Deandre SMITH v. STATE of Maryland.
No. 135, Sept. Term, 2006.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
June 8, 2007.
924 A.2d 1175
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENTS.
Mary Ann Ince, Assistant Attorney General (Douglas F. Gansler, Attorney General of Maryland, of Baltimore), on brief, for appellee.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, GREENE and ALAN M. WILNER, (retired, specially assigned), JJ.
BATTAGLIA, J.
The case sub judice presents this Court with the task of determining whether, once a circuit court sitting as a criminal court transfers jurisdiction of a case to the juvenile court for disposition, the juvenile court in turn possesses the power to return the case to the criminal court.1 Because we hold that the juvenile court does not possess such power, we shall
I. Introduction
On March 31, 2005, appellant, Deandre Smith, then seventeen years of age, was indicted for one count of motor vehicle theft in violation of
Subsequently, Smith and the State entered into a plea agreement by which Smith pled guilty to one count of motor vehicle theft and one count of fleeing and eluding an officer in a vehicle, in exchange for having the disposition of his charges handled by the juvenile court pursuant to
Smith subsequently escaped, was apprehended and appeared again before the juvenile court. Judge McKee found that Smith was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system,3 ordered the original case unsealed, and remanded Smith to the criminal court for sentencing. On remand, Smith was sentenced to four years imprisonment on the motor vehicle theft charge, with all but six months suspended, followed by three years supervised probation; with respect to the fleeing and eluding an officer in a vehicle charge, Smith was sentenced to one year imprisonment, suspended, concurrent with the sentence for the motor vehicle theft charge.
Smith noted an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals and subsequently, this Court issued, on its own initiative, a writ of certiorari prior to any proceedings in the intermediate appellate court. Smith v. State, 397 Md. 107, 916 A.2d 256 (2007). Smith‘s brief presents the following issue:
Once the circuit court sitting as a criminal court transfers a case to the juvenile court for disposition under
§ 4-202.2 of the Maryland Criminal Proceedings Code , does the juvenile court thereafter lack the power to remand the case to the criminal court, and does the criminal court lack jurisdiction to impose a sentence?
We shall hold that once a criminal court transfers the case to the juvenile court for disposition, the juvenile court cannot return the case to the criminal court.
II. Discussion
Smith contends that once a criminal court transfers jurisdiction of a case to a juvenile court for disposition under
The State, conversely, contends that, after the criminal court transfers jurisdiction of a case to the juvenile court for disposition under
The juvenile courts are created by statute and have limited jurisdiction, ordinarily possessing exclusive original jurisdiction over youthful offenders alleged to have committed delinquent acts.5
(d) Limitations. - The court does not have jurisdiction over:
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(4) A child at least 16 years old alleged to have committed any of the following crimes, as well as all other charges against the child arising out of the same incident, unless an
order removing the proceeding to the court has been filed under
§ 4-202 of the Criminal Procedure Article :* * *
(xvii) A violation of
§ 4-203 ,§ 4-204 ,§ 4-404 , or§ 4-405 of the Criminal Law Article.
Although a charge may be excluded from the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction under
(b) When transfer allowed. -Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a case involving a child may transfer the case to the juvenile court before trial or before a plea is entered under Maryland Rule 4-242 if:
(1) the accused child was at least 14 but not 18 years of age when the alleged crime was committed;
(2) the alleged crime is excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under
§ 3-8A-03(d)(1) ,(4) , or(5) of the Courts Article; and(3) the court determines by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer of its jurisdiction is in the interest of the child or society.
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(d) Transfer criteria. -In determining whether to transfer jurisdiction under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall consider:
(1) the age of the child;
(2) the mental and physical condition of the child;
(3) the amenability of the child to treatment in an institution, facility, or program available to delinquent children;
(4) the nature of the alleged crime; and
(5) the public safety.
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(g) Procedures on transfer-Juvenile court. -If the court transfers its jurisdiction under this section, the court may order the child held for an adjudicatory hearing under the regular procedure of the juvenile court.
