Snead v. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

lant argues that it constituted an abuse of SNEAD, Appellant

discretion for Laila the trial court to rule on his petition in the hearing. absence of a The general it rule is that is within the discre- SOCIETY FOR PREVENTION tion of the trial court to determine wheth- OF TO CRUELTY ANIMALS er briefs oral argument are re- and/or OF PENNSYLVANIA. quired petition; to rule on a it is also within the discretion of the trial court to Laila Snead decide whether a matter can be best dis- posed of from a review of the record alone. Elash, Thomas v. Society Cruelty for the Prevention of

(Pa.Super.2001). Pennsylvania, to Animals of ¶ 17 We Appellant’s argu- understand Appellant.

ment that BAPCPA altered bankruptcy Superior Pennsylvania. Court in way law a that is unfair in particu- his lar case. is a federal Argued Oct. 2006. matter purview not within the of Penn- July Filed 2007. sylvania state courts to address. It was Reargument Sept. Denied unnecessary for the trial court to hold a hearing to ascertain Appellant whether

misunderstood bankruptcy law and mis-

takenly believed he had the benefit of a

stay pursuant to section 362 even though stay provisions

the automatic clearly did apply

not to Appellant’s petition. third telephone

Whether a call was or not

made to the sheriffs office does not alter stay

the fact that no in bankruptcy was

in place on the date of the sheriffs sale. above,

As noted Appellant not has cited any statutory law, provision, case

statewide rule or local rule that absolved

him responsibility from the verifying

that his real property was removed from

the sheriffs sale light list. of these

facts, we cannot conclude that the trial

court committed an abuse of discretion in

declining to conduct a hearing pursuant

to Appellant’s petition to set aside sale.

¶ 18 Order affirmed.

H71 H73 $154,926.37, in- jury The awarded $100,000 punitive damages. in We cluding part, judgment affirm the reverse proceedings. for further part, and remand history of this case is procedural 2 The the facts in- complicated and somewhat dogs at the volving the condition very disturbing. Al- of this case are heart repeat several times though we will infra law, the animals Pennsylvania that under clearly this court property, considered are unique hold a pets as recognizes friend, com- place many people’s lives family member. panion, and lawsuit, to leading to the 3 The facts when greater detail be discussed infra ap- claims on addressing specific SPCA’s as follows. On peal, generally are Felix Society Humane Officer Beltram”) (“Officer re- Anthony Beltram regarding a dead complaint to a sponded Street, Phila- inside 713 East Hilton dog (Notes testimony, delphia. 202-203.) arrived, he he discovered When (Id. 150.) at and 12 alive. dogs, dead terriers, with pit all bull dogs The were “Aramis,” a Beauceron.1 II, exception of Philadelphia, for Glen H. Ridenour 35.) (Notes at Officer testimony, of Snead. 7/7/05 appeared that the house Beltram testified Jr., Atty., Phillips, Asst. Dist. Walter poor condition. and was to be abandoned Philadelphia, for Com. 205.) (Notes testimony, at Sever- of 7/6/05 and dogs had suffered wounds al of the P.J., ELLIOTT, BEFORE: FORD (Id. at 216- emaciated. to be appeared McEWEN, BOWES, P.J.E. J. 220.) ELLIOTT, P.J.: BY

OPINION FORD ¶ pro- in the the animals were While home, from the ¶ removed being cess of cross-appeals 1 This matter involves 148-149.) (Id. Snead defendant, at arrived. Snead jury trial in which following at the that she lived Beltram Cruelty to told Officer of Society for the Prevention (Id. (“SPCA”), the animals were hers. home and that Pennsylvania Animals of 169.) 150, placed Beltram Officer dogs be- at euthanizing for found hable (“Snead”). dog-fighting2 for under arrest Snead Laila Snead longing plaintiff, (h.l) fighting. person commits Animal shepherd. a French breed of 1. A Beauceron is —A 160.) degree if he: (Notes felony third testimony, at of the of 7/7/05 causes, gain, allows for amusement any engage in ani- permits animal to provides, in relevant 2. 18 Pa.C.S.A. fighting; mal part:

