Smith v. YeagerSmith v. Yeager
- Reporters:
- , , ,
- Before:
- White
This рetition for a writ of certiorari presents the question whether petitioner’s relinquishment of an evidentiary
In 1957, petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder in a New Jersey court, and sentenced to death. The Suрreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the conviction, State v. Smith, 27 N. J. 433, 142 A. 2d 890, and subsequently affirmed the denial of a motion for a new trial. State v. Smith, 29 N. J. 561, 150 A. 2d 769.
Petitioner thereafter sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. During oral argument before the District Court on June 5, 1961, petitioner’s counsel, referring to the then recent decision in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U. S. 534, stated:
“The United States Supreme Court says your Honor may hold a hearing de novo if need be to go into the historical facts behind this case. I don’t think it is necessary here.
“I think if your Honor limits himself to the record, I think that the error, the fundamental constitutional error in this case is so overwhelming that I need not stand here and argue this casе at any great length.” Appendix to Petition 69a.
The District Court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. Relying on the state trial record, it dеnied the application, holding, inter alia, that petitioner’s confession, introduced at his trial, was not the product of coerciоn. United States ex rel. Smith v. New Jersey, 201 F. Supp. 272. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 322 F. 2d 810. 1
We note initially that the usual principles of
res judi-cata
are inapplicable to successive habeas corpus pro
At the time of the 1961 proceeding, Brown v. Allen, 344 U. S. 443, indicated that a District Court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing was to be exercised only in “unusual circumstances,” 344 U. S., at 463, or where a “vital flaw” existed in the state procedure. 344 U. S., at 506 (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter). Townsend v. Sain, supra, had not yet been decided. This Court recognized in Townsend “that the opinions in Brown v. Allen ... do not provide answers for all aspects of the hearing problem for the lower federal courts, which have reached widely divergеnt, in fact often irreconcilable, results,” 372 U. S., at 310, and established criteria for the granting of evidentiary hearings “which must be considered to suрersede, to the extent of any inconsistencies, the opinions in Brown v. Allen . . . 372 U. S., at 312. Townsend v. Sain substantially increased the availability of evidentiary hearings in habeas corpus proceedings, and made mandatory much of what had previously been within the broad discretion of the District Cоurt. See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391.
It is at least doubtful whether petitioner could have obtained an evidentiary hearing as the law stood in 1961. Indeed, at the time, the State argued to the District Court with some cogency that petitioner presented “no unusual circumstances calling for a hearing.” We do not believe that petitioner should be placed in a worse position be
“If, for any reason not attributable to the inexcusable negleсt of petitioner . . . evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not devеloped at the state hearing, a federal hearing is compelled.” Townsend v. Sain, supra, at 317. Petitioner’s assertion that he comes within this principle is not controverted by respondent or by the record below. We do not, however, pass on this question, or on the other quеstions presented in the petition. These, as well as other issues appropriately raised below, may be considered by thе District Court. We hold only that petitioner has not, by reason of anything that occurred during the 1961 habeas proceeding, waived his clаim to an eviden-tiary hearing in the District Court.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is revеrsed, and the case is remanded to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. /£ {s so ordered.
Mb. Justice White dissents and would grant certiorari and set the case for oral argument.
Notes
Petitioner has sought, and was denied, certiorari in this Court on three previous ocсasions — twice to the state courts, 361 U. S. 861; 379 U. S. 1005, once to the United States Court of Appeals in the prior habeas corpus proceeding, 376 U. S. 928. It is worth noting that the present pleadings below substantially expand and clarify the claims heretofore presentеd by petitioner.
The allegations, which include claims of physical harassment by the police, are set out in Judge Biggs’ dissenting opiniоn below, 395 F. 2d 245, 253, n. 12.
On May 15, 1961, during argument on the State’s motion to strike petitioner’s “Amended and/or Supplemental Petition,” the District Court indicated its сoncern that the record be complete to the satisfaction of both parties. The Court of Appeals construеd this as an offer to conduct an evidentiary hearing. No explicit mention of an evidentiary hearing was made, however. A reading of the entire colloquy in the District Court, though not unambiguous, suggests, as Judge Biggs noted in dissent below, that the discussion was concerned only with “the issuе of whether or not the case would proceed upon the original petition for habeas corpus and answer, the suрplemental petition for habeas corpus and answer, or on both sets of pleadings.” 395 F. 2d 245, 249, n. 4.
Judge Biggs did not participate.
For this reason, if no other, the fact that Townsend v. Sain was decided before the Court оf Appeals’ decision in the first proceeding, and considered by the Court of Appeals there in denying rehearing en banc, is not dispositive of the present case.
As the State pointed out during the 1961 hearing, Rogers v. Richmond, supra, the case chiefly relied on by petitioner, does not appear to support his claim to an evidentiary hearing. See especially 365 U. S., at 547.