85 Ga. App. 129 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1951
“To support a conviction of arson, it is necessary to show that the burning was not due to accidental or providential cause.” Sutton v. State, 17 Ga. App. 713 (88 S. E. 122).
“ ‘It is not often possible to make out a case of arson by direct proof establishing the corpus delicti or showing the connection of the defendant with the commission of the crime, for arson is seldom committed except at an hour when there is small chance that the criminal will be actually observed in the execution of his nefarious purpose, and it is also generally easy to commit the crime by stealth, without the help of an accomplice, without the beating of drums or blare of trumpets or any betraying noises; and therefore circumstances must generally be depended upon not only to show the guilt of the accused, but to establish the corpus delicti. The rule that the circumstances proved should exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save the guilt of the accused should not be relaxed; but it does not follow that the criminal must go unwhipped of justice because absolute proof is not presented by the State. If there be enough shown to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the guilt of the accused has been established to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis, and no other reasonable hypothesis is suggested by the evidence, and there is nothing to indicate that
Applying the foregoing rules to the evidence in the instant case, the jury was authorized to find the defendant, Roy Smith, guilty of arson. There were facts in evidence from which the jury could infer that the origin of the fire was neither accidental nor providential. The only fire kindled in the house on the morning the house was destroyed was built in the kitchen stove. The fuel used was splinters which were ordinarily consumed in about thirty minutes. Mrs. Sarah Smith had built the fire in the kitchen stove, cooked breakfast, and had left the house at about 7:15 a.m. The fire was not replenished after that time. She returned to the house a few minutes later to instruct her mother, Mrs. Maxwell, to go to the Wigley home for the day. Mrs. Maxwell left the house at about 7:45 a.m. The house was not on fire at that time. The stove was in good condition. The electric lights were in good condition. There was no electrical disturbance or lightning on the morning in question. Between 8:30 a.m. and 9 a.m. the house was seen to be on fire and flames were coming from the front bedroom window in which room no fire had been kindled on that morning. From these facts the jury was authorized to infer that the fire was criminal in its origin.
There were also facts from which the jury could infer the defendant’s connection with the origin of the fire. The defendant’s ill feeling for Mrs. Sarah Smith, the occupant of the house and for Mr. Wigley, the owner of the house was established; and,
“Where two persons are jointly indicted for an offense which does not require in its commission the joint act of both, but may be separately committed by either, a verdict finding one of the defendants guilty, if supported by the evidence, would be authorized,” even though the other, defendant was found not guilty upon the same evidence. Easterling v. State, 12 Ga. App. 690 (78 S. E. 140); Page v. State, 23 Ga. App. 548 (99 S. E. 55).
In special ground 1 of the amended motion for a new trial counsel for the defendant insist that although the following charge was given at their insistence and request,.it was erroneous and injurious to the defendant in that it confused the jury as to the burden of proof which the State had to carry in order to authorize the jury to convict the accused, inasmuch as the court had previously charged the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty the jury must do so beyond a reasonable doubt, and the following charge complained of was the last charge given the jury with regard to the burden of proof and the court had previously charged the jury correctly as to the burden of proof which the defendant must cany with reference to his defense of alibi and at the time the court gave this latter charge he did not instruct the jury as to what he was referring to and the jury was misled and confused as to whether it would be authorized to find the defendant guilty if it believed the evidence preponderated toward his guilt or whether it must find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt: “In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, the jury may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity for knowing the facts to which they testify, the nature of the facts to which they
In special ground 2, the defendant assigns error upon the following excerpt from the court’s charge to the jury upon the ground that it “was erroneous and not sound as an abstract principle of law”: “A reasonable doubt, gentlemen, the words 'reasonable doubt’ have their ordinary and usual meaning. You would have a reasonable doubt if when you consider all the evidence and the defendant’s statements your minds are wavering and uncertain, and if you have that doubt it would be your duty to give the benefit of it to the defendant and to acquit, that is, the defendant that you have such doubt about.” This assignment of error raises only the question of whether this language complained of states a principle of law correct in the abstract. Anderson v. Southern Ry. Co., 107 Ga. 500 (4) (33 S. E. 644). There is no error in this charge which is substantially the language used and approved as stating a correct principle of law in Chancey v. State, 145 Ga. 12 (1) (88 S. E. 205). There is no merit in this ground of the amended motion for a new trial.
In special ground 3 error is assigned upon the following excerpt from the court’s charge to the jury: “You look to the evidence and see whether or not the property described in this indictment has been burned, and then you look to the evidence and the defendants’ statements and determine what the facts are
In special ground 4 counsel for the defendant contend that the following colloquy between the trial judge and the foreman of the jury constituted coercion on the part of the judge to force the jury to reach a verdict. Court: “Well, you needn’t tell me
The foregoing colloquy is not subject to the criticism that it coerced the jury into returning a,verdict on consideration of matters not in issue, as was the case in Campbell v. State, 81 Ga. App. 834 (60 S. E. 2d, 169), where the court admonished the jury to consider the expense and time for a trial, nor is it subject to the criticism that the court intimated or expressed an opinion in favor of one party as against the other, as was the case in Peavy v. Clemons, 10 Ga. App. 507 (73 S. E. 756), the cases upon which counsel for the defendant rely.
While it is true the court intimated that there might not be a place for the jury to stay overnight other than in the courthouse and instructed the jury that it was as well qualified as any other to reach a verdict, the court at the same time admonished the jury that'no juror was expected to give up any conscientious views that he might have. The court admonished the jury to reconcile the differences but did not intimate that the jurors should in any manner compromise solely for the purpose of reaching an agreement, and we are convinced that under the rulings of the Supreme Court, the colloquy in this case
The trial court did not err in overruling the motion for a new trial for any reason assigned.
Judgment affirmed.