H75 (Notes dogs plied any informed her that her would be held with conditions. SPCA 70-71.) testimony, as pending evidence resolution of the at Snead also 7/7/05 (Id. 150-151; charges.3 dogs at that at 65- testified several were 7/7/05 67.) strays that she had taken in with the them nursing intention of back to health. 24, 1999, following day, January 5 The (Id. 42-43.) at attorney the district dropped dog- initially in municipal 6 Snead filed suit however, fighting charges; Snead was not 2001, contending court in ille- SPCA charges aware that the dropped were gally destroyed dogs. sought dogs that the were therefore available to $8,450, judgment alleged value of 27, 1999, be reclaimed.4 On dogs. The municipal granted court Snead went to the shelter to check on the 5, judgment favor of Snead on March dogs; spoke she Spencer with Charles 2001, 22, appealed and SPCA March (“Spencer”), care, the director of animal appeal 2001. The was listed for a trial de who informed Snead that all of dogs novo in the court of common pleas; and on (Notes had been testimony, euthanized. 19, 2001, June Snead filed a civil com- 59; 69-70.) at at Snead was 7/6/05 7/7/05 conversion, plaint, alleging trespass, negli- told that the only required shelter is gence, and violations of 42 U.S.C.A. hours; keep animals for 48 and since the § 1983. The case was transferred to com- charges were dropped and the were arbitration; pulsory and on January no longer evidence, needed they were 2003, the arbitrators report entered their (Notes put to sleep. of testimony, 7/7/05 finding in Snead’s favor on all counts. 69-70,193-194.) hysteri- Snead became appeal SPCA filed an from the arbitrators’ (Id. 192.) cal and left the shelter. on February award fact, the dogs were not until euthanized January 30,1999, (Notes days three later. The proceeded jury case to a trial on testimony, Snead testi- October at the conclusion fied that had she provided been notice which made an oral motion for a the dogs redeemed, were available to be granted directed verdict. The trial court she would have taken them back and com- the motion order entered October (2) compensation receives by l(j), provides § for the admis- 3. Authorized which person part: any place kept sion of another to fighting; or used for (j) kept animal Seizure of animals or used for ani- owns, (3) trains, possesses, police keeps, pro- fighting. Any mal officer or — motes, agent purchases society of a knowingly any or association for the or sells prevention cruelty to of animals incor- fighting; animal for animal porated under the of laws this Common- any way knowingly encourages, aids wealth, power any shall have to seize therein; or assists used, kept, animal or intended to be (5) wagers on the outcome of animal fighting. used for animal When the sei- fight; made, zure is the animal or animals so (6) pays fight for admission to an animal or absolutely seized shall not be deemed fight spectator; attends an animal aas forfeited, but shall be held the officer agent seizing the same until a convic- (7) knowingly permits any place under his person tion of some is first obtained for possession kept control or to be or used (h.l). a violation of subsection fighting. for animal apply activity

This subsection shall not to summary 4. Snead was later convicted of the agricultural opera- cruelty, undertaken in a normal offense of animal 18 Pa.C.S.A. 5511(c). § tion. weigh- Id. at argu- by Spencer. dieted 14. The post-trial 2003. Snead filed motions alia, ing, ing testimony credibility inter that the trial court erred of this involved for ver- granting SPCA’s motion directed jury. were for determinations which the presented dict because Snead had suffi- Id. at 14-15.5 each prove cient evidence to count raised 6;' 2005, July jury trial On second post-trial mo- complaint. in her Snead’s commenced, following jury which the ren- denied; 3, February tions were ' dered verdict above. described 2004, appeal Snead notice of this filed with post-trial SPCA’s motions were denied. court. delay motion dam- post-trial Snead’s for panel appeal, 8 On a unanimous of this $1,544.50 ages grant- of was the amount could not court held that Snead sustain ed; however, post-trial her motion for for violation her Section claim of parties counsel fees was denied. Both to right privacy Fourth Amendment based filed of and have timely appeal6 notices on the warrantless search seizure of di- complied with the trial order court’s dogs. Society the Preven Snead for recting them to file concise statements Cruelty Pennsylva tion to Animals complained pursuant of on appeal matters (“Snead I”), EDA nia No. 402 un 1925(b). February to Pa.R.A.P. On memorandum, 873 A.2d 778 published Honorable Edward E. Russell 2005). (Pa.Super. February ap It filed addressing filed' raised opinions the issues pearing the uncontroverted evidence appeals. in both that the house at 713 East Hilton Street ¶ 10 claims will address We SPCA’s and that Snead was not was abandoned following is- first. has raised the SPCA actually in the structure in Janu sleeping sues for this court’s review: ary that had no we found Legislature, it Because when privacy legitimate expectation charged police power the SPCA with claims of and the violation of her trespass cruelty animals, prevent to in- to rights, civil on her Fourth Amend based to vest the immu- tended SPCA with structure, in the right ment to privacy nity from common causes of ac- law as a of law. Id. at 10-14. failed matter tion, did the trial court err it when regard with to remain Snead’s to dismiss conver- refused Snead’s conversion, and ing negligence, claims for negligence sion and claims? claims, for a Section we remanded legal- trial 2. Because the evidence was that the trial new trial. determined We jury’s ly support insufficient weighed conflicting court had improperly that violated findings SPCA on SPCA’s motion evidence rule rights civil under U.S.C. respect with to these directed verdict negli- claims, testimony including Snead’s that the was liable and SPCA gent, to retrieve the attempted she had handling conversion its they al for January only to be told were indeed, dead, dogs-and where ready testimony which contra- Snead’s was initially appeal filed its December 6. SPCA 5. This court also addressed'several evidentia- ' motions, post-trial ry issues raised in Court. On in Commonwealth 24, 2006, trial such as evidence introduced the first Supe- appeal was transferred pit bull that Snead been involved with had rior Court. dog-fighting court determined activities. This prejudicial to be introduced this evidence too at retrial. Id. at 15-19. H77 (1) most, proved: agency” evidence that ecutive is defined as “The Gover- may inaccurately boards, the SPCA have departments, nor and the commis- represented the status of eleven sions, authorities and other officers and euthanized; dogs that had been and agencies govern- of the Commonwealth (2) overwhelmingly, that the near- ment, any but the term does not include death condition of the animals re- agency court or other officer or being sulted from them under the As- judicial system, unified the General custody and ‘care’ Snead-did the sembly and agencies, its officers trial court err when it denied turn, any independent agency.” Id. SPCA’s Motion for Post-Trial Re- “independent agency” is defined as lief? Boards, commissions, authorities and 3. Because there was no evidence agencies other and officers of the Com- reckless, SPCA had evil in- government which are not monwealth tent, or demonstrated callous indif- subject policy supervision to the handling ference its of Snead’s Governor, control of the but the term dogs, and because the punitive dam- any does not include court or other offi- ages unconstitutionally award was agency judicial sys- cer or of the unified excessive and a violation of pro- due Assembly tem or the General and its cess, did the trial by up- court err agencies. purposes officers and For $100,000 holding jury’s punitive jurisdiction of courts the term includes damages award? Pennsylvania Deposit Insurance SPCA’s brief at 3.7 Corporation existing under the act of First, argues (P.L. 255), October No. Snead’s common law claims for conversion ‘Pennsylvania known as the In- Deposit and negligence are barred the doctrine Corporation surance Act.’ of sovereign immunity and the Political (footnote omitted). Subdivision Tort Claims Act. SPCA ar gues it is a party Commonwealth and/or sovereign immunity provisions of [T]he agency local immunity. entitled to We were to insu- Judicial Code enacted disagree.8 agencies late the Commonwealth and its liability except specified certain 12 The sovereign defense of im munity governmen- circumstances so that state is available to a Commonwealth subject tal party, depletion which assets are not is defined as “a Common agency any through multiple wealth employee thereof.” lawsuits. See Jones § Pennsylvania Transp. Pa.C.S.A. “Commonwealth Southeastern Auth., agency” any means 565 Pa. agency executive 438-40 102; Thus, independent agency. § in determining Pa.C.S.A. whether entity Standard Pa. Practice 2d 114:27. “Ex- agency an is a Commonwealth for 1925(b) apparently 7. Additional claims raised determined that SPCA in SPCA’s was not statement, including whether the trial court jurisdictional pur- party Commonwealth for granting erred in Snead’s motion in limine to entity may poses. be a Com- summary exclude evidence of her conviction immunity party sovereign pur- monwealth cruelty, for animal have been abandoned on poses jurisdictional purposes. but not for appeal. Gory Contracting, Mechanical Inc. v. James J. 26, Philadelphia Housing Authority, 579 Pa. granting 8. We note that in Snead’s motion to (2004). A.2d 855 669 court, transfer to this Commonwealth Court 1178 Pa.C.S.A., “Except as otherwise provides, the im-

