for record on the eighteenth of August, 1882. This was also read over plaintiff’s objection.
Gr. AY. Harrison’s discharge in bankruptcy dated May 26, 1885.
Defendant, G-. AY. Harrison, was then introduced as a witness for defendants and testified as follows: “I am one of the defendants; Brunetta Harrison is my wife. I am in possession of the land in right of my wife. The rental value of the land is from $1.25 to $2.50 per acre per annum. I borrowed the money from Harvey Harrison, secured by the mortgage on the south eighty, My wife [bought and ] furnished the money to buy the land at the sale made by Harvey Harrison under his mortgage. [He had offered to sell to Snell the plaintiff, at the same price.] My wife, as tenant of Harvey Harrison, or the mortgagee, was in possession of the south eighty some two or three years prior to the date of the deed from him to her, read in evidence. She held possession [ I presume ] through me as her husband. The contract, however, was in writing between Harvey Harrison and my wife; he had taken possession before that as mortgagee. After the sale, she, through me, as her husband, held possession down to the present time. I consider I am in possession in
Cross-examined: “The money paid to Glass for quitclaim deed was furnished by my wife. She got the money from proceeds of some land she owned near the. Henry county line. I had nothing whatever to do with furnishing the money. The way the money was paid on the mortgage was by my wife giving her note, I signed the note with her. The note was recorded.”
Defendants next read in evidence a warranty deed executed and acknowledged by Stephens and wife to Brunetta Harrison, on a certain eighty acres of land in section 27, township 45, range 24, in Johnson county,
In rebuttal plaintiff offered in evidence certified copy of note from Brunetta Harrison and Geo. W. Harrison to Harvey Harrison, as follows: “Brunetta Harrison to Harvey Harrison, $745.
“ Warrensburg, Mo., January 14, 1882.
“Twelve months after date, we, or either of us promise to pay to Harvey Harrison or order, seven hundred and forty-five dollars ($745), the purchase money for the southwest quarter of southeast, and the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section thirteen (13), township forty-five (45), range twenty-four (24), in Johnson county, state of Missouri, for value received, with interest from date at ten per cent, per annum. Brunetta .Harrison,
“G. W. Harrison.”
The foregoing instrument was filed for record January 28, 1882.
The foregoing was substantially all the testimony offered in the cause.
The court then entered the following decree in the cause:
“And the court, being fully advised touching the matters in controversy in this case, doth find from the pleadings and all the evidence In the case, that' the defendant, Brunetta Harrison, and her codefendant, G. W. Harrison, are now, and. were at the time of the institution of this suit, husband and wife; and that the said defendant, Brunetta Harrison, was at the time of the institution of this suit the legal owner of the following described portion or interest in the premises in controvery, to-wit.: The whole of the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter, and the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter and sixteen-thirtieths of the northwest quarter of the southeast quarter, and the northeast quarter of the southwest quarter, all in section number 13, township 45, range 24, and that, at the time of the institution of this suit, the said defendant, G. W. Harrison, was in possession of said portion of said premises as the husband of said Brunetta Harrison, and claiming his right to such possession under said Brunetta Harrison solely ; and that the said John R. Snell was at the
After an unsuccessful motion for a new trial, plaintiff brings up this cause on error.
I. As will have been observed from the foregoing statement, much of the evidence in this cause which was dumped upon the lower court, had no more of relevancy to the issues joined therein than the rings on Saturn.
It will be well, therefore, to shovel away the huge pile of debris which forensic contention has heaped on the foundations of this cause in order that we may know just where the lines of those foundations run. Here is a diagram of the locus in quo:
For convenience we will hereafter refer to the land, in dispute as the north eighty and the south eighty.
The chain of title to the latter eighty is the following:
First. Geo. W. Harrison owned it in 1874.
Second. Geo. W. Harrison and Brunetta to Harvey Harrison, mortgage, 1874/
Third. Geo. W. Harrison and wife to Alfred B. Harrison, warranty deed, 1875.
