HARRY L. SNEAD, JR. v. JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, ET AL.
Record No. 901119
Supreme Court of Virginia
April 19, 1991
241 Va. 524
Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Russell, Whiting, and Lacy, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice
Gilbert E. Schill, Jr. (James P. McElligott, Jr.; Kathleen Taylor Sooy; McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, on brief), for appellees.
JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Harry L. Snead, Jr., a professor at the University оf Richmond Law School, filed this suit alleging that the Dean of the Law School, Joseph D. Harbaugh, and other law professors (collectively Harbaugh) defamed him and conspired to injure his name аnd reputation in violation of
Harbaugh filed a demurrer, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act,
Snead first asserts that the Act is inapplicable because the alleged injury resulting from the defamation is not within the meaning of “injury” as that term is used in the Act. The trial court neither addressed this issue nor indicated why it considered Haddon dispositive. However, Harbaugh argued there, as he does here, that Haddon stands for the proposition that the Act is the exclusive remedy for any employee who sustains injury as a result of an intentional tort by a fellow employеe. Harbaugh concludes that, because both Haddon and the instant case involved a claim based on the intentional tort of defamation by a fellow employee, the dismissal of the claim in Haddon compelled dismissal of Snead‘s claim. We disagree.
The Act applies to an employee‘s claim for an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment.
Haddon dealt mainly with one of the conditions for coverage. There, the employee argued that an intentional tort does not fall within the concept of “accident” and, therefore, the Act should not apply. Haddon, 239 Va. at 398, 389 S.E.2d at 713-14. We rejected this contentiоn, noting long-standing precedent for the proposition that intentional torts by co-workers are within the
We also reject Harbaugh‘s argument that Haddon is dispositive because both suits alleged defamation by a fellow employee. This simplistic, label-oriented method of determining the Act‘s applicability improрerly focuses the coverage inquiry on the character of the tort-feasor‘s act, rather than on the nature of the injury for which the claim is made. The Act is not concerned with the species of tort which caused the harm. Rather, it is concerned with compensating for the loss caused by the injury. Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 210-11, 13 S.E.2d 291, 293 (1941).
In contrast to the allegations in Haddon, Snead pled neither physical nor emotional injury, but solely damage to reputаtion. He sought no payment for medical costs, but only the general and special damages recognized under common law defamation principles of recovery. Haddon did not address whеther an intentional tort claim for non-personal damage as claimed in this case falls within the concept of “injury” required for coverage under the Act. We now conduct that analysis.
Thе Act itself embodies the concept of an injury to an employee‘s person. The compensation structure provides payment for permanent or temporary, partial оr total, disability, preventing an employee from engaging in normal employment.
In our opinion, a fair reading of the Act and its purposes treats the term “injury” as either a mental or a physical condition, affecting the employee‘s person. While we must construe this remedial act broadly to afford coverage for the employee, we are constrained by the Act itself and its intent. Baggett & Meador Cos. v. Dillon, 219 Va. 633, 637, 248 S.E.2d 819, 822 (1979). Consistent with this understаnding of the Act, we have recognized that an “injury” occurs when “a lesion or change in any part of
The cause of action for defamation is based on the transmission of derogatory statements, not on any physical or emotional distress to a plaintiff which may result. “Defamation is not concerned with the plaintiff‘s own humiliation, wrath or sorrow.” W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 111 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). The recoverable damages are both general and special. An award of general damages is based on a concept of per se injury, and resulting damage is presumed to exist if the defamation tort is established. No further prоof of injury or loss is required for recovery of general damages. Slaughter v. Valleydale Packers Inc., 198 Va. 339, 347, 94 S.E.2d 260, 266 (1956). In this case, Snead claims general damages and no personal injury is alleged.
We are not persuaded by the authoritiеs from other jurisdictions which Harbaugh cites as holding that “defamation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the workers’ compensation acts of those states.” Two of the three cases cited arе distinguishable, as they were filed as actions for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging personal injuries of severe or disabling emotional distress. Brown v. Southland Corp., 620 F.Supp. 1495 (E.D. Mo. 1985); Jenson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 154 Wis. 2d 313, 453 N.W.2d 165 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). While physical injury or emotional distress сould result from derogatory statements, such injuries are not before us in this case.
The single case involving a defamation count among the cases Harbaugh cites did not identify the alleged injury or rеlief sought. Becker v. Automatic Garage Door Co., 156 Wis. 2d 409, 456 N.W.2d 888 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). Becker was decided by two of the three judges who decided Jenson, and relied solely on Jenson, which has been granted a petition for review by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
The more prevalent view, in those jurisdictions which include intentional torts within the meaning of “accident” for the purpose of workers’ compensation, excludes injury to reputation
We think this is the better-reasoned approach and is consistent with our prior decisions. Therefore, we conclude that the injury to reputation and the damages claimed in Snеad‘s defamation count do not fall within the interpretation and application of “injury” under the Act.2
In light of this holding, we need not address Snead‘s other assignment of error regarding the constitutionality оf the Act.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings on the defamation count consistent with this opinion.
Reversed in part and remanded.
CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom SENIOR JUSTICE POFF joins, dissenting.
I would grant Harbaugh‘s mоtion to dismiss and not reach the merits of this appeal. The majority declines to dismiss because, it says, Snead would have undertaken a futile act had he sought to amend his motion for judgment. I disagreе with the majority‘s rationale. Seeking amendment would not have been futile for it would have saved the point in the event of remand on appeal.
But there can be no remand. Even if Snead сan get over the hurdle of his failure to seek amendment, he faces an insurmountable problem the majority has not addressed: Snead has failed to assign error to the trial court‘s dismissal of his cаse on the separate ground that the motion for judgment does not state a cause of action.
For Snead‘s failure to assign error to the separate basis for the dismissal of his motion fоr judgment, the dismissal has become
Rule 5:17(c) provides that “[o]nly errors assigned in the petition for appeal will be noticed by this Court.” We enforce this Rule against other defaulting litigants on a regular basis. I see absolutely no reason for declining to enforce it in this case. Indeed, to ignore the Rule would create what, in my opinion, would be an absurd result. The case would be remanded for further proceеdings on a pleading which has been declared in an unappealed final judgment to be insufficient as a matter of law to support any relief. This would turn Rule 5:17(c) on its head.