sovereign immunity purposes, no local subchapter, agen- in this provided are factors to be considered portant any damages on hable for cy shall be entity by created whether the person prop- or any injury of to account function so that perform to a state state any agency act of the local essence, erty by caused would, in judgment against it any per- or other employee or an thereof injure the state. son.” Contracting, Gory Mechanical James J. purpose of the Tort Claims The overall Authority, Philadelphia Housing v. Inc. Act, course, governmental to limit of is (2004) 26, 39, 669, A.2d 677 579 Pa. 855 liability for its acts. exposure to tort omitted). (footnote See, City Philadelphia, v. e.g., Lory of record that apparent 13 It is from the 38, 43, 673, 674 A.2d 675-76 544 Pa. private, not-for-profit corpora- is a SPCA denied, 870, (1996), 519 117 cert. U.S. tion, agency.” Its not a “Commonwealth (1996). 184, L.Ed.2d See S.Ct. 136 123 appointed officers and directors are not City Philadelphia, 512 also Smith v. of Commonwealth, but rather elected (1986) 129, 139, 306, 311 Pa. corporation. The does Commonwealth (‘preservation of (plurality opinion) operations over its not have control treasury against possibility public as adopts by-laws its own assets. SPCA unusually large recoveries tort of affairs. is not manages its own SPCA cases, is, self-evidently, important an by public monies. SPCA has not funded interest’). governmental recognized by legislature our as been Drake Insurance Co. v. Philadel- Sphere “instrumentality” of the Com- “agent” Works, 541, 548, 566 Pa. 782 phia Gas Although and its qual- monwealth.9 SPCA A.2d 515 empowered have to en- agents ified been an examina inquiry begins with Our animals, pertaining force those statutes plain language of rele tion of the not make a “Common- this does SPCA statutory provisions. See Pa.C.S. vant agency” immunity purposes. wealth 1921(b); 1903(a), §§ Commonwealth determine, law, as a matter We Burnsworth, 18, 24, 669 A.2d 543 Pa. sovereign immunity apply does not (1995) (when language of stat SPCA. it must be unambiguous, ute is clear argues also that the plain with its given effect accordance Act insu Tort Claims Political Subdivision v. Albur meaning); and common Guinn common liability lates it from for Snead’s Co., 500, 502-03, 614 531 Pa. tis Fire Again, disagree.10 we law tort claims. (1992) (the all object of A.2d of stat interpretation and construction Pennsylvania Political Subdivi- 15 The and effectuate Act, utes is to ascertain Section sion Tort Claims argument was not raised entity 10. We note that this argues it is a Commonwealth 9. SPCA below, nor in SPCA's Rule the court assembly by act it was created because However, 1925(b) a defense of statement. P.L. 615. 1868. Act of immunity an absolute de governmental is states, time for it was common at that non-waivable; may it be raised at and is fense Pennsylvania corporations to be formed un- time, Taylor stage. appellate at the any even legisla- provisions special der acts of the 308, 313 City Philadelphia, 692 A.2d ture, suggests nothing in the Act of 1868 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997), affirmed, 548 Pa. a Common- SPCA was intended to be (footnote and citations omit A.2d 730 (Snead's agency. brief at wealth ted).

