163 P. 810 | Or. | 1917
Opinion by
“The evidence was sufficient to sustain the findings of fact by the court. At law appellee was not entitled to set up in this action by way of set-off or countei'*278 claim, the $1,050 damages suffered by it by a breach of contract made by appellant. Was it entitled to set it up as an equitable set-off? In 2 Story’s Equity Jurisprudence, 13th ed., § 1437a, it is said: ‘It has been already suggested that courts of equity will extend the doctrine of set-off and claims in the nature of set-off beyond* the law in all cases where peculiar equities intervene between the parties. These are so very various as to admit of no comprehensive enumeration.’ In North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596, 616, 38 L. Ed. 565, 572, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 710, 716, it is said: ‘By the decided weight of authority it is settled that the insolvency of the party against whom the set-off is claimed is a sufficient ground for equitable interference. * * In addition to insolvency it is held by many well-considered decisions, including those of Illinois, that the nonresidence of the party against whom the set-off is asserted is good ground for equitable relief. Quick v. Lemon, 105 Ill. 578; Taylor v. Stowell, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 175; Forbes v. Cooper, 88 Ky. 285 (11 S. W. 24); Robbins v. Holley, 1 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 191; Edminson v. Baxter, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 112 (9 Am. Dec. 751); Davis v. Milburn, 3 Iowa, 163.’ In Forbes v. Cooper, supra, it is said: ‘It is certainly unconscientious for an insolvent party to coerce the payment of his claim when he is owing the other party an equal or larger sum, and thus leave the latter remediless, nor should a nonresident be allowed, under like circumstances, to enforce through, the agency of the courts the collection of his debt, and compel the other party to seek a foreign jurisdiction for relief, and then perhaps find the debtor insolvent. If the object of litigation be the attainment of justice, assuredly such results should be prevented. Indeed, the.doctrine of equitable set-off to the extent it was formerly applied was based upon moral justice, and to meet such cases as the above, thus preventing wrong. It was then not uncommon to stay an insolvent or nonresident debtor in the collection of his claim until damages to which the complainant might be entitled against him*279 were liquidated under the order of the chancellor, and then apply them in satisfaction of his independent debt.’ In Quick v. Lemon, supra, it is said: ‘It would seem to be inequitable to require the corporation to go to another state to collect its demand in an action at law, and we are inclined to hold that the nonresidence of the complainant, in connection with the fact that he calls upon a court of equity to enforce his judgment, is sufficient to allow the defendant corporation to prove and set off its demand set up in the cross-bill against the judgment of the complainant.’ To the same effect see Porter v. Roseman, 165 Ind. 255, 112 Am. St. Rep. 222, 74 N. E. 1105, 6 Ann. Cas. 718, and note to that case and cases cited. The rule announced in these cases is a just rule, and should be enforced. We see no good reason for sending a citizen of this state to a foreign jurisdiction to obtain justice when the courts of this state can afford relief. They are as fully competent to afford relief to the citizen as to the nonresident. Why should one in cases like this be accorded greater rights than the other ?’’
Among the cases cited in the note to the above case are the following, where the claims offset were for unliquidated damages: Plattner Implement Co. v. Bradley A. & Co., 40 Colo. 95 (90 Pac. 86); Fitzgerald v. Wiley, 22 App. D. C. 329; Taylor v. Stowell, 4 Met. (Ky.) 175; Forbes v. Cooper, 88 Ky. 285 (11 S. W. 24); Edminson v. Baxter, 4 Hayw. (Tenn.) 112 (9 Am. Dec. 751); North Chicago Rolling Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co., 152 U. S. 596 (38 L. Ed. 565, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 710). The authorities both for and against the proposition are so exceedingly well collated in the note in 30 L. R. A. 21, that it is needless to recapitulate them here. We have carefully examined them, as well as other cases cited by counsel, and agree with the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in the case first cited. The plain
“You owe us $3,000 upon a note and mortgage, and we demand payment or foreclosure.”
The defendants reply:
“Yes, it is true that we gave you a note and mortgage and agreed to pay you $3,000, but that promise was in consideration, among other things, that you would furnish us water to irrigate our orchard and crops. You did not furnish the water, and by reason of your breach of the contract the land that we mortgaged to you failed to produce the crops which a compliance by you with your agreement would have enabled us to produce, and by your failure to keep your agreement we are injured in a sum greater than the amount of your mortgage.”
The plaintiffs then say to the court:
“Please allow us to use the equitable machinery of this court to sell these people out of house and home, and after we have done that they can come to Chicago and bring an action at law to determine whether we have broken our agreement to furnish them water.”
This is not one whit overdrawn. It is plaintiffs’ contention stripped of legal verbiage and expressed in common, every-day language; and the very statement of it marks its inequity. The defendants’ answer was good as an equitable defense.
“That by the use of said water on said land in the irrigation thereof under and pursuant to said perpetual right of use as aforesaid, said land became especially valuable for the cultivation and propagation of fruit trees and particularly for apples, peaches, and pears, and said land also thereby became valuable for the raising of the ordinary agricultural crops.”
This taken in connection with the other allegations regarding the worthlessness of the land without water fairly states that water was necessary in order to raise agricultural crops. Again we find this allegation:
“And by reason of said faults, failures, and refusals [referring to plaintiffs’ failure to furnish water], said S. M. Willis has suffered the loss of, and to, her fruit trees and fruit, and agricultural crops planted and growing on said land to the full amount of $4,500.”
Both these allegations are denied in the reply. We think they put in issue three matters: (1) Whether the water was necessary for the growing of agricultural crops; (2) whether such crops were planted and grown upon said land; and (3) whether they were injured by reason of plaintiffs’ refusal to furnish the necessary water to irrigate them as provided in the agreement. It is true that the allegations in the answer are not models of good pleading, but they were sufficient to raise the issue, and the testimony on this branch of the case was not objected to on the ground of the insufficiency of the pleading. We think such damages were general and such as might reasonably be expected as the result of the injury averred: 1 Sutherland on Damages, 763 et seq.; 8 R. C. L., § 156, p. 611; Wisner v. Barber, 10 Or. 342; Dose v. Tooze, 37 Or. 13 (60 Pac. 380). It is the view of the writer
Modified and Affirmed.