117 Ga. 320 | Ga. | 1903
The defendant offered to plead guilty of the offense •of larceny from the person, contending that, under the decisions of this court in Fannin v. State, 66 Ga. 167, and Spencer v. State, 106 Ga. 692, he could not properly be convicted of robbery. A comparison of these two cases with the common-law authorities and the Penal Code may be instructive, as the question presented by this record is one of constant recurrence. In the Fannin case it appeared “ that the defendant slipped his hand into a lady’s outside pocket and furtively took therefrom a purse of money. Before "he got the purse entirely out, she felt the hand and tried to seize it, but the thief had succeeded and the purse was gone. In extracting hand and purse the pocket was torn, and when the lady turned she saw the thief looking unconcernedly at the houses on "Whitehall street. She rushed upon him and caught him by the coat, which, in his struggle to escape, was torn and left in her possession.” It was there held that “ The criminal deed was consummated when the purse was taken from the lady.” The fact that the pocket was torn in the effort to get the furtive hand out was not sufficient to show such open force and violence as to make the crime robbery. The attempt and intent were private; his purpose was to take the purse privately and without her knowledge. The pocket was torn in the effort to escape, rather than as a means of effecting the crime. In the Spencer case a lady was holding her purse loosely, when her attention was diverted by the thief, who suddenly snatched the purse from her hand, without intimidation, and without resistance on her part or injury of any sort to her person. According to Jones v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 57 L. R. A. 432, even this was robbery. Bobbery is defined in our Penal ■Code, §151, as “the wrongful, fraudulent, and violent taking -of money, goods, or chattels from the person of another by force or intimidation, without the consent of the owner.” And “any sort of secret, sudden, or wrongful taking from the person with the
A brief review of leading cases from other jurisdictions where the common law has been applied may serve to illustrate the meaning of force and violence as an element of robbery. In Hex Lapier, discussed in 2 East, P. C. 557 (s. c. 1 Leach, C. C. 320),. the force and violence were held to be sufficient to constitute the crime of robbery, where an earring was snatched from the ear of a lady so that it bled. In Eex v. Moore, “ to snatch a diamond pin from the headdress of a lady with such force as to remove it, with part of the hair, from the place in which it was fixed ” was held to be “a sufficient violence to constitute robbery.” 1 Leach, C. C. 335. Eex v. Mason, 1 Leach, C. C. 418, was a case where the accused “laid violent hold of the seals and chain of the prosecutor’s gold watch, and succeeded in pulling the watch out of his fob. The watch was fastened by a steel chain, which went round his neck, and which prevented the prisoner from immediately taking the watch; but by pulling and two or three jerks he broke the steel chain, and then made off with the watch.” It was there ruled that “ snatching an article from a man will constitute robbery, if it is so attached to his person or clothes as to afford resistance; ”' that while there was no injury to the person, as in Lapier’s case* yet, as force was necessary to separate from the person the thing stolen, it was robbery. It appeared in State v. Broderick, 59 Mo. 318, “ that defendant, coming unexpectedly upon the prosecutor*
Jv,dgment affirmed.