H79 Assembly; opera- control over its intention of the General the does not exercise in its assets. legislative best indicator of intent the tions or have interest is statute). by-laws man- plain language adopts The its own [SPCA] Tort Act affairs. The Common- comprises Subchapter ages Claims its own income, Code, the is not its sole source of Chapter C of 85 of Judicial wealth it or indemni- chapter provide which addresses ‘Matters nor does benefits inquiry set Affecting ty. expanded Government Units.’ The defi- Under Drake, Chapter Sphere supra, nition section of defines a forth in [SPCA] 85 ‘local agency’ government qualify unit does not as Commonwealth ‘[a] than govern- party employee. other the Commonwealth or § 42 general ment.’ Pa.C.S. 8501. The opinion, agree Trial court at 7. We Code, definitions section of the Judicial trial and will not disturb the court’s deter- applies which the absence of further Tabaj Fayette Society mination. See definitions, specific ‘govern- defines a Inc., Cruelty the Prevention to Animals of ‘ alia, as, “any govern- ment unit’ inter 2001), (Fayette 53 Pa.D. & C.4th 399 af- § agency....’ ‘gov- ment Id. 102. A firmed, (Pa.Super.2003), ap- A.2d 409 828 turn, agency,’ by ernment is defined denied, peal 575 Pa. 836 A.2d 123 ‘[a]ny the Judicial Code as Common- (2003) (Fayette County SPCA not entitled agency any political wealth or subdivi- agency immunity to local under the Tort sion or municipal or other local authori- Act). SPCA, Compare Claims Vonstein ty, any or officer agency any or of such 1993) (Lycoming 24 Pa.D. & C.4th political authority.’ subdivision or local (SPCA statutorily authorized agents, while (emphasis supplied). Id. See also proceedings, to initiate criminal not enti- Guinn, 531 Pa. at A.2d 502 n. at suit). immunity tled to official 220 n. 2. Having found that SPCA is not Although the Judicial Code does not liability, proceed immune from we to its authority,’ Statutory define ‘local remaining argues claims. SPCA that the provides Construction Act does. It insufficient, of evidence was as a matter phrase authority,’ ‘local used ‘[w]hen law, claims. dis- to sustain Snead’s We in any finally statute on or enacted after agree. 1, 1975,’ January municipal means ‘a authority any body or other corporate First, we examine Snead’s politic by politi- created one or more rights claims. Section 1983 civil pursuant cal subdivisions statute.’ Pa.C.S. 1991. Both the Judicial Code part: in relevant provides Section 1983 and the Tort Claims Act were enacted who, any under of Every person color 1, 1975; hence, after both are statute, ordinance, custom, regulation, subject overarching to this definition. any Territory or usage, State or (citation 545-546, Columbia, subjects, the District omitted). subjected, any causes to be citizen determining 16 In is not a person States or other United government agency, the trial court stated: jurisdiction to the within the thereof case, any rights, privileges, deprivation the instant directors [SPCA’s] by the or immunities secured Consti- appointed

and officers are not laws, Commonwealth, rather, be hable to the but elected tution and shall law, suit party injured in an action corporation. The Commonwealth 1180 632, (1995), equity, proceeding Pa.Super. ap- or other 658 A.2d proper 375 denied, 713, for redress. peal 543 Pa. 672 A.2d 308 ‘ (1995). §

42 “is U.S.C.A. 1983. The statute rights,’ not itself a source of substantive Id. merely provides but ‘a of vindi- method

cating rights con- federal elsewhere step The a evaluating first Sec Oliver, Albright ferred.’” v. 510 U.S. tion 1983 claim to the exact ‘identify is 266, 807, 271, 114 127 L.Ed.2d 114 S.Ct. underlying right contours of said to (1994) McCollan, 443 (quoting Baker v. been have violated’ to determine 144, 3, 2689, 137, U.S. n. 99 61 S.Ct. has a plaintiff alleged depri “whether (1979)). L.Ed.2d 433 a right vation of constitutional at all.’ Waitlevertch, 1247, Lewis, Wagner County Sacramento v. 523 U.S. of (Pa.Super.2001). 833, 842, 5, 1708, 1251 n. S.Ct. 140 L.Ed.2d 118 claim, 1043 To a a properly state Section 1983 a a plaintiff allege deprivation must of right guaranteed by the or Constitution Here, 19 Snead’s Section a de

the laws of the United States claims grounded 1983 are the Fourth fendant under law. Tun acting color of and Fourteenth Amendments to the Unit Support stall v. Judicial of Office of ed States Constitution.11 Snead claims Pleas, Court 820 F.2d Common of euthanizing dogs that SPCA’s of the con (3d Cir.1987) Bros., 633 (citing Flagg in viola stituted unreasonable “seizure” Brooks, 149, 155, Inc. v. 436 98 U.S. rights; tion of her Fourth (1978)). Amendment S.Ct. 56 L.Ed.2d 185 and, additionally, deprived that she of There essential neces are two elements process due under the Amend Fourteenth sary to claim state a under 42 U.S.C.A. It is 1983:(1) ment. conceded that was act complained the conduct ing under law12 it took color of state when acting of was person committed a law; possession dogs; of and euthanized under that the color of state therefore, prerequisite making rights, conduct first for deprived Plaintiff of (Tri a claim is privileges, by the out Section 1983 satisfied. or immunities secured opinion, 5; laws al court notes of Constitution or United 2/1/06 Desmond, testimony, 441 States. Johnson . that, argues appeal, acting prior

