Jonathan D. SMITH v. STATE of Maryland
No. 23, Sept. Term, 2002
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Nov. 4, 2002
810 A.2d 449
Diane E. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran Jr., Atty. Gen. of Maryland, on brief), Baltimore, for respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL and BATTAGLIA, JJ.
WILNER, Judge.
Following his conviction by a jury in the Circuit Court for Talbot County of felony murder and daytime housebreaking, petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment. That judgment was affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals. We granted certiorari to consider whether the trial court erred (1) in excluding evidence that petitioner asserted would impeach one of the State‘s principal witnesses and a co-defendant, and (2) in refusing to re-instruct the jury that a person‘s mere presence at the scene of a crime does not suffice to prove that the person committed the crime. As we find no error in either ruling, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.
BACKGROUND
Adeline Wilford was murdered in her home on January 5, 1987. She died from loss of blood caused by multiple stab and cutting wounds inflicted with several knives in a most gruesome manner. A number of the wounds were described as defensive wounds, caused as she attempted to shield herself from the attack. From the evidence found at the scene, the police concluded that intruders had entered the house through a window in the utility room, that they were apparently looking for money or property, that Ms. Wilford returned home while they were in the house, and that one or more of them killed her. She still had her coat on when her body was discovered, her keys were in the back door, unpacked groceries were on the kitchen table, the living room and an upstairs bedroom were in disarray, and her pocketbook, wallet, credit
In 1999, Ms. Wilford‘s son, upset at the status of the case, offered a reward of $10,000 for information leading to the arrest of his mother‘s murderer(s) and an additional $15,000 for information leading to the conviction of the murderer(s). Upon learning of that reward, petitioner‘s aunt, Beverly Haddaway, contacted the State Police and gave them information indicating the involvement of petitioner and two other persons, David Faulkner and Ray Andrews. As best we can tell, she informed the police that she had encountered the three of them near the scene of the crime on the day of its commission and of a conversation that they had at the time. Ms. Haddaway later testified about that encounter. As a result of the information she supplied, the police proposed that Ms. Haddaway be fitted with a body wire, that she engage petitioner in a conversation regarding the murder, and that the conversation be recorded. Ms. Haddaway agreed, and on April 11, 2000, she invited petitioner to her house. As they were moving items from her shed to her car, she asked petitioner about the incident and recorded some incriminating responses.
As noted, Ms. Haddaway said that she had seen petitioner, Faulkner, and Andrews near Ms. Wilford‘s home at about the time of the murder. As she later testified, she was driving home with a friend when she came across the three boys on foot emerging from a cornfield. She stopped and engaged them in conversation. They said that they were waiting for a ride, and, after a while, a truck arrived and they got in. Ms. Haddaway noticed that petitioner was not wearing a coat and that his tee-shirt was flecked with red dots. Petitioner told her at the time he had killed a dog with a knife because it had bitten him. The taped conversation was laced with references
Two weeks later, the police took petitioner to the station for questioning. After receiving his Miranda warnings, petitioner orally acknowledged that he, Faulkner, and Andrews had gone to Ms. Wilford‘s home, that Andrews remained outside but that, while he and Faulkner were in the house, Ms. Wilford returned, and that “when he noticed her she was standing in front of him screaming and that David Faulkner was stabbing her.” Petitioner described what Ms. Wilford was wearing, including her blue coat, and said that “she was fighting and moving her arms about,” which would account for the defensive wounds. When the police asked whether petitioner, himself, had stabbed her, he asked for an attorney and questioning ceased.
There was no physical evidence connecting petitioner to the murder. The evidence against him came from Ms. Haddaway‘s testimony about the encounter near the scene on the afternoon of the murder, the taped statement, Sergeant Bollinger‘s testimony about the oral statement given by petitioner, testimony by the co-defendant Andrews, and the testimony of a one-time cellmate of petitioner at the Talbot County Detention Center—a former police officer awaiting sentencing for bank robbery. Andrews testified pursuant to a plea agreement under which he entered an “Alford” plea of guilty to involuntary manslaughter coupled with a recommended sentence of five years in prison. Andrews said that he waited outside while petitioner and Faulkner went into the house and that he later joined them running across the field until they came to the road where they met Ms. Haddaway, and that petitioner told her the story about killing a dog. After leaving Ms. Haddaway, they went to petitioner‘s house, where petitioner and Faulkner pulled money from their pockets. Andrews said that he got none of the money and that petitioner and Faulkner never told him what happened in the house.
