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Smulls v. State
71 S.W.3d 138
Mo.
2002
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*1 SMULLS, Appellant, Herbert Missouri, Respondent.

STATE

No. SC 83179. Missouri,

Supreme Court

En Banc. 26, 2002.

Feb.

Rehearing April Denied

142

LIMBAUGH, Chief Justice. in the was convicted Herbert Smulls County of first- Circuit Court of St. Louis other crimes and was degree murder and appeal, his convic sentenced to death. On affirmed, were but the tions sentence post-conviction judgment on his Rule 29.15 motion was reversed. State 1996), denied, cert. 138 L.Ed.2d 180 U.S. S.Ct. (1997). remand, post-conviction On overruled, again judg motion was appeal. ment was reversed on On 10 S.W.3d 497 remand, post-conviction mo the latest has again tion was overruled. This Court *5 Const, V, jurisdiction. art. sec. 10. Mo. affirmed. judgment Background I. charged In with first- murder, assault, first-degree two degree robbery, and two first-degree counts of jury of armed criminal action. The counts robbery but could not convicted Smulls charges. the other come to a verdict on retrial, all the Smulls was convicted on On remaining counts. William Corri- The facts presided at trials. gan both offenses, reported in surrounding the as fol- original opinion, are as this Court’s lows:

Stephen and Florence Honickman operated jewelry a business. owned ap- wold make an Typically, customers jewelry to examine the for pointment July person In a iden- early sale. Defender, Swift, Public J. Asst. William called “Jeffrey Taylor” himself as tifying Columbia, Appellant. for appoint- and made an the Honickmans “Jeffrey Tay- buy ment to a diamond. Nixon, Gen., (Jay) Atty. Jeremiah W. defendant. was later identified as lor” Gen., Atty. Burgess, Mr. Breck K. Asst. 22,1991, and Norman July defendant On City, Respondent. Jefferson to the Honickmans’ store. Brown went diamonds, Powell, defen- viewing Kan- After several Popper, Burnele V. Robert Hickman, left the store without MO, dant and Brown B. San City, sas Christine purchase. CA, making Diego, for Amicus Curiae. 27, 1991, at 13. July the afternoon of State

On jury found the existence penalty phase, followed defendant and Norman Brown factors: statutory aggravating customer into the store. Flor- of three another Honickman was unable to show ence Honickman Stephen murder of [T]he sug- any jewelry them at that time but en- defendant was was committed while might help be able to them gested she attempted unlawful homi- gaged later. Defendant and Brown returned Honickman; the defen- cide of Florence evening. viewing to the store that After Stephen Honickman for dant murdered diamonds, some defendant and Brown mon- purpose receiving of defendant hallway, purportedly went into a to dis- thing monetary value ey any or other A time prices. Honickman; and, cuss the diamond short Stephen from later, up Florence Honickman looked com- Stephen murder of Honickman was pistol at aiming and saw defendant engaged mitted while defendant was her. then ran and hid behind a She perpetration robbery. of a door. Defendant fired three shots Additionally, Id. at 24. the state intro- her, striking her arm and side. Defen- non-statutory aggrava- duced evidence of Stephen dant then fired several shots at including circumstances Smulls’ elev- ting Honickman, times. who was struck three felony affirming convictions. In prior en jewelry Defendant and Brown stole sentence, judgment imposing the death worn Florence Honickman and other 1) that the this Court determined sentence items in the store. After the two men imposed was not under the influence store, left the Florence Honickman con- passion, prejudice, arbitrary other police. Stephen tacted the Honickman 2) factor, of the jury’s finding *6 wounds, died from his and Florence aggravating circumstance was statutory permanent injuries Honickman suffered 3) record, by the and that the supported from the attack. dispropor- not excessive or sentence was tionate to similar cases. A robbery, police short time after the Despite convictions stopped speed- defendant and Brown for the fact Smulls’ affirmed, this ing. standing While defendant was at and death sentence were car, Judge police the rear of his officer Court held that certain comments hearing at describing Corrigan during heard a radio broadcast made a Batson objective upon provided men who robbed the Honickmans’ store. voir dire “an basis person could base a descrip- Defendant and Brown fit the which a reasonable impartiality of the tions. The officer ordered defendant to doubt about the racial comments, ground. then ran trial court.” Id. at 26. These he on the Defendant coupled allegations pre-trial out-of- apprehended from his car but was while Judge Corrigan’s and hiding police near a service road. The court misconduct on alle- potential items status as a witness those jewelry found and other stolen from required disqualification gations, from the store the car and Brown’s po- hearing. Rule 29.15 Id. possession. following morning Smulls’ Judge Corrigan’s denial pistol Accordingly, lice found a on the shoulder of the reversed, 29.15 relief was and prior defendant drove to Rule road on which hearing. for a new On stopped speeding. for Bullets test case was remanded being O’Brien, remand, Judge Emmett another pistol matched bullets fired from the County Louis Circuit Stephen from the store and member of St. recovered Court, to hear the motion. assigned Honickman. However, motions to voir dire and dis- again. to raise the issue Smulls filed on qualify Judge past and all other Court’s earlier resolution the issue O’Brien present County and the merits is the law of the case and the judges. St. Louis Williams those Judge may again. O’Brien overruled motions issue not be raised Kimes, and denied the Rule 29.15 motion on the 153-54 appeal, merits. this Court held that On deposition Judge in a taken of

statements Disqualify III. Motion to Corrigan prior taking indicated that to case, Judge Judge O’Brien may have discussed Corrigan and should Judge case with A. Exelusion Evidence from the possibly have recused himself Har- Judge Smulls first claims that Smulls v. hearing. 29.15 in excluding tenbach erred certain evi at 504. This Court remanded for determi- pertained hearing dence from the issue, nation of the recusal but with the (1) Judge alleged O’Brien’s bias: the testi following proviso: mony judges City of two from St. Louis ... court no hearing [I]f finds basis campaign concern that a expressing O’Brien, Judge for disqualification being waged by judges other favor of proceedings may reassigned Rule 29 Judge Corrigan against the author of Judge re-entry O’Brien for of his (2) opinion; this Court’s first letters sent judgment. judges to this other Court Id. at 505. asking to re Corrigan’s behalf this Court remand, assigned On the case was (3) case; newspa hear certain Smulls’ Hartenbach, yet another James Louis Post-Dis St. per articles from the County member of the St. Louis Circuit patch harshly Corrigan. critical of Court, who, evidentiary hearing, after an contends the evidence is relevant disqualify determined that the motion to engender sympathy it would because properly O’Brien was overruled. pressure directive, Judge Pursuant to this Court’s judge. his fellow Ad- O’Brien to vindicate reassigned Hartenbach ordered the case *7 ditionally, points Smulls to this evidence O’Brien, and then re- Judge Judge O’Brien that was influ- Judge establish O’Brien judgment overruling entered his Smulls’ factors, extra-judicial giving rise by enced appeals Rule 29.15 motion. now Smulls impropriety. See appearance to an of Judge the determination that O’Brien Hunter, (Mo. 850, v. State 840 866 S.W.2d properly could hear the motion as well as 1992). banc Judge O’Brien’s denial on the merits of his motion. Rule 29.15 rejected this evi- Judge Hartenbach This because it was irrelevant. dence Disqualify Motion to Smulls’ II. agrees. did not show Court Smulls Judges County All St. Louis exposed any of Judge O’Brien had been remand, did specific question, the evidence in nor After the 1996 Smulls filed attempt Judge current for to ask O’Brien disqualify a motion to all and during testimony at the County mer Louis Cir O’Brien’s judges of St. about Al- hearing Judge Hartenbach. cuit. That motion was overruled. The before testified that he was appeal though Judge on the second O’Brien issue was briefed State, v. newspaper articles on this Court and denied. generally 10 aware of issue, not recall the content attempts now he could S.W.3d at 499-500. Smulls