11. SPCA in the this 12. We note that a defendant can be color law for 1983 under of state Section against Fourth court held Snead on her purposes, as when SPCA was it seized and reading claim. a close Amendment dogs, yet then euthanized Snead’s not be prior we held of our memorandum reveals government entity jurisdictional party or only legitimate privacy that Snead had no immunity Although purposes. the color Hilton interest in the house 713 East necessarily requirement all law excludes Street, indicated the uncontested evidence conduct, merely private no how matter Therefore, had no it was abandoned. as she wrongful discriminatory, simple no there is legitimate expectation privacy the struc- action, defining formula for state and Section ture, Amend- she could not maintain a Fourth scope superficially 1983 within its includes warrantless ment claim for Officer Beltram's sufficiently private which have close actions I, supra property. at 14. search of the fairly with as to be treated as nexus the State question separate This is a whether or Rossignol itself. v. Voorh those aar, State killing subsequent not the of Snead’s (4th Cir.2003), cert. 316 F.3d constituted an unreasonable seizure. denied, U.S. S.Ct. (2003) (citations omitted). L.Ed.2d property purview A seizure of there ter within the exclusive occurs when meaningful is some interference with an jury.13 possessory individuars interest in that ¶ Next, 21 we turn to Snead’s property. County, See Soldal v. Cook pro process prevail due claim. To her 56, 61-65, 538, 543, 506 U.S. 113 S.Ct. claim, process Snead must cedural due (1992). 121 A L.Ed.2d 450 seizure of (1) a possessed pro demonstrate: that she property implicate sufficient to Fourth (2) interest; and that she property tected Amendment the rights occurs where deprived of that interest without due seizure is unreasonable. Id. In deter- (cita Patten, process. supra at 104 Van mining government whether a seizure omitted). Pennsylvania tion law considers Amendment, violates the Fourth the dogs personal property. to be Desanctis seizure must be scrutinized its over- (Pa.Su Pritchard, 803 A.2d 232 all reasonableness. denied, per.2002), appeal 572 Pa. 818

Wagner, supra hilling at 1254. The of (2003), 459-601(a); citing A.2d 504 3 P.S. dogs is a Snead’s seizure within the mean- Brown, 216, 224, Price v. 545 Pa. ing of the Fourth Amendment. Van Pat- Therefore, 1153 n. 3 we find City Binghamton, F.Supp.2d ten 137 protected property Snead did have a inter (N.D.N.Y.2001) (citation omitted). dogs. est in her However, a seizure alone does not consti- ¶ 22 must next determine to We violation; tute a Fourth Amendment the legal process what amount of she was enti question is whether this seizure was rea- tled. Id., sonable under the circumstances. cit- due, determining process In what a is Soldal, ing supra, 61-62, 506 U.S. at (1) court must three factors: balance S.Ct. 538. private by interest will be affected Instantly, there was sufficient (2) action; the official risk evidence for jury to find killing deprivation erroneous of such interest unreasonable, dogs to particu be used, through procedures and the larly testimony where there was that she value, probable any, if of additional or had days been to the shelter three prior procedural safeguards; substitute and erroneously and dogs informed that her interest, including the Government’s already were dead. January As of the function and the fiscal and involved felony dog-fighting charges against her administrative burdens that the addi- dropped had been and she was free to require- tional or procedural substitute (Notes redeem the dogs. testimony, ment would entail. 154-155.) Obviously, at having been (citations Patten, supra at 104 and Van dead, dogs told the were Snead never re omitted). quotation internal marks turned to the Al shelter to reclaim them. Patten, though Snead’s account was contradicted 23 As in Van we find in Spencer, significant property who testified that he never that Snead had a (id. spoke dogs. supra, with Snead on at in her Penn terest As stated 116), testimony go sylvania property. such conflicts in to the law considers as addition, credibility although of the witnesses which is a mat- there was evidence unit,” argues "government already for the 13. SPCA that as a we have determined employ- Snead would have to show that its supra that reasons discussed SPCA is not ees/agents acting pursuant were to an official government party. (SPCA's 25.) policy or custom. at brief (Id. unlicensed, unhealthy strays. If as the animals were suffered were,14 length dogs apparently they only con- neglect, Snead testified these ani- held hours her love and to the need to be another 48 before a cerning devotion (Id.) licensed, to be If and her efforts nurse them decision will made. mals to .back health, testimony they days, we will be held 10 must credit this certified notifying jury apparently did. letter is sent the owner (Id. 165-166.) reclaim her animals.

¶ Next, procedures we turn to the Spencer testified that the 27 Officer Beltram testified al- used SPCA. SPCA, by is dogs initially being though employed held as evidence he SPCA were (Notes Society of tes- and Humane officers have ongoing investigation. sepa- in an (Id. 64.) at timony, Subsequently, at the rate and distinct functions. 157- 7/6/05 158.) dropped Society there was no The Humane officers work charges were and auspices At that longer a hold on animals. under the of the state and enforce the circumstances, laws, if simply on the state animal while SPCA point, depending (Id.) known, identity the ani- and Officer the owner’s was houses shelters animals. returned; however, policy no Spencer be Beltram testified that SPCA had mals would notify policy place charges there was hard-clad as to that testified “no owner (Id. 82.) dropped permitted at asked whether had been and she was such.” When 155-156.) (Id. any steps was her at he took to ensure Snead to redeem animals. officer, Society to as a he notified that her animals were available Humane returned, not to home Spencer supposed that it was is visit the owner’s to be stated (Id. 157.) at and had whether she there. responsibility his that the decision see is made, already although been he was aware ¶ January 27th the afternoon of that Officer Beltram had been to 713 East 28th, to Officer Beltram went Snead’s (Id. nobody Hilton home. Street was (Id. at 713 East Hilton Street. at home 83-85.) at 162-163.) Nobody present (Id. ¶ Spencer any appeared that safe- still to be abandoned. testified house 162.) that did not leave a place notify to an owner his at Officer Beltram guards (Id.) anything are re- the door. No her animals available to be note or to through investigative by de- mail was ever sent Snead. deemed are notice (Id. 93.) (Id. 172.) No was made to attempt at He knew Officer at partment. her, had by go- although to attempt telephone contact Snead Beltram’s unsuccessful; telephone computer to the number in their be- ing back house was (Id. however, it was not cause she had animals from department. his redeemed (Id. 95.) in the at dogs past. He was of when the them recent 175- at aware 176.) he, sleep, to Bel- put were since Officer

