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Sneeden v. City of Marion, Ill.
64 F.2d 721
7th Cir.
1933
Check Treatment

*2 SPARKS, Before ALSCHULER District Judges, LINDLEY, Circuit Judge. stating (after SPARKS, Judge Circuit above). the facts as questions presented (1) are: Wheth- er the within the securities was powers valid; Bank and therefore assuming lack (2) to be invalid for power, recover whether the receiver pledged. the securities so country courts are not in ac- cord as to national or state whether pledge their as for de- posits money. di- private This versity has arisen reason of the contrariety statutes, difference of state applying views in the Federal economic formulating policies. statute and in state powers National banks have given by as are statute. Their pow applicable which ers be 1864, fore us found in the Act are to be par. 8, 101; amended, 7, 106,13 clause e. Stat. 5136, seventh, R. clause §S. USCA § and are follows: directors, “To exercise its board of duly agents, subject to authorized officers or law, nec- potoers all such incidental as shall be essary carry banicing; on the business of negotiating promissory by discounting and drafts, exchange, notes, bills of and other debt; by receiving deposits; evidences * * * (Our italics.) .” Act amеnded of June Under the . c. Stat. USCA public moneys depositories relates Government, pro it is agents financial that: vided “Any may, upon association money of a State or thereof, give political subdivision safe-keeping prompt payment deposited, of the same kind as 'by the is authorized law the State in which association is located the ease of oth- banking institutions State.” er Ferrell Hay, Hosea V. and John both of Banking did not The National Act Marion, appellant. Ill., for pledge a expressly give bank's if it Meyer, were there Mayer, Carl Richard F. and David granted implied virtue of an Rosenthal, Chicago, Ill., Pope all of C. E. such inci power contained in the clause “all Driemeyer, Louis, Ill., II. F. East both St. postal as to § depositories, Acts of U. S. bute of lon Ins. Co. form 308; United States v. State Bank of national hanks in the granted by that thought already existed under ute. debts kind of incidentally recognized city ferred to. This tained right money state in hanks relative utes cure, by pledge thereof enactment, prompt indirectly pertinent only upon S. Ct. sive of the eys clude controversy did power to national amended Act 1864 it seems Appellant, however, to land hank state course one receiving dental [1] [1] 192; USCA As United USCA The Federal Those the business of deposited of powers relating grant depositories 253, of national banks to that in service as due Michigan as 511, powers of a state because Congress did not intend to which such hank located. The 1930 intend receivership § as is authorized relative payment § deposit v. Johnson States sovereignty but government. North intention of well Congress. 332; enactments, however, are not deci- deposits; 43 Ct. deposits, provides for 39 Stat. question 70 L. Ed. therefore, to a making additional funds, enacting operating S. to as as to Indian bonds, to state banks. Hence Carolina, each to courts Trust state of their oí June land bank and government create additional priority in construction of the law of moneys shall he position cannot be 40 Stat. moneys, Congress 39 Stat. of certain the public moneys, 295, land Shipyards Corp. (C. contends 40 Stat. hanking; national United States before of treasurer Congress to its own banks to se- respect 25, 1930, Co., 924; narrows the under the commission respective powers to 67 Ed. the political received assets, public mon- 6 authority, depends upon moneys, 39 Stat. as USOA pledge their * ” necessary to safe-keeping 271 L. Pet. statutes power us, consistently has assumed acts, Liberty joint the law of the is not an attri- they that those stat mentioned, but give hanks, and Oklahoma, 39 USCA a former stat supra. Since of an Illinois U. S. which 1?* 29, from the sale J? 701; payment USCA passing 121, joint stock subdivision shall 36 Slat. deposits in stock banks except the 638; USCA power for the same which it Congress 8 they national Stat. we con if [12] present Mutual 236, enlarge funds.1 L. Ed. grants main *3 assets here § § State carry USOA Mel- hear Tlie fact that Federal hold organized any, 261 162; 759; the has held 771. re 46 C. of it had loaned had received as as a the bank was rate ly hands of a trustee for suant far as ing a new name vides in effect that national hanks-in Illinois powers as the laws of right ists those powers or a new holding N. 319; Calumet, etc., Dock. ly recognized the only ted them. Those to 273 ple Chicago or jurisdiction. of express statutory power curity posits by pledge cided in curity stances relative to answer the granted by the charter 57 A. L. R. 814. In this by implication оut A.) from Stale. States Oil created an “investment within the carry Illinois to implied, E. Ward ease expressly granted appellees to general banking it must be Ill. basis, controverted. not he is authorized thereto 798, F.(2d) Illinois prevail ten that such 318, done out those of the former class. Peo 1880, Federal otherwise, agency; the bank to deposits. deposits; must be conceded that Illinois has under a other record Corp. (C. 8 R.L. A. other per mortgage 848. We and the latter class is limited to Johnson, 112 original corporate power. which are receiving In that such a by creating respect money, powers may is relied 752; it must Gas Trust hank corporations by implication. to branch security from segregated cent. corporations. hanking' N. statute heret implied it was done merely giv discloses, gave of their assets unless that special national and that After it had United E. instant case are thereupon procedure now before business for some time know no banks are no different C. notes 95 Ill. statutes have 497, Using annual interest at the that state have upon 982, reasonably to receive A.) department.” Co., institutiоns in that guaranty a new given right, purpose, of charter law be either Co. 17 States v. Middle L. R. hanks, have principle 215, express power the hank as se 18 F.