Fourth. Geo. W. Harrison, by sheriff, to Alfred B. Harrison, sheriff’s deed, 1876.
Fifth. Geo. W. Harrison, by sheriff, to J. H. Warren, sheriff’s deed, October 26, 1877.
Sixth. J. H. Warren and wife to Brunetta Harrison, quitclaim, January 24, 1878.
Seventh. Geo. W. Harrison, by sheriff, to Snell and Glass, sheriff’s deed, February 15, 1878. July 16, 1878, suit was filed by Snell and Glass to set aside deeds above numbered 3, 4, 5 and 6, and on February 24, 1880, a decree was rendered in the Johnson county circuit
Eighth. David A. Glass to Brunetta Harrison, quitclaim, April 19,1881. Harvey Harrison to Brunetta Harrison, January 14, 1882.
The decree of February 24,1880, swept out of existence all the right, title and interest which Geo. W. Harrison had in the land in controversy, as well as all that his wife Brunetta had, by and through the covinous contrivances, fraudulent execution sales., sheriff’s deeds and individual deeds in that decree set forth. The only thing which could arrest the searching and sweeping force of that decree, as to a portion of the land, was the mortgage executed by G. W. Harrison and his wife July 6, 1874, whereby the south eighty was conveyed to Harvey Harrison. But these remarks only apply to the legal title of G. W. Harrison, and not to any equity of his which might pass in consequence of the execution sales in favor of Snell and in favor of Glass and by reason also of the decree of February 24, 1880, in their favor. Under which proceedings plaintiff would be entitled to seven-tenths of the equitable title of G. W. Harrison in said south eighty.
This statement is, however, made upon the theory that the mortgage executed by G. W. Harrison and wife to Harvey Harrison, conveying to the latter the south eighty, was a bona fide instrument and not a mere sham, intended to assist G. W. Harrison in concealing his property from his creditors.
That G. W. Harrison and Brunetta, his wife, had no scruples in that direction and were familiar with such co vinous contrivances and were well disposed toward the-same is conspicuously and abundantly shown by the chain of title already set forth and by the decree of February 24, 1880, which overthrew and brought to naught all those fraudulent transactions. But note
On October 9, 1875, this same south eighty (as well as the north eighty, also) had been conveyed by Gr. W Harrison and wife to A. B..Harrison for an expressed consideration of $2,000, which conveyance, the decree of February 24, aforesaid, found to be fraudulent and void. In addition to the foregoing facts, the sale and deed made by Harvey Harrison to Brunetta Harrison on the fourteenth day of January, 1882, though the deed was not acknowledged and recorded till August 18, 1882, are remarkable in several particulars: As to the manner of executing the extraordinary power 'of sale alleged to have been conferred by the mortgage of 1874; as to the consideration for which sale and deed were made, and as to the fact that they were made at all.
Taking the alleged original debt, $400, and calculating the interest thereon at ten per cent, up to the date of said deed,- it will be found that that sum put at single interest for, say, seven and one-half years will amount to about the sum for which the second note was given, $745. But if the note for $400 was a real and valid debt what was the reason Harvey Harrison, the curator of the minor heirs of Culver, did not pursue the usual course of business and of duty by annually collecting the interest due on that note for the benefit of his wards '{■
But notice further: It is claimed that the mortgage under the terms of the statute, section 3310, Revised Statutes, 1879, conferred the power on Harvey Harrison without notice, publication or warning, bids, counter-bids or competition to sell the mortgaged premises at such time and place and for cash or on credit, as his own sweet will might determine, and thus foreclose Gh W. Harrison’s equity of redemption.
N o case has been found where the point has been directly adjudicated. In Davey v. Durrant, 1 De G. & J. 535, the power given authorized a sale, either public or by private contract. In Mowry v. Sanborn, 68 N. Y. 153, and in Martin v. Paxson, 66 Mo., loc. cit. 266, the utterances were wholly obiter. But it has been determined that, “ if the mortgagee omits to give proper notice, whether directed by the power or not, the sale may be impeached in chancery.” 4 Kent [13 Ed.] 190.
