188 Ind. 64 | Ind. | 1919
— On January 10, 1918, appellant was sentenced to pay a fine of $250, and to imprisonment on the .Indiana State Farm for a period of six months. On
Counter-affidavits were filed by the Honorable William A. Thompson and the deputy sheriff of Delaware county denying certain statements of fact contained in appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment. The facts thus questioned, we will not undertake to settle. With these facts out of the way, this case is before us under practically an agreed statement as follows: Two indictments were returned by the grand jury at the January term, 1917, of the Delaware Circuit Court, one on January 6, and one on January 16, hereafter referred to as the first and second respectively. On March 19, 1917, appellant appeared in the Delaware Circuit Court, and before the Honorable William A. Thompson, sole judge thereof, and entered a plea of guilty to each of said indictments. He was then permitted to go hence on bond for his appearance in that court on May 22, 1917. He appeared in court as stipulated in the bond, and before the judge thereof, who then and there on appellant’s plea of guilty, theretofore entered to the first indictment, pronounced judgment and sentence fixing a fine of $250 and imprisonment on the Indiana State Farm for a period of three months. Appellant paid the fine and costs assessed against him, and was imprisoned in accordance with the sentence imposed. The term of his imprisonment expired on August 22, 1917, at which time he was released and then and there
Appellant insists that under this state of the record, the Delaware Circuit Court had no authority or jurisdiction to pronounce judgment or sentence him on January 10, 1918.
Section 2166 Burns 1914, Acts 1905 p. 584, §290, of our Criminal Code provides that: “After a finding or verdict of guilty, against the defendant, if a new trial be not granted, or the judgment be not arrested, the court must pronounce judgment.” And §2171 Burns 1914, Acts 1905 p. 584, §295, provides'that: “If no sufficient cause be alleged or appear to the court why judgment should not be pronounced, it shall thereupon be rendered.” Under §2073 Burns 1914, Acts 1905 p. 584, §202, “If the accused plead guilty, said plea shall be entered on the minutes, and he shall be sentenced, or he may he placed in the custody of the sheriff until sentenced.” The remainder of this section has reference
The state has called our attention to the case of Gray v. State (1886), 107 Ind. 177, 8 N. E. 16. That case holds that any agreement to compound, discontinue or delay a prosecution, is forbidden by the statute, and is illegal a,nd void. It also reaffirmed the doctrine announced in the case of Smith v. Hess (1884), 91 Ind. 424, to the effect that the trial court under the provisions of §2073, supra, had no power to permit the accused to depart from court without sentence, subject to arrest in case he did not behave well. The ruling thus made is in harmony with the holding of this court,in Shaffer v. State (1885), 100 Ind. 365. In this -last case there was an order-book entry showing that the sentence was suspended. A motion to discharge the accused on the ground that the order suspending sentence amounted to a judgment which was not subject to change or amendment was overruled, and the defendant sentenced. This action of the court was upheld for the reason that it did not appear from the record that the judgment w;as unnecessarily delayed. In the Smith case this court said: “The legitimate inference - from the statute is that the Legislature, in its enactment, did not intend that the courts should allow adult offenders to go on good behavior. Without deciding what might be the result of such a practice, upon a proper case made, and properly brought before us, we may say that, as at present advised, we do not feel like giving our sanction to that practice.”
The case of Ledgerwood v. State (1893), 134 Ind. 81, 33 N. E. 631, is cited by the state in support of its contention that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction to punish appellant on his plea of guilty. That case holds that the court’s failure to render judgment, after a plea of guilty, until the next term, will not divest its
Judgment reversed, with instruction to the Delaware Circuit Court to sustain appellant’s motion to vacate the judgment, and that the appellant be discharged.
Note. — Reported in 121 N. E. 829. Postponement of sentence, 132 Am. St. 644, 12 Cye 969.