(2d) 130 Ill. those whom hank had been pertinent business clear Am. St. issued of Illinois in placed exists v. Conkling, If therefore power by the State appellees which loans and if it ex corporation theory ns, state engaged trust certain for the se a ease de A. necessary which, the hank their de does not deposits. implied because permit express 268, 1917B, in the is not arises given fund Rep. Pur This pro that; in- in 22 as It is guaran- first using which it obvious that vestment certificates just two per quoted sentences dis rate of 7.3 Court was teed interest at annual certificates, cussing corporation quarterly. to re eent, These payable exchangeable deposit. ceive either loan or transfer, were after sale or last hands, quotation sentence of the refers course certificates in the trustee’s like currency, powers assign the bank’s were redeemable in mortgage negotiable instruments which it is presentation, of the funds order out might take, necessаry trustee, authorized whenever it is or which hands of and proper incident 'to the conduct collection next come to his hands sup business. The pledged for the Melntire Case cited in *4 port of the last proposition an Illinois redemption purchasing of these thereof. The all, merely decision which held open including the insurance alike to certificates was corporation power general de- the to take a note and depositors bank. Some the negotiate to init the certain of the transaction of its ordi purchased bank positors of the nary question pre business. they paid trans- There was no eertifieates, by for which preference policy sented to gen- relative the corresponding ferring a depositors, holders department, or and no bank was in to the investment deposits eral controversy. terested In the certificates of investment Planters’ purchased Others cited, which Bank Case had never been de- was also the Court not then and who were Mississippi held in- which un bank became statute made it bank. The positors of the any lawful fоr within question the bank that state to solvent, the arose whether by transfer endorsement or assigned trustee held otherwise the note, bill receivable, or other protection of the certificate evidence primarily for debt, payment unconstitutional. That cited as for of de- ease holders, or were available authority opinion depositors of Chief Mar generally. The court Justice mands of Robertson, shall in United States v. U. was valid and that the held that S. (5 Pet.) Ed. by primarily L. which case securities were held trustee holders, authority it was assumed citation without protection for of the certificate many the United States had a se has cited That decision been other for a jurisdietions cured funds. In the holding that Illinois state Case, counsel, Robertson Court and gen- pledge their assets to secure construing question bond which the entire but we think that eral Case, deposits bank nor decided the Ward neither raised officer, ignored any question customs of its enumerating express powers of the After possible although invalidity, power to re- corporation, which includes very strong constituted the basis dis (at money deposit, ceive on the court said opinion Baldwin, senting Mr. Justice page 237): which he called that the attention fact express powers “In addition these no was neither raised counsel nor P°int corporations pos- doubt that can be no tieed Court. The fact implied sess, also, power to borrow mon- right United be se tbat the States to ey. Banking, 4; Morse Banks and Plant- as eured funds was (U. Sharp, S.) ers’ Bank 6 How. 323 [12 counsel, sumed the court and inwas b5r Leavitt, 447]; Curtis L. Ed. N. 52-Y. probability of Congress due to the Act 53; Vires, (Seward’s on Ultra Brice Ed. (chapter 20, § March 1 Stat. 209). §191), force, 31 USCA then in not, therefore, important “It will i’- priority of established the United holders, determine whether the certificate ^hlch “ wbieb lt have States elalms mlSbt claiming deed, under re- trust estates, persons insolvent or a8'aiIlst garded having or made loans for obtained, merely which their Up point certificates were for in to this the Ward Case receiving premised propositions upon one ease elemental deposits] three [that requisite power expressly given to the cor- it based its conclusions: (1) which The poration by charter, еxpress power its deposits, (2) the other ease had receive borrowing money] possesses implied power (3). money, the had to borrow [that by necessary implication. business, implied Nor can the as an incident to its it had corporation assign assign general power mortgage negoti- or mort- g’age negotiable instruments which instruments it was it is au- able authorized to questioned. take thorized to taken Melntire take and it had the' ' Preston, 5 Am. Gilman course of its business. Court then con- 321]; Dee. [48 supra.” Planters’ Bank Sharp, particular pre- eluded facts there ed them. This is quite clearly of the hank which had fact seated that the assets estab- a lished first opinion, delivered to constituted sentence of been the trustee principal payment question arising of “The valid of securities for the holding is, record did Merchants, the certificates of investment to ‘The Farmers and expressly Savings them; and this without stat- Mechanics’ Bank’ it did ing, mentioned, money borrow than hereafter ‘investment otherwise issue certifi- moneys therefor, received from deed, whether the the certifi- cates’ secured trust as was cаte or deposits. holders constituted loans here done?” Under those circumstances we Court, however, following moneys used the lan- are convinced paid by guage (at page 111.), corpo- 238 of 95 “The certificate holders for investment certifi- agree ration was authorized contract cates constituted loans to the and were persons desiring meaning to make or not within ordinary might Hence, loan toas terms. execute that word. cannot be said that bond, note or certificate as evidence of the Ward Case Illinois has authorized indebtedness, and secure the same banks to their assets as mortgage, note, payment chattel securi- general depositors, ties, etc., mortgage nor real estate or trust brought been *5 just deed, mutually agreed. as should be to our attention which proce- authorizes such suggested, And there has been and no reason dure. The comes to us therefore none, why sys- we providing helpful precedent can conceiveof a without from that State. securing generally tem for loans and Much has by been said counsel as to the particular way in objectionable, a is when it necessity procedure of such and the reasona objectionable Would single not be conduct thereof, quite bleness but it is obvious to us way.” language transaction in that This it is that neither necessitous nor reasonable. altogether the Court pertinent is necessity urged The based competi is question presented, moiiey for if the received among tion banks in growing their ever de loans, from certificate holders constituted deposits. sire employment to obtain right then bank to its as- such for purpose means that seems to tous sets general depositors to secure some of its wholly unworthy of, and with, inconsistent the exclusion of others was not before the object for which organized, banks are and Court, in event whatever that the Court is means it certain from this record said about the assets for the procedure that demand for such gen is question, was beside the extent, eral or that is not actuated and must be considered as dictum. The mere depositors rather than fact that the Court failed to characterize the apparent necessity banks. arises out of moneys thus received as loans or either wrongful practice, if all banks he posits language does not such render less ob- prevented making practice use jectionable moneys if in fact were loans. result will he the to all. same areWe they That did constitute loans we think there prevention 1hat convinced will result question, can be no and as such it may be depletion any appreciable n concededthat the bank had a length time, for the risk and inconvenience payment. its assets for their It is not con- personally earing one’s