tram, have had and the veterinarian would foregoing 29 The was. sufficient evi- 83.) (Id. 74-75, give approval. their to jury that SPCA had dence for to find in place to inadequate procedures/policies Beltram that SPCA 26 Officer testified interests in dogs being safeguard property no held as policy longer is for dogs dogs. Although as unlicensed are in a criminal to be treated evidence case (Notes licensing point. paid a fee. this SPCA and 14. There is some confusion on Indeed, 99, 103.) Spenc- testimony testimony, had been to There was that Snead 20, 1999, prior with Snead testified that he contact shelter on er had the SPCA regarding her animals on several occasions precipitated the instant to the incident (Id. lawsuit, prior this animals from incident. when she redeemed only they by jury held for 48 hours after are no and decided as a matter of law longer needed as evidence in a criminal only entirely where case is free from investigation, proce- there is no standard no possibility doubt and there is by notify dure which to an owner that jury negligence. reasonable could find charges have been dismissed or withdrawn dogs his or her are available to be Center, Regional Bloom v. Dubois Medical Although

reclaimed. Snead was known to Pa.Super. 679-680 phone SPCA and her number was its computer, she was never contacted tele- ¶ All prove three elements to phone, nor was notice sent mail. negligence have been met. When Snead’s Patten, 80 As recognize Van we seized, they were were to be held in protecting public SPCA’s interest evidence in a criminal investigation. animals, dangerous or sick and the duty notify SPCA had a Snead when the in housing costs involved animals for ex- dog-fighting charges were dropped and Patten, periods tended of time. Van her animals were available to be re swpra additional safe- Obviously, duty deemed. it breached that guards by such as notice mail or tele- notify when it failed to Snead to redeem owner, phoning the identity where her and, fact, dogs in misrepresented that and address/phone number are or known they already had been euthanized Janu ascertainable, overly would not be bur- 27, ary 1999 when she came to see them. costly. densome or Finally, proved damages by Snead actual Next, 31 challenges SPCA presenting testimony concerning expert sufficiency the of the evidence to sustain (Notes dogs. the value of the of testimo negligence and conversion claims. 153-188.) ny, 7/7/05 To a sounding establish cause of action negligence, in a party must demonstrate 33 now con We address Snead’s they duty were owed a of care the version claim. defendant, the defendant breached this The classic definition of conversion un- duty, and this breach in injury resulted Pennsylvania deprivation der law is ‘the and actual loss. Brisbine v. Outside In in, right property of another’s of or use Educ., Inc., Experiential Sch. 799 of of, chattel, possession a in- or other 89, A.2d 93 (Pa.Super.2002), citing Brez therewith, terference the without own- Transfer, enski v. World Truck 755 A.2d justifica- consent and lawful er’s without 36, (Pa.Super.2000). 40 Bank, tion.’ McKeeman v. Corestates Edwards, 900,

McCandless v. 908 A.2d 903 (Pa.Su- N.A., 751 A.2d 659 n. 3 (Pa.Super.2006). of con- per.2000). Although the exercise determination of an act or

