49 So. 945 | Miss. | 1909
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
Defendant was convicted in the court below of murder, sentenced to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary, and appeals to this court. His defense was delusional insanity; the particular delusion being that his daughter had been debauched by Laurent, the man whom he killed. One of the assignments of error is that the verdict was not warranted by the evidence. The testimony in this case is so voluminous that an intelligent review of the same would require a volume in itself and would serve no good purpose; suffice it to say that on the evidence the question of defendant’s criminal responsibility was for the jury, and, unless some error of law was committed prejudicial to the defendant, the verdict, of course,-must stand.
On the cross-examination of the defendant he was asked, and permitted to testify over his objection, to his conduct in several fights which he had had with various parties at various times, when there was no pretense of his not being sane. Other witnesses testified, over defendant’s objection, to this conduct also. This action of the court is also assigned as error. This evidence was relevant to the issue and perfectly competent. Where the defense is insanity, general or partial, the door is thrown wide open for the admission of evidence; every act of the party’s life is relevant to the issue and admissible in evidence. 1 Wig-
The twentieth instruction asked by the defendant was as follows: “If from the evidence the jury believe that, at the time of the killing, the defendant honestly and in good faith believed that deceased had seduced and ruined his only daughter, and that such belief on the part of the defendant had no foundation in truth and fact, and that on the occasion of the killing the defendant, on meeting the deceased, was seized with an insane and irresistible impulse to kill him because he believed that the deceased had seduced and ruined his only daughter, and that the defendant’s-act in killing deceased was the direct result of said uncontrollable impulse, springing from a mental disease, existing to so high a degree that for the time being.it overwhelmed the reason, judgment, and conscience of the defendant, then he is not guilty, and the jury will acquit.” This instruction was modified by adding after the word “defendant” and before the word “then” in the last line the words “that he was unable to distinguish moral right from wrong.” And this action of the court is assigned as error.
Where the defense is insanity, total or partial, the test of the defendant’s criminal responsibility is his ability, at the time he committed the act, to realize and appreciate the nature and quality thereof — his ability to distinguish right and wrong. Grissom v. State, 62 Miss. 169. And the test is the same where the defense is that the act was the result of an uncontrollable impulse caused by any species of insanity. This is distinctly held in Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. (Mass.) 500, 41 Am. Dec. 458, and Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss. 269, 21 Am. Rep. 360, so much relied upon by the appellant, and the reasons therefor clearly set forth.
Uncontrollable impulse as a defense when the defendant is able to distinguish right from wrong was in the Cunningham case repudiated in the following language: “But there is said to 'be an uncontrollable impulse springing from a mental con
Our interpretation of these-cases is sustained by many high authorities, among .whom are Mr. Bishop. In his work on Criminal Law (8th ed.) vol. 1, § 383b, Mr. Bishop says: “But many seem to maintain that if one is so disordered mentally as, while intellectually comprehending right and wrong, and knowing an act to be forbidden and punishable by the law, to> be still unable to adjust his conduct to the law and avoid doing the forbidden thin¿’, ho is to be punished if he does it, the same as though he was sane,” citing in support thereof, among other authorities, the Cunningham case. And again, in section 384, he says: “It is not in all the cases absolutely clear what, of the language addressed to the jury, is meant for pure law, and what of it is for mere practical suggestion. But either as the one or the other, the jury in the greater number of the cases are in substance directed to consider whether, when the prisoner committed the act, he was in a state to comprehend his relations to others, the nature of the thing done, and its criminal character
In this last-cited case Chalmers, J., author of the opinion in the Cunningham case, said: “The test with us in this class of cases is the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong, and we know no difference in this regard between total and partial insanity.” In People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 223, 51 Pac. 331, 63 Am. St. Rep. 77, it is said: “It must be held that, conceding that the act was the offspring of an irresistible impulse because of mental disease, still the defendant must be held responsible if he at the time had the requisite knowledge-as to the nature and quality of the act and of its wrongfulness. Wo do' not know that the impulse was irresistible, but only that it was not resisted. Whether irresistible or not must depend upon the relative force of the impulse and the restraining force, and it has been well said to grant immunity from punishment to one who retains sufficient intelligence to understand the consequences to him of a violation of the law may be to make an impulse irresistible which before was not. . . . Lord Bromwell, in a discussion of this subject, related a case in which a witness, to prove that a prisoner was so afflicted, related that he had once become violent and killed a cat, and said he believed the impulse could not be resisted by the defendant. His lordship asked if he thought he would have killed the cat if a policeman 'had been present. The witness answered, ‘No.’ His lordship then said he supposed the impulse was irresistible only in the absence of a policeman.”
