Plaintiffs appeal as of right the January 11, 1989, opinion and order awarding plaintiffs $2,000 in attorney fees under the Michigan Con
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sumer Protection Act (mcpa), MCL 445.901
et seq.;
MSA 19.418(1)
et seq.
On appeal, plaintiffs allege that the trial court erred in the amount of the award, the method of calculation and factors to be considered, the imposition of interest on the award, and the availability of discovery of defendants’ attorneys’ time records. We hold that the trial court erred in failing to consider plaintiffs’ attorney’s computer printouts of his time records and in failing to apply the factors contаined in
Crawley v Schick,
First, plaintiffs allege that the trial court erred in refusing to consider plaintiffs’ counsel’s computer records indicating the amount of time spent on the case. We agree. The trial court ruled that the computer entries did not consist of original contemporaneous time records. However, our rеview of the record indicates that most of the information contained on the computer printout was placed directly into the computer sometime following the work рerformed for plaintiff. While it is true that some of the information in the computer was transferred to the computer from temporary notes indicating the amount of time spent on individuаl projects, we hold that this does not destroy the admissibility of the computer entries. In an analogous situation, our Supreme Court in
Green v Woods,
In so holding, we do not express an opinion on the validity of the charges contained on the computer sheet. We only find that the trial сourt erred in failing to consider them. The trial court retains the discretion to assess reasonable attorney fees, not actual attorney fees.
Ecclestone v Ogne,
Plaintiffs also allege that the trial court applied the wrong standard in assessing reasonable attorney fees. While the trial court based its award on a typical, hypothetical case, plaintiffs argue that the court must base its decision on the application of the factors contained in
Crawley, supra.
We agree. The mcpa allows a person who suffers a loss as a result of а violation of the act to bring an action to recover reasonable attorney fees. MCL 445.911(2); MSA 19.418(H)(2),
Mikos v Chrysler Corp,
There is no precise formula for computing the reasonableness of an attorney’s fee. However, among the facts to be taken intо consideration in determining the reasonableness of a fee include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the professional standing and experience of the attorney; (2) the skill, timе and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results achieved; (4) the diffi *296 culty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. See generally 3 Michigan Law & Practice, Attorneys and Counselors, § 44, p 275 and Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Ethics. [Crawley, supra at 737.]
While the trial court should consider the guidelines of
Crawley,
it is not limited to those factors in making its decision.
Wood v DAIIE,
We hold that the trial court erred in failing to apply the Crawley factors in determining attorney fees. The trial court’s award of $2,000 in attorney fees based on a typical action tо recover wrongfully withheld security deposits brought under the mcpa was inadequate. In so holding, we do not express an opinion on the appropriateness of plaintiffs’ requеst for over $50,000 in attorney fees.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that in remanding this case to the trial court we should set forth specific additional items which should be considered in detеrmining attorney fees. We decline to do so. We decline to follow plaintiffs’ suggestion that the trial court must use a determination of a reasonable fee, computed as the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, as a starting point in determining reasonable attorney fees. In essence, plaintiffs suggest that plaintiffs’ attorney is entitled to be compensated at the market rate of $100 per hour of trial work and $125 per hour of
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appellate work multiplied by the time expended. We reject the application of any rigid formula, whether based on a contingent fee arrangement or an hourly formula, that fails to take into account the totаlity of the special circumstances applicable to the case at hand.
Hartman v Associated Truck Lines,
Plaintiffs also argue that their attorney is entitled to a fee for services rendered on appeal. We agree. We hold that the underlying purpose behind the mcpa’s award of attorney fees is to afford an indigent client the opportunity to seek protection and obtain a judgment where otherwise precluded because of monetary constraints. In interpreting a statute, we give effect to the legislative intent and to the рlain and unambiguous meaning of the statute.
Joy Management Co v Detroit,
Plaintiffs also allege that the trial court erred in not allowing plaintiffs to discover information concerning defendants’ attorneys’ time spent on the litigation. We disagree. The trial court’s decision to grant or deny a discovery motion will be reversed on appeal only if there has been an abuse of discretion.
Eyde v Eyde,
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the interest on the
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attorney fee portion of an award under the mcpa should accrue from the date of the filing of the complaint or at least from the date of the оriginal order granting attorney fees. We disagree. This Court in
Harvey v Gerber,
Reversed as to the amount of attorney fees awarded and remanded for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact regarding reasonable attorney fees. We do not retain jurisdiction.