*2 rаte not less than one and one-half times CARNES, Before TJOFLAT and *3 regular pay any rate” of for spent time RONEY, Judges, Circuit and Senior working forty excess of per hours week. Judge. Circuit The Act also contains an anti-retaliation TJOFLAT, Judge: Circuit 215(a)(3) provision. prohibits Section em- ployers from Snapp Brian filed this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 discharging] or in any other manner (“FLSA”), (1994), 29 U.S.C. 201-219 as discriminating] against any employee amended, in the United States District employee because such any has filed Court for Middle District of Florida complaint or instituted or caused to be Inc., against Concepts, Unlimited doing any proceeding instituted under or relat- Café, business as Ramshackle’s and Glen ed to chapter, оr has testified or is Gerken, owner, President, and Chief about to testify any such proceeding, Executive Officer Ramshackle’s.1 Plain- or has served or is about to serve on an tiff alleged that the Ramshackle’s Café industry committee.
was “Ramshackle” more than name penalties Act, The section of the only.2 Snapp complained that while work- both café, ing at the he suffered violations of private sanctions and rights of action. Un- the minimum wage, wage, overtime and 216(a), der section provisions anti-retaliation of the FLSA. He [a]ny person willfully who violates sought for unpaid minimum the provisions of section 215 of this title compensation, compensation, overtime liq- shall upon conviction thereof subject fees; uidated damages, attorneys and $10,000, to a fine of not more than or to plaintiff sought compensatory and pu- imprisonment for not more than six alleged nitive for his retaliatory months, or both. person No shall be discharge.3 The issue this appeal is imprisoned under this subsection except plaintiff whether can recover for an offense committed after the con- retaliatory on his discharge claim.
viction of such for a prior offense under this subsection.4 I. In contrast penalties pro- to the criminal
A. 216(a), vided in section section au- alia, inter requires, employ- FLSA thorizes against causes of action to pay employees ers covered a minimum еmployers for violations of the Act. Section wage, provide and to compensa- additional also describes the relief afforded to tion for overtime work. plaintiff: successful 1. Plaintiff also named as a prayer defendant Staff compensatory damages Plaintiff's Inc., Leasing, now known as Bill Mullís En- upon allegation was based his that he suffered Inc., terprises, but the district court later physical severe pain and emotional and suf- complaint Leasing dismissed the as to Staff fering retaliatory discharge. because of his plaintiff's perfect because of the failure to process required by service of Federal 215(a)(2) 4. Section makes it unlawful "to vio- Rule of Civil Procedure 4. lаte section 207,” above, section and as noted section as, 2. Webster’s Third defines "ramshackle” 215(a)(3) contains the FLSA's anti-retaliation alia, sense,” "having inter little moral provision. synonyms "dissipated” lists as the words "unruly.” Webster's Third New International Dictionary B. provi- violates who [a]ny employer 207 [the 206 or section sions of rise giving events wage pro- overtime wage and minimum working while he was occurred grievance the em- liable to shall visions] Café. at the Ramshackle’s as a waiter affected employees that he was ployee alleged complaint, his time than the minimum paid less and, compensation, cooking janitorial unpaid overtime spent performing or their (for be, tipped), in an additional he not which was duties as the case paid was he equal amount per forty hours in excess time worked who violates Any employer filing complaint, Weeks before week. anti-retali- [the sions of *4 practices that such was alerted plaintiff for shall be liable provision] ation when the FLSA unlawful under might be relief legal or such attorney friend at a social an spoke to he purposes of the to effectuate appropriate wrote to the Plaintiff first gathering. title, including of this section the United and Hour Division Wage rein- employment, limitation without express his Labor to Department States payment statement, and the promotion, advan- “being taken he was that cоncern an additional and wages lost backfired, when This tage of.” The damages.... Gerken, boss, discovered Glen plaintiffs shall, to in addition such action court in Department. the contacted he had plaintiff awarded any judgment have that he should telling plaintiff After attorney’s allow reasonable plaintiffs, manage- to restaurant concerns voiced his 'defendant, and paid by the fee to be outsiders, involving than ment rather the action.... costs of further from plaintiff terminated Gerken the Congress added § com- plaintiffs 29 U.S.C. Included employment. employers against that he had been allowing allegation suits an plaint was 215(a)(3)’s rights asserting anti- his for of section retaliation fired in for violations of section violation La FLSA in See Fair under the 1977. retaliation 215(a)(3). Amendments bor Standards 91 Stat.