The modification of this instruction was entirely proper. It simply made plain to the jury of unprofessional men what the
Among the many authorities examined by us upon this subject, in addition to those hereinbefore cited, we refer to Bovard v. State, 80 Miss. 600; Ford v. State, 73 Miss. 734, 19 South. 665, 35 L. R. A. 117; U. S. v. McGlue, 1 Curt. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 15,679; U. S. v. Holmes, 1 Cliff. 98, Fed. Cas. No. 15,382; State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S. E. 982, 18 L. R. A. 224; Merritt v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 70, 45 S. W. 21; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279, 3 S. W. 539, 58 Am. Rep. 638; State v. Mowry, 37 Kan. 369, 15 Pac. 282; McCarty v. Com
What we have said with reference to the modification of defendant’s twentieth instruction disposes of his objection to the state’s fifth instruction. This trial continued over a period of several days, during the whole of which time there was a large audience present, the courtroom being packed to its full capacity. Complaint is made of the fact that this audience failed to observe the proprieties due on such an occasion, and demonstrated, in an audible manner, its approval of some things which occurred on the trial. The circuit judge seems to have tried to prevent this, and finally had a number of special deputies sworn in and placed in different portions of the room to preserve order. It would have been well had he exercised his power in this regard to the full extent; a few wholesome fines, or a clearing of the room of all persons who would not observe the proprieties, would have prevented any further disturbance. We cannot say that the defendant was prejudiced by this conduct of the audience. We must presume, in the absence of clear inference that the fact might be otherwise, that the jury were common-sense men, observed their oaths, and tried the case on the law and the evidence.
Several alienists testified in behalf of the defendant. Over the objection of the defendant, they .were excluded from the courtroom while all the witnesses, except the defendant and his daughter, were testifying, and this action of the court is assigned as error. These alienists ought to have been permitted to remain in the courtroom during the whole of the trial and hear the evidence in order that they might form an intelligent opinion thereon. They were in .the courtroom, however, while the two principal witnesses were on the stand, and therefore the defendant was not prejudiced by this action of the court to the extent that would warrant the reversal of the judgment.
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
delivered the following dissenting opinion..
The appellant killed Mr. Laurent at Artesia, Miss., on the-15th day of January, 1909. The killing was merciless and cruel in the extreme. Laurent was unarmed and anticipating-no difficulty. Smith had come to the depot in his hack to meet his daughter, whom he expected from Columbus. Laurent was-standing near the depot building, on the grounds of which there ■were some scores of persons; Smith did not see him. When Smith, walking north, had passed him two- or three steps, Laurent, seeing Smith, stepped forward and extended his hand with a view of shaking hands. Smith, turning, for the first time-saw him, became wildly infuriated, and struck him with his umbrella which he was carrying under his arm. Laurent, astonished, turned and ran through the crowd; Smith pursued and struck him twice more with the umbrella. Laurent ran behind a man, Smith, pursuing, having drawn a pistol. This-man said to Smith, “Don’t shoot me; -I’m -no shortstop-,” and to Laurent, “Get from behind me.” Laurent ran from behind this man into the baggage room, attempted to shut the door,, but could not do it. Smith pursued him, saying, “You need not run,” fired one shot at him as he entered the baggage room, and Laurent fell against the wall on the floor. Laurent then said to Smith, “Don’t shoot he any more; don’t kill me, don’t kill me.” Smith, without another word, shot him twice in the head whilst lying on the floor’, killing him almost instantly. Smith turned, walked out of the baggage room, put his pistol into his bosom, and walked some steps down to the railroad track. Some one asked him -what he had done; he said, “Killed a damned son of a bitch up there in the office.” Mr. Mitchell, a justice of the peace and lifetime friend, came to- him and asked him about what he had done, and he told him he had
It is, of course, too plain for discussion that, if this had been the act of a sane man, Smith should have been convicted of murder and duly hanged. The defense, in the trial below, conceded Smith’s manifest guilt of murder if sane, and the sole defense interposed was that the act of killing Laurent was the result of an uncontrollable impulse growing out of an insane delusion on the part of Smith to the effect that Laurent had debauched his daughter, such delusion rising to such a degree of force as that it overthrew the reason, judgment, and conscience of Smith in the act of killing; that, precisely, was the defense. It must be carefully observed that there was no sort of insistence on the part of the defense that Smith was not generally sane; that he was generally sane was conceded repeatedly throughout the trial by his counsel in the court below. The defense was not, therefore, general insanity, but that he killed Laurent under the particular delusion stated, as the result of an irresistible impulse growing out of that delusion, so strong and overmastering at the time and place of the killing as to completely overwhelm Smith’s reason, judgment, and conscience. That, exactly, was the issue the jury had to try.'