Our statute to which reference has been made is the ' following (R. S. 1879, sec. 3310): “All mortgages of real or personal property, or both, with powers of sale in the mortgagee, and all sales made by such mortgagee or his personal representative, in pursuance of the provisions of such mortgages, shall be valid and binding, by the laws of this state, upon the mortgagors, and all persons claiming under them, and shall forever foreclose
But in the mortgage in question there are no “provisions” “in pursuance” of which a sale was to occur. The statute, therefore, would seem not to sanction the view of it for which the defendants contend. Taking their thqory, however, of the statute as correct, this only enhances the extraordinary power which the mortgage of 1874 gave to the mortgagee.
Contrasted with such a summary instrument as that, the ordinary “cut-throat” mortgage, as it is colloquially termed, might well “hide its diminished head.” But the sale under the mortgage, if valid, cut out all subsequent purchasers, etc., and related to the date when that mortgage was given. 2 Jones, Mort., sec. 1654. This may, perhaps, furnish one of the reasons why the mortgage was drawn as it was, and why the sale thereunder occurred in the manner it did.
But notice further: This cause was heard in December, 1886, about four years after the sale under the mortgage happened, and there was no testimony that the note for $745, which fell due in twelve months, had ever been paid, or that any interest thereon had ever been paid. Furthermore, the note itself on the twenty-eighth day of January, 1882, was recorded, though .the deed' for the land for which the note was given was not acknowledged and recorded till August 18, 1882. Why this should have been done is certainly strange and out of the customary course. Does the curator still let that unsecured note run at interest as he did the one which was secured ?
Now, if the transactions aforesaid were fraudulent as to the creditors, then they were void under the statute and no title passed by reason of them ; but, whenever a question of fraud is involved in the issues, then any unusual clause in an instrument, any unusual method of transacting the business, apparently done to give the transaction an air of honesty and good faith, is of itself
Taking all the foregoing circumstances into consideration, the antecedent fraudulent purpose of G. W. Harrison, and his proclivity to defraud his creditors, manifested in such a variety of ways and for such a number of years, and the recorded participation of his wife Brnnetta, therein, with regard to this same land; the extraordinary character of the mortgage deed and the remarkable sale and deed made thereunder, as well as the releasing of the mortgage, and the singular pains taken to record the note after the incumbrance which secured it in its original state was canceled ; the conclusion has been reached that nothing in that mortgage or any of the subsequent proceedings thereunder offer any barrier to the successful prosecution of the plaintiff ’ s action, and that, therefore, he is entitled to recover the undivided seven-tenths of the south eighty — twenty-one-thirtieths thereof, and that Brnnetta Harrison is entitled to three-tenths of the same, nine-thirtieths thereof.
II. Next for discussion are the facts and circumstances relating to the north eighty, the chain oí title to which is as follows :
First. George W. Glass died seized thereof, leaving Rebecca, his widow, who elected to take child’s part, leaving one son, David A. Glass, and one daughter, • Lucinda.
Second,. Rebecca Glass, widow to Geo. W. Harrison, warranty deed, one-third, January 11, 1867.
Third. Geo. W. Glass by administrator to Geo. W. Harrison, A. D., April 4, 1870.
Fourth. Geo. W. Harrison to A. B. Harrison, warranty deed, October 9, 1875.
Sixth. Geo. W. Harrison by sheriff to J. H. Warren, sheriff’s deed, October 26, 1877.
Seventh. J. H. Warren to Brunetta Harrison, quitclaim, January 24, 1878.