(a) In general. -At sentencing, a court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a case involving a child shall determine whether to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court if:
(1) as a result of trial or a plea entered under Maryland Rule 4-242, all charges that excluded jurisdiction from the juvenile court under
§ 3-8A-03(d) (1) or(4) of the Courts Article do not result in a finding of guilty; and(2)(i) pretrial transfer was prohibited under
§ 4-202(c)(3) of this subtitle; or(ii) the court did not transfer jurisdiction after a hearing under
§ 4-202(b) of this subtitle.(b) Considerations. -In determining whether to transfer jurisdiction under subsection (a) of this section, the court shall consider:
(1) the age of the child;
(2) the mental and physical condition of the child;
(3) the amenability of the child to treatment in an institution, facility, or program available to delinquent children;
(4) the nature of the child‘s acts as proven in the trial or admitted to in a plea entered under Maryland Rule 4-242; and
(5) public safety.
(c) May not consider transfer.----The court may not consider transferring jurisdiction to the juvenile court under this section if:
(1) under the terms of a plea agreement entered under Maryland Rule 4-243, the child agrees that jurisdiction is not to be transferred; or
(2) pretrial transfer was prohibited under
§ 4-202(c)(1) or(2) of this subtitle.* * *
(e) Disposition. -(1) If the court transfers its jurisdiction to the juvenile court, the court shall conduct a disposition under the regular procedures of the juvenile court.
(2) The record of the hearing and of the disposition shall be transferred to the juvenile court, subject to
§ 3-8A-27 of the Courts Article .
We have held that juvenile courts, as statutorily created courts of limited jurisdiction, may exercise only those powers expressly designated by statute. In In re Franklin P., 366 Md. at 306, 783 A.2d at 673, we considered whether a juvenile court had the authority to rescind its order waiving jurisdiction to the criminal court. In that case, Franklin P. was charged with various offenses, and the State successfully petitioned the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction under
In Austin v. Director of Patuxent Institution, we stated, quoting from Scherr v. Braun, that “[n]o principle is better established than that in exercising a statutory power, a court is without jurisdiction unless it complies with the statute.” We went on to hold:
“[I]t is apparent that the court, in the exercise of the special jurisdiction conferred on it by statute, was required to follow the only course of action prescribed by the statute when, as here, the defendant was found not to be a defective delinquent. If new trials are to be granted
(a) How waived. The court may waive the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by
§ 3-8A-03 of this subtitle with respect to a petition alleging delinquency by:(1) A child who is 15 years old or older; or
(2) A child who has not reached his 15th birthday, but who is charged with committing an act which if committed by an adult, would be punishable by death or life imprisonment.
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(d) Unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitation measures. -(1) The court may not waive its jurisdiction under this section unless it determines, from a preponderance of the evidence presented at the hearing, that the child is an unfit subject for juvenile rehabilitative measures.
(2) For purposes of determining whether to waive its jurisdiction under this section, the court shall assume that the child committed the delinquent act alleged.
(e) Criteria.-In making its determination, the court shall consider the following criteria individually and in relation to each other on the record:
(1) Age of the child;
(2) Mental and physical condition of the child;
(3) The child‘s amenability to treatment in any institution, facility, or program available to delinquents;
(4) The nature of the offense and the child‘s alleged participation in it; and
(5) The public safety.
(f) Procedures. If jurisdiction is waived under this section, the court shall order the child held for trial under the regular procedures of the court which would have jurisdiction over the offense if committed by an adult. The petition alleging delinquency shall be considered a charging document for purposes of detaining the child pending a bail hearing.
in defective delinquent proceedings, the Legislature, not the Courts, should provide for them.”
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Petitioner is asking our Court to grant to the Juvenile Court the power to waive “jurisdiction” back to that court by way of its modification of its original waiver order. The waiver statute contains no provision permitting the Juvenile Court to rescind its waiver order once authority is vested in the criminal court.
* * *
That, the juvenile court has no power to do.