145 recognizes “justice must the concern from the tive standard any of them. As for justice.” Lilje satisfy appearance and the letters City judges two St. Louis Court, Corp., O’Brien testified Acquisition to this Health Servs. berg v. by legal 865, 2194, he was not aware of effort 847, 100 108 S.Ct. 486 U.S. opin- community to influence this Court’s (1986). standard, this L.Ed.2d 855 Under knowledge he had no of the ion. Because person” gives is one who due a “reasonable articles, letters, rejected testimony, and judges act regard presumption to the “that influenced could him. Even they not have honesty integrity and will if had been aware of the Judge O’Brien in preside a trial which undertake evidence, require this alone would not v. Kind they impartial.” cannot be State pre- disqualification judges because are 1996). (Mo. er, 313, 321 banc 942 S.W.2d sumed to be able to set such evidence addition, person” is one In a “reasonable deciding aside in a case. See State v. knows all that has been said “who (Mo. 209, Taylor, 929 220 banc S.W.2d presence judge.” done 1996). (Mo. State, 199, 203 Haynes v. 937 S.W.2d 1996). process Finally, banc as to due Impartiality B. O’Brien’s Supreme has made challenges, the Court Smulls next claims Harten- “only clear that the most extreme in his bach erred determination that disqualification on this basis cases would impartially O’Brien could hear Smulls’ constitutionally Aetna required.” Life Rule 29.15 motion on remand. The basis Lavoie, 813, 821, Ins. 475 U.S. Co. claim, on, point of the from Smulls’ relied 1580, (1986); L.Ed.2d 823 see also S.Ct. Corrigan is that “O’Brien was with when Jones, 171, 177 State v. 979 S.W.2d Corrigan calling condemned this Court’s may partic him ‘a racist’ have ipated criticizing pro language allegations In view of the raised lobbying against thereby duced Court particularly helpful. are two cases creating appearance improprie Nunley, State v.

ty....” claim against This arises the back 1996), presented an issue drop of original this Court’s revision of its resentencing judge whether a from opinion I by deleting in Smulls certain original judge circuit could same as the language highly that was critical of original trial feelings “set aside his for the Corrigan. See Smulls v. 10 S.W.3d sen- judge” independent and come to an J., 2 (Limbaugh, dissenting). at n. tencing Similarly, determination. State defen- Taylor, Due of the Process Clause *8 collegial rela- argued dant that due United States Missouri Constitutions tionship resentencing judge between guarantee impar a criminal defendant an resentencing original judge, and the tribunal, permitting any litigant tial to re “give[] original judge would want to judge. Taylor, move a biased State v. imposing judge a vote of confidence” 3(D)(1) at 220. of the Mis Canon Nunley In both the same sentence. Conduct, 2.03, souri Code of Judicial Rule disqualifica- that Taylor, this Court held judge proceeding requires a to recuse required absent evidence of a tion was not person would have a where “reasonable relationship judges special between judge’s impar factual basis to doubt the impro- appearance might that create tiality.” Id. This standard does not re Id.; at 918. bias, objec priety. Nunley, 923 S.W.2d quire proof of actual but is an Here, Judge Corrigan’s has failed to establish that because it was critical of special relationship fitness for the bench. such a existed. Judge that Finally, there is no evidence particularly,

More there is no basis for “participated criticizing lan- O’Brien establishing special relationship, that much guage produced lobbying against that appearance impropriety, through less an noted, Court,” nor, as is there evidence Corrigan knew allegation O’Brien allega- knew of Judge O’Brien even him calling condemned this Court for “a fact, criti- only tions to that effect. In racist,” O’Brien, himself, may and that cism on this record was that this Court’s original opin- criticized have this Court’s Corrigan’s fit- regarding Judge comments regard, Judge ion. In that the record of a matter better ness for the bench was Judge Corrigan O’Brien’s interaction with Retirement, suited for the Commission on following: Judge Corrigan shows the testi- Discipline. That criticism Removal and fied that he discussed this Court’s decision bias, if for disqualifying does not establish many judges County with on the St. Louis no other reason than that the criticism was bench; judges some of those criti- Circuit deleted the com- validated when this Court opinion, cized this Court’s and he and Judge Corrigan’s fitness. regarding ments the case at some Judge O’Brien discussed point of this between the issuance Court’s sum, prove, failed to either however, original opinions; and modified through special existence of a relation- Judge Corrigan was not sure whether his Judge ship Judge between O’Brien and superfi- Judge discussion with O’Brien was com- Corrigan through Judge O’Brien’s Judge cial was or even whether O’Brien themselves, actions that a rea- ments and opin- criticized the judges one of the who person would have reason to doubt sonable ion. impartiality. Judge O’Brien’s testified that he did not Judge O’Brien Denial Rule 29.15 Claims IV. express overhearing Corrigan recall Hearing Evidentiary with specific including any any disagreement, specific disagreement language with used The effect of this Court’s determination original opinion. in this When Court’s could hear Smulls’ O’Brien if discussed asked he and hearing is that O’Brien’s Rule 29.15 Smulls, Judge the racial bias claim is reinstated. Smulls’ denial on the merits stated, “I’ve heard statements twenty-six motion contained amended none of which by Judge Corrigan, made All five were dismissed with- claims. opinion came out were after the modified An evidentiary hearing. evidentia- out an think them dealt with any claims, ... I don’t on the five ry hearing granted opinion. I think specific issues within the se pro from Smulls’ as well as several just displeasure an overall These include ineffective assis- motion. (a) opinion.” Judge O’Brien also testified claims for failure tance of counsel not have contact with Corrigan’s disqualification, he did move for (b) opinion was Corrigan present gunshot after the modified the results of failure to *9 issued, anyone contact and his performed and he avoided tests on Smulls residue (c) present it certain accomplice, he knew was failure to discussing case because (d) phase, and mitigating penalty to hear factors possible assigned that he would be testifying from most, opin- discouraging Smulls presumed case. At he claims were favorite,” All of these second trial. Judge Corrigan’s ion “was not the vic- have been aware Corrigan is as fol- would The standard of review denied. and the defendant tims were white lows: presided over the first because he black to deter- This review is limited Court’s did not Corrigan stated he Judge trial. clearly mining whether the motion court was black and who remember who conclusions. findings erred in its and white, the defen- accept that he would of the mo- findings The and conclusions then reiterated his dant’s statement. He if, only clearly tion court are erroneous Batson claim. denial of the When record, the after a review of the entire Sidney was again noted that Ms. defendant appellate court is left with the definite venireperson, Judge Corri- the last black impression that has a mistake been that he did not know what gan stated made. black, that he never takes meant to be 576, 581 Rousan v. judicial person’s of a race without notice 2001) (citations omitted). evidence, and that it is counsel’s direct Judge Corrigan’s A. Failure to Move to establish who is black and responsibility for Disqualification regard, In this he added: who is not. appeal claim principal of this complexioned There were some dark Smulls’ trial counsel was ineffective I if that people jury. on this don’t know Judge evidence of failing to discover Corri- said, or white. As I I makes them black gan’s disquali- racial and move for his bias know what constitutes black. don’t claim essentially fication. This is based they say drop one ago Years used allegations the same and conduct I don’t know blood constitutes black. disqualifying Judge considered in Court somebody black means. Can en- what Corrigan hearing from the Rule 29.15 mo- black I don’t lighten me of what is? 1) case, prior tion: to the Cor- know; people. I think of them as joke rigan group told a racist to a

judges, judgment had been entered 1. Exclusion Evidence harassment, against him for sexual and error to Initially, assigns against that he discriminated African- exclusion of certain evidence re- O’Brien’s disposition American defendants in the Corrigan’s prejudice. racial garding Judge cases; 2) during criminal and case, racially he made insensitive com- Transcript a. hearing.