Eighth. Geo. W. Harrison by sheriff to J. R. Snell and David A. Glass, sheriff’s deed, February 15, 1878. July 16, 1878, suit was brought by Snell'and Glass to set aside deeds above, numbered 4, 5, 6 and 7, and on February 24,1880, decree was rendered setting aside said deeds, divesting the title, of the grantees and Geo. W. Harrison to said land and vesting the title thereof in Snell and Glass.
Ninth. Lucinda Ray, nee Glass, and husband to David A. Glass, warranty deed, one-third, January 29, 1879.
Tenth. David A. Glass to Brunetta'Harrison, quitclaim, April 19, 1881.
As already disclosed by the record, David A. Glass was entitled by reason of heirship to the undivided one-third of the eighty in question, and his sister Lucinda, to a like proportion of that tract; but G. W. Harrison, by his fraudulent conduct through administration proceedings, obtained the title of the two heirs, which title so far as concerned David A. Glass was set aside on his part by proceedings in equity. This resulted simply in his being restored to that which he had lost, and he was not estopped from claiming that interest by his agreement with Snell already set forth, nor from after-wards purchasing from his sister Lucinda her undivided one-third interest in said eighty. In all probability without any agreement to that effect the law would have divided and apportioned the legal and equitable title and interest of Snell and Glass in accordance with, and in proportion to, the respective amounts of purchase money paid, just as was done by the agreement and by the sheriff’s deed ; but be that as it may, the sheriff’s
The evident object and meaning of that agreement was to establish, then and there, just what proportion of interest each of the parties acquired as a result of the sheriff’s sale and deed, and not to restrict either party from afterwards purchasing whatever further interest in .the land they desired todo. Nor was Glass debarred from taking the entire independent interest which he should thus purchase for his own individual benefit. Of course, being a tenant in common with Snell, by reason of their joint purchase, he could not buy in an adverse or outstanding paramount title, so as to oust his cotenant; for such purchase would in equity inure to the benefit of the other tenant in common (Picot v. Page, 26 Mo. 398 ; Dillinger v. Kelley, 84 Mo. 561); but this rule would be inapplicable when one tenant in common buys in the independent interest of another tenant in common — similarly situated as himself.
The effect, then, of the purchase of Glass from his sister Lucinda Ray was the acquisition of the undivided one-third of the north eighty. But this was only her equitable title thereto. Such transfer, however, of the property carries with it as an incident the right and equity to set aside the administrator’s deed to Harrison on account of the fraud he had practiced in procuring it. Traer v. Clews, 115 U. S. 528; McMahon v. Allen, 35 N. Y. 403; Smith v. Harris, 43 Mo. 557.
And the possession of such an equitable title was a sufficient defense to plaintiff s action so far as the interest of Lucinda extended. As the result of the above facts, Brunetta Harrison through the deed from David A. Glass acquired title to the undivided two-thirds of the north eighty as well as the undivided three-tenths of the undivided one-third of that eighty, making two-thirds plus three-tenths of one-third equal to twenty - three-thirtieths of that tract. Snell by his sheriff ’ s deed
III. The counsel for Bruñetta Harrison was permitted to strike from her answer her claim to a certain portion of the north eighty, as recited in the decree. While it is true that under our practice a plaintiff may take a nonsuit, certainly a defendant cannot do so and thus keep back a portion of the matter in litigation from adjudication.
IV. It has been deemed unnecessary to enter on any discussion of whether the purchase by Brunetta Harrison of the interest of David A. Class in the north eighty was made with her own means or not, since whether or not this was the case cannot affect the interests of plaintiff, whose execution spent its force at the sale in February, 1878, and, of coarse, could not extend to after-acquired property.
Relative tq the bill of exceptions not having thereto affixed the seal of the judge, it suffices to say that the statute, section 3635, Revised Statutes, 1879, requires that the bill should be signed by the judge, but not that he should seal it. Besides, the defendants having joined in error, it is quite too late to raise such an objection. Baile v. Ins. Co., 73 Mo., loc cit. 388.
The judgment will be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to the lower court to enter judgment as heretofore indicated after taking an account as to the rents and profits.