The cellmate, Michael Snow, said that he asked petitioner whether he really killed “the woman,” and that he replied in the affirmative. When asked how, petitioner moved his folded hand “like he was holding something” and made a “kissing-like” sound with his mouth. When asked why, he told Snow that she had startled him when she came in, that he was fighting with her and that she bit him, and that “when she bit him he said he went crazy.”
Petitioner attacked this evidence on a number of grounds. He established that he had a profound hearing loss since childhood, that with his hearing aid he could hear only about 25% of what is said, that he was an excellent lip reader, “in the area of 55-60%,” and that “he‘s cuing” or guessing, as to the remaining 15% to 20%. The witnesses who testified about conversations with petitioner were questioned regarding his ability to understand the conversation. His principal defense, however, was that he was “set up” by Ms. Haddaway and Andrews. The first issue before us arises from that defense.
DISCUSSION
The Alleged Conspiracy
In his opening statement, defense counsel asserted the defense position to be that petitioner “is a patsy in this case” and suggested that he was “framed” by his aunt, Ms. Haddaway, because of animosity between her and her brother, petitioner‘s father. He did not attempt to explain the nature or derivation of that animosity, noting only “her brother whom she despises.” Counsel pointed out later that Ms. Haddaway had collected the $10,000 reward offered for information leading to petitioner‘s arrest and asserted that she was looking as well to claim the additional $15,000 offered for information leading to his conviction. He also brought out that Ms. Haddaway had visited Andrews in jail.
The aspect of the “patsy” defense that produced the first complaint in this appeal arose during the cross-examination of
The positing of this theory produced considerable discussion. The prosecutor noted that the father died after charges had already been filed against petitioner and said that she failed to see the relevance of his disposition of his land. The court inquired several times about the relevance, asking first what the will had to do with the criminal case. The response was that Mr. Eckel “is apparently representing two conflicting, opposing interests in this matter“—Andrews in this case and Ms. Haddaway‘s daughter in the will case. The court had trouble seeing how that was a conflict, and the best counsel could respond was that Andrews‘s lawyer was helping Ms. Haddaway‘s daughter obtain the land by having Andrews help convict petitioner. The court characterized the theory as confusing, to which counsel responded: “I agree it‘s confusing. But I don‘t see why the jury should be painted a pristine picture that shows there is no problems. And it‘s not confusing when in fact it is confusing, has been confusing to all of us from the very beginning.” With that bit of supposed clarification, the court held that the point sought to be made was
Counsel returned to his conspiracy theory in closing argument, but cast it entirely in terms of Ms. Haddaway‘s seeking to collect the reward money. He explained that petitioner was a “patsy” because Haddaway wanted to collect the reward and, in order to do so, she needed to supply information, and “so she has an opportunity to set up with Mr. Andrews a situation in which Mr. Andrews is going to take a small fall [and] someone else can take a big one, her nephew.”
In this appeal, petitioner urges that the court erred in excluding evidence “tending to show that the State‘s main witness had an interest in the outcome of the proceeding and had a motive to testify falsely.” Citing Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529, 547, 796 A.2d 697, 707 (2002), he posits that “a defendant, within evidentiary and procedural restraints, is always entitled to present his full defense to the trier of fact,” which in this case included the accusation that “there was a conspiracy between [Haddaway and Andrews] (and perhaps Eckel), the object of which was to secure the wrongful conviction of Petitioner, collect the reward money, and secure the inheritance of Haddaway‘s daughter of the real property of Petitioner‘s father.”