There is great danger in the trial of a case of this sort before the twelve average men in the jury box of allowing the horribleness, the cruelty, and the brutality of the killing to prevent that just and clear and dispassionate inquiry into the existence of the
With this brief statement of the killing, let us now enlarge the view of the case so as to understand how the case was presented to the jury by the state and by the defense with respect to the existence of this insane delusion, and the degree to which it controlled Smith in his action. There were somethings which I premise conceded in the court below: First, it was conceded by the state in the most emphatic and explicit terms over and over that Laurent never had debauched Smith’s daughter. This concession is one of tremendous significance in this case. The jury were bound by this, concession to dismiss from their minds any thought of Laurent having debauched her. It was their duty to take the innocence of Smith’s daughter of this charge as an established fact. Second, the court itself charged the jury, first, that hereditary insanity in Smith’s family was an established fact in the case and should be so treated by them, and, second, that the predisposition on the part of Smith to insanity growing out of this previously established hereditary insanity was also an established fact in the case, and the jury should accept it also as an established fact. These instructions are also of the greatest importance in this case, since they directly charge the jury that the effect of the testimony was to establish, beyond controversy, two facts, hereditary im sanity and Smith’s predisposition, on account of that hereditary insanity, to become insane himself. Third, the defense conceded over and over, in every form of statement, that Smith was generally sane, a good business man; that he had acquired a fortune; that he was shrewd, sagacious, and thoroughly competent to deal with men in all business matters in which he engaged; in short, to sum it all up in one word, that he was generally sane. This concession on the part of the defense is also extremely important as showing that no proof was needed on the part of the state to establish the mere fact of general sanity, if that proof had no other object than the establishment
The court committed no error in charging the jury as above •stated. The testimony shows, without contradiction, that Smith had an epileptic father; two half-uncles insane, and who have been in the insane asylum at Tuscaloosa, Ala., from sixteen to ■eighteen years each to about sixty-one and sixty-three years of age, being there now; one idiotic uncle; one full brother in the insane asylum at Meridian; two female cousins deranged; one male •cousin in the asylum; and the daughter of a cousin also insane. 'This testimony discloses that some of this 'insanity was upon 'Smith’s mother’s side, most of it being in the family of Smith’s father. ITereditary insanity having thus been established beyond •controversy, and the court having charged the jury that it was so ■established and was to be accepted by them as true, and the ■testimony having established Smith’s predisposition to insanity ■growing out of this hereditary insanity, and the court having ■charged the jury that this predisposition had been established, and was to be accepted as true, what were the instructions of the court as to this delusion? Those charges were:
No. 5. “The court charges the jury for the state: The defense of so-called moral or emotional insanity or irresistible impulse, where the defendant’s mental power to distinguish between moral right and wrong with respect to the act for which lie is indicted remains unimpaired, it is not recognized by the law of the state; and you are accordingly instructed that you
No. 2 for defense: “The court instructs the jury that it has been proven, in this case, by the undisputed testimony, that there is insanity in the family of the defendant, and that a predisposition or susceptibility to insanity on the part of the der
No. 20: “If from the evidence the jury believe that at the time of the killiug the defendant honestly and in good faith believed that the deceased had seduced and ruined his only daughter, and that such belief on the part of the defendant had no foundation in truth and fact, and that on the occasion of the killing the defendant on meeting the deceased was seized with an insane and irresistible impulse to kill him because he believed that the deceased had seduced and ruined his only daughter, and that the defendant’s act in killing the deceased was the direct result of said uncontrollable impulse, springing from a mental disease, existing in so high a degree that for the time being it overwhelmed the reason, judgment, and conscience of the defendant, then he is not guilty, and the jury will acquit.”