Pub.L. complaint his filed plaintiff After rely then, had to on employees Before court, filed a motion defendants district injunctive relief criminal and Glen against claims all dismiss discourage em 217 to and sections claims for individually, and all Gerken, against them. See retaliating damages. The ployers from and compensatory Inc., Jewelry, motion, finding De Mario Robert Mitchell v. denied court district 333-34, 4 “employ- of an definition that the FLSA, (1960).5 see Plaintiff contends er” under L.Ed.2d 323 encompass defendant 203(d),6 authorizes could amendment the 1977 and that Gerken, individually,7 retali courts award an under legal relief against employers. ation suits alia, includеs, “any per- inter “[E]mployer” part: pertinent provides, in § 217 5.29 U.S.C. interest indirectly in the acting directly or son jurisdic- ... shall have courts The district employee.” employer in relation shown, tion, of an violations to restrain cause 203(d). 215 of title.... Mitchell, interpreted Supreme Court lost to award to allow courts that section issue of’whether reach do not 7. We employees had been retaliated who Gerken court's determination district in- employers, in addition to by against "employer” individually as an sued could relief, by brought the Secre- in cases junctive is correct. the FLSA under Mitchell, 361 the Act. tary enforce of Labor to at 337. U.S. at employer’s puni- retaliation could include availability punitive damages in suits compensation tive and retaliation under emo- FLSA.8 The court decided to revisit tional distress. noting issue after that an intervening deci trial, jury plaintiff At found that had sion a sister interpreted court had bind prove by preponderance failed to ing circuit precedent prohibit punitive paid evidence that he had not been a mini- FLSA, damages under see Bolick v. FLSA, wagte' mum but also County Dep’t., Brevard Sheriff’s guilty found the defendants were (M.D.Fla.1996). 1560, 1566-67 F.Supp. Af violating the overtime anti-retali- Bolick, examining ter the court concluded jury ation the Act. persuasive it was granted awarded in overtime $200 defendants’ renewed motion for $1,000 wages lost because of his retalia- as a matter of law on the issue of $35,000 in tory discharge, $35,- court thus struck the damages on the retaliation claim. The in punitive damages plain awarded Gerken, jury individually, also found that tiff on his retaliation Plaintiff claim.9 now (along was with the “employer” appeals. Café) FLSA, Ramshackle’s under the *5 recommended that be liable for Gerken II. thirty percent punitive We review the district court’s award. grant judgment of defendants’ motion for
Thereafter the district court ordered as a punitive matter of law on the issue parties regarding file memoranda damages County of law de novo. Dade v. Alva- judgment 8. Defendants moved for only as a matter The district court noted that section 260 punitive damages of law on the issue of at the aрpears provide good a faith defense to an of all the evidence. The court close issue under took the liquidated damages award of when an em- submission, pending jury's ployer has been found to violate either the jury verdict. After the a returned verdict for wage, wage provi- or overtime $35,000 punitive damages on the retalia- FLSA, §§ sions of the see 29 U.S.C. claim, tion the court that it stated was still 215(a)(3)'s Section anti-retaliation issue, considering punitive damages Nevertheless, is not mentioned. the court parties then directed the to file relevant mem- good concluded the same faith defense appears oranda of Because the law. court available for violations of sections 206 and engaged dialogue have ain with the defen- 207 is also available for violations of section concerning availability dants merits, however, 215(a)(3). On the the court immediately in retaliation cases af- concluded that the defendants had failed to verdict, jury ter the returned its we find that prove good their entitlement to the faith de- 50(b) requirements the Rule a renewed liquidated damages fense on either the judgment motion for as a matter law were overtime or the retaliation claims. Af- met in this case. punitive damage ter the court aside set 9. Under 29 U.S.C. award, plaintiff jury was left with a award of any unpaid $1,000 [i]n action to recover mini- wages $200 in overtime in lost wages, compensa- mum tion, wages retaliatory discharge. aas result