Desmond L. Smith was convicted of battery, a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, he argues:
1. The evidence was insufficient to support conviction; and
2. His due process rights were violated in that he was convicted of battering his child despite the parental authority afforded by IND.CODE 85-41-8-1. We affirm.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we may neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses. We will examine only the evidence favoring the judgment, together with the reasonable inferences therefrom. If substantial evidence of probative value supports the conclusion that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict will not be set aside. Harris v. State (1985), Ind.,
The evidence supporting the judgment in this case indicates that on November 29, 1984, Smith's fifteen-year-old daughter, Lamia, received a report card containing three failing grades. While she was attempting to explain her poor marks, Smith removed a belt from a drawer and swung it across her face, hitting her ear and arm. He then ordered her to remove her pants and stockings and place her hands on a dresser. When she complied, he struck her repeatedly on her buttocks with the belt,. Lamia testified, "[Hle was hitting me so hard that I couldn't take the pain no more so I put my hand behind my butt and he started hitting my arms and legs too." 1 Although Lamia cried and asked Smith to stop, he continued to beat her in this fashion for approximately ten minutes. Lamia was struck approximately fifteen times and suffered a facial laceration plus numerous contusions on her buttocks, arms, legs and shoulder.
Smith does not deny the fact of this beating but, rather, argues his conduct should be protected under IC 35-41-8-1. That section provides: "A person is justi-ifed in engaging in conduct otherwise prohibited if he has legal authority to do so." The defense of legal authority has been construed to include reasonable parental discipline which would otherwise constitute battery. Thompson, Commentary on IC 35-41-3-1, West's AIC (1978), at 165.
In order to qualify as a defense, however, parental discipline must be reasonable and not cruel or excessive. Hinkle v. State (1891),
*142 Smith also contends the evidence is insufficient to show he struck Lamia with a belt buckle as charged in the information. This argument ignores the testimony of Officer Brown that shortly after the incident La-mia said she was struck with a belt buckle. The trial court, therefore, reasonably could have believe that when Lamia testified she was struck with a belt, she was using that word in its general sense to include the buckle. Smith's argument in this regard is without merit.
Appellant next contends his constitutional right to due process was violated by the fact of his prosecution. He reasons that "a parent who corporally punishes his child literally cannot commit misdemean- or battery because that parent has license to rudely, insolently and angrily touch the child even if bodily injury, but not serious bodily injury, results." Smith cites no cases to support his contention.
The concept of legal authority does not, as Smith contends, authorize a parent to inflict injury upon his child in any manner so long as serious bodily injury does not result. The scope of authorized parental punishment is not so broad. A parent must not only avoid inflicting serious bodily injury upon his child, but must also avoid any physical punishment which is excessive or eruel. As this court explained some time ago:
The law is well settled that a parent has the right to administer proper and reasonable chastisement to his child without being guilty of an assault and battery; but he has no right to administer unreasonable or cruel and inhuman punish ment. If the punishment is excessive, unreasonable, or cruel it is unlawful. The mere fact that the punishment was administered by the appellant upon the person of his own child will not sereen him from criminal lability.
Hornbeck,
Alternatively, Smith argues he was denied due process because the misdemean- or battery statute and the statute recognizing parental authority to punish a child are unconstitutionally vague. He reasons that the statutes failed to fairly advise him of the limits of authorized punishment.
A statute is unconstitutionally vague if "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." Wallman v. State (1981), Ind.App.,
The record reveals Smith initially struck Lamia with a belt on her face and arm. He then inflicted approximately fifteen blows to her buttocks, arms and legs during a beating which lasted approximately ten minutes. Lamia suffered numerous contusions and a facial laceration. No reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would have difficulty determining that this conduct was excessive and not protected parental discipline.
Having found no error, we affirm.
Notes
. R. at 40.