ments at the Batson Unofficial Although During original proceed of the Bat- 29.15 circumstances for admis hearing reported extensively ings, request son were Smulls directed a opinion, they repeat- prosecuting attorney seeking sions to the the first Smulls bear black, ing here: The defendant noted that Ms. to establish that the defendant was white, jury panel and the Sidney only remaining was the black veni- the victims were Following long all white. reperson requested hearing. a Batson selected was standing practice for non-evi- prosecutor stated his reasons for custom When cases, dentiary hearings motion in civil striking Sidney, Ms. Smulls’ counsel Corrigan provide did not the court’s pretextual claimed the reasons were Therefore, reporter. a mistrial. The court denied official requested private reporter court to the day, brought The next request. defendant’s and transcribed the hearing chal- who recorded Smulls’ counsel renewed the Batson Corrigan: following statements from lenge and stated for the record that *10 position hearing, Judge Corrigan the that tial Rule 29.15 This Court won’t take people are white or black. It is the years referred to the woman who before you that can’t look at position Court’s sued him for sexual discrimination as people and determine what their race is objected to the “white.” The state testi- lawyers .... If the don’t want to ask the mony grounds, including on several rele- jurors people or whether the are white sustained the vancy, and O’Brien if or black or ask a witness he’s white objection. testimony was of- Although the black, I think that I—I can then don’t Corrigan’s possible fered to show parties to make that admission. ask the race-recogni- about bias or untruthfulness hearing At the 29.15 remand before tion, counsel’s inef- it is irrelevant to show O’Brien, tran- tried to admit this failing fectiveness for to discover that bias script, transcript that the demon- arguing or untruthfulness. For this evidence to be professed inabili- Judge Corrigan’s strates claim, to that the evidence must relevant ty acknowledge person’s to a race. Smulls known to counsel or discover- have been present testimony and an also wished to during investigation. able reasonable original affidavit from his 29.15 counsel White v. 895-96 that made Judge Corrigan statements indi- 1997). However, Judge Corri- cating recognize person’s he could a race gan’s statement was not made to counsel when he so chose. hearing, until initial 29.15 after the Rule state, objection by

On the pre- have trial. counsel could not Smulls’ transcript properly excluded the on the disqual- in a motion to sented this evidence reporter was not the official basis trial, ify during many or months before reporter appear did not reporter, court was made. before statement attempt to authenticate hearing at the ” transcript and the was not transcript, c. “Barbecue Joke Evidence 57.03(f) addition, Rule self-proving. Postr-Dispatch published A article deposition that after a is taken and

states Corrigan said reported in 1983 transcribed, it must be submitted to the that, can’t during meeting judges “We deponent reading signature. for his we don’t have a barbecue because have (g) This was not done. Subsection then cooking.” judge black to do the provides signature of the officer for the not to claims he offered this article estab deposition, in the ab transcribing any in fact black lish whether there were deponent, signature sence of the of the Circuit, but judges County in the St. Louis guarantee the that attestation does not was bi accuracy transcript. of the to establish Coffel (Mo.App. public knowl Spradley, 495 S.W.2d ased and that his bias was reasons, the tran For all of these He claims his counsel knew edge. given script Regardless, was inadmissible. alleged this evi should have discovered transcript bias, the similarities between that contributed to dence of and that during statements Judge Corrigan’s failing to file a counsel’s ineffectiveness evidence, hearing already in Batson disqualify Judge Corrigan. motion been cumulative. transcript would have article was hear Judge O’Brien ruled the say. Race-Recognition Testimo- b. Counsel’s

ny “A out- hearsay statement prove statement that is used of-court attempted counsel former Smulls’ and that ini- the matter asserted during the truth of testify via affidavit *11 2) “white,” reflecting sheets and docket depends veracity on the of the statement African- heard that the case was Rodriguez its v. Suzuki Motor value.” relevancy purported judge. American Corp., 996 S.W.2d that it tended to show of this evidence was To the extent that the article was offered bias, identify could Judge Corrigan it Con- that prove was inadmissible. chose, and party when he so position, the truth of race of a trary to defendant’s prove[d] why Corri- they “demonstrat[ed] that could the matter asserted is not approximately year one later told gan have a because there were no barbecue available, matters were not joke.” These judges Judge black but that Cor- barbecue motion, and pled part of the Rule 29.15 rigan they said could not have a barbecue as properly excluded for judges there were no avail- the evidence because black SALTZBURG, if those matters were A. that reason. Even able. See STEPHEN AL., pled, relevancy of the evi properly ET FEDERAL OF EVI- RULES (7th ed.1998). tenuous, especially light in of this MANUAL 1466 dence is DENCE hand, original in holding article admissi- Court’s On the other opinion gender discrimination suit allegation Judge to show that the ble pub- question disqualify Judge did not Corri- Corrigan was biased was a matter of and, fact, claims. gan hearing gender-Raisoii from knowledge, Judge lic O’Brien at 16-17. testimony for that limited State v. admitted the purpose. testimony e. Dr. Galliher’s Exclusion of deposition

Smulls also offered the testi- Galliher, Dr. Smulls called John Campbell, of mony Judge who related professor sociology of who had reviewed personally he overheard Judge Corrigan’s during conduct various joke. making O’Brien disal- racial trials in order to establish bias. hearsay grounds, lowed this evidence on excluded the evidence for but the state has made no effort its brief reasons, variety ultimately concluding ruling. Assuming to defend the the testi- testimony that the was not credible. On admitted, mony is should have been review, will appellate such a determination probative much coun- less what Smulls’ rarely a trial court be overturned because sel knew or should have discovered about position in the best to assess the credi newspaper the matter than the article. To expert testimony. bility and usefulness of extent O’Brien disallowed State, 48 at 589. Rousan v. evidence, discounted this Smulls was not prejudiced. dis- proof, In an offer of Dr. Galliher length the existence effect cussed Evidence d. Gender Discrimination Suit society, in our unconscious racial bias falsely claim not to people the motion court with such bias Smulls next claims jokes tell recognize related race and will excluding erred certain evidence be able that there is express feelings, their gender to a 1982 discrimination suit and ra- gender in a a correlation between bias against Judge Corrigan that resulted excerpts him cial bias. He also commented judgment against reported as Good County, from Smulls’ trial and several win v. Circuit Court St. Louis (8th Cir.1984). concluded that Corrigan’s other cases. He 729 F.2d 541 The evidence 1) viewed to- plain “Judge Corrigan’s behaviors consisted of: an affidavit from the adhering to inconsistent with gether tiff in that case to the effect that were spirit and were relevant Corrigan accurately identified her as Batson’s *12 alleged policy an of racial ability fairly to have Batson decid- dence about Smulls’ County prose- by ed.” discrimination St. Louis in dire.” This cutors voir evidence in Judge rejected testimony O’Brien from three by way offered of affidavits satisfy the part Frye because it did not de- lawyers local criminal defense and was expert opinion must test that be based should signed to show that Smulls’ counsel accepted scientific meth upon valid and to avoid disqualified Judge Corrigan have in and assist the trier of fact odology prosecutor of a the combination biased determination of an issue. Callahan judge. claim fails because it a biased This Hosp., Glennon 863 S.W.2d Cardinal appeal initial was determined 1993); Frye v. United merits of deciding no error occurred (D.C.Cir.1923). States, 293 F. challenge. the Batson State opinions Dr. admitted that his Galliher at 14-16. upon sampling were not based a random of Corrigan’s any cases or first-hand Judge Judge Corrigan’s of of observation Judge Deposition Stay O’Toole’s of Judge Corrigan cases. He testified that Daniel subpoenaed Judge Smulls black defendants in a manner not berates O’Toole, also heard claiming O’Toole defendants, found in cases with white but joke.” Corrigan the “barbecue tell beyond that he look admitted did not request, At the state’s O’Brien (out hun nine selected of cases Smulls stayed deposition until he determined heard), and that the defendants dreds evidentiary was entitled to an hear Smulls in only were black six of those nine cases. the ineffective assistance of counsel ing on prove the The circumstances of these cases deposition which the related. claim to case, Judge Corrigan re point: one stay January lifted the Judge O’Brien “animal,” ferred to the defendant as an but 5, 1998, he denied motion for a but Smulls’ had been convicted of the the defendant un evidentiary hearing continuance of the beating rape elderly of an wom brutal could taken. None deposition til the an; case, called in another theless, that additional he assured Smulls the defen dog;”