of his liquidated damages, under the Fair 216(b) provides Section that a court amended, Labor Standards Act of as liqui- award "an additional amount as employer if the shows to the satisfaction damages” dated for both of these violations. giving the court that the act or omission plain- Therefore the court doubled the sum of good rise to such action was in faith and tiff’s on awards overtime and lost grounds that he had reasonable for believ- plaintiff entered in favor of the ing that his act or omission was not a against Concepts, the defendant Unlimited violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of $2,400. Inc. in the amount of Defendant amended, may, as thе court in its any personal Glen Gerken was relieved of discretion, sound dam- award liability jury since the had made ages or award amount thereof not to thirty percent him liable dam- .specified exceed ages only. award of this title. Cir.1997). (11th rez, relief successful afforded 124 F.3d dam- retaliation cases. can award a court Whether a viola- proven who has to a text original prescribed Because the anti-retaliation of the FLSA’s remedy double the shortfall of ais consistent with 29 U.S.C. sion violations of sections [for interpretation. question 207], says and the amendment that dam- Questions statutory interpretation limitation”, ages include this “without law. See Caro-Galvan pure questions of has authorized other measures Inc., Richardson, v. Curtis 993 F.2d Which other forms? The an- relief. Cir.1993). (11th left to the swer has been courts. interpreting
could not find case III. history legislative amendment. The unhelpful. language originated A. Senate; report the committee does ques us with a presents This case it. The Commit- not discuss Conference in this circuit re impression tion of first adopted proposal, the Senate’s re- tee garding the-proper construction marking that the bill authorizes suits is, question when re- “for provide in 1977 to amended the FLSA what relief describing lief’ without employer when an right of action H.R. “appropriate”. Conf. might 215(a)(3), did the amend violates section Cong., No. 95th 1st Sess. Rep. allowing plaintiffs ment include
to recovеr legal relief Appropriate includes Plaintiff, course, an legal relief? could limit these dam- ages. Congress *6 affirmative; question in the and swers this does ages, but the 1977 amendment cir only from the other support he finds away with the old limitations without In Tra the issue. cuit to have addressed establishing Compensation new ones. Community Mental Health Gary v. vis distress, dam- for emotional Inc., (7th Ctr., Cir.1990), F.2d 112 921 are for intentional ages, appropriate “punitive held that the Seventh Circuit retaliatory discharge. as torts such damages! appropriate are for intentional ] Travis, at 111-12. 921 F.2d discharge.” The retaliatory torts such as holding observing after court reached its B. the 1977 retaliation amendment Cir disagree Seventh 216(b) includes brоader section punitive damages are cuit’s conclusion reme original language providing than the 216(b). In inter available under section and 207 for violations of sections 206 dies always, begin, preting the statute (the wage and overtime wage minimum language Congress enacted. plain with the much broader Con provisions).10 How above, the statute As noted to state so with gress explicitly; declined provi who violates the discussion, [a]ny employer the Seventh Circuit out much this title of section had tossed the sions Congress concluded that legal for such or shall be liable judiciary, and that issue court, may appropriate to effectu damages relief as of the 215(a)(3) of purposes component ate were reasonable 216(b) against may impose an em- a court supra, of the FLSA 10. As noted section 215(a)(3) appear ployer "unpaid who violates section remedies to mini- limits .., including any "legal equi- expansive, compen- wages, or overtime more mum sation, be, may effectu- relief as may and ... an addi- table as the case 215(a)(3).” 29 damages” purposes of section equal liquidated ate the tional 216(b). § 206 and 207. The for violations of sections 934 title, attempt put limitation lost all including wages without reinstatement, promotion, place she would have been absent
employment,
employer’s
liq-
an the
misconduct. Even the
payment
lost and
uidated
is
equal
liquidated
рrovision
compensato-
amount as
additional
ry
in nature.
