Gregory Lynn SMITH, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 20131030
Supreme Court of Utah
Aug. 11, 2015
2015 UT 68 | 359 P.3d 580
David B. Barlow, Amy J. Oliver, Jeffrey E. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Sean D. Reyes, Att‘y Gen., Bridget K. Romano, Solicitor Gen., Salt Lake City, for the State of Utah.
Justice PARRISH authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice LEE, Justice DURHAM, and Judge TOOMEY joined. Due to his retirement, Justice NEHRING did not participate herein; Court of Appeals Judge KATE A. TOOMEY sat. Justice DENO G. HIMONAS became a member of the Court on February 13, 2015, after oral argument in this matter, and accordingly did not participate.
Justice PARRISH, opinion of the Court:
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 For millennia, physicians have sworn, “With regard to healing the sick, ... I will take care that they suffer no hurt or damage.”1 And for perhaps just as long, the sick have sought redress when hurt or damage inevitably occur.2 Caught in the middle, lawmakers have tried to strike a balance that provides redress for the injured while accounting for the concerns of the medical profession.3
¶ 2 In 1986, the Utah Legislature amended the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, sections
Is the noneconomic damages cap in section
78B-3-410 of the Malpractice Act permissible as applied to wrongful-death cases underarticle XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution ? We hold that it is not.
BACKGROUND
¶ 3 Gregory Lynn Smith‘s son, Gregory Lee Smith, died on Octоber 22, 2010, of an acute drug intoxication involving the medications prescribed to him by medical staff at the VA medical center in Salt Lake City. The VA staff had prescribed the pain medications upon his discharge from the medical center after a back surgery.
¶ 4 Mr. Smith filed suit against the United States of America in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging that VA medical staff negligently caused his son‘s death.6 That court certified two questions to us:
- Does the limitation on a plaintiff‘s recovery of noneconomic damages in
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-410 apply to claims alleging wrongful death caused by medical malpractice? - If the answer to Question No. 1 is in the affirmative, is
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-410 permissible underArticle XVI, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution ?7
We have jurisdiction to answer these questions pursuant to
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5 On certification from a federal court, there is no prior decisiоn and thus no standard of review.8 We answer the legal questions presented and do not resolve the underlying dispute.9
ANALYSIS
¶ 6 The United States District Court has asked us if the damages cap in section
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law.10
But the damages cap in section
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. The amount of damages awarded for noneconomic loss may not exceed ... $450,000.11
Our analysis proceeds in two parts. We hold that
I. ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
¶ 7 The interpretation of
A. Article XVI, Section 5 Protects Economic and Certain Noneconomic Damages
¶ 8 The parties agree that
¶ 9 A particular point of disagreement is the pronouncement in Webb that “only the pecuniary loss sustаined can be compensated” in a suit for wrongful death.15 Mr. Smith argues that “pecuniary” as used in that case includes economic and noneconomic damages. The United States argues that pecuniary damages are limited to economic damages. We agree with Mr. Smith and conclude that the damages allowed under Webb and its progeny are not so limited.
¶ 10 To understand Webb and the scope of protection afforded by
Be it enacted by the Governor and Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Utah: That whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the company or corporation which, would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
SEC. 2. That every such action shall be brought by, and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person ... : And provided further, that the damages so recovered shall not in any case exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars.19
Ten years later, the territorial legislature enacted a new wrongful-death statute. The new statute prоvided,
SEC. 234. When the death of a person - not being a minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the death, or if such person be employed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such other person. In every action under this and the preceding section, such dam
ages may be given as under all circumstances of the case may be just.20
Unlike its predecessor, the new statute contained no limit on the amount of damages. It was against the backdrop of this statute thаt the constitutional provision prohibiting damage caps in wrongful-death cases went into affect in 1896 when Utah became a state.21
¶ 11 The first case to address the issue of allowable damages under the revised Utah statute was the 1890 case of Webb v. Denver & R.G.W. Railway, which both parties recognize as the seminal case on this question. In that case, our predecessors recognized
the rule almost uniformly laid down by the courts of England and the United States to the effect that only the pecuniary loss sustained can be compensated for, and that no compensation can be given for the mental anguish or suffering of the heirs or next of kin of the deceased.22
The court‘s inclusion of the word pecuniary is the basis for the substantial differences in the parties’ understanding of the holding in Webb. The word pecuniary has the same meaning today as it did in the late nineteenth century—“consisting of or measured in money” or “of or relating to money.”23 But the court in Webb stated that “the word ‘pecuniary’ in this [context] is not construed in any very strict sense.”24 Indeed, the court held that there is “great[] liberality” in allowable damages under the statute and they “include every element of injury that may be deemed to have a pecuniary value, although this value may not be susceptible of positive proof, and can only be vaguely estimаted.”25 It further stated that even though “the pecuniary injury ... cannot be proved with even an approach to accuracy, ... [it is] to be estimated and awarded, for ... the jury is to give such damages as may be just under all the circumstances.”26 The court then listed various species of allowable damages, including the loss of nurture, intellectual and moral training, and society.27 These damages are not pecuniary as that term is commonly understood. We are therefore persuaded that the badge pecuniary, as that word is commonly understood, is not helpful in identifying the damages that were available in wrongful-death cases at the timе the Utah Constitution was adopted. Instead, we must look to the species of damages allowed by the court under the statute.