the defendant a “mad but provided necessary. time would be as case, rapist; a serial in another dant was deposition for March Smulls scheduled the man,” a “flim-flam he called the defendant 9, 1998, on that O’Toole died guilty found but the defendant had been can very day after an extended bout with employer. forgery defrauding cer. This hard comparable. other cases are is proof pattern of a of racial bias. More

ly state had no first claims that the Smulls over, identify Dr. was not able to Galliher request stay. Smulls standing to imposition any prejudice the actual procedure civil mistaken. The rules of Corrigan con sentences and noted Rule Rule 29.15 motions. apply to sistently jury’s followed the recommenda 56.01(c) 29.15(a). any party permits Rule reasons, Judge For these tion. A protective for a order. to file a motion rejecting not abuse his discretion did within that stay for a order falls request testimony. Dr. Galliher’s rule. Attor- f. Smulls’ Defense trial Affidavits from next claims that the court’s Smulls neys be- deposition improper stay of the to a wit- denied access

Next, cause Smulls was complains “Trial “evi- who had useful information. improperly excluded ness Judge O’Brien Judge Corrigan’s Char- 3. Admission courts have broad discretion administer acter Witnesses discovery, which this Court ing rules will not disturb absent an abuse of discre objected to the relevan Dandur tion.” ex rel. Crowden v. State promi cy presentation the state’s of five and, 340, 343 attorneys defense who know nent criminal noted, the state’s As the basis of motion reputa to his Judge Corrigan and testified *13 deposition premature was that the was judging being tion as free of bias when unduly burdensome until the motion court African-Americans. involving cases to determined whether Smulls was entitled concedes that character evidence Smulls evidentiary hearing. stay an The nature of put by relevant when in issue 56.01(c), permits proper under Rule which complaint real proceeding, and his “any the trial court to make order which character evidence has no seems to be that justice protect party per to a or requires However, inqui an bearing on racial bias. embarrassment, annoyance, op son from ry judge’s alleged racial bias cannot into a pression, expense.” or undue burden or inquiry conducted without an into the 56.01(b)(1), Smulls’ citation to Rule which presence judge’s character because or parties discovery that states are entitled to part judge’s absence of racial bias is of matter, on relevant does address Where, here, party has character. as Judge ruling the issue. O’Brien’s was not of opened by introducing the door evidence a determination that Smulls was not enti bias, by bad character as manifested racial discovery. stay to the tled party may the other introduce evidence place only granted evidentiary until he good by character as manifested the lack prior hearing and was lifted three months of racial bias. Judge O’Toole’s death. There was no State, v. 785 S.W.2d Citing Clemmons Fergu abuse of discretion. See State v. (Mo. 524, 1990), also ar- 531 banc Smulls son, (Mo. 2000). 20 504 S.W.3d banc gues reputation that the character argues that Judge

Smulls also competent testify were not witnesses improperly refused testimony solely to continue eviden- because their relates tiary hearing until It Judge O’Toole could be the motion court must decide.” “issues however, deposed. testimony, filed a requesting motion is clear from their or, minimum,” testifying a continuance “at that the that the witnesses were not as law, open’ experts persons court “hold the evidence” until the a matter of but as Corrigan’s judicial deposition response, Judge could be taken. In familiar with Clemmons, motion, temperament. O’Brien denied the stat- In the attor- neys impermissibly testifying regard- ed he at the grant would a continuance were counsel, an deposition ing evidence if ineffective assistance of close Smulls’ contrast, the wit- yet had not been secured. It is well set- issue of law. Id. bias, a fac- deny regarding a nesses here testified grant tled that decision to “[t]he Kinder, ... tual See State v. request for a continuance rests within determination. (Mo. 1996); at State the trial court’s discretion and will not be 942 S.W.2d 334 banc (Mo. Thomas, 409, 413 banc v. 596 S.W.2d showing absent a clear of abuse reversed 1980). Barton, v. 998 of discretion.” State 1999). Because S.W.2d Racial Analysis the Evidence willing grant

the court was a continu- Bias deposition ance if O’Toole’s was not case, that time To succeed on the claim taken Smulls rested his disqualified trial counsel should have there was no abuse of discretion. Furthermore, had counsel conduct- of racial even ground on the pre-trial investigation that ed the kind bias, that there was Smulls must show now claims was re- hindsight, disqualifying bias that his evidence of such likely would have quired, investigation discov trial counsel knew of or could have up turned as much evidence ered a reasonable amount of investi was not biased as evidence Corrigan 895- gation. White criminal defense he was biased. The five Twenter, 96; State practice regularly before lawyers who has not done so. Corrigan unequivocally testified evidence pre-trial, Most of the out-of-court African-American clients had their Judge Corri- purportedly indicated Camp- even fairly, been treated gan’s racial bias should not be considered bell, that he overheard the who testified from evi properly it was excluded because joke years ago, qualified his state- racist *14 hearing Rule 29.15 before dence at the during the testifying ment then that newspa particular, the Judge O’Brien. Judge many years he had served with per joke the racist was hear article about or Corrigan, he had never heard of a claim report from Dr. on say, and the Galliher against racial made him. allegation of bias disparate treat Judge Corrigan’s allegedly circumstances, counsel cannot Under these was not based on ment of black defendants Judge move for failing faulted for be credibility and lacked oth study scientific trial. Corrigan’s disqualification before erwise. have moved to counsel should Whether properly Even if that had been evidence his com- disqualify Judge Corrigan after admitted, it that trial coun- is not evidence perhaps hearing at the Batson is ments of or could have discovered with sel knew ultimately, the issue question, another investigation. To a reasonable amount of to be resolved is whether counsel should Judge Judge Corrigan attempted disqualify evidence that al- Corri- uncover have during joke in- of his comments single gan racist to an on the basis legedly told a Although alone. hearing the Batson years ten judges formal of some group opin- in the first Smulls Court determined trial, joke even was re- before when racially in- comments were ion that those newspaper, required in the is not ported sensitive, at 935 State v. S.W.2d part investigation. reasonable as 26, from Corrigan’s disqualification Judge considering true trial especially This is proceeding required the Rule 29.15 only has limited resources and counsel coupled were those comments because as to necessarily given deference must pre-trial, allegations the several with scope investigation. of such target the likelihood misconduct and out-of-court 121, 143 Clay, See State himself, would be a Judge Corrigan, that 1998). (Mo. applies This conclusion banc at 27. allegations. those Id. witness for investigation kind all the more to the impor- by Dr. More conducted Galliher. judge disqualify The decision to not know the need to tantly, counsel would strategy. State v. a matter of trial (Mo. al- investigations until the conduct these banc Ayers, 911 S.W.2d 1995); remarks were legedly racially insensitive see also Wilson 1982). hearing the Batson As during made 248-49 S.W.2d after strategy, appellate Only then did all matters of trial trial had commenced. to trial properly deferential prejudice racial courts are Judge Corrigan’s issue State, 39 Lyons v. counsel’s decisions. clearly present itself. Corrigan correctly denied In that and that 14-16. challenge. Id. at the Batson may well be that trial counsel regard, indicating no evidence advances perceived Judge Corrigan’s that Batson Smulls simple fact is that Fur- otherwise. The innocuously. were made comments Batson ther, skepticism Smulls’ acknowledged Corrigan’s that there was counsel obstinate, or did hearing, honest important strategic reason to whether at least one being claims from prevent not Smulls’ keep Judge Corrigan on this case: prove that the outcome jury that the instruction heard and did Corrigan believed the trial as a whole was impose hearing of that permitted judge product judge’s of the bias. penalty jury agree if the could not death 313.48B, punishment, MAI-CR3d Because Retention Disqualification B. unconstitutional, stat- Vote diffi- extremely ed that he would have penalty if the imposing cult time the death next claims that his coun record, can-