This last instruction was modified by adding the words, “and that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong” after the word “defendant,” in the last line, and, let it be noted, without making the ability to so distinguish relate to the very -act of killing at the time and place.
"What, now, is the testimony in this case with respect to the existence of this special delusion? On the part of the defense it shows that: The mother of the daughter died in childbirth; the daughter was the only child; the father kept her with him on the plantation until she was about five years old; at the end of that time, though all of his family were Protestants, he sent her to a Oatholic convent in Jackson, where she stayed three or four years, returning home to the plantation in the summers; he then sent her to a Catholic convent in Mobile, where she stayed for several years; he then sent her to the I. I. & 0. one year at Columbus; he theu sent her to a Oatholic convent in New York, and finally sent her to a Catholic convent in Paris, Prance, where she remained several years; he thus kept her in Catholic convents for a period of about fourteen years, acting apparently, upon the idea in Hamlet’s mind when he said to
Two things are most noteworthy here: First, that the very acts, snubs, disrespect, etc., toward him and his daughter, which Smith’s diseased mind tortured into evidence that his daughter had been debauched, show clearly to a rational mind Laurent cai’ed nothing for her; and, second, the astounding fact that the father was the only person in all the world to suspect his daughter of impurity! It does the state infinite credit that throughout the trial it utterly scouted the charge that the daughter was not a pure worn,an.
This is a short summary, necessarily greatly condensed, and substantially presents the evidence which the defense insists shows conclusively the fact that Smith was laboring under an insane delusion that Laurent had debauched his daughter. Let it be specially noted: First, that the state introduced no alienists to contradict, in any wise the testimony of the five alienists introduced by the defense; second, that these five alienists all testified emphatically and most positively that the defendant was suffering under an insane delusion as to his daughter having been debauched by Laurent at the time he killed Laurent, and that that delusion was so strong as to destroy his mind and conscience, and that he was not an accountable being at the time of the killing. They further testify that a good memory can coexist in the mind with the kind of insane delusion under which the defendant labored, and that general sanity may also so coexist with this sort of delusion. There is not a word from any alienist to contradict this unbroken testimony; second, that the daughter Estelle; the farm manager, Mr. Walker; the storekeeper on the farm, Mr. Cockerham; the housekeeper, Miss Mercer — being the persons who were right about him every day and every night, and who knew him, of course, most intimately — ■ every one swore most positively to the same effect, that his act in killing Laurent was the act of a man laboring under an in
There is no attempt, it may be said, on the part of the state to deny any of the facts testified to by the witnesses for the defense with respect to the existence of this delusion in Smith’s mind; for example, Miss Smith herself testified that her father made this charge against her, and she herself told Mr. Walker, the manager of the plantation, and Miss Mercer, the housekeeper, and Mrs. General Sharp, her intimate friend at Columbus, about this charge. Miss Mercer confirmed the fact that Miss Smith so told her, and that Smith himself so told her, and. Dr. McKinley’s testimony is positive and emphatic, as heretofore set out, that Smith was laboring under such delusion, and that it had no foundation whatever, but that Miss Smith was an absolutely pure -woman.
This being the evidence on the question whether Smith was laboring under an insane delusion that Laurent had debauched his daughter, it becomes important to notice the instructions in the case set out supra.