money, own they tended that or trust de- especially considerable, if amount is is posits, they very few characteris- greater people assume, than most desire tics, any, if of limited pay- time is say only deposits and it fair to that it is currency ment of the certificates could bo proportion sought thus sizable are only demanded presen- the order of their secured. But whatever value be ascribed tation and from funds in the hands of increasing to the method as a means of de trustee, might or whiсh next come to his outweighed posits, is that value far hands from the collection of the notes and likely evil results which than are more to fol pledged redemption securities for the thereof. We are convinced that low. is The certificates were characterized on their reasonably necessary carrying out investments, face as and interest thereon was statutory powers which have guaranteed by the bank. granted banks, been national or to state Regardless of the Court’s statement that in Illinois. unnecessary it was to decide whether the argued transactions between the It is inasmuch hank and the as'a bank certificate holders constituted loans its bills or de- receivable to secure posits, quite by analogy is obvious that loams, the Court and a de argument in like manner posit them as loans and so treat- exists. That counsel considered thereby is no real premise that there increased the amount of the de- based tbe posit. loan, Appellees, however, posi- and a not in a difference between a urge and tion to point, relation of debtоr because value of either ease the pledged amount creditor arises. It is true that there are cer exceeded the tain are common to several thousands dol- characteristics which sure, pledged lars. To each, and better rea if the securities but we think later dif retained their excess would eventu- opinions soned hold that there is a vast value the ally return with ex to the bank for the benefit To that difference ference. define depositors; the other retain difficult, they and for hut if did not actness indeed be would unnecessary they might value never return and purposes of this ease depositor say participate secured in a the dif would thus to do sufficient to so. greater always proportion of bank’s than recognized by been ference be entitled. that which it would otherwise theory practice, bankers both If value of the should fall bookkeeping pub and their their method of deposit, below the reports fail to reveal basis for an lished might deposit, order to retain be com- government tbe analogy. The United States pelled pledges to make additional thus recog states, including Illinois, tbe various deplete prejudice further the assets reports tbe difference as shown nize .to depositors. the other require published. Con legislatures rec gress the various inequitable apparent Another feature is many period ognized the over difference subsequently in case insol- the bank becomes years by making it criminal offense for vent, happened here. In that event if the deposits. to receive This has insolvent bank pay pledged assets are sufficient to the se- obviously purpose pro for the been done deposit, expenses winding up cured *6 tecting depositors; while on other hand paid the un- the affairs of the bank are out of weight authority that overwhelming of is upon fall assets and tbe unsecured power money borrow to a has the to bank depositors. emergency exigency, an such as meet an right A bank’s to its assets as insolvency. temporary See threatened general depositors to for some of Baird, County 45, v. 55 N. D. 212 N. Divide others constituted the tbe exclusion of 236, L. R. 296. W. 51 A. legal in this many basis for controversies diversity of country, and as a there is a is bear in result It well to mind that the busi opinion. diversity That not intimately judicial is banking ness is connected of due economic views but to the differences of Congress interest that and alone with the to the statutes involved. legislatures may prohibit altogether, differences or also every practically phase of the In those eases may prescribe the conditions under which it very ably discussed, and question we has been on. In that be carried exercise of the. unnecessary except refer to them to deem legislative power there manifested in all is general classify relation to the to them with legislation-bearing banking bn American Ap- presented.2 statutes there and the facts every possible disposition to throw safe a rights- guard gen around the and interests of 2 Pledge by virtue depositors, fairly, public funds valid eral and to treat them all to secure 581, Hall, statute: Williams v. 30 Ariz. of state 249 equitably, impartially. The and doctrine (1926); Earhart, 34 Ariz. P. 755 Williams (1929); Sanguinetti, guaranty deposits bank has its ad *Button v. 11 565, P. 273 728 1932) (Ariz. Highway P.(2d) ; Im *Ark.-La. 1085 opponents, vocates and also its but we have S.W.(2d) Ark. Taylor, Dist. v. 177 6 provemеnt yet voluntary public bear advocacy (1928); Edwards, 185 Ark. 48 *McCown v. 533 (1932); (2d) Foss, Bank 96 First Nat. 558 S.W. guaranteeing part general deposi a of tbe Imperial App. 107, 273 P. *Wood v. Cal. Irr. (1928); others, securing tors to the exelusion of and (Cal. 1932); P.(2d) Sup. Dist., *Porter County Co., Idaho, guaranty ¡by pledge Canyon Fire Ins. a of tbe bank’s as (1928); Butler, 185 N. E. Schornick P. Legislation looking sets. to that ap end we Supreme Indiana, March Court decided (This prehend would unpopular as it- however, decision, reverses the de 1933. originally down cision on same handed publicly would be for a bank to advertise published in 172 N. E. July 3, indulging that it practice the fact tbe permitting- deposi lieu of held that statute which it was tories personal of or specified guise an implied under the incidental given surety bonds power. assign did not authorize them to public funds types of other the sure secure however, is said, general deposi- It given deposits. bonds secure Since ties on wis,e who is injured tor is in no decision, rendered, personnel secured changed, Indiana has Court of and the Supreme if at time transaction is the bank remains is one who* who dissented only member solvent, because the. bank’s сash assetsare decision.) original *City Louisville -weight greater of au- assets pellces general ci/niend that the inci- is an thority pledge. However, per- power dental upholds “necessary carry on the busi- that soma ness of banking,” of those discloses equi- usal decisions is so inconsistent with expressly ty- good upon are statutes which fraught based conscience and is grant upon wrongful statutes possibilities others power, that we from, power willing provisions which contain to foist it the State of Illinois rightfully legislature Since none until its be inferred. or its spoken courts have stat- provisions present clearly in the Illinois is that effect. That those bodies have opin- majority right utes, appears what to be a if they approve pol- choose to sueh reality icy is not supporting pledge, in denied, ions merely but we hold that authority they array yet on have not done so. sueh a formidable Illinois