646 N.Y.S.2d 110 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1996
—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Irad S. Ingraham, J.), entered February 21, 1996, which, in an action against a cooperative housing corporation for withholding consent to an assignment of plaintiffs’ shares and proprietary lease, granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and entered judgment for defendant, unanimously reversed, on the law and the facts, without costs, the jury verdict reinstated, and the matter remanded for trial on the issue of damages.
Plaintiffs are the owners of shares and holders of a proprietary lease relating to one unit within a 12-unit property
By contract dated October 19, 1991, plaintiffs sought to sell their cooperative housing unit to third parties (the St. Johns), but were denied consent of the Board. Plaintiffs thereafter commenced this action, contending that this denial breached both the consent provision of the proprietary lease and the Board’s general fiduciary obligation to fellow shareholders. Plaintiffs alleged that the Board had denied consent to the transfer on account of an animus against plaintiffs resulting from litigation conducted against the corporation by a third party over an accident which had occurred at plaintiffs’ unit; plaintiffs further claimed that some Board members sought to condition sale of the unit upon a future waiver by the St. Johns of the right, enjoyed by all shareholders under the proprietary lease but apparently exercised by few, to sublet their unit after the purchase. At trial, defendant argued that the Board had denied consent to the transfer for other reasons, including technical problems in the sale contract and bad prior experiences with the St. Johns, who had previously rented units on the property; defendant conceded at trial that one or more members of the Board were concerned about the sublet issue.
The first trial of this matter resulted in a hung jury. In a second, bifurcated trial, the jury concluded that defendant had unreasonably withheld consent to the transfer. Thereafter, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that the jury’s findings were contrary to the evidence and the law. Plaintiffs appealed.
We reverse. It is well established that "[¡Judgment as a matter of law may be granted to a party after a contrary jury verdict only if 'there is simply no valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could possibly lead rational [jurors] to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis-of the evidence presented at trial’ ” (Frances G. v Vincent G., 71 NY2d 1001,1002). That is not the case here. Although cooperatives have exceedingly broad discretion in admissions decisions