Instruction No. 20 as heretofore set out in this opinion, was undoubtedly correct as asked, and it was fatal error for the court to modify that instruction by inserting the clause “that he was
I have said of the modification of the twentieth instruction that it rendered it utterly meaningless, and, in effect, destroyed its whole force as a charge peculiarly applicable to his precise defense, to wit, the special delusion under which he labored. Ily Brethren say that the addition of these words, “that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong,” was correct. I think I have shown in what I have hereinbefore said that this mod
My Brethren have quoted from quite a number of authorities, and cited a great many more, for the purpose of demonstrating that there is but one test of sanity, to wit, the capacity to distinguish between, right and wrong, and also for the purpose of defining the kind of uncontrollable impulse which excuses from punishment on the ground that the defendant is not accountable. The trouble here is the confusing of two entirely distinct phases of insanity. In so far as these authorities are cited to define the uncontrollable impulse which constitutes a defense on the ground of insanity, I have only to say that, in my judgment; that sort of uncontrollable impulse acting under which one is excused is far better defined by Oi-ialmers, J., in the Ounningham case, supra, than in any other of the cases cited by my Brethren. It does not seem to me to be possible to define the two kinds of uncontrollable impulse, the one which so over
It will thus be seen that the learned circuit judge inadvertently, by inserting the clause that he was unable to distinguish moral right from wrong, confused two wholly different phases of the defense of insanity. He applied the general test, the inability to distinguish between right and wrong, where the defense is general insanity, to a case, or at least to one branch of a case, -where the defense of insane delusion rising to such a degree as to overthrow reason, conscience, and judgment was the defense put forward. It must be obvious, on careful reflection, that if an insane delusion rises to that degree of force that it completely overthrows reason and judgment (that is to say, the mind) and also the conscience (that is to say, the moral faculty
There was, therefore, fatal error in modifying the twentieth instruction asked by defendant, which instruction was not used by the defendant after modification, and in confusing in the fifth instruction for the state emotional insanity with insane delusion. In emotional insanity the mind still acts and perceives the difference between right and wrong, but there is a lesion of the will, as a result of which the party, while perceiving clearly the difference between right and wrong, is unable to resist or refrain from the criminal act. In the insanity set up here, to wit, uncontrollable impulse due to an insane delusion
Finally, it is urged that this verdict was due, s manifestly, to the conduct of the audience during the trial of his cause, and this ground of the motion for a new trial is pressed upon us with great earnestness, and was so pressed upon the learned court below. A great many witnesses were introduced upon this point, and it may be stated, in short, that it was clearly shown that the audience constantly engaged in applause, lighter or more pronounced, at every stage where the state scored a point; it is even shown that there was slapping of the hands and stamping' of the feet, most emphatic expressions of approval of the prosecution. Dr. Sharp testified that he thought nine out of ten persons in the audience were for the prosecution with Bantle Bell; that it was perfectly apparent that the sympathy of the entire audience was in favor of the prosecution, and that there was nothing to prevent the jury from seeing that. So highly wrought had the audience become, and so constant and emphatic were their interruptions by the applause of the prosecution, that the jury was retired, and the counsel for the defense and counsel for the state joined in asking the court to put a stop to this unseemly conduct, and the learned circuit judge actually had the sheriff appoint some dozen special deputies for the express and declared purpose of suppressing these highly improper manifestations on the part of the audience. I would not be understood as criticising in the least degree the learned circuit judge. He threatened the audience; he reprimanded the audience severely; he had special deputies enough appointed it would seem, to suppress any applause from any audience, and what more he reasonably could have done it is. difficult to say; but one thing is certain, that is, that he did not suppress the applause, and the sheriff did not suppress it, nor did the twelve deputies .with the sheriff. One thing remains clear, and that
I am thoroughly satisfied, and cannot escape the conviction, that the only way in which to explain this verdict is to attribute it in part to the erroneous instructions indicated, but most especially and emphatically to the extraordinary applause constantly repeated and uniformly kept up throughout the progress of the trial whenever the state scored a point. It is idle to say that the twelve plain men in the jury box were not impressed by this demonstration; that the spirit of the audience did not come to infect the jury box itself; that the very atmosphere of condemnation was breathed from the audience into the jurors, and that they left the box with the set conviction that a verdict of guilty was demanded by the audience and must be rendered. It is extremely easy to explain the aversion of the audience. Nothing could bo more natural than their feeling, looking at the case from their standpoint. They realized the awful brutality of the killing; and lost sight of the question of sanity because horrified at the cruelty of the killing; and again, and very likely worse for the defendant, they were shocked and astounded at the unaccountable perversity -of the defendant in believing, in the face of the protest of all the world, and declaring in the face of all the world, and swearing to the jury on this trial
Erom the reasons indicated, I dissent emphatically from the reasoning of the court and the judgment in this case.