Edward Smith was tried and convicted of. rape and sentenced to a term of not more than fifteen years nor. less.,than seven years in the penitentiary. He filed his motion for new.trial on the general grounds, and amended by adding three special'grounds complaining of certain rulings of the trial judge on the аdmission of certain testimony. The motion for new trial was denied. . The .exception here is to this judgment. H.eld:
1. It is not necessary to set forth here the evidenсe produced upon the trial of this defendant for the offense of rаpe. It is sufficient to say that there was evidence which, if believed by the jury, wаs sufficient to authorize them to find the defendant guilty as charged. The jury hav-i ing so found, that finding will not be disturbed by this court.
2. The first special ground complains becausе the court refused to allow counsel for the defendant, upon cross-examination, to question the' prosecutrix regarding a conversatiоn between a deputy sheriff, the attorney for the defendant, and the prosecutrix on the day the warrant was taken out and approximately three days after the offense was alleged to have been committed. The specific question to which objection was made and sustained wаs as follows: “Q. Do you remember when the deputy sheriff made the statement to you that — ‘Confucius say, “The rape being unavoidable to relax and enjoy it”?’ I will ask you what was your reaction to that statement? Did you laugh?” The solicitоr-general objected to the question and this objection was sus *714 tailed. There , was no error in this ruling excluding the testimony here objected to. The reaction of the witness to the statement above referred to, some thrеe days after the offense was alleged to have'been committed, could have shed no light upon the question of whether or not a rapе had been committed by this defendant upon this prosecutrix. Such testimony would hаve been entirely immaterial and irrelevant. It was not error to. exclude it for any reason assigned.
3. The second special ground of the motion for new trial is not insisted upon in this court and has been specifiсally abandoned.
4. ;The third special ground complains of the admission over proper objection of the following testimony regarding the car allegedly driven by the defendant on the night the offense was alleged to hаve been committed: “Q. ‘Mr. Lee, do you know who that car belonged to?’ (Objеction by Mr. Smith). The Court: T don’t know. I will let him answer, if he knows.’. Q. (By Mr. Walker) ‘Do you know who the cаr belonged to?’ A. ‘No, sir. At that time I didn’t, but since then we learned that (sic) came оff of a used-car lot in Jacksonville.’ Q. ‘How 'did it come off?’ A. ‘It was stolen from there.’ (Objection by Mr. Smith). The Court: T think we could ask whose car it was.’ (Argument'by Mr. Walker). The Court: T overrule the objection’.” It is contended that the above testimony was irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial and should have been excludеd. Whether or not this ground should have been sustained if there had been no othеr testimony regarding the facts surrounding the car, it presents no ground for a new triаl in this case, for the reason that later another witness for. the State testified to substantially the same thing, and no objection was made to that testimоny and no motion was made to rule it out. Where evidence is admitted over objection, but thereafter, during the trial of the case, ‘ the'same faсts are testified to by another witness without objection, the admission of the testimony of the first witness is not cause for reversal.
Seymour
v.
State,
210
Ga.
21 (77 S. E. 2d
519); Thompson
v.
State,
191
Ga.
222 (
5. It follows from what has been sаid above, the judgment complained of was not error for any reason assigned.'
Judgment affirmed.