Id. at 333-334, 783 A.2d at 689-90 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Further, in In re Glenn S., 293 Md. at 510, 445 A.2d at 1029, a case similar to the present case except for the presence of Section 4-202.2, we considered whether a juvenile court could remand jurisdiction to the criminal court after the criminal court had reverse waived jurisdiction to the juvenile court, pursuant to
The juvenile causes provisions . . . do not expressly or impliedly allow the juvenile court to modify decisions of the circuit court sitting in a criminal case. Because courts of special jurisdiction exercise only those powers granted to them by statute, the juvenile court in this case had no power to vacate the order of the circuit court, thus returning the case to the criminal side of the circuit court. Although the juvenile court has the statutory power to transfer jurisdiction of a case to the circuit court pursuant to
§ 3-817 of the Courts Article , that section only applies in cases where the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction. Because the charge here was robbery with a deadly weapon, original jurisdiction was in the circuit court, . . .§ 3-817 has no application. Jurisdiction in this case was originally in the circuit court, was transferred to the juvenile court and it remains there.
(5) The public safety.
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(d) Procedures of the juvenile court.-If the jurisdiction is waived, the court may order the person held for trial under the regular procedures of the juvenile court.
Maryland Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol.), Article 27, § 594A .In 2001, Section 594A was recodified without relevant change as
CP Section 4-202 . 2001 Md. Laws, Chap. 10.Section 4-202 was repealed and reenacted without relevant change in 2002. 2002 Md. Laws, Chap. 159.
Our goal, when interpreting statutes, is to “identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue.” Gilmer v. State, 389 Md. 656, 662, 887 A.2d 549, 553 (2005); Cain v. State, 386 Md. 320, 327, 872 A.2d 681, 685 (2005); Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000); Pete v. State, 384 Md. 47, 57-58, 862 A.2d 419, 425 (2004); Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 345, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001). See also Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 148-49, 626 A.2d 946, 951 (1993) (” [T]he search for [legislative] intent is most accurately described as an effort to discern some general purpose, aim, or policy of the statute. “); In re Keith G., 325 Md. 538, 542, 601 A.2d 1107, 1109 (1992); Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991) (“Our focus is, therefore, centered upon the statute‘s policy or purpose.“). The best source of legislative intent is the statute‘s plain language, and when the language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ends there. Gilmer, 389 Md. at 663, 887 A.2d at 553; Cain, 386 Md. at 327, 872 A.2d at 685; Pete, 384 Md. at 57-58, 862 A.2d at 425; Drew, 379 Md. at 327, 842 A.2d at 6; Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995); State v. Thompson, 332 Md. 1, 6-7, 629 A.2d 731, 734 (1993). “In the interest of completeness, however, we may look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account.” Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). See also Robey v. State, 397 Md. 449, 454, 918 A.2d 499, 502 (2007); Stanley v. State, 390 Md. 175, 185, 887 A.2d 1078, 1084 (2005). In other words, the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to seek contradiction of the plain meaning of the statute. Robey, 397 Md. at 454, 918 A.2d at 502; Stanley, 390 Md. at 185, 887 A.2d at 1084. In such instances, we may find useful the context of a statute, the
The State argues that the CP Sections 4-202.2 and 4-202 are different because the transfer of jurisdiction in Section 4–202.2 is limited to disposition.
The State argues, nevertheless, that although the legislative history of
To permit the juvenile court to reverse the decision of the criminal court that the juvenile is amenable to treatment and return the case to the criminal court would contradict the nature and purpose of the juvenile justice system.9 The juvenile courts were created with the specific purpose “[t]o provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this subtitle; and to provide for a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation consistent with the child‘s best interests and the protection of the public interest.”
Moreover,
THIS BILL ALLOWS A JUVENILE CHARGED AS AN ADULT, BUT NOT CONVICTED OF THE CHARGE THAT WAS THE BASIS FOR BEING EXCLUDED FROM JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION, TO BE TRANSFERRED BACK TO JUVENILE COURT FOR PURPOSES OF DISPOSITION. THE BILL RESULTED FROM A RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE JURISDICTION.
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In its September 30, 2001 final report to the Governor and General Assembly, the [Commission on Juvenile Justice Jurisdiction] made a number of recommendations. One recommendation was that youth who are initially excluded from the juvenile court‘s jurisdiction based upon their charges and are only convicted of crimes for which they would not have been excluded should be given the opportunity to bring before a court the merits of a transfer to the juvenile justice system for purposes of disposition.