statutes. presented under the argued inasmuch money to deal with Some of the cases referred deposited general deposit when as a becomes others deal with posits public monеy, immediately property hank, than corporate individual and the relation of thereupon debtor and creditor princi- public money, but think the same we arises, therefore has an inherent applies power as- ple to each. The right to deal with those in the con not, can sets for of its business pleases. duct as it Personal Court, Supreme under the decisions our property rights terms, are relative sovereignty upon any based attribute they can be exercised so far as do part pledgee, power hut such must rights not conflict with the of others. Illinois express implied legisla- be based an power virtue of charters have grant. express an tive the absence of general banking business, to do in grant power, by implication deposits. cludes the receive prevail should bo unless the assets, To be such bank owns its sure presented render it neces- reasonably facts general deposits, term includes but to implication sary in order ful- that such arise thq say that bank in conduct sueh of its busi ly fairly express powers to effectuate as has an unrestricted to use its ness granted. that that condi- We are convinced going further, pleases think, sets as it we implica- not exist tion does here. Such than the law authorizes. Those who become specific tion, viz., that the transfer depositors do so of an result [181] v. App. Com. v. Mothersead the 1932. ‍​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‍A. 269 bolt Fulton, [75] prohibited 749, Dist., 160, 45 L. R. French ing State 286, v. beyond Counties ties Trust v. So. statute S.W.(2d) involved (2d) (a Pledge ’"Tlmse State Iowa, Ohio Anderson, 5th City *7 Fidelity VGiy strictly County N. [1913] [26] P. [219] Court [12] Sav. [644] 1980); [122] Bank v. See, App. Co. & (1927) Huntsville E. S.W. Circuit, [144] N. and the [44] Bank, Kentucky (8th Guaranty 707, Road Dist. cases hold [40] does have Bank, 815, a Neb. pledged, v. right express School W. Ohio 1932). (1928) also, Com'rs, (2d) 751 Longview, v. U. *A & Columbia ; 1930) (1932). ustin 45 N. C. Cit. Appeals [38] 163, A. statute: 107 Or. Consolidated 1933); Pixton 203, [203] case C. App. : Wyo. leading construed, Ward ; Pottorff S. Dist., *Maryland Casualty (N. Trust [65] terms, Co. or the funds pledge) *U. 294W. A. case decided 240 W. 291 Iowa, (1928); 128 Okl. v. But Fidelity variously A. ‍​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‍decided 238, 267, 214 P. S.) Lamar, v. Okl. 1927) ; [26] 88, N. S. v. L. R. Richards Texas, Co. statute, one Trust Bassfield, see, either Trust Lucas 1335, S.W.(2d) [184] 950, [264] Fulton, Fidelity & funds (1890) ; *Bliss v. Pathfinder Mo. and not .*Farmers' School [153] 58, v. & by opposed v. El N. [1407] also, P. [26] Ann. 214 N. that, [62] Co., as to Guaranty Co. to be Perry, App. County, [260] [813] Ky. S.W.(2d) E. [1030] valid prior v. (1932) F.(2d) [125] Andrews (1928) ; City [148] [1059] v. Dist., Comm. while [839] [245] (1923); Cas. to- be Supreme P. 1112 Paso-Hudspeth type Osceola 566, W. 559 53, protected, Guaranty (1928). Noel, statute & Ohio Co. Miss. [72] because ; (decided Ky. (Tex. Merchants’ Ohio, [498] Co., 156 S. Utah, 129, 1915C, [1062] 174 Minn. Grigsby of securi Snider U. the state v. Portland extended S.W.(2d) Bank v. *Foster [321] St. 109, 704, (1927) ; (1926) grant Board (C. S. Bank, Court 22 F. (Tex. Com. Ode Dec. [1932] Irr. Mo. etc-. 382, Fidelity Co. W. [160] [114] by v. C. [54] & : by solvent entitled 55 N. D. insolvent, holding [415] La. [117] with fra, has [1075] P. [673] 696, 1933, 212 pledge lar 135 S. irning See port & decided deposit ican P. 581 sion Circuit Nat. must Interstate invalid. Co., Spencerport, Pledge Pledge of securities [1055] (1892). [237] to the one construed P. (1931) So. (1928). (1928 ; also a 12, [195] (1931) holding Bank general v. Bank, O return E. [1916] [489] (1927) ; valid; holding 900, by is 110 So. to the return Stone, hio R. v. N. 795 (1926) ; McFerson to ‍​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‍secure reference ; 45, and ; Page invalid, (1923), Nat’l Kansas bank. Toohey, 49 S. People’s the New & Melaven See, Ainsworth [65] [98] C. Circuit Court 212 N. practice [143] Trust Bliss v. does Kan. A. L. R. to secure [261] 545, State also, Bank Co. Misc. giving while Trust case public N. Y. (1926) Divide v. Nat’l [142] Bank, Richmond W. Co. York v. 109, Bank invalid: Citizens’ receiver Mason, v. v. Hunker, S. 196, Smith, holding a prevent 236, v. no reason [1398] D. public policy: ; private Co. to 157 P. 175, funds valid Ferguson, Court E. Kruger, [158] Palm pledge by [255] Surety pledged securities; 51 A. L. Himing v. (1928); [786] Appeals 121 Neb. Tenn. [184] County Commerce State Carter 207 W. 462 N. deposit that.a Rose, 392, [35] even deposit to secure Beach, (a F.(2d) N. E. County a [80] N. Appeals, for holding N. Y. Co., [1928] L. R. A. 182, [48] private In re insolvent v. Bank private Mont. R. v. [192] M. 484, bank S. 482 v. statute Kan. before First Amer [72] also Toohey, [11] [96] 750, Page N. accordance 408, Brock, N. of Brock the Third 237 W. v. a Colo. S.W. Fla. Bank of v. First Feb. already 468, C. valid) private a deci deposit a 732, C. (1926); (1926); Baird, [299] N. 1917A, (1932). Trust simi bank such case (2d) and 247, 673, 482, in [260] [162] 28, P. [30] is Balt. H ; bank, al- deal with are con- implied implied powers invitation from the which we ease, owner of vinced do' not though bank becomes the arise in the instant not, questions absence with money deposited, it will economic which no doubt were permittedHo legislative authorization, when Legislature considered the Illinois violate a use it in such manner section paragraph 374, supra, 316 and equita- fairly, treated depositor’s enacted, ju- and with which we cannot be general de- bly impartially with dicially concerned. ' positors. question next arises whether section think obstacle which we There is another 51 of the Commission Form of Government prevail in this ac appellees’ defeats any way Act has in been modified subse what is known Illinois enacted tion. quent legislation. 