[T]he whether intentional, trol over the chattel must be negligence, failure to act constitutes of the tort of conversion does not rest on any degree, in view of all the evidence proof specific intent commit always particularly has been committed wrong. Id. jury. to determination Colloi v. L.B. Foster Co. v. Charles Caracciolo Steel Co., Philadelphia Pa.Super. 332 Electric Yard, Inc., Metal 1095 & (1984); A.2d 481 616 East Texas (Pa.Super.2001). Freight Lloyd, Pa.Super. Motor deprived It 34 SPCA of her 484 A.2d 797 is issue Snead may possession dogs, from use and of the which are be removed consideration Luddy, Hutchison v. Hutchison ex rel. Pennsylvania, when property considered (internal (Pa.Super.2006) A.2d came to Snead it euthanized them. When omitted). marks and citations quotation 27,1999, days three the shelter on and after put punitive damages were down is only purpose The before It im- outrageous had been conduct. is charges to deter dog-fighting taking person to deter a possible return of was entitled to seek dropped, she action if he is not conscious risky (Notes testimony, dogs.15 Merriam, Thus, Pa. risk. Feld give op- failed to Snead SPCA (1984), supreme [our 485 A.2d 742 dogs, after the to retrieve her portunity puni- the issue of when addressed court] no they were charges dropped were damages are warranted tive evidence, thereby unlaw- longer needed as that, determining whether stressed her of her chattel. fully depriving outrageous, ‘[t]he certain conduct is vital. The of mind of the actor is state ¶35 Next, argues that SPCA act, act, must be inten- the failure to denying its motion the trial court erred Similarly, tional, or malicious.’ reckless argues that for remittitur. Restatement ex- of] [Section an evil acted with failed to establish SPCA indifference to plains that ‘reckless indifference such motive or reckless action in and conscious rights of others imposition punitive support would may ... of them disregard deliberate agree. we proposition, this damages. With necessary state of mind provide the awarded for damages may be damages.’ Punitive justify punitive outrageous, that because conduct is 1266, Luddy quoting at Hutchison Id. motive or his reck- the defendant’s evil 114, 123-124, (“Hutchison IV”), 582 Pa. rights of others. indifference to less (additional (2005) 766, A.2d 771-772 in Further, damages penal are [P]unitive omitted) (emphasis Hutchison citations in cases proper only are nature and IV). “Therefore, of the appreciation an are so actions the defendant’s where the mental necessary element of risk is a willful, outrageous as to demonstrate imposition of such for the required state conduct. Because wanton or reckless damages.” punish intended to damages are punitive IV court therefore As the Hutchison conduct outrageous for the tortfeasor ‘Thus, Pennsylvania,’a puni- opined: him others like to deter him and and supported claim must be damages tive future, conduct in the [t]he from similar that to establish by evidence sufficient (1) actor is vital. The subjective appreci- mind of the a state of had defendant act, harm to which the act, must be inten- of the or the failure to ation risk (2)' he and that exposed was plaintiff tional, or malicious. reckless 131.) fact, Officer Beltram ultimately 116^, at dogs, in would Whether the 115— felony dog-fighting that when the question testified is in based returned to her have been dropped, were charges the animals were Spencer testified that condition. on their owner, al- redemption available for due to cru- had been seized where animal automatic; owner, though not have been it would be returned elty by it would not have had to (Notes he would Officer Beltram testified it. of testi- wanted even if the owner pre-inspection and a 82-83.) cleaned Spencer order house testified mony, at 7/6/05 sores, permitted to were done before the animals dogs and were emaciated suffered 154-155, dermatitis, eczema, {Id. return to that environment. were not in {Id. to their owner. to be returned condition 202.) acted, act, may say failed to as the case in conscious disre- SPCA acted be, in disregard conscious of that risk.’ it gard of a risk of harm to Snead when Therefore, euthanized the animals. we Id., IV, supra Hutchison quoting $100,000 punitive reverse the award citing Martin v. Johns- 870 A.2d at ac- damages judgment and will re-enter Corp., Manville 171-172, 508 Pa. cordingly. 1088, 1097-1098 A.2d (plurality). Certainly, for the argues punitive reasons dis- also that the 37 SPCA above, we agree

cussed the evidence was damages award should be reduced because jury sufficient for the to find it bears no reasonable relation to Snead’s however, negligent; the evidence does not damages constitutionally actual and is ex- support a conclusion that Spencer Obviously, cessive. this issue is rendered and/or Beltram acted with intent or malice in eu- disposition previous moot our thanizing dogs. Snead’s Although, as the issue, and we need not address it. below, prevailing party the court we Now, we turn to Snead’s accept must testimony that she cross-appeal, seeking attorney’s fees. The went the shelter on trial post-trial court denied Snead’s motion erroneously and was by Spencer informed fees, imposition attorney’s finding for dead,16 dogs were this establishes adequately compensated by that she was nothing than more mistake or on accident jury’s damages noting award of Spencer’s Indeed, part. Spencer testified that there was evidence of record that the responsible that he was approximately (Trial dogs had been mistreated. court 40,000 per year, animals and that on Jan- opinion cross-appeal, on at We 2/1/06 uary when the were disagree are constrained to and determine brought Beltram, in by Officer he was prevailed that because Snead the Sec informed that Snead was involved but was claim, rights tion 1983 civil which we have not aware that they actually belonged to supra, affirmed for the reasons discussed (Notes 62, 67, her. of testimony, attorney’s she is entitled to reasonable 130.) Furthermore, because the did fees. (id. tags 122-124), not bear license they at ¶ authority to at- 39 Courts have award strays were considered and it was SPCA’s 42 torney’s rights fees in civil cases under policy they only that need to be held for 1988(b), provides § that in hours; U.S.C. which 27, 1999, 48 as of four any provision action to enforce a of Section days they brought after were in and after title, court, in 1983 of that ‘The its discre- dog-fighting charges the dropped, were tion, may party, other prevailing allow the may Spencer simply have assumed that States, attor- than the United a reasonable they put had been down. Spencer testi- In that, ney’s part fee as of the costs.” inter- opinion, fied his the animals were (Id. 1988, preting Section the United States not in a condition at adopted. to be rate, Supreme gener- Court has stated that as a any simply At there is no rule, plaintiff al should recover impute Spencer prevailing evidence to or SPCA attorney’s special evil motive or to the fees unless circum- reckless indifference render an rights accepting of Snead. Even Snead’s stances exist that would such Eckerhart, unjust. Hensley testimony 461 resolving as true and all rea- award favor, 424, 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 sonable inferences we cannot U.S. 103 S.Ct. (Notes testimony, at 16. to the shelter. This account was corroborated mother, 189-190.) accompanied who testified she Snead 1186 prove has his failure to an essential Although Supreme Court cause of the relief, monetary of his claim for rule for deter element bright-line