“[T]he
damages.
provision
penal
is not
its nature but
216(b).
Plaintiff contends that
compensation
constitutes
for the retention
empowered
“legal
relief’ courts
pay
might
of a workman’s
which
result in
enough
award is
to include
broad
proof
too obscure and difficult of
by liquidated
for estimate other than
certainly a broad for-
“Legal relief’ is
O’Neil,
ages.” Brooklyn Sav. Bank v.
mulation.
It would have almost
bound-
697, 707,
895, 902,
L.Ed.
U.S.
commonly
ary at all
it not for the
were
(1945);
Overnight
see also
Motor
“legal”
understood division between
Missel,
572, 583,
Transp. Co.
a court.
“equitable” powers
Where
(1942).11
1223,
understand the exact nature of the reject section is compensation, we intended; relief’ that and we are plaintiffs argument “legal relief’ in disappointed when we look to section punitive damages. cludes When so broad 216(b). employer violates the a term as is in a When relief’ included statutory wage provi- minimum or overtime that delineates more redress, specific judicial has sions of sections 206 and forms mind provided employer naturally principle ejusdem is liable for turns to the unpaid generis. general ... “unpaid interpret We must “a compensation, light specific as the case term ... be, it.” Hughey an additional amount as terms that surround v. Unit States, 411, 419, ed liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. U.S. 215(a)(3)’s It is And violations of L.Ed.2d 408 provision, Congress anti-retaliation has not clear that all of the relief Although specificity. compensatory abandoned all nature. *7 damages, nothing of relief Punitive says statute that these forms have compensation. be included in a “without limita- to do with Punitive dam tion,” Congress specifically empowered generally has are available for willful or intentional a “employment, a court to order reinstate- violations of common law or ment, statutory duty, of promotion, payment purpose and the and their is to punish wrongdoer and deter the rather wages lost and an additional damages.” compensate aggrieved party. Id. than to Therefore, punitive damages would be out Although it is clear Con in a place statutory provision aimed at gress limit in retaliation did not a court making whole. relief, to the enumerated forms of cases something strengthened there is that all of the relief We are our holding in common: when we look at the rest of the provided has plaintiff. remedial scheme in section 216. compensate is meant ref wages, unpaid statutory provision We read each with Awards expounding to the whole Act. compensation, employment, “[I]n rein erence statute, statement, guided by a a promotion, payment [are] and the not However, Supreme Brooklyn Savings 206 and 207. 11. The Court in violations of sеctions compensatory apply Overnight Transportation rationale would Bank and Motor Co. same liquidated damages addressing liquidated damages provi- in retaliation was to awards 216(b) dealing part suits. sion in the of section
935
sentence,
substantive
violations
FLSA’s
of a
or member
single sentence
puni-
whole terrain
that covers the
the whole
sions
provisions
but look
relief,
sanctions,
Morash,
compensatory
490 U.S.
tive
v.
Massachusetts
law.”
action,
brought by the
1673,
and actions
1668,
rights
104 L.Ed.2d
115,
107,
109 S.Ct.
It
Labor.12
is clear
sec-
(1989)
Secretary
Ins. Co.