jury did not. On this counsel failing for to have sel was ineffective being not be convicted of ineffective because Corri- Corrigan disqualified Judge Corrigan. failing disqualify reten upcoming about his gan was worried general election. tion vote the 1992 Finally, hindsight shows concern, explains given *15 disqualify Judge Corrigan not to decision unwilling Corrigan would be to con prejudice. not result in cannot did Smulls instead of the death sider a life sentence point judicial evi decision that penalty willingness because a to consider Corrigan’s alleged or in dences bias support at the might life sentence erode Judge Corrigan’s alleged pro bias which claim is frivolous. The 1992 polls. This unjust ex duced an result. This Court election was held Smulls’ general before 1996 decision that pressed concern its trial. Judge Corrigan’s acknowledge refusal to questions race raises “serious about his Present Residue C. Failure to Gunshot requires,” to do what Batson willingness Evidence 26, 935 at and this Court S.W.2d per residue tests were “The trial court cannot add subtle Gunshot wrote: accomplice. No refusing formed on Smulls and process by burdens to the Batson Smulls, and the was detected on to take note of race where trial counsel residue However, inconclusive. accomplice on his was properly places it at issue.” Id. test trial, expert, the first the state’s During a careful review of the record shows unavailable, Rothove, par and the challenge was heard not Dr. was Smulls’ Batson twice, stipulation regarding once, agreed to a short hearing, but and at the first ties trial, At the second dispute did not that Ms. the test results. Rothove, Indeed, subpoenaed but Smulls’ counsel Sidney was African-American. him, just learned that having not call controversy did not arise until the did the theory day support when he would not hearing second on the second under fired the shots. As we memory accomplice had Judge Corrigan’s faded it, claim is that counsel did stand Smulls’ Sidney jurors and the other who were Ms. adjust Rothove time to not interview longer present. not were no Ulti selected ineffective and that counsel was origi strategy in the mately, this determined Court stipulation. present preempto- failing appeal prosecutor’s nal that the stipulation concedes that the pretextual not Smulls now ry Sidney of Ms. was strike 154 nonviolent, amicable, he abandoned at not available on retrial and claims his was

was childhood, impoverished, cared for his chil- indepen- counsel should have obtained an dren, helpful he was to friends and that pled. expert. dent This claim was not and relatives. Nevertheless, present attempted Smith, testimony of Donald a criminol- to inves required While counsel is re- ogist. gratuitously circumstances, tigate possible mitigating claim, rejected tes- viewed the Smith’s at there is nó Nunley, 923 S.W.2d timony identify because could not Smith evi duty present mitigating absolute shooter, suspects which of the two Shurn, 866 dence. State v. S.W.2d sufficiently duplicate did not the state’s 1993). Furthermore, 472 test, and was not otherwise credible. putting is not ineffective for “[c]ounsel evidence.” v. that his counsel on cumulative Skillicorn Smulls must establish State, S.W.3d failing an inde was ineffective to obtain pendent expert reasonably and that it is during presented five witnesses probable deficiency affected the Hively, a penalty phase: Dr. Wells outcome. at White S.W.2d had psychologist; pastor, Smulls’ who Twenter, 895-96; State child; supervi- known him since he was a that either one of the 640. Smith testified jail officer at the sor and a corrections shooter. defendants could have been the incarcerated; where Smulls However, tests, own conducting his father, who had raised adopted Smulls’ attempt the same Smith did not to obtain half year him since he was a and a old. crime, weapon used and he admitted is de- Hively explained Dr. that Smulls weapons of the same make different pressed, dependent personality, has a and model can “kick off’ different resi is not violent unless he is coerced. addition, dues. Smith was not certain pastor polite, re- testified that Smulls is *16 he the same machine and the state used spectful and not violent. The corrections the tests. He also was conduct unaware supervisor that he was guard and testified struggled grass that Smulls wet with not cause good a worker and that he did police continuously wiped his and trouble. His father testified Smulls hands, which can remove residue. See did not abandoned as a child and Lockhart, 1226, v. F.3d Wainwright 80 school, that he still cared high finish and (8th Cir.1996). upon 1230 Based these own blood. for Smulls as he would his factors it cannot be said that it was clear testimony and Most of the witnesses error for the motion court to find Smith’s pre- his counsel should have Smulls claims lacking credibility. See State evidence testimony would be cumulative of sented Hall, v. 982 S.W.2d 687-88 In addi- already presented. that had been 1998); 1230 Wainwright, 80 F.3d at tion, court, in the best the motion which is credibility, found that position to evaluate Mitigating Present Cir- D. Failure to not a number of these witnesses were cumstances Edwards They Randy credible. include Brown, who arrived and Dennis both Smulls claims ques- typed a list of testify claim that court to clearly denying erred in his answers; Crispin parenthetical failing for to inter tions with counsel was ineffective Smith, relationship” with a “close mitigating wit who had present and certain view know he supposedly did not phase. These wit Smulls but during penalty nesses Cain, knew parole; Maggie who have testified that was on allegedly nesses would

155 (1) must the motion church; requirements: three and Patricia only from Smulls conclusions, facts, warranting allege him not Lee, only passing. who knew (2) relief; must raise alleged the facts this matter were findings court’s motion State, the files and by refuted Rousan v. 48 matters not clearly not erroneous. (3) case; matters Furthermore, in the and fight records at 589. S.W.3d complains must have jury, movant by factors found of which aggravating prejudice. that the additional resulted in Smulls has not shown produced testimony would have mitigating (Mo. State, 21 S.W.3d Morrow presented had it been at a different result 2000). trial. the Death Prosecutor’s Motive to Seek

