532 So. 2d 70 | Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 1988
Appellant, Marcus Deon Smith, appeals from a departure sentence imposed upon him in his absence after this court had ordered resentencing. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Because appellant will again be resentenced, and it is possible that the lower court may again consider a departure sentence, we consider it necessary to give certain cautionary directions to the trial court in light of the review standard set forth in Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985).
As to the third reason given, “crime binge,” it is unclear from the record whether the trial court considered the instant offenses to constitute a crime binge due to the number of crimes the defendant committed within a relatively short period of time, or the temporal proximity of the commission of the crimes. Crime binge is not a clear and convincing ground for departure when each crime is calculated in determining the guideline sentence, and “[t]here are no additional facts that would justify departure.” Mathis v. State, 515 So.2d 214, 216 (Fla.1987). See also State v. Rousseau, 509 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla.1987). However, where the temporal proximity of the commission of the crimes demonstrates the “defendant’s involvement in a continuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity,” a valid ground for departure exists. State v. Jones, 530 So.2d 53, 56 (Fla.1988).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. Because the offenses were committed prior to the effective date of the 1987 amendment to Section 921.001(5), Florida Statutes, the amendment does not apply.