¶ 12 In the years leading to the adoption of the Utah Constitution, the court upheld a broad range of damages for wrongful death, including both economic and noneconomic damages. In the arena of economic damages, the court held that the jury should consider the financial contribution the deceased reasonably would have provided to his survivors based on “his ability to earn wages and provide for his family,” “the number in
¶ 13 Significantly for our purposes, the court also allowed damages for certain noneconomic losses. For example, the court allowed recovery for “the loss of nurture, [that is] the intellectual, moral, and physical training” of a parent and “the loss of the society of a near relative,” including “the loss of [a] fathеr by children who are of full age living away from the home of the deceased and supporting themselves.”30 The court also upheld instructions for the jury to “take into account the loss of society, and the comfort” that surviving parents would have gained by raising the deceased child;31 to “include any loss which the widow of [the] deceased and his daughter have sustained or may hereafter sustain by being deprived of the support, care, nurture, companionship, assistance, and protection which ... they would have received from the deceased if he had not been killed“;32 and to award damages for the loss of “the benefits from the аssociations, comforts, and pleasures that ... [the decedent‘s survivors] would have received from him had his life been spared.”33 This court continued a broad conception of allowable damages by upholding similar awards after statehood.34
¶ 14 While the court clearly allowed damages for noneconomic losses, such damages were not unlimited. In Webb, the court held that “no compensation can be given for the mental anguish or suffering of the heirs or next of kin of the deceased.”35 The opinion in Webb notes the same concerns expressed in the seminal English case on this issue,36 namely that “if the mental suffering of the heirs is to be taken into the aсcount, and compensated for in money, the difficulty [of proving or estimating the pecuniary loss] is infinitely increased.”37 In short, the court held that this kind of loss is “too remote and
¶ 15 It is against this legal backdrop that the framers adopted the constitutional provision protecting the recovery of damages for wrongful death. Accordingly,
B. The Compensation Exception to Articlе XVI, Section 5 Applies Only to Schemes Akin to Workers’ Compensation
¶ 16 Having defined the types of wrongful-death damages protected by
¶ 17 The compensation exception to
¶ 18 The United States argues that the exception applies because the Smiths are still entitled to recover damages (compensation) up to the amount of the cap. In other words, it suggests that the exception empowers the
¶ 19 The United States’ proposed construction is also flawed because it conflates the concept of damages with that of compensation. The fact that the Smiths may be entitled to recover some damages under the cap does not transform those recoverable damages into compensation. In fact, the terms damages and compensation have distinct meanings. The word compensation means “making amends” or “that which is necessary to restore an injured party to his former position.”44 In contrast, the word damages means “[a] pecuniary compensation ... which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss, detriment, or injury ... through the unlawful act or omission or negligence of another.”45 As Black‘s Law Dictionary stated in 1891 and repeated in 1910, “[d]amages [are] amends exacted from a wrong-doer for a tort” but “[c]ompensation is amends for something which was taken without the owner‘s choice, yet without commission of a tort.”46 Thus, compensation is distinguished from damages because damages require fault.47 Because any damages awardable within the cap are based upon a medical provider‘s fault, the fact of their awardability does not make the constitutional exception available. Accordingly, we hold that the compensation exception to
II. SECTION 78B-3-410 OF THE UTAH CODE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED TO WRONGFUL-DEATH CASES
¶ 20 The Malpractice Act limits noneconomic damages in a “malpracticе action,” including damages in those cases of malpractice that result in death.48
In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. The amount of damages awarded for noneconomic loss may not exceed ... $450,000.