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Floor Report for Senate Bill 428 (2002) (emphasis in original). Specifically, the Final Report of the Commission on Juvenile Justice Jurisdiction noted:
Maryland is one of 24 states which permits a juvenile who is being prosecuted as an adult in criminal court to petition to have the case transferred to juvenile court for adjudication. An adult criminal court may transfer or “reverse waive” a youth initially excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to juvenile court if such a waiver is “in the interests of the child or society.” The court must consider the same factors that the juvenile court considers when deciding whether to waive a child to adult court (age, mental and physical condition, amenability to treatment, nature of offense, and public safety).
* * *
It is Unfair for Youth Charged, But Not Convicted Of, an Excluded Offense to Remain in the Adult System
Without Further Possibility of Transfer to the Juvenile Justice System.
Youth who are charged with serious crimes excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court may be convicted of lesser crimes as adults, even if they are not found guilty of the more serious offense which formed the basis for their exclusion from the juvenile justice system. When the charges that are a predicate to criminal jurisdiction do not result in conviction, it is unfair to continue using the original charge as the basis for adult criminal jurisdiction without requiring the criminal court, at sentencing, to consider the possibility of transfer to the juvenile justice system for disposition.
A survey of Commission members conducted by the Subcommittee revealed a Commission consensus that such youth be given the opportunity to bring before the court the merits of a transfer for purposes of disposition.
* * *
Youth Charged, But Not Convicted Of, an Excluded Offense Should Be Eligible for Transfer to the Juvenile Justice System If Convicted of a Lesser Offense.
*
The law should be amended to require youth who are excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, but not convicted of the offense which was the basis for that exclusion, to be considered for transfer back to juvenile court for disposition. When the charges that are a predicate to criminal jurisdiction do not result in conviction, the criminal court should be required to consider, at sentencing, whether transfer to juvenile court for disposition is appropriate.
Commission on Juvenile Justice Jurisdiction, Final Report to the Governor and General Assembly 24, 34, 53 (Sept. 30, 2001) (emphasis in original). See also Department of Legislative Services, Fiscal Note, Senate Bill 428 (2002) (noting that “[a] criminal court must determine whether to transfer jurisdiction
In conclusion, once the criminal court transferred jurisdiction of the case to the juvenile court for disposition of the
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE‘S COUNTY VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED TO THE JUVENILE COURT. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE‘S COUNTY.
WILNER, J., concurs.
Concurring Opinion by WILNER, J.
I concur in the Court‘s Opinion and judgment but offer these additional thoughts. First, although both the Code and this Court have long spoken of the “jurisdiction” of the juvenile and criminal courts (see, for example,
As the Court notes, both the juvenile and criminal courts are now part of the Constitutionally-created Circuit Courts that exist in the State‘s 23 counties and Baltimore City. Article IV, § 1 of the State Constitution lists the courts that are the repositories of the judicial power of the State, and it does not mention a Juvenile Court. It is the Circuit Courts that are authorized to “hear and decide all cases at law and in equity other than those which fall within the class of controversies reserved by a particular law for the exclusive jurisdiction of some other forum,” such as the District Court. First Federated Com. Tr. v. Comm‘r, 272 Md. 329, 335, 322 A.2d 539, 543 (1974) (Emphasis added). Maryland Rule 16-204 expressly makes the juvenile court part of the family division of the Circuit Courts required to have family divisions. There is no separate Juvenile Court in Maryland.
be considered for transfer back to juvenile court for disposition.“) (emphasis added).
That allocation is important and must be honored. It is not just an organizational matter but implements the different procedures and options available in the “juvenile court“-that, in delinquency cases, the proceedings are regarded as civil, rather than criminal, that there is no right of jury trial, that there is a much more therapeutic overlay requiring greater coordination with the departments of health, education, social services, and juvenile services, and that the disposition options are quite different from those available in criminal proceedings. Failure to honor this legislative allocation will ordinarily constitute reversible error, but the allocation is not truly a jurisdictional one, at least in the sense that this Court, in recent times, has come to view the concept of jurisdiction.