A. Penalty Testify Decision Not to E. Smulls’ trial counsel claims his his counsel was Smulls

Smulls claims investigate failing for advising testify. not him to was ineffective ineffective for trial, motive to challenge prosecutor’s testified at his first Again, to estab penalty. the mur seek the death jury could not reach a verdict on assistance, must de a ineffective gives der count. He claims this rise to lish attorney failed not the information his probability” “reasonable that he would scribe discover, that a reasonable inves allege he at his have been convicted had testified State, the infor tigation have uncovered second trial. See Rousan v. would mation, would prove the information at 581-82. “Advice of counsel S.W.3d more, position. testify, a defendant not is have aided his White without Twenter, 895-96; at State v. incompetent might when it be consid 939 S.W.2d Further, show “[t]o at 640. strategy.” ered sound trial State v. Pow ell, pen prosecutor sought the death that the S.W.2d reasons,” racially discriminatory history, alty criminal Smulls has extensive prove prosecu subject which of cross-examination defendant must discriminatory effect” tor’s had “a during probable the first trial and a sub decision and that the decision was ject during the sec on defendant of cross-examination discriminatory purpose.” ond trial. This would have undercut his “motivated State, 21 Fi theory ringleader that he was not the of Morrow v. *17 addition, proof offer clear nally, In trial court movant “must robbery. in his own case.” State v. him his not to tes discrimination discussed with decision Brooks, testimony at at 499. tify. argument that his S.W.2d hung jury the first trial caused the is (1) he is an alleged motion that: Smulls’ speculative, and he has not demonstrated disadvantaged African-Amer- economically anything that his counsel’s decision was (2) ican, and were Caucasian his victims strategy. other than sound trial See State in an affluent Cauca- the crime occurred Chambers, 93, 112 v. 891 S.W.2d (3) suburb, pre- evidence would sian factually in homicide similar sented state defendants the cases with Caucasian Denial Rule 29.15 Claims Without V. (4) penalty, not seek the death did Evidentiary Hearing an in case be- penalty sought death was motions, In relief post-conviction (5) African-American, reason- cause he is investi- competent counsel would have ably evidentia- appellant is entitled to an [a]n (6) matter, he gated and raised only if his motion meets ry hearing unavailable, Hively, Dr. prejudiced. claims that fear of who worked Smulls case, they expert are with the on the was called as African-American males because “causally replacement. motivated the Counsel cannot be faulted linked to crime” call prosecutor penalty. to seek the death because she had little choice but to report. another witness familiar with the support of these alle- Smulls’ evidence addition, testimony trial counsel’s to the Report of a Force gations consisted “Task contrary notwithstanding, unlikely the African-American on Status of prejudice suffered from coun- Smulls plead- Male in attached to his Missouri” present expert choice to a different sel’s purportedly capital ings, which showed report. prepared than the one who “glaring cases a racial difference” that “re- Hively testified that his entire of- Doctor discretionary sults from the decisions fice, himself, was involved including prove prosecutors.” This evidence fails preparation report, of the that he exam- specific purposeful discrimination to his times, opin- ined four and that his State, case. v. at 825. Morrow upon examinations as ion was based those Furthermore, where, here, as the facts psychological tests well as the results of support strongly the case the existence court’s police reports. The motion factors, statutory aggravating not to men- clearly errone- denial of this claim was history, tion Smulls’ extensive criminal ous. likely seeking the death motivation strength prosecution’s penalty is the of the call- alleges that instead of Smulls also id.; Brooks, case. See 960 S.W.2d State have ing Hively, Dr. his counsel should 499-500. does not The record warrant “comprehensive mental health ex- called finding much less a evidentiary hearing, an failing not ineffective for pert.” Counsel is of ineffective assistance of counsel. experts. shop around for additional at 41. Lyons v. 39 S.W.3d takes with the

Smulls also issue interrogato motion court’s refusal to allow Penalty Opening Phase Statement C. this claim. the determina ries on Because in claims his counsel was deny tion to the claim without an eviden- during opening commenting, effective for tiary hearing properly solely made penalty phase, that Smulls statement motion and the files and records of “the job disability of a could not find a because case,” discovery the determina before easy an and turned to a life of crime as tion of which claims warrant an evidentia- prior felony con way out. Smulls’ eleven ry hearing premature. would be See State impeach his admissible to victions were Discovery at 504. Ferguson, credibility if took the stand and admis he unwarranted after denial of such a claim is factor aggravating regardless sible as discovery longer is no “rele because the common and penalty phase. It is a subject matter in the vant to the involved *18 to mention convic proper strategy defense action.” Id. pending in to soften the blow. See tions first order Testimony Hively’s B.Dr. 577 S.W.2d Richardson 1979). was not ineffec Counsel erred in Smulls claims his counsel in regard. tive during penalty calling Hively Dr. Wells Hively not the au phase because Dr. was Object to Instructions D. Failure to report, psychological thor of Smulls’ which counsel was ineffective in claims his prepared mitigation. as evidence confusing object allegedly report failing to to expert prepared the for The who PRICE, HOLSTEIN, BENTON and pres- to phase instructions and punishment JJ., juror concur. accuracy the of survey data on ent that this concedes comprehension. Smuils J., opinion in WOLFF, separate concurs claim in rejected such a recently has Court filed. Deck, 527, 542-48 State claim is denied on The STITH, J., concurs DENVIR LAURA basis. separate in part in and dissents part opinion filed. E. Voir Dire WHITE, J., opinion of concurs was ineffective claims his counsel Smuils STITH, J. DENVIR LAURA the trial court object to when failing that, speaking, the “theoretically” stated WOLFF, Judge, concurring. to does not have the burden defendant opinion, but principal to death. in the put he should not be I concur prove that question to raise the dialogue separately only The record reflects extensive write nine allowing each side juror during which question, with the of the wisdom system challenges. it clear that the state Our peremptory the trial court made context, encourages challenges greatly and peremptory the burden. Taken bore jury selection person did not serve the racial discrimination considering 79, 106 Kentucky, not 476 U.S. jury, explanation the court’s did that Batson v. (1986), burden, attempt- any claim the L.Ed.2d 69 misallocate the S.Ct. Moreover, jury selection is speculative. is jury was tainted ed to end. by either manipulated susceptible being to Appeal Direct Denied on VI. Claims to the extent or defense prosecution to appear resulting jury does a motion also raises number Smuils’ cross-section from a reasonable drawn claims in ineffective assistance of counsel community. denied underlying issues were which the (1) failure appeal: this court on direct Hell, said, paved to it is The road prove prosecutor’s for strik to reasons was decided with intentions. Batson good Sidney pretextual, were State v. ing Ms. eliminating racial best intentions — (2) 14-16; to at failure peremptory in the use of discrimination the entire venire because quash move to case, tor- with its present challenges. permitted juror who had been stricken was intentions history, good shows that mented (3) 19; at stay questions, and answer id. Hades, road but the not have led to may mitigating factor present failure to as difficulty. fraught with surely has been shooting accomplice that the admitted predicted Marshall Thurgood Justice (4) victims, 20-21; failing to id. at for in Batson provided protections that the jury ex move for a mistrial when Batson, 476 largely illusory. would be safety in notes sent pressed concern for its (Marshall, con- 106 S.Ct. 1712 U.S. during phase delibera guilt the court course, for right, of curring). He was tions, cannot be ineffec id. at 22. Counsel find uncomforta- lawyers may reasons that failing to raise non-meritorious tive for acknowledge. ble claims. essential arises from the discomfort Our *19 Conclusion VII. is based on jury selection—it truth about venireperson’s about a generalizations affirmed. judgment The is race, sex, in ethnicity, religion, peremptory challenge England socioeconomic of the status, occupation, neighborhood, among playing against was to balance the field study jury other factors. Those who be- ability pro- unlimited to eliminate Crown’s advocacy havior and teach trial tell us that However, spective jurors. Judge Hoffman preferred ju- types people certain are in argues, peremptory challenge Amer- depending particular type rors on the purpose ica has no such because of noble instance, commonly case. For it is be- history. our racial Id. at Once the plaintiffs personal injury lieved that rights civil movement resulted in elimina- jurors prefer cases with ethnic back- enforcing segrega- tion of Jim Crow laws African-Americans, grounds such as His- tion, contends, per- Judge Hoffman French, Irish, Jews, Italians, panics, and emptory challenge continued to serve as other Mediterraneans. It is claimed that an efficient final racial filter to ensure all- respond people these well to the emotional juries. against Id. at 829. The case white appeal Irving cases. 1 & Goldstein grounds peremptory challenges on racial Lane, Technique, Fred Trial Goldstein Ch because, may irrespec- be a bit overstated ed.2001). (3d hand, On other jurisdictions deny tive of its in some to use German, English, those and Scandinavi- participation African-Americans full in the an descent are considered to for be best it legal system, remains well entrenched personal injury the defense in Id. cases. jurisdictions history that have no of resis- at Ch 87. Practitioners in criminal rights. tance to civil generalizations cases make similar based believed, commonly on such factors. It is Perhaps we are comfortable our instance, jurors that African-American generalizations. lawyer if a trial What favorably the death than penalty view less mem- infers from the social sciences that counterparts.1 their white religious bers of certain racial or ethnic or are, groups average, likely on more than point say gener- The not to is these favorably disposed not to be to a client’s alizations are evil or even inaccurate. But to kind of a zealous in an say profiling, suffices racial while cause? As advocate exactly by lawyers, may, not invented trial is adversary system, lawyer jury process. alive well in the selection should, arguably consider that characteris- potential jurors tic in to determining which Historically peremptory challenge where, especially true as in strike. This is lawyer allowed a to strike a certain num- Missouri, given trial time to allow little prospective jurors having without ber jurors extensively lawyers question peremptory challenge state a reason. The atti- to determine their actual individual in the is said to have been United States minimal lawyers gain The some tudes. by desegregation used states to resist the jurors’ information about attitudes upon govern- forced them the federal examination, perceptions the voir dire Hoffman, Peremptory ment. Morris B. pre- to counter the usually enough A Trial Challenges Should be Abolished: lawyer brings conceived notions that the L.Rev. Judge’s Perspective, U. Chi. (Summer 1997). original purpose the courtroom. noted, penal- Gallup year reporting Roughly favor the death 1. The Poll last of whites 70% polls, majority of public support penalty: ty in recent while less than a for the death “Tra- Jones, Jeffrey ditionally, do.” M. Two- non-whites have been much less non-whites whites, surpris- Support Death Penal- supportive Thirds Americans than which is not 2001) (March ty, ing given paid Gallup Poll News Service the attention that has been www.gallup.com. disparities sentencing. in death available racial

