70 So. 905 | Ala. | 1916
The opinion of the court was delivered by
this case having been submitted and considered under new rule 46 (175 Ala., 65 South, vii).
The main subject dealt with, purpose sought, or object to be accomplished, as indicated by this title and which has been dealt with in the body of the law, was the establishment of one general circuit court system, to the exclusion of other trial courts having the jurisdiction of the circuit and chancery court; to provide a circuit court in every county in the state and to get rid of the others, whether by merger, consolidation, conversion, or abolition, and for the transfer of all cases pending in the other courts to the circuit court. The title deals with but one general subject, and all things done by the act are germane and cognate to the title, which provides for the establishment or maintenance of a circuit court system throughout the entire state to the exclusion of all other trial courts exercising chancery or circuit jurisdiction. In other words, the law provides for a circuit court in every county in the state and for wiping out
As heretofore stated, the act in question provides for a circuit court in every county in the state, and which includes Lee and Marengo; whether by creating the same and destroying the existing one by merger or conversion matters not. These counties were circuits or court divisions of themselves, with but one court each, possessing the jurisdiction of the circuit and chancery courts (just such a court as the act fixes for all counties in the state, only one is called the law and equity court and the other the circuit court), and the only change made as to these counties is, perhaps, to change the name of the court; but the act gives each of them a circuit court, just as it does every other
This section provides that a county of certain population and wealth need not be included in any circuit or chancery court division, meaning that they can be a circuit in and of themselves, just as Jefferson ánd Mobile have been for years, and as Lee and Marengo now are, and when such counties are left out of circuits, or are detached from a circuit, they in reality, and for all practical purposes, become circuits under the influence of section 147 of the Constitution.
Much has been said in argument as to the inequality of the circuits, brought about by the Governor’s veto of the recircuiting bill, and much could be said against conditions that will exist if the act in question is stricken down, as we would have restored 51 trial judges as well as 14 additional circuit judges, created by the present Legislature, to meet conditions wrought by the consolidated court act, and notwithstanding the Legislature has restored much of the jurisdiction now exercised by the law and equity courts to the old system of county courts. We are also aware of the fact that the veto of the recircuiting bill will save the state the salary of but a few judges and solicitors, which may be a small sum for jeopardizing the whole judicial system of the state and thwarting a legislative attempt to reform and equalize the circuits; but we must deal with conditions as they exist and as produced by the legislative and ex
Counsel, in brief, suggest that the act does not conform to section 68 of the Constitution, in that it was not read on three different days in the House and Senate, though it is fairly admitted by counsel that the journal has not been examined. Ordinarily this would not amount to such an insistence as to merit the consideration of this point by this court, for the reason that counsel should examine the record and point out the defect in the journal if one existed, and not expect the court to look the matter up upon a mere doubtful suggestion that a defect exists. As this is a law, however, of considerable public importance, the journal has been examined and contains the recital alluded to in brief.
In the consideration of this case, we have considered it in connection with a companion case involving the same question, and have borne in mind the oral argument in both cases, as well as all briefs that have been filed upon the subject. (See Taylor v. Hasty, 70 South. 910; Gilder v. Hasty, 70 South. 910; and Garrett v. Camp, 70 South. 910, all infra.)
As the office to which the appellant sought to become a candidate has been abolished, after the time prescribed by the act, the respondent probate judge did not err in declining to receive the announcement of petitioner as a candidate for judge of the city court, and the special judge of the city court correctly denied the mandamus, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.