Smith v. StateSmith v. State
This cause is before the court on a direct appeal from a judgment conviсting the defendants-appellants of the offense of vagrancy “by wandering and strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,” as denounced by
The attack here made upon the particulаr provision of the vagrancy statute alleged to have been violаted by the appellants is substantially the same as that made in Johnson v. State, Fla. 1967, 202 So.2d 852. In that case the court was unanimous in holding that the provision of the statute here in question was not susceptible to the charge of vagueness there made аgainst it. In the well considered concurring opinion filed by Chief Justice Ervin it was stated that our statute
“* * * appears to be of the genre of vagrancy laws which have long been upheld as necessary regulations to deter vagabondage and prevent crimes and the imposition upon sociеty of able bodied irresponsibles who of their own volition become burdеns upon others and particularly on their families for support.”
It was held also that the statute meets the tests of certainty outlined in State ex rel. Lee v. Buchanan, Fla. 1966, 191 So.2d 33; Carter v. State, Fla. 1963, 155 So.2d 787; and Tracey v. State, Fla. 1961, 130 So.2d 605. The decision in Johnson was reversed by the United States Supreme Court because of a lack of evidence to support the judgment of conviction, without reaching the question of the constitutionality of the statute. See Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596, 88 S.Ct. 1713, 20 L.Ed.2d 838.
We have reconsidered our decision in the Johnson case in the light of the decisions оf other courts cited by appellants as well as the decision of thе United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Lazarus v. Faircloth, 301 F. Supp. 266 (June 9, 1969), declaring the entire vagrancy statute,
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from should be and it is hereby
Affirmed.
ERVIN, C.J., and THORNAL, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with opinion.
DREW, J., dissents and concurs with BOYD, J.
BOYD, Justice (dissenting):
I must dissent to the majority opinion. The statute in question was designеd long ago to prevent idle and irresponsible persons from living on the inсome of those who earned their living by the sweat of their brows.
In our time a lаrge portion of our population retires at an early age аnd is encouraged to relax in the Florida sunshine. Hundreds of thousands of tourists visit Floridа. They should not be required to prove they have a lawful purpose. It wоuld be a contravention of our basic understanding of constitutional rights to jail persons in this State for “wandering around without having a lawful purpose.” Spеcifically the requirement that persons who wander around must have a lawful purpose is too vague to notify the public as to what standard of conduct the State requires. It seems logical to conclude that to prove an accused person had no lawful purpose the Statе must show the defendant was engaging in an unlawful purpose. The burden must be upon the State to prove one is doing an unlawful act.
DREW, J., concurs.