My second thought proceeds from the first. In allocating authority between the juvenile and criminal courts, the Legislature has committed to the criminal court the initial authority to deal with juveniles who commit certain more grievous offenses. See
The obvious premise of the 2002 law that enacted
In exercising that discretion to transfer the case for disposition, the criminal court judge must consider the five factors set forth in
Following the approach taken in In re Glenn S., supra, 293 Md. 510, 445 A.2d 1029, the Court seems to put this prohibition against second-guessing the decision of the criminal court judge on jurisdictional grounds-that the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to send the matter back to the criminal court. I prefer to view it as a matter of fairness and proper court administration-that the juvenile not be bounced back and forth like a ping pong ball in the same case. What is at issue is not really fundamental jurisdiction, which is vested in the Circuit Court, but rather its appropriate exercise.
I would hold that, once a criminal court judge, after considering the required statutory factors set forth in
Finally, and more globally, I suggest that the time may have come for a serious reexamination of whether this dual structure within a single court, beset with exceptions and waivers, continues to serve any useful purpose. The “children in need of assistance” (CINA) cases handled in juvenile court
With respect to delinquency cases, some offenses are placed initially in the criminal court and some in the juvenile court, subject to waivers both ways. If the case is in juvenile court, the child is deprived of a right to a jury trial and, most often, the case is tried by a master rather than a judge, even though a finding of delinquency could result in a significant deprivation of liberty.3 The posited advantages of a supposedly separate juvenile court, with these deviations, are that (1) there is a relative, but by no means complete, anonymity associated with juvenile court proceedings, which protects the child from the glare of publicity, (2) the child does not receive a criminal record if found delinquent, and (3) dispositions more appropriate to juvenile offenders are available in juvenile court. I question whether those perceived advantages require
Except for the fact that there is no jury in juvenile court and the adjudicator may be a master rather than a judge, the due process protections are essentially the same in both juvenile and criminal proceedings, notwithstanding that delinquency proceedings are regarded as civil rather than criminal. What is the trade-off for denying a child 17 years old the right of jury trial possessed by a child 18 years old? Certainly not anonymity. If the law permits juvenile court proceedings to be closed, or access to them limited, it can permit that degree of confidentiality as well if those cases proceeded in the criminal courts. The name “juvenile court” is not necessary to allow that kind of confidentiality.
The real, or at least perceived, value of juvenile court in delinquency cases that begin and remain, or are transferred, there are the more therapeutic dispositional options. But the law could just as easily provide those options in the criminal court, including the prospect of expungement or reclassification as a civil infraction if the juvenile successfully completes whatever program is ordered by the court. I see no reason why the criminal courts could not interface with the social service and juvenile service agencies as the juvenile courts do. We now offer special training to judges in the family divisions; similar training could be offered to judges in criminal court who would handle cases involving young offenders.
The concept of the juvenile court as a beneficent alternative to the traditional approach to the treatment of children who commit criminal offenses came about in the 1890s. It was a progressive idea then. But that was a different era. A huge part of our social structure has undergone significant change since then. The stability and even the nature and structure of families are different. The whole social dynamic facing children is different, beginning almost from birth and extending through adolescence.
We have, at least tacitly, acknowledged those facts by tinkering over the years with the role and the process of the
Notes
(a) Duration.----If the court obtains jurisdiction over a child under this subtitle, that jurisdiction continues until that person reaches 21 years of age unless terminated sooner.
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(c) Termination. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the court‘s jurisdiction is terminated over a person who has reached 18 years of age when he is convicted of a crime, including manslaughter by automobile, unauthorized use or occupancy of a motor vehicle, any violation of Title 2, Subtitle 5 or
(a) Transfer to juvenile court. - In any case involving a child who has reached 14 years of age but has not reached 18 years of age at the time of any alleged offense excluded under the provisions of
(b) Determination as to waiver of jurisdiction. - In making a determination as to waiver of jurisdiction the court shall consider the following:
(1) Age of child;
(2) Mental and physical condition of child;
(3) The child‘s amenability to treatment in any institution, facility, or program available to delinquents;
(4) The nature of the alleged offense; and