Though acknowledging, from Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683 (1986), that judges retain “wide latitude” to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination, to avoid “harassment, prejudice, confusion of issues ... or interrogation that is ... only marginally relevant,” petitioner nonetheless asserts that he established a sufficient threshold to be entitled to proceed further with his theory, and that the court both erred as a matter of Constitutional law and abused its discretion in not allowing him to do so. He contends that the court was wrong in relying on the fact that his father died after the charges were filed against
We have no disagreement with the general propositions posited by petitioner that he had a right to present his defense to the jury, that evidence of bias and interest on the part of adverse witnesses is always relevant, and that such bias or interest is always the proper subject for cross-examination, which may not be unreasonably denied or limited. See Marshall v. State, 346 Md. 186, 695 A.2d 184 (1997). Those propositions are subject, however, to two paramount rules of evidence, embodied both in case law and in
The exploration of bias or interest on the part of an adverse witness—Ms. Haddaway and Mr. Andrews in this case—is always material, and, indeed, petitioner was permitted to expose that bias or interest. He got before the jury that Ms. Haddaway had waited nearly 12 years to go to the police and did so only after learning of the reward, that she had already received $10,000 of the reward and was looking to claim the additional $15,000 offered for conviction. He got before the jury that Andrews was testifying pursuant to an Alford plea agreement to a much reduced charge with a recommended sentence not to exceed five years in prison. That kind of evidence was certainly relevant to establishing the material fact of bias or interest.
The conspiracy theory arising from the father‘s will, however, was so unclear, so amorphous, and so tenuous as to strain any connection with bias or interest on the part of Haddaway or Andrews. It necessarily rested on the tacit premise that Ms. Haddaway, in concert with Mr. Andrews and/or Mr. Eckel, somehow importuned the father to devise the land by will to Ms. Janda rather than allow it to devolve by intestacy to petitioner. Even if we were to excuse the lack of a formal proffer of evidence to support such a conclusion, there was no indication of what counsel wished to explore—what questions he wanted to ask. In the face of an objection on the ground of relevance, there was no assertion that he intended to inquire as to any of the facts or circumstances that might serve to establish a connection between the will and the testimony of Haddaway or Andrews—(1) what the overall relationship was between petitioner and his father, (2) what the relationship was between the father and the niece, Ms. Janda, (3) when the holographic will was written—whether before or after the father may have become aware of petitioner‘s alleged involvement in Ms. Wilford‘s murder, (4) what the father‘s health and mental state were when the will was executed, (5) whether the will provided any other bequest to
We do not suggest that petitioner was required to establish these things in advance, before being allowed to proceed. Had he offered even a rudimentary basis for a connection between the will and the testimony of Haddaway or Andrews, he would have been entitled to some leeway to develop it. Here, however, there was nothing. The isolated fact that, at some unknown point, petitioner‘s father drew a will that devised land of unknown value to his niece makes neither more probable nor less probable that Ms. Haddaway or Mr. Andrews had a motive to testify falsely against petitioner.
If there was any relevance inferrable from this void, it was certainly marginal at best, which invokes the discretion accorded both under the cases cited and under
The Re-Instruction
Among other crimes, petitioner was charged with daytime housebreaking, which is a felony, and first degree felony murder based on the daytime housebreaking. The court instructed the jury that, in order to convict petitioner of
With respect to felony murder, the court instructed in accord with the Pattern Jury Instructions (MPJI-Cr.4:17.7):
“In order to convict the Defendant of first degree felony murder the State must prove, one, that the Defendant or another participating in the crime with the Defendant committed a felony or felonies. Two, that the Defendant or another participating in the crime killed Adeline Curry Wilford. And three, that the act resulting in the death of [Ms. Wilford] occurred during the commission of the felonies. Felony murder does not require the State to prove that the Defendant intended to kill the victim.”
As part of its introductory general instructions, prior to instructing on the elements of any of the charged offenses, the court informed the jury that “[a] person‘s presence at the scene of a crime without more is not enough to prove that the person committed the crime” but that “a person‘s presence at the time and place of a crime is a fact in determining whether the Defendant is guilty or not guilty.” That instruction, also taken from the Pattern Jury Instructions (MPJI-Cr.3:25) is sometimes referred to as the “mere presence” instruction.
After some period of deliberation, the jury sent the following question to the judge: “In the case of first degree felony murder, does the evidence have to prove that the Defendant committed the murder or only that he was present during the commission of a felony when the murder occurred?” Without objection, the court responded by repeating the felony murder instruction it had given. Petitioner then asked the court to
Bearing on the exercise of that discretion is the principle, embodied in
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
ELDRIDGE, J., and CATHELL, J., dissenting.
We totally fail to comprehend what legal issue of public importance is presented by this case so as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. The writ should be dismissed as improvidently granted.