Pilot
(quoting
98
Life
1549,
51,
216(a),
penal-
41,
which
Dedeaux,
tion
481 U.S.
violations,
(1987));
Pav
is punitive
1555,
“willful[]”
see
ties for
L.Ed.2d 39
95
216(b), as we
Entertainment
have
purpose;
v. Marvel
and section
LeFlore
elic &
456,
found,
clearly compensatory.
is
already
Group,
(1989). Further, we
obvious
ignore
438
if
L.Ed.2d
Even
we were to
107
statutory language
reading
ejusdem generis canon
avoid
ramifications of the
should
covered
specifically
not
relief” in section
an issue
in interpreting “legal
address
has addressed
Congress
that Con-
216(b),
when
not find
the text
we would still
elsewhere.
language
specific
in more
include
that term to
gress
issue
meant
Hosps.,
Virginia Univ.
Congress
West
has
generally
See
is
damages. This
because
83, 111 S.Ct.
Casey, 499 U.S.
Inc. v.
sanctions
sec-
already
covered
68
113 L.Ed.2d
216(a);
simply no
and there is
reason
over
carry
punitive element
from
provisions
to the make-whole
contrast
216(b), provision
a
to section
for
216(b), Congress provided
of section
compensate,
punish.13
intended to
216(a):
in section
any of
willfully violates
who
Any person
a sort of “harm
Nor would it be
title
of this
to include
less error”
subject
thereof
upon conviction
shall
authorized
relief’
$10,000, or to
of not more than
to a fine
may be
It
Congress in section
than six
not more
imprisonment
chosen, in
deliberately
some
has
shall be
months,
person
both. No
contexts,
am
to leave
except
under this subsection
imprisoned
predicated
is
a choice
biguous; such
con-
after the
committed
an offense
expertise
use their
that courts can
idea
offense
prior
viction of such
of law most effec
particular
area
develop
subsection.
they
given
power
tively when
legislative guidelines
within broad
216(a).
operate
disagree with
powers
separation
from a
(though,
Circuit’s contention
Seventh
problematic,
standpoint,
this idea
remedies
issue of
[the
“left
has
cf.
Resources
v. Natural
Tra- Chevron
courts.”
cases]
retaliation
Defense
Council, Inc.,
S.Ct.
U.S.
enact-
vis,
Congress has
F.2d at 111.
(“Courts
(1984)
L.Ed.2d 694
scheme
comprehensive remedial
ed a
*8
employer liable therefor
by
rights
of this title
providing for
addition to
12.
or
this subsection
against employers
provisions
who vio-
of
under the
action for suits
of
wage,
sought
a
(2)
the FLSA's minimum
relief is
or
late
provisions, section
wage, and anti-retaliation
alleged violations of section
of
result
215(a)(3)
216(b)
provides:
furthеr
of
title.
to
by this subsection
right provided
any
by
of
bring
on behalf
an action
employee
right
any
to
of
employee, and the
though
purpose
the
even
We also note that
13.
action,
party plaintiff to
such
a
become
216(b)
the
compensation,
actual
is
of section
filing of a com-
upon
terminate
the
shall
damages provision
effect
an ac-
by
Secretary of Labor in
the
plaint
employer’s
to an
provides further deterrence
which
of this title in
under section 217
anti-retaliation
violation of the FLSA's
delay
(1)
sought
further
restraint is
Bank,
at
U.S.
Brooklyn Sav.
See
sion.
wages, or
payment
in
Congress
(finding that
937
-
therefore,
think,
Supreme
the
Court held that
le
“[w]here
the Seventh
invaded,
rights have been
and a federal
gal
cannot
reading of section
Circuit’s
right
general
statute
for a
to sue
design.
It
the
squared
invasion,
may
federal
use
for such
сourts
in section
language
that the
is true
remedy
good
available
to make
the
dealing with violations of section
66,
wrong done.” Id. at
(No.
expressly
thereof
autho-
separation
Section
(discussing
courts
recovery
punitive
that arise when
powers concerns
rizes
remedy
that,
injunctive
beyond what
....