not articulated only usually fee is no are ... the reasonable special circumstances mining when 115, at In at all.” Id. 113 S.Ct. 566. that fee other observed present, courts have the Farrar principle, accordance with that easily not be “special circumstances should the Fifth denial of Ibrahim, Court Circuit’s 121 Fed. found.” Cleveland v. affirmed counsel, fees, jury that the (6th observing Cir.2005), citing Blanch Appx. 90 damages nominal in that case be- awarded Bergeron, 109 S.Ct. ard v. 489 U.S. prove proxi- plaintiffs cause the failed (1989); also In 103 L.Ed.2d 67 see causation, which mate was essential Pierce, Allegheny County Jail mates of the cause of action. underlying element of (3d Cir.1983). 716 F.2d bar, prevailed In the case Hobby, 40 In Farrar v. 506 U.S. claim, and rights of her civil on the merits (1992), 566, 121 113 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d jury approximately awarded her that Supreme Court the factors discussed $54,000 damages. The compensatory guide a court’s decision to award should court, however, post- trial denied Snead’s in a action. attorney’s rights fees civil attorney’s for fees under trial motion case, million plaintiffs sought that $17 1988(b), stating as follows: U.S.C. viola- damages rights for civil alleged In the instant case the evidence tions, jury dollar but a awarded them one a Section jury for to find sufficient the defen- on its determination that based violation, re- justice but does not proximate “a dant’s misconduct was not by an that benefit quire should [Snead] any therein. damages” cause sustained attorney’s fees. additional award of The federal S.Ct. dogs both at mistreated her [Snead] plaintiffs court district awarded immediately the civil preceding time fees, $280,000 the Fifth in counsel but past. violation as in the rights as well Court of reversed Appeals Circuit jury could that factor weigh The not award, reasoning did not plaintiffs verdict, but this respect with to their they sued actually prevail trial because it so at this necessary finds to do Court requesting purely monetary damages, underlying Given the facts juncture. million, only but one dollar. recovered $17 case, against [Snead’s] this the violations Supreme plaintiffs appealed, and the The rights do not rise to the level civil granted Court certiorari. by the stat- contemplated egregiousness rul- reviewing 41 In the Fifth Circuit’s circumstances, totality ute. The clarified that coun- ing, Supreme the Court award, a amount show and the any party that fees can be awarded to sel to allowing [Snead] fam result without rights the a civil prevails on merits of in the it to sue recover what cost her the merits and “[ljiability claim because on place. first for hand in go fees responsibility opinion, Trial court at 3. quot- 113 S.Ct. hand....” ¶ Graham, deny counsel fees 43 The decision to 473 U.S. ing Kentucky inappropri- on Snead’s misconduct is L.Ed.2d based 105 S.Ct. it Su- violates United States the Court also reiterated ate because that precedent and undermines preme in ev- Court attorney’s fees are not recoverable the enactment legislative violation the intent behind rights where civil ery instance a Supreme Court occurred, plain- a 42 U.S.C. 1988. The that stating “[w]hen has fees that counsel unequivocally be- stated only damages has tiff recovers nominal H87 constitutional violation established a on the extent of Snead are to be awarded based $54,000 compensatory in that his and received proving success in plaintiffs Farrar, proving in damages, su- she was successful rights were violated. See civil 114-116,113 Thus, if and therefore against case pra at S.Ct. reasonable attor- rights were have recovered plaintiff establishes that his should “actual, progeny. and its ney’s fees under Farrar violated in a that caused manner (where 117,113 a fee S.Ct. 566 compensable injury,” Compare a reasonable id. only a has achieved prevailing plaintiff awarded. Id. at 113 S.Ct. should be that can be characterized Pyrrhic victory character should not plaintiffs 566. The minimis, determination, no fees and fees technical or de purely factor into this awarded) (O’Connor, J., concur- a should not be or withheld as can be awarded punitive ring). measure.

¶44 Sheahan, part in and re- Judgment affirmed 104 F.3d Simpson v. (7th entry remanded for Cir.1997), part. versed in Case Circuit fur- the Seventh damages compensatory purpose judgment proper ther elaborated on the is relin- in and counsel fees. Jurisdiction attorney’s rights the award of fees civil quished. In determining actions. that an award of

attorney’s against fees as a sanction ¶ McEWEN, P.J.E. files a improper purpose, defendant is an Dissenting Concurring and Statement. explained Congress court that enacted compe- Section 1988 an effort to induce AND DISSENTING CONCURRING attorneys litigate tent to meritorious civil McEWEN, BY P.J.E.: STATEMENT rights claims on behalf of individuals who in the case Opinion 1 The author of the private often cannot afford to hire counsel. analyzed saga- perceptively has so Moreover, attorney’s Id. at 1002-1003. substantive issues of ciously addressed the are compensatory fees not substitute for join that I in the decision of appeals these punitive damages. Id. at 1003. As the exception majority single with but the by crafting district court violated this rule ruling I of the eminent agree with nature, punitive a fee award that was denied Judge Edward E. Russell Appeals the Court of vacated and remand- plaintiff Snead. counsel fees ed for calculation of a new award. reasoning 45 Under the of Farrar and Simpson, we find that the trial court erred denying counsel fees based on its deter- (1)

mination that: Snead did not deserve to recover such fees because she abused Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH (2) dogs; rights the civil violation here- Appellee sufficiently support egregious was not fees; attorney’s an award of OWENS, Appellant. James $54,000 compensatory damage award was (Trial opinion, “a fair result.” court Pennsylvania. Superior Court discretion, This was abuse of 29, 2007. Submitted Jan. inquiry proper was whether July Filed of the material elements of her proved all a com- cause of action and demonstrated Farrar, injury. supra. Since

pensable

Case Details

Case Name: Snead v. Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Jul 11, 2007

Citation: 929 A.2d 1169

Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.