The parties agree that this statute cannot constitutionally limit damages that
¶ 21 When construing a statute, we seek primarily to give effect to the intent of the Legislature.49 To begin, we look to the plain language of the specific provision within its context.50 And because we presume that the Legislature intends a statute to complement, not contradict, constitutional protections, we attempt to construe it accordingly.51 We address Mr. Smith‘s three alternatives in turn.
¶ 22 First, Mr. Smith reasons that the Legislature never intended for the Malpractice Act to apply to wrongful-death cases because it did not explicitly reference the cap in the wrongful-death statute itself. Mr. Smith points to the consortium statute as an example. In that statute, the Legislature provided that “[d]amages awarded for loss of consortium ... may not exceed any applicable statutory limit on noneconomic damages, including [the damages cap in]
¶ 23 The United States soundly rebuts this reasoning on the basis of the express scope of the cap. The first sentence denotes the cap‘s scope: “[i]n a malpractice action against a health care рrovider.”54 And the definition section defines “[m]alpractice action against a health care provider” as “any action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise.”55 Further, there is nothing in the language of the cap indicating that it applies only if it is expressly referenced in the statute giving rise to the underlying cause of action. In short, the plain language of the Malpractice Act forecloses any reading under which it is inapplicable as a whole to wrongful-death cases.
¶ 24 Mr. Smith‘s second proposed construction would narrow the application of the cap to apply only to those damages that are not protected by the constitution. The Malpractice Act provides that
an injured plaintiff may recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. The amount of damages awarded for noneconomic loss may not exceed ... $450,000.56
Mr. Smith proposes that we narrowly construe the phrase “noneconomic losses to compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience” to refer only to damages for “mental anguish and suffering” because the latter are not protected by the constitution.
¶ 25 As the United States points out, this construction results in a reading of the Malpractice Act that is contrary to our precedent. We previously have noted that damages for “pain, suffering, and inconvenience” provided by this statute “amount to the same measure” as noneconomic loss or general damages.57 Thus, Mr. Smith‘s proposed reading of “pain, suffering, and inconvenience” as a subset of noneconomic damages is inconsistent with our precedent. And we will not depart from our common-sense precedent to adopt an unnatural reading of the statutory text.
¶ 26 Moreover, Mr. Smith‘s second proposed construction would vitiate the policy addressed by the Legislature in the Malpractice Act as a whole. The damages cap applies to all medical malpractice cases, only a small subset of which involve wrongful death. Were we to narrowly construe the damages cap on the basis of the constitutional protection for wrongful-death damages, that narrow construction would impact the scope of the cap in all medical malpractice cases, not just those involving wrongful death. This approach would unduly narrow the damages cap imposed by the Legislature. We are
¶ 27 Finally, Mr. Smith reasons that if the statute cannot be saved through either of the first two alternatives, it must be declared unconstitutional as applied to the class of cases involving damages for wrongful death. The United States has proposed no construction to stave off this alternative. Accordingly, we hold that the damages cap in
¶ 28 We are generally reluctant to strike down stаtutory enactments. But declaring the damages cap unconstitutional in this narrow subset of cases is the only viable approach given the conflicting constitutional and statutory language. The Malpractice Act provides broad procedural safeguards for the medical profession that are applicable in all malpractice cases.58 The Legislature clearly intended for these protections to apply in wrongful-death cases. But when it inserted the damages cap in 1986, it did not account for the constitutionally significant differences between the operation of the cap inside and outside of the wrongful-death context. Had the Legislature intended to abrogate the constitutional protection for wrongful-death damages in the context of medical malpractice, it could have sought an exception to
¶ 29 We note that our holding is limited to those damages that are protected by
CONCLUSION
¶ 30 The United States District Court has asked us to resolve the conflict between the prohibition of damage caps in