159 500, (Mo.App.1993),and State 503 challenge brings up a S.W.2d peremptory The Hudson, 477, (Mo.App. prosecuting of a at- 481 tension between two v. duty zealously ethical torney’s 1991). duties —the I I what am not sure understand the duty to the client2 and to represent postal against have attorney would If the justice, merely to convict.3 seek workers, race- is a less it more or lax, then it of Batson is is enforcement neutral reason. easy prosecuting attorney for the to fairly penalty this Court’s death Examining duty zealously represent to the let largest juris- cases from the state’s three justice. duty override the to seek client dictions, Louis, Louis city of St. St. Preventing jury racial discrimination se- since the County, County and Jackson part justice of seeing lection is is 1977, penalty death reinstated Berger States, done. See v. United 295 12 in the following found: of 26 cases are 78, 88, 629, 55 79 L.Ed. U.S. S.Ct. 1314 Louis, of in St. (1935). City of seven 17 cases part justice may St. But this of not be prosecutor believes that four 12 cases County, done where Louis of justice requires of the conviction defen- chal- County Batson Jackson contained dant, although trump this should not belief were lenges. challenges of Batson None norms. other ethical examining all appeal. successful on reported appeals 1995 criminal since prosecutors peremptory use their When challenges, appears contain Batson challenges to strike African-Americans 100 cases. Of there have been about such jury panel, from the Batson challenge a race, placed two remanded frequently concerning results. The burden is those were upon prosecutor racially Bat- give proper a a neutral to the a trial court conduct Jones, for the v. reason strike. State 979 Only reported son one case hearing.4 1998). 171, 185 Accept S.W.2d trial found that was remanded for new racially may ed neutral reasons include appellate because the court sustained juror “uncommunicative,” seemed that a or If ef- challenge.5 Batson has Batson Batson, a “never cracked smile.” 476 U.S. state, it is trial court law simply fect 1712, (Marshall, 106 S.Ct. concur Batson where even rumors sustained If ring opinion). such reasons are suffi challenges by. hard to come are strikes, justify prosecutor’s cient to be Large-scale empirical studies seem protection illusory, then the of Batson racial lacking as to the effect Batson on just predicted. as Id. Justice Marshall But studies examined discrimination. Moreover, question may of race very only no effect date show either inextricably bound in other up attributes use peremptory limited effect on the status, juror, of prospective employment Bal- challenges to discriminate. David C. example, justify the strike. may dus, Challenges Peremptory Use decisions, Appellate to illustrate exam A Em- Capital Legal Trials: Murder ple, upheld have exclusion of African- L., Pa. pirical U. J. Const. Analysis, as employment post because of Americans capital A February, study at 34. Pepper, al See v. 855 workers. State Johnson, Nathan, (Mo.App. 992 908 2. S.W.2d 4. State v. S.W.2d State v. Dunn, 1999), and State 1985). 1994). (Mo.App. generally to Missouri Rule 4- See Comment Davis, (Mo.App. 5. State 894 S.W.2d 703 Conduct). (Rules of Professional 3.8. *21 160