Thus it
if
use the
is obvious
n
n
prescribed).
damages
has
punitive
believed
in
necessary to eliminate discrimination
to exclude
feel some constraint
We also
it knew
employment
age,
based on
ex-
“legal
relief’
damages from
punitive
actly
provide
how to
for them.
216(b) by the former
in
in Dean v. Ameri-
decision
Fifth Circuit’s
Dean,
at 1039. The
relief’
559 F.2d
(5th
Co.,
F.2d 1036
Ins.
559
Security
can
exactly
in the ADEA is
the same
language
Cir.1977).15 Dean,
called
the court was
In
FLSA,
in
and so we
as that found
alia,
decide,
whether remedi-
inter
upon to
inter-
conclude that the FLSA should be
in
Age
Discrimination
language
al
similarly
preclude
an award
preted
(ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
Employment Act
Bolick,
damages.
See
punitive
(1994),
plaintiffs to re-
allowed
621-634
F.Supp. at 1566-67.
punitive
cover
by
arguing
Plaintiff counters
ADEA is similar to that
section 626 of the
portions
damages provisions
of the
the two
liquidated
in the remedial
found
In the
purposes.
statutes serve different
FLSA:
FLSA, liquidated damages
compensa
as a result of
owing
Amounts
nature,
require
the ADEA’s
tory
but
shall
chapter
be
a violation
this
'an award of
“willfulness]”
ment of
wages
minimum
or
deemed to be
they
serve
compensation
pur-
liquidated
means
unpaid overtime
and 217 of this
poses
punitive purpose.
sections 216
See Commissioner
Provided,
Schleier,
323,
liquidated damages
That
title:
Internal Revenue v.
515 U.S.
only
2165,
in cases of willful
payable
331,
2159,
shall
Court’s concurring: and purpose,” humanitarian dial conclusion agree I with the Court’s ... in a interpreted “must not be that it Act does not the Fair Labor Standards narrow, manner.” Tennessee grudging recovery the provide No. Coal, v. Muscoda Local Iron & R. Co. most of the reason- agree and I with ages, 321 U.S. opinion to reach (1944). ing majority the uses con “By giving a broad
L.Ed. 949
with
disagree
I
is
The
conclusion.
provision
to the anti-retaliation
struction
Congress’ provision
proposition
the
promoted.”
further
purpose
...
its
will
see 29 U.S.C.
penalties;
for criminal
Enterprises, 881
& Son
v. White
EEOC
216(a),
to exclude
an intent
(11th Cir.1989);
indicates
see also
F.2d
majority
Tellingly, the
damages.
Mitchell,
subject culprit possibility K., Personally, KYLE al., prosecution penalties upon criminal Plaintiffs-Appellees, et hardly puni- conviction. That forecloses tive damages. Maggie CHAPMAN, in her individual majority opinion says The that the en- capacity, Larry Foston, individ his provision forcement the criminal capacity, Defendants-Appellants. ual “discretionary,” FLSA but is more discretionary any than provision criminal No. 99-11048. 216(a) any other statute. What section United Appeals, States Court of
provides is: Eleventh Circuit. Any person willfully any who violates provisions 215 of this April upon title shall conviction thereof be
subject $10,- to a fine of not more than
000, or imprisonment not more months,
than six person or both. No imprisoned
shall be under this subsec- except for offense committed
after the conviction of such for a offense
prior under this subsection. 216(a). “Where is the discre-
tion in that? majority points out person may punished
that no government unless
proves guilt beyond a doubt. reasonable
But that is true of criminal statute. majority opinion upon
relies the existence of a criminal
penalty negate FLSA to upon rests proposition:
Whenever decides that a stat-
ute’s are sufficiently important reinforcing
to warrant compensatory rem- sanction,
edies with we should
infer intended that dam-
ages not I disagree available.
proposition. For the other reasons dis- majority opinion,
cussed I
agree with the Court’s conclusion that
Congress did not intend for
ages to be available violations of the
FLSA.