13 Ga. App. 241 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1913
We recognize the principle announced in the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Weems and LigMner, supra, as will be seen by reference to the opinion of this court in Conner v. State, 3 Ga. App. 475 (60 S. E. 111), that one can not be found guilty of illicit intercourse upon circumstantial evidence, where the incriminatory circumstances are as compatable with the theory of his innocence as with the inference of guilt. In the Weems and LigMner cases the evidence showed nothing more than that the accused in each case had the opportunity (provided the female was willing) • to commit the offense. In no case would this alone be sufficient to authorize conviction of an act of illicit intercourse. As to the fact of intercourse this case might be somewhat similar to the Weems case, if the girl in question had only been seen once at the room of the accused, but, according to the testimony for the State, she was several times a visitor to the room of the defendant, under circumstances which require explanation. The Weems case is really very
There is no intimation in the opinion in the Coleman case, supra, that proof of the reputation of the alleged lewd house or of its inmates is not admissible in corroboration of other circumstances tending to show that the house in question is maintained for the purpose of prostitution. The decision upon this point is to the effect that proof merely of a reputation for lewdness is not sufficient to authorize conviction. The rule laid down in Clement v. Kimball, 98 Mass. 535, that “such testimony often becomes competent .when there is. other evidence in the case to show relations of an equivocal character” is clearly recognized. If there were nothing more in this case than the proof of the reputation of the room and of the women who visited there, which was adduced by the State, or if the judge had instructed the jury that this testimony as to reputation would be sufficient to authorize conviction of the accused, the ease at bar would be - controlled by the ruling in the Coleman case. Inasmuch, however, as there are circumstances which authorize the jury to infer that more than one act of lewdness was committed in the room rented by the defendant, the ease differs from the Coleman case. If the jury had been satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt, by the circumstances which surrounded the female in question upon the occasions when she was seen with other men in the room of the accused, that an illicit act had actually been committed, the proof of reputation and the frequency
The credibility of the witnesses as well as their prejudice or bias, if any existed, was exclusively for the jury; their finding is approved by the trial judge, and this court has no power to interfere.
Judgment affirmed*