23, 1919, On June Act. as its Commission Form of Government Banking “General Act” en of Illinois was c. Smith-Hurd Rev. St. Ill. acted, and it became effective on December seq., Illinois Revised Statutes et Cahill’s 1920. Smith-Hurd Rev. St. Ill. e. 1931, 24, par. seq. 316 and c. 323 et Section 16%, Statutes, 1931, Cahill’s Illinois Revised deposit by paragraph 374 deals with the o. 16a. In that Act no au city city treasurer of thority granting pledge, “any specifically provides banks. It prohibiting them pledging, their as before is made there deposits; sets for the but under * * * * * * ‍​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‍good in, shall execute general powers granted broad therein bond, ap sureties to be (and) sufficient banking form banks and associations for the council, president proved of the said by the purpose deposit, buying of discount and safely that such will conditioned selling exchange, doing general banking for, mon keeр pay and account over said business, it is appellees contended ey. council, com president Said implications same as announced Ward of accounts and finance and the missioner Johnson, supra, prevail, continue inas deposi treasurer, the selection of general banking powers granted much as the into tory bank, take consideration the shall in the former materially enactments are not solvency thereof, reputation and-the suf different from those in the Act of contained ficiency the offered such bank.” 1919. expressly sets forth what an That enactment shall be authorized to do in or Illinois bank Whether a repealed statute has been funds of a der to secure by implication legislative is a city operating under the Illinois commission intention, acknowledged rules there are government, implication form of ascertaining repeals that intention. Such cleap which is not will be to strike favored, are not and one statute will not be express requirement. prior If down repealing considered as another statute enactment, appellees contend, implication posi unless the later statute *8 itself policy permit had committed to the tively repugnant plain to the former or is a ting pledged security assets to for the be repeal substitute for it. The intent to must prevent that fact would a not. very clearly appear. United Cla States v. change policy of that whenever the lawmak flin, 546, 97 U. S. L. Ed. re 1082. Such might ing authorities of Illinois it consider peals indulged will any not be if there is oth expedient change, make such and their er reasonable construction. Peck Elliott doing for so reviewable reasons would be (C. A.) 10, 616; C. 79 F. 38 L. R. A. Chica by courts. go, etc., Doyle, R. 624, Co. v. 258 Ill. 102 N. appellees Even if be conceded that 260, 1914B, E. Ann. Cas. 385. The presump properly language construed Court’s against implied repeals peculiar tion has Johnson, supra, say Ward then that we special conflicting provisions when force 51 of the section Illinois Commission Form thought repeal which work are con a (Smith-Hurd of Government Act Rev. St. special in a local or tained act and a later and 1931, 24, 316, Ill. c. and paragraph 374, e. general act. Petri v. Creelman Co., Lumber superseded 24, supra) has the doctrine an 487, 199 U. S. S. Ct. 50 L. Ed. 281. nounced Court in that far as so presumption special The is that the act is in

the facts in the instant ease are concerned. exception tended remain in force as discussing Rodgers States, We have refrained from act. the the v. United 816; authorities from other courts, cited because U. S. S. Ct. 46 L. Ed. they than, Washington Miller, deal with statutes other dif- 235 U. S. 35 S. ferent from, statutes; they the Illinois Ct. 59 L. Ed. 295. repudiate not be the contract as of this ease Under the circumstances against part State, party. an innocent third was intention think there no wo phase On that we do repeal or modi Legislature to of the Illinois ease, prefer choose to that para follow but rather 316 and fy provisions section rely reasoning perlinent on the to that 374, supra, enactment graph subject in & Baltimore Ohio R. v. Smith former Co. Banking Act in 1919. The General (C. A.) 56 799. F.(2d) C. powers of deals with the special a act and con generally. two are not to be The banks 316, 24, Section c. Smith-Hurd Rev. St. repugnant nor offensive positively as sidered paragraph 374, Ill. supra, express might well that ly inconsistent. ly provides may that before Illinois Legislature good and sufficient deposit funds, receive of the kind with sureties preferring bonds reasons herein described, shall execute bond with security instead approved by city sureties president com under the operating cities council, for the return of the mon government. This it had a form mission ey deposited; not authorized to desired, its reasons if it to do give, nor is the treasurer authorized to ac Subsequent questioned. cannot therefor Any cept, security. other other construction fairly judicial take events of which we meaningless. would render the statute In the having somewhat considered as notice present given by Bank, case no bond was justified ehoiee. deposited and the assets which viola Wil- Appellees urge our consideration of approved tion of the neither statute were 565, 273 P. Earhart, Ariz. liams president council, nor were de of a bank sued In 730. that case the receiver posited city except with the treasurer in es there- treasurer to recover collateral state joint surety crow under control with the bank to tofore and delivered original bond, on the treasurer’s these the treasurer to secure a appellees acts hope to circumvent the ex money. not consist pledge did things press the statute. Those nei terms of statute, bond provided state which that a the Bank author ther the treasurer nor was given with sureties should or that law the Fed ized to do under the Illinois interest-hearing bonds of United States supra. 25,1930, Act of eral June should be made state treasurer. with the called Our attention been to Pottorff beneficiary, real state of Arizona was the Paso-Hudspeth v. El Counties Road Dist. deciding Court, assuming without (C. A.) F.(2d) Texas 498. that case C. taking contrary law, appellee organized special under a might repudiate held that the receiver Act, among things, provided that other against contract interests gov- depository the Treasurer or should be beneficiary, State, was an innocent provided for erned same laws as are agree party. third said: “We The Court depositories county funds; provided specified in of the kind the stat- depository such treasurer or before taking kind of which utе is the any funds of the entitled receive should he to' exempt would from liabil- the state treasurer give district, it should bond to the district deposited his ity on official bond in case he equal deposited. Article designated depository bank, state relating Tex., St. 517a Vernon’s Ann. Civ. necessarily but it follows means funds, provided depositories county security, though even it does not ex- *9 company, ex- and trust bank, or bank that empt liability the treasurer from for specifically authorized statute cept where protec- for posit, cannot he used him public of a except in the ease us tion of the latter.” The before preference any deposi- funds, give should Court, pow- was not decided that and the corporation of the pledging tor pledge national hank to its assets as er a security. giving a Instead collateral under a statute sim- part appellee’s deposit, of the protect bond not in to the us was issue. ilar one before pledged. Appellee con- assets were quotation to, bank’s From above referred how- statutes should be construed tended that the that the state ever, the Court said treasurer such construction the together on and that liable to the his bond still would he State valid. con- authorized and This statute, pledge was because had not followed the anti he sustained and the Court further from tention was not he released this means that he would 517a, ample au- from article not that aside his bond because was authorized said he found in other statutes thing thority