murder by juries Then, cases tried a alty over 16- if justify the facts it. from that year period in Philadelphia penalty qualified” “death group, found that Bat- the state permitted son had no is prosecutorial prospec- effect on strike nine of the strikes jurors tive against for no reason. This elimi- may African-American venire mem- just nate everyone about who might bers. Id. at 70. even they look give capital like could a defen- Apparently the most substantial effect of dant the benefit of a reasonable doubt. Missouri, Batson in regret I say, has Does really the state need to strike nine of been question to call into the actions of the its citizens in order for the state to receive judges two trial in this case. In addition trial, a fair even jury panel after a is opinions case, to the in this see State v. penalty “death qualified?” (Mo. 1996) 935 S.W.2d 9 banc A system many peremptory allows Smulls v. 10 S.W.3d 497 banc challenges open manipulation by 2000). It is a matter irony of unfortunate popular press defense as well. The has apparently Batson has had little or no many Dunne, examples. See Dominick effect preventing racial discrimination Crimes, Justice: Trials and Punishments in the use of peremptory challenges. (2001). Perhaps, reports, as Dunne only way to eliminate completely prosecutor fascists,” wants “twelve and de- profiling racial in jury selection is to elimi fense counsel wants bleeding-heart “twelve nate peremptory challenge. Justice weirdos, liberals assumption with the Batson, position Marshall advocated this they will arrive somewhere in be- 107, 106 476 U.S. S.Ct. and Justice tween.” Id. at 15. Is the really result a Goldberg hinted at per elimination of the fair trial a jury before drawn from a rea- emptory challenge in his dissent Swain sonable community? cross-section of the Alabama, 202, 244, v. 380 U.S. 85 S.Ct. In may imprisonment, cases that involve 824, 13 (1965). L.Ed.2d 759 death, given each side is per- six Complete per elimination of the emptory challenges, per and two side emptory is a challenge remedy, drastic and where there would prison be no sentence. one that I am espouse. reluctant In case, penalty a death at least 18 citi- 7 complete elimination, stead of legisla zens up undergo show voir dire ex- might ture consider at least a drastic cur away amination and are sent for no stated tailment of the number peremptory reason. This is a waste of time. For a challenges. Section 494.480 allows nine juror to discern that his or her may race peremptory challenges per side death have been a factor is to add insult to the penalty cases. These strikes occur after injury. proper waste-of-time This is not a challenges pro for cause remove way citizens, for the state to treat its spective jurors impose capi who would not especially those who come when sum- So, punishment.6 tal we, each case there is moned for service. If as a democratic panel of citizens who have indicated that society, jury system believe the is essen- tial, they impose will be able to pen- ought the death then respect we to foster prospective juror 6. A usually is removed for cause if 7. The number is more than 18 be- "prevent his or her views would or substan- peremptoiy challenges cause are also allowed tially impair performance of his duties as jurors being when alternate are selected. It is Six, juror ....” State v. 805 S.W.2d possible, likely, peremptory but not that some 1991), citing Wainwright challenges will be unused. Witt, 412, 424, 469 U.S. 105 S.Ct. (1985). L.Ed.2d 841 claims no hear- post-conviction as to which this service. See State ex rel. Linthicum 2001) Calvin, (Mo ing granted. J.). Wolff, opinion of (separate *22 principal opinion’s disagree I with the grant to Mr. determination whether depend challenge on the for cause to We the relief due to post-conviction Smulls jurors are prospective remove who biased created the appearance impropriety by of particular or otherwise unsuitable for a at trial Judge Corrigan of the comments peremptory The of case. benefit the opinion in and this Court’s initial following helps fair is that it ensure a trial strike case, 9 935 State S.W.2d in judge wrong overruling the trial is when 1996) (Smulls I). (Mo. As set out banc cause. of challenge fight a for the below, or not whether given trial appropriately deference to court biased, in fact his comments themselves rulings, judge a can in trial be incorrect appearance impropriety. caused an challenge overruling a for cause without this Court to order This should have led But committing reversible error. how I post-conviction relief in rather Smulls are for a many safety valves needed fair for, remanding for further hearing, than a six peremptory trial? Nine or even chal- noted, the for as Smulls I itself standard wildly lenges seem On chal- excessive. judge or cause, whether a should recuse himself many as in lenges other trial events, judge herself the is shown is not whether trial court rul- correctness of fact, whether, to be in based on biased ings appropriately is One assumed. or judge’s conduct or comments: peremptory challenges two should be enough. person a would have factual reasonable grounds appearance impro- find an If the of peremptory challenges number impartiality doubt the of the priety and two, in juries one or were reduced to ra- court. cially likely diverse counties would more representative community. 935 at 17.1 S.W.2d importantly, More such move would Judge Corrigan’s comments been have drastically yet reduce often subtle al- above, length purpose out and no set at ways racial insidious discrimination inher- by repeating them here. would be served many peremptory challenges. ent that, assuming said is What can be Judge Corrigan’s subjective intent in mak- STITH, Judge, LAURA DENVIR one, innocuous ing the remarks was an concurring part. and part dissenting provide remarks nonetheless factual grounds person which a reasonable on agree principal opinion’s I de- appearance of impropriety could find the termination that Mr. Smulls has not shown impartiality judge. doubt in failing that counsel was ineffective ignores simply To otherwise suggest gunshot or present residue evidence fur- I, fact, as that: stated circumstances, mitigating ther evidence of testify. judge Mr. I It is not the to whom we should advising Smulls not agree he has an afford the benefit of the doubt. also not shown enti- process hearing rights expecta- on the and due based evidentiary tlement 171, Dodd, 584, Accord, Jones, 1996); S.W.2d 586 State v. 944 State v. 177- Kinder, (Mo. 1998); S.D.1997); 78 State v. 942 (Mo.App. banc Graham 11 1996); S.D.1999). S.W.2d State v. (Mo.App. S.W.3d Nunley, 923 S.W.2d parties tions of the prop- are the court’s this Court stating that he had dis- er focus. cussed Smulls I with all the judges of the circuit, O’Brien, including Judge they I, 935 S.W.2d at 26. It ig- also had agreed with him wrong. that was wisdom, nores the amply demonstrated the subsequent history of this very litiga- This Court held in Smulls II that these tion, strictly adhering to a standard of provided conversations a basis on which “a recusal ap- the reasonable solely based person reasonable could impar- doubt the pearance of impropriety. That why tiality of’ O’Brien. 10 “judicial statement —on the record or off— 504. The ensuing controversy among *23 a genuine raises doubt as to the of members the bar and community con- law, judge’s willingness to pro- follow the firmed that this was the case. “While or, vides a basis for recusal if judge Judge the O’Brien indicated that he could be recuse, refuses to appeal.” impartial, reversal on many and community the said Kinder, State v. they thought he impartial, could be and they Judge believed that Corrigan himself biased and had not shown here, Applying principles these no one comments, by bias publicly others disa- familiar with the continuing saga of this But, greed. whether Judge O’Brien or case could deny that the June 1996 deci- Judge Corrigan impartial were fact or I, sion in Smulls and the subsequent histo- believed themselves to be is not the issue. case, ry of this have engendered great A judge cannot his own judge impartiality controversy. Immediately following the and appearance the of impropriety cannot decision, initial members of the bar took be by determined a show of hands. The conflicting positions as to whether the standard for recusal is whether the facts appearance facts created an impropriety of give people grounds reasonable for doubt- of and whether he was ing impartiality. the court’s being fairly by treated this Court. Over following the years, three and one-half Mr. appeal Now Smulls’ is before this hearing new was held before Judge time, Court yet years third some two presented O’Brien on the issues by Mr. after the decision in Smulls II and and five Smulls’ Rule 29.15 hearing, judge and the one-half years after the decision Smulls concluded that Judge Corrigan I. Yet, was not most principal opinion of the biased and Mr. Smulls was not entitled to again directed not to the issue of Mr. post-conviction relief. guilt Smulls’ punishment, but to the (1) propriety appearance issues of the and Smulls v. appeal, On (2) of propriety Judge of Corrigan; 2000) (Smulls II), did not propriety appearance and propriety of of reach the issue of Mr. Smulls’ entitlement presiding O’Brien in hearing over a post-conviction relief, to directly or even propriety colleague’s into the of his con- address Corrigan’s alleged improp- (3) duct; propriety of the rulings II er comments at the trial. ad- of Hartenbach in presiding over the dressed issues raised very publicity hearing into propriety of the conduct that surrounded this Court’s decision in of in presiding over the I, wit, allowing Judge whether hearing into the propriety of Corri- preside O’Brien to over the Rule 29.15 gan’s conduct. hearing itself appearance created an of impropriety Judge Corrigan’s because of get The route this case took to here is public castigating statements members of more complex circuitous than the most else tongue-twister. Whatever this series Missouri, Respondent, show,

of serves demonstrates STATE of events teachings prior of cases the wisdom of impro- appearance as to the doubts COLE, Appellant. Andre in favor recu- priety should be resolved Otherwise, here, fo- sal. as occurred No. SC 83485. and character cus will become conduct Missouri, Supreme Court whereas the focus judge, should En Banc.

fairness the trial of the defendant. Feb. 2002. focus, repu- Due this loss of both the 23, April Denied Rehearing judges tations of various Mr. Smulls’ unfairly trial left right a new have been the fair- years,

in doubt for over five judi- impartiality

ness and of the Missouri system into repeatedly

cial has been called *24 just type

question. It is avoid

situation that recusal should be ordered the appearance

where the facts raise even a impropriety eyes reasonable

person. This Court should have directed 29.15

in Smulls I that Mr. Smulls’ Rule now,

motion I so hold granted. be would so new can be

and remand that a trial simply fact

held. This scenario should permitted to continue.2 above, I

For the reasons set out concur part part. and dissent in impartial- ably question judge’s disagree principal opinion’s called into I with the also disqualify opinion really principal statement order ity. I believe the O’Brien, required to show Mr. Smulls principle: a espouse intends to narrower Corrigan "spe- Judges a O’Brien and had as merely being a member of the same circuit relationship.” special relation- cial While To judge not a basis for recusal. another would, course, per- ship give a reasonable impartiality, there must be doubt as to create grounds appearance of to find an son "factual factor,” as, “plus but not limited such some impartiality impropriety and doubt to, relationship judges. With special of the too, court,’’ I, 17, so, agree. principle, fully I this narrower presence facts reason- would the of other

Case Details

Case Name: Smulls v. State
Court Name: Supreme Court of Missouri
Date Published: Feb 26, 2002
Citation: 71 S.W.3d 138
Docket Number: SC 83179
Court Abbreviation: Mo.
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