he did. The was to be that statute do general in the law. held, however, upon, relied Court that the receiver would may depositor It that the secured take advan- not cited. other statutes referred to tage and as- of the ultra vires act the bank statutes that the Illinois remembered will be upon act. It estoppel grounded sert an such re- resembling provisions nothing contain rely making in had no this lied in case. preference a form of an unlaw-' equities sur- may urged It that par- transfer both ful of assets. Otherwise appeal even rounding should the transaction illegality ties, to realize the bound arriving at its conclusions a court of law in in unlawful- transfer, might, the face of such in made ground pledge that tile saying nеss, agree transfer, each make the approval of the board good faith and with the au- other, “though transfer is not also be remem- directors; it should but yet ac- by law, will make thorized we probability pledge in bered' that the despite ille- complish result desired without in of and made the absence rescind gality, neither hereafter depositors. It knowledge unsecured of the original We restoring without status.” surety treasur- on the that obvious accomplishment of an approve not do moving spirit in this contro- er’s bond is the way illegal any such unconsciona- result perfect right to be. It versy, a estoppel. hold the doctrine of We ble use of penalized on nor neither be criticised should eases cited that with the decisions fact, speaking equi- but account of that repudiate invalid receiver that it volun- be borne mind ties should that returning deposit, and the valid without tarily contract for which entered into the other appellees must share with considera- it received a cash assume that we Bank’s depositors in the distribution of the the risk of ac- voluntarily It assumed tion. assets. assets of аn Illinois cepting a notwithstanding the fact is re- judgment District Court im- granted neither nor State for further versed, and the cause remanded to, pledge. plied power its banks make opin- not proceedings inconsistent with surety is think the Under conditions we ion. complain. position in no (dissent- Judge ALSCHULER, Circuit Appellees’ contention that the receiver ing). authority maintain this action is is without holding not I do concur v. Baltimore R. Co. without merit. & O. policy against permit Imperial Irr. Dist. Smith, supra; Wood v. securing pub ting banks to 128; (Cal. (2d) Austin Lamar Sup.) 17 P. I authorized a statute. lic unless S.W.(2d) 1062. The (Tex. App.) Com. Johnson, Ward 95 Ill. believe that than represents the insolvent receiver more Supreme sufficiently indicates the view of the represents all the credi institution. He also op not public policy Illinois is Court that insolvent institution. Davis tors of that has been Wall.) pledges. 447; posed 21 Ed. Gray, (16 L. U. S. Whitehead, jurisdictions to quite frequently Nat’l Bank v. 149 Ind. in other Franklin cited L. R. A. 63 Am. 560, N. E. St. in Illinois such proposition that support ordinarily when two Rep. 302. is true that contrary to the state’s assets is into a contract parties have entered which public policy. fully sides, on both will has been executed one People rel. Nelson The recent ex ease up to set the defense of ultra be allowed 266 Ill. Maywood, Peoples State Bank of making some sort of restitution. vires without respects in all like App. while here, However, in such case as has arisen recognizes bind- my judgment bar, in at parties there are considered reviewing pledge; and the ing force contracting parties, to the two addition Supreme Illinois, Court decision of namely, general depositors rights whose E. 1932, - N. filed October infringed by been the action of the two However, conflict therewith. -, does not contracting sim parties. Restitution would parties rehearing petition both upon the *10 wrong against par ply continue that innocent writing present which at is granted, been Further, as in Balt. & R. was stated O. ties. pending. Imp. Dist., Smith, and in Wood v. Irr. v.Co. in a state so commer- significant that It is in involved the supra, there were two acts Illinois, presumably where cially important as consideration, one, the de transaction under many such been transactions not valid, oth have perfectly and the there posit which was any statute, provisions of falling the within invalid. It does not er, the was contrary the pledges, if deemed judicial approval such appear worthy to us of as long depositor the public policy, who, upon slate’s have since been the faith of the pledge, deposited denounced its courts. the in the bank. The bank itself could not urge properly its want pointed out, support in of such a It is of to make pledge, support the in ordinarily policy state, that the undertaking to recall pledge, the without pledges secrecy in of which the there is making good first deposit; the and, fully general public notice, de- has no and that reasoned in the New York case, rights the usually positors not so secured would the receiver are not in regard different knowing means much no how of the bank’s from those of the bank itself if no there were reported segregated. assets are so receiver. It is not seems me that with the the vice It is said that this rule apply would not assets, pledging of the but with laws and because there party is another to the transac- regulations concerning reports and advertise- tion, namely, the depositors unsecured and fully agree ments banks. I that banks creditors of the bank. As to this contention required frequent public make should be New York case is like this one, both hav- reports condition, of their in such ing party” as the “third de- unsecured reports specifically it disclosed should what positors and creditors. Without further elab- part reported pledged. oí the is so To oration thereon I refer to that case and its my practice permit mind it is vicious discussion proposition. of the their “resources” at an advertise deposits, amount total with- In inclusive this connection I think it should be time, requiring out that at the same considered that in a one as this prominently, as. stated the liabilities bank’s he depleted. arc not subject. posit which the resources are of the funds made on the strength pledged of the assets becomes the pointed pledging that such is also out property gives bank, of the bank and to the may, bank’s bank’s assets ease in additional ‍​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​​‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‍assets, cash the substantial disaster, depositors threatened enable equivalent of the pledged. securities against This, favored others. bring course, picture into the collusion would But is further based on the probably fraud, which would be dealt conclusion the Illinois Commission appears, but which not in- with when Form of Government city Act and its eoneededly here, volved where there was disqualified treasurer are depositing, from favoritism, suggestion of circumvention and the 'receiving, city bank from deposit of where, pledge, the time of the the bank at any funds on other terms than pre- act solvent. scribes, subsequent Congress act of referring specifies. laws stale This first policy if that the But said act specifies city treasurer shall make States, state, even of the United daily deposits receipts all sources pledges, giving against such revenue one or more banks situated prop vires another them was ultra city, president to be selected judgment my arises osition would council, the commissionerof accounts and the any require event restoration treasurer, them, two of and that good upon faith ultimate securi made deposit before is made therein the bank shall pledge, bank or its ty of the bank’s before the requirеd obligation enter into representativo permitted lie to take back pay said council to interest on Bank, etc., The case of State the securities. than per per at a rate of not less three cent Stone, 261 N. Y. 184 N. E. de annum, bond, shall execute with sureties New of Appeals York Court cided approved by president council, con- 28, 1933,specifically In February decides. will safely keep ditioned the bank that, while the that case it held bank money. account for said pledge assets to secure a without “private deposit,” receiver of insol provisions prescribe These the duties and pledgor bank must back the pay vent conduct the treasurer direct the and other deposit he city before is entitled to a re depositing in the matter of mon- officers judgment ey, my turn of the securities. the case but no sense at degree limitation good faith bar was the of the bank’s the- its assets as for de- city’s securities that enabled treasurer to procure making protect city against posits. a bond If treasur- through statute, may deposit; comply loss er does nоt with the the bank municipality or its receiver personally should not be to remain liable withdraw making deposit, without does safety whole but the act *11 priving to deny right the further secure Illinois banks right state to to banks municipality pledge or its treasurer their assets to depositing deposits secure made the by pledge assets, of even Commission I am sureties, municipalities, or his Form of requirements opinion though statutory have the the amended of June Act 1930, 12 USCA to re been observed. was intended limit strict or national banks in their there only comparatively It is to noted that quite 'generally recognized right tofore to municipalities Illinois the few under pledge pub- their assets of deposits to secure act, policy in Form the Commission and that many lie funds. While in relations such se pledging permitting of the of curity required specifically is federal stat security publie of deposit bank’s assets as for ute, I believe this is no inhibition act applicable to mu- funds those continues pledging publie assets funds in to secure nicipalities unaffected the Commission instances is where there no such statu by the Form act. I cannot coneeive that tory requirement. it intended to dis- CommissionForm act was munici- tinguish classes of between two providing by the Act of 1930 that na- the-right pledge to palities as to of banks may give tional banks for the deposits of mu- their assets make secure to safe-keeping publie payment of funds as regulation nicipal in of funds. The act was is authorized of the state in which law cities, not banks. the national in of hank is located the case state, banking of institutions right general I am well satisfied that the placed upon national bank same was foot- se- bank to its assets to of an Illinois ing respect bidding publie in to publie was not with- cure of funds which, quite banks, were the state with act, and that Commission Form drawn naturally, in Far competition.' right had have to Illinois banks thereby withdrawing from from national deposits mu- assets to secure pledge their had to it theretofore gov- nicipalities under Commission Form public funds, its municipalities. ernment, as of other as well was, my enlargement in judgment, act city in it is But ease of the of Marion that, in power, addition to this time particularly to be noted that at right to secure city, in the there were nо banks whatever notwithstanding right, thereafter impossible with the comply was statu any upon’ banks prior inhibition national city tory selecting a bank mandate in doing things from some or deposit city’s funds. What which to regard particular might in some state n thenwas city done? Must thereof. The act was be done the banks and fire treasurer risk of thieves assume doubt of the calculated remove by keeping funds perils and other on foot- national the same banks to physical possession for statu lack ing of the several states. state banks as the depositary tory to .select a else authority interesting light An in connection side where? In the of October appears mar- passage of this act Peoples People ex rel. Nelson v. State gin.3 Maywood, supra, it is said: “There Bank necessity no for a or an ordinance was law appears legislation Referring this village authorizing deposit treasurer Congress, Sess., Report 2nd 71st No. House Secretary Treasury Acting this letter in his in a bank. funds hands That the customarily McFadden: ** Lowman to Committee Chairman * of no done. We know “My made to Reference is dear Mr. Chairman: legality the S. this State which the of the Re- act to amend section 5153 ‘An Statutes, passed the Sen- as amended’ (cid:127)which vised publie custodian by their pending April 1, now be- ate fore the questioned. reason, a bank has been Currency Banking Committee Representatives. is, the House doubt, has been practice universal Comptroller of the Cur- office of the “While the recognized necessary.” has been position rency consistently that na- taken give evidently situation was one which the statute hanks have tional the payment safekeeping prompt my not contemplate, and mind did stat political moneys of the State or subdivision there- contingency ute did not cover banking deposited with such national associa- tions, decisions thrown some recent several applicable therefore not to this ease. If with the result that in some doubt on application statute has no ato situation such the State banks secure the States posits, but this, the officers of the State are in doubt bank’s its assets depositing with the national about not affected it. any specific by Congress law on the absence subject. extremely helpful, therefore, It would be But, even if were concluded that the possible your report out, if it committee Commission Form act had the effect of .de and the House pass, S. 486.“ *12 parted se bank with an the withdrawing re- “The interest thereby or Instead of subject the to equal curities to the to hanks right of national stricting any re that, condition to the extent to pub- secure their assets to pledge paid cash, it reclaim securities. only the would the Congress undertook funds, act lic the amounts to no more than sale of se It any, possible doubt whatever, if remove to The their actual value for cash. curities at might of the states. be light there sueh genera] nothing' creditors the bank lost opinion of copy of an received Wo have transaction, and, they affected at the if March Supreme Court the Indiana filed all, bank is more they are benefited since the Butler, 185 N. E. in Schornick liquid by having cash rather reason the opinion herein. in note referred to appellees gained The than the securities. the here, and The facts there are so like nothing. public deposit proceeds The its the conclu discussion is so corroborative used, used, payment be for was or will the justi I feel dissent, that sions staled general No more creditors of the bank. commenting thereon. fied equal pledged *13 power assets, but enforced, pledge of the bank to will be deposit a certificate “merely trans fixed the terms and conditions that the the contention in answer to public in ordinary deposit deposits and which officers make an action constituted banks.” said: the eourt loan, not a “ this regarded in it should 'As to how In contend- place, referring another deposit loan or a as a respect deposit a loan to —is ed difference between —whether for, ease; in this facts material, under the pledge lat- its for the ordinary deposit, its anas if it be considered says: former, opinion ter not’ of debt- relation create effect would be obligation pay is “The basic contractual appel appellee creditor between or and and, the same if when is received Randolph Coun al. et bank.’ Harris lаnt’s assigns guaranty collateral as a 1025, 1032. 120, 60 N. E. ty Bank, Ind. repayment, or reason we know of no rule ** permit be re- would the collateral to right of recognized tained in in another.” one ease and not Legislature “The pay- to secure the collateral a bank The note refers to unusual circum- enacted ordinary deposits when it ment of prior opinion stance in a in same title examination depository An law. July 3, 1930, court, filed ease the same clearly discloses body that act reported N. E. conclusions powers affect the intended to was not diametrically opposite were stated ' and condi- terms merely fixed the It banks. the first opinion. announced in the later make public officers upon which tions and, opinion reversed; Court was Circuit posits in banks.” granted, rehearing having been petition for gen- respecting statute Indiana judgment second was affirmed. dif- does not essence eral the fact The note also calls attention to subject. on* same from that of Illinois fer personnel the eourt the interim the recognizes opinion The Schorniek changеd, leaving beneh one of banks to make participated of'the members five who private funds; public secure opinion, dissenting first therefrom. Case, supra, opinion in the Harris and the true that the first involving private transaction holds (two therefrom). dissenting unanimous assets as bank’s agreement to materiality beyond apparent, of this is not trans- immaterial whether the security it was indicating the likelihood that each instance deposit. bank or a loan action was the ease had the careful consideration of the distinguish as between Although cases some court. private public and pledges to secure loans, I can see public Whether tested the laws and and between distinctions. How- adequate for the policy reason the state of or of the United those distinctions' are my judgment I ever, States, both, or of believe here, where sustained; that, material but bank’s assets should directing event, funds. an order return of upon pay- the securities should be conditioned paragraph indicates quoted above The last of the amount of ment Indiana, in statute which, directly indirectly, the seсurities deposits mu- security for specifying what pledged. require, must did not affect nicipality notes

Notes

than an amount of: notes the directors of appellees, who were The equi will be The action sounds withheld. to bank’s bond hank, sureties on the became ty. general of the bank or the The creditors municipality pubLc funds which for the be appellant, representative, their cannot mu- deposited the bank would be say pledging that the of the securi heard to becoming nicipality. In consideration illegal they ties was retained the bene while suf- agreed them that sureties, with fits of transaction. Melaven v. Hunker to from time time assets should ficient al., et N. M. 1075. It would P. as a col- turned over to them aside and be set permit be unconscionable to credi up- against loss insure them pledge to lateral profit loss, tors to where had no at the (which The bank bond as sureties. their expense appellees, profited who have insol- found to have been Circuit Court wrong. nothing and have done no It must agreement security vent at time the insu unless there is some up- receivership, and action went made) into perable requires it.” rule law which municipality brought bond was on the court depository The refers to thereupon demand- against sureties, who Indiana, (Burns’ 1926) section law of turned over to agreed ed collateral be that the receiving requires de- hank refused them. the receiver This posits give municipality bond to se- brought by the sureties do. Suit provides Section 12622 cure same. possession of against receiver to secure may pledge sueh lieu of bond the bank judgment of collateral, and the the Cir- specified bonds, municipal classes of or bonds found for the sureties. cuit Court or of the state of Indi- the United States affirming judgment opinion The deposits. ana, to secure such The upon propositions touches several I agreed pledged were not sueh as opinion have considered. The held above municipality take, the statute authorized whether given immaterial given to the mu- and were or to he directly municipality, ease, nicipality itself; and so in as in municipality bond sureties comply bar, pledge did case at securing It of its funds. statute, to sustain the resort pledging discusses thе contention that the general power must bo of a bank the bank’s assets is con- to secure assets as for such de- trary public policy, and after some con- opinion says: posits. As to this the question says: sideration of that find “We banking (see law Burns’ Ann. St. “Our statutory no enactments, no constitutional or gives et seq.) pow banks ‘all the practices judicial officials, decisions in proper, ers incidental and or which pledging indicating this state of col- necessary carrying oil and usual the busi against public lateral banking.’ ness of of a bank to bor inherently wrong nothing There policy. pay its assets for row immoral in sueh a de- transaction. beyond question. thereof is serious It ment subject that cision of this court we urged, however, deposit is loan that a not a upholding agreement sueh have found and that banks no policy.” nies sueh a deposits. assets to There is reason Respecting the distinction. either ease the rela equities of sueh a situa tion, and creditor is created. bearing proposition on the of debtor tion expressly held this court that an pledges vires the bank and been are ultra assign against agreement collateral as public policy, the states:

Case Details

Case Name: Sneeden v. City of Marion, Ill.
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Apr 25, 1933
Citation: 64